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Cover page: A Cariò Indian in Dominica (Photo Division of Tourism, Sational Development Corporation, Dominica) The Minority Rights Group (MRG) is an 
international research and information 
unit which aims to secure justice for 
minorities — or majority groups — suffer-
ing discrimination. Its main weapon is 
publicity and since its establishment in 
1960 the Group has highlighted many cases 
of oppression of ethnic, linguistic or 
religious groups in all parts of the world. In 
this interview. Alan Phillips, who is 
Director of the MRG. explains the ac-
tivities of the Group in more detail and 
reveals the scale of the challenge facing his 
organisation. Pages 2 to 4. 
HINT: Alan Phillips 
ACP-EEC 
ACP-EEC Council in Brussels: Sustainable development, the incorpor-
ation of developing countries into the world economy and the alleviation 
of poverty : Ministers agreed that these were the priorities for future ACP-
EEC development cooperation. But health, food security, education and 
protection for vulnerable groups were high on the list too. And the ACP 
would like faster EC action on Stabex pay-outs and development finance. 
EC Development Council: The EC and its Member States decided to 
coordinate their development efforts more closely, and the EC is to put 
ECU 100 million into a special initiative for rehabilitation in Africa. 
Development cooperation should promote human rights and democracy. 
Ministers declared. Pages 5 to 9. 
COUNTRY REPORTS 
DOMINICA 
Mauritius 
What oil is to Kuweit or 
bananas are to Do- sugar to 
minica. "If bananas do well, Dominica does 
well' is certainly true, but there is far more 
to it than that, say the Dominicans: to 
them being in the banana trade and 
industry is an issue of life or death. The new 
EC banana import regime leaves it room to 
I operate as an exporter — even if this is 
EEr'^^^Eto^^^e^E being disputed within GATT and the 
^F "J^je. j I European Court of Justice -- yet at the 
m ^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ same time poses the dual challenge of 
raising the quality of its fruit and increasing 
its productivity. Pushing ahead meanwhile with further diversification, 
air access remains a serious bottleneck to be overcome. Prime Minister 
Dame Eugenia Charles puts it all into perspective. Pages 10 to 31. 
MOZAMBIQUE: After 14 years of civil 
war. hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
incalculable suffering inflicted upon in-
nocent civilian populations, and destruc-
tion of infrastructure that will bear heavily 
on the future. Mozambique's fighters have 
at last laid down their arms. All the 
conditions for a peaceful transition to 
democracy seem to be in place. But the 
question that is in everybody's mind is : can 
they avoid becoming another Angola? 
Pages 32 to 43. 
DOSSIER: National Minorities 
As we approach the end of the 20th century, it would be nice to believe 
that mankind had found a way of satisfying its inherent 'group reflex' 
without the accompanying mistrust of other groups which so often spills 
over into conflict. But the sad reality is that oppression, discrimination, 
intolerance and prejudice still pollute the atmosphere of too many 
societies. And where this happens, it is the minority communities -
people of different ethnic or cultural origin or those who speak different 
languages or practise different religions — who usually suffer. In our 
Dossier, we examine the 'minority question' as it affects the world today. 
with a particular emphasis on the situation in the European Community 
and in the countries of the ACP. Pages 49 to 83. 
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ALAN PHILLIPS 
Director of 
the Minority Rights Group 
Breaking down prejudices 
The Minority Rights Group (MRG), whose inter-
national secretariat is based in London ( UK), is a small hut 
influential organisation which works to secure justice for 
minorities who are suffering discrimination and prejudice. 
In conjunction with this issue's Dossier, in which we 
examine a range of questions involving minorities, we 
interviewed Alan Phillips, who is Director of the MRG. 
Mr Phillips was a student of physics — perhaps not the 
most conventional academic background for the head of a 
'people-centred' NGO -- but he argues that his training 
helps hini to avoid generalities and instead to focus on the 
fundamental components of the problems he has to deal with 
in his work. 
In fact, Mr Phillips' career since he left university has 
been very much 'people-centred'. He has worked in the 
provision of education programmes for refugees and in 
wider educational initiatives, notably in Africa and South 
Asia. He is also a former Deputy Director of the British 
Refugee Council, where he was responsible for policy 
aspects, employment training and educational program-
mes. It was in the course of this work, which included 
helping refugees to resettle, that Mr Phillips first came into 
close contact with the M RG. As he himself points out : 'So 
often, the root cause of refugee problems is conflict 
involving minorities and majority communities. ' 
In this interview, Alan Phillips describes the philosophy 
and activity of the Minority Rights Group, talks about 
recent developments in the international arena and gives us 
his own analysis o f some of the main minority-related issues 
affecting the world today. 
► Mr Phillips, the term 'minority' 
seems to cover a multitude of very different 
situations. What criteria do you use in 
deciding which of these situations merit the 
attention of the Minority Rights Group.' 
- We emphasise ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities and particularly 
communities who are without power. 
looking at minorities worldwide. In 
determining where we believe we should 
act. we look at situations where we think 
we can be most effective. That may be 
where we can work with a local partner, 
where particular minorities are unknown 
or not well-known in the international 
arena or indeed because a minority is the 
centre of attention nationally and there 
needs to be a better understanding of the 
root causes of the tension or the conflict : 
for example, the Kurds. We generally act 
in cases where we think we can be 
effective at a period of change — where 
new governments may be open to ap­
proaches to dealing with minorities. 
► What form does your action lake? 
— We act in three kinds of ways. First 
of all. research and analysis of particular 
minority groups and minority issues; 
secondly, working with local partners to 
try and develop information and edu­
cation programmes to help achieve a 
better understanding of minority issues 
locally; thirdly, advocacy in the inter­
national arena, which might be on a 
particular minority issue or perhaps more 
generally on international standards for 
minorities such as in the discussions 
leading up to the adoption of the UN 
Declaration on Minorities. 
► Minority 'problems' are often, if not 
always, the result of prejudice on the part 
of the majority in a given community or 
state. What can he done in concrete terms 
to tackle the root causes of prejudice? 
The first stage is to analyse each 
situation carefully and to have a dialogue 
with the majority ami the minority 
together if one can. You mustn't go in 
with prejudices yourself about what can 
be done to solve the situation. The way 
forward should bea process involving the 
commitment of people across commu­
nities. Often there is a need to break down 
prejudices that have grown through 
misunderstandinszs or throuah misinfor­
mation. This can be tackled sometimes 
through education projects, through 
information activities by trying to ensure 
that accurate information appears in the 
press and by Unding various ways of 
promoting a climate of mutual cooper­
ation so that minorities may be seen as a 
source of strength and richness to a 
society rather than an tilien community 
that in some way threatens them, their 
society or the State. 
► Do vou think, in the time that von 
have heen involved in this area, that 
prejudice has increased or decreased'? 
I think one has got to look at every 
country closely to answer that. There is 
no room for complacency, for example, 
in Western Europe. One of the depressing 
things we see at the moment is that quite a 
lot of people in Western countries tire 
telling the South how things should be 
done as regards minority majority re­
lationships. But these people also need to 
look closely at their own societies. We 
have seen in Western Europe, just this 
weekend. ' some horrific racist killings. I 
think it is very difficult to generalise on 
1 This interview took place on 1 June 199.1. MEETING POINT 
this but there are no grounds for smug­
ness anywhere. 
► You are referring here to the burning 
of the house in Germany which resulted in 
the deaths of five Turkish people? 
- Exactly, though I should say that 
there were racist murders in virtually 
every European country last year — in 
Britain, France, Germany and even 
Denmark. It requires much more action 
in the European Community to counter 
these racist acts and racism generally. 
► What effect do you think the ending 
of the Cold War has had on the position of 
ethnic and other minorities in the states of 
the former Communist bloc? 
— This is a huge area for discussion so I 
shall have to give you fairly broad brush­
strokes. I would start off by saying that 
almost every country in the world is 
multicultural and multilingual. In 
Europe, there is probably only one 
country which isn't and that is Iceland. In 
all those countries, you are facing ele­
ments of prejudice and situations which 
politicians can manipulate for their own 
power. This is as much the case in 
Western Europe as it is in Eastern 
Europe. As for the situation in the former 
Soviet Union, it is very complex and each 
state has its own problems, but there are 
similarities — instability, economic de­
cline, rising unemployment, inexperience 
of democracy and disillusionment. All of 
this means that speedy solutions are not 
to hand. You have in these new, emerging 
democracies, states that are trying to find 
their own identity, in the aftermath of the 
rejection of international communism. In 
some cases, this has led to a growth in 
nationalism and pressure to create a 
single nation-state — let us say mono-
ethnic states or states that are sym­
pathetic towards or designed exclusively 
for the majority ethnic group. And I think 
this has led in some cases to immense 
problems for minorities, not least for 
Russian minorities who are often un­
reasonably blamed for the past, un­
doubtedly genocidal policies of Stalin. 
There are sometimes attempts to redress 
and rectify historical injustices by looking 
at the minority community and holding 
them responsible for the deeds of others. 
► To what extent do the provisions of 
international law protect minorities from 
oppressive or discriminatory treatment ? 
— Well, there is the broader question 
of how powerful international law is. 
particularly if it is not incorporated into 
Mission Statement of the Minority Rights Group 
'Minority Rights Group is an international non-governmental organisation working to 
secure justice for minorities suffering discrimination and prejudice, and the peaceful 
coexistence of majority and minority communities. 
'Founded in the 1960s. Minority Rights Group informs and warns governments, the 
international community, non-governmental organisations and the wider public about the 
situation of minorities the world over. This work is based on the publication of well-
researched reports, books, papers; on direct advocacy on behalf of minority rights in 
international fora ; on developing an international network of like-minded organisations and 
minority communities to cooperate on these issues; and by challenging prejudice and 
promoting public understanding through information and education activities. 
'Minority Rights Group believes that the best hope for a peaceful world lies in identifying 
and monitoring potential conflict between communities, advocating preventive measures to 
avoid the escalation of conflict and encouraging positive action to build trust between 
majority and minority communities. 
'Minority Rights Group has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council and has a world-wide network of affiliates. Its international headquarters are 
in London. Legally it is registered both as a charity and a limited company under United 
Kingdom Law with an International Governing Council.' 
(Address: Minority Rights Group, 379 Brixton Road, London SW9 7DE, United 
Kingdom) 
state law. but in any case, with the 
exception of Article 27 of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant, international 
law makes very little reference to mino­
rities. However, I think protection is best 
provided, not only by the morality of 
international instruments, but by a de­
termination to seek peaceful coexistence 
in states. The new UN Declaration on 
Minorities was passed by the General 
Assembly in December and we think it is 
a very important instrument. The pro­
spect of discussing its implementation 
with governments is a crucial challenge 
for us in our work. And we believe that, 
more so than international law, political 
goodwill, effective participation and 
resources are the key issues for providing 
minority rights. 
► Canyon tell us something about what 
the UN General Assembly Declaration 
actually says? 
— Yes. Let me refer to three provisions 
which I think may be the most important 
— assuming they were to be accepted in 
practice by states. There is Article 1 
which says that 'States shall protect the 
existence and the national or ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic identity 
of minorities within their respective 
territories and shall encourage conditions 
for the promotion of that identity.' Now 
that's really very strong. At Article 4.5 it 
is set out that: 'States should consider 
appropriate measures so that persons 
belonging to minorities may participate 
fully in the economic progress and 
development in their country.'Then there 
is Article 5, which I think is perhaps the 
most significant. The first paragraph 
refers to national policies and program­
mes which 'shall be planned and im­
plemented with due regard to the legi­
timate interests of persons belonging to 
minorities.' Article 5.2, which I think is 
very important for DG VIII of the 
European Commission — and for your 
readers — goes on to say that program­
mes of cooperation and assistance among 
states should be planned and implemen­
ted with due regard to the legitimate 
interests of persons belonging to mino­
rities. 
► How confident are you that these 
provisions will be adopted and implemen-
ted in practice by individual countries? 
— How long is a piece of string'.' 
Engaging in a dialogue about the UN 
Declaration, with governments at both 
central and local level, is one of the major 
priorities we have set ourselves for our 
work in the future. It is not a question of 
using the Declaration as an instrument to 
point the finger and say 'why are you not 
applying it', but rather of entering into a 
conversation as to what can be done. 
States have many problems in terms of 
resources. It is one of the challenges to 
programmes of cooperation and assist­
ance among states that they should be 
sensitive to minority issues. If program­
mes of cooperation involve minority 
communities the positive effects will 
create economic and social stability, 
encouraging further programmes of 
cooperation and support, and new invest­
ments. 
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=■ Can we assume from what you have 
said that existing international law, not-
ably with respect to human rights, does not 
adequately cover minorities and that there 
is a need for something more along the lines 
of the Declaration vou have fust referred 
to? 
- That's right. Of course, the Declar-
ation is an international instrument but it 
doesn't have the same force as a coven-
ant. But then many states do not sign 
covenants and even if they do. they often 
don't implement them. 
Yes, but do you think the next stage 
might be the preparation of a covenant ; a 
multilateral convention on this subject'.'' 
- I am not sure that that is helpful at 
the moment. I think it is much better to 
have the dialogue with states first and for 
them to feel comfortable about im-
plementation before one tries to enshrine 
it in international law. The Declaration's 
weakness can be its strength. 
Do you think that the principles of 
territorial integrity and self-determination 
are compatible'? 
- Well, it all depends on your de-
finitions and especially on what you mean 
by 'self-determination'. The MRG would 
argue that the granting of group rights to 
minorities provides a form of internal 
self-determination for that group and 
helps to ensure that the minority com-
munity will want to coexist peacefully 
within the frontiers of a state. We think 
that the way forward is to look at group 
rights or. if you prefer, internal self-
determination. 
In recent years, the international 
community has moved, but only very 
tentatively, towards the idea that interven-
tion might be justified in extreme cases of 
human rights violation. Do you think the 
UN docs, or should, have a right to step in 
to protect minorities that are threatened'? 
- This is a very difficult question to 
answer. There can be many motives for 
intervening, including what may be very 
honourable human rights reasons. But I 
think that there has been a lack of 
consistency in the UN as regards where it 
has taken action and where it has not. If 
you look at the former Yugoslavia. I 
don't think that the government of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina feels that the UN 
has acted in a consistent way. On the 
broader principle. I think the position is 
very clear. The first three words of the 
UN Charter are: 'We the peoples...' and 
that is something that is often forgotten. 
Chapters 7 and 8 place a responsibility on 
the Securitv Council to encouraee the 
pacific settlement of local disputes. There 
is also Article 39 which gives authority to 
the Security Council to decide upon 
measures to maintain and restore inter-
national peace and security. I would say 
that the UN has not only the right but the 
responsibility to act to protect minorities 
— very, very much more than it has done 
so far. But it should be consistent and 
where possible, it should avoid the 
extreme of military intervention. 
In general terms, which minority 
situations currently give you cause for 
greatest concern ? 
- There are so many minority com-
munities that it is probably best for me to 
generalise rather than to focus on one or 
other specific situation. According to 
how you define them, and how you sub-
divide them, it is estimated that there are 
over 7000 different minority communities 
in the world and it very difficult in these 
circumstances to establish any sort of 
'hierarchy' of concern. But in broad 
terms, there arc obviously immense dif-
ficulties in that category which might be 
called 'new emerging democracies' where 
there is instability and economic decline. 
In such cases, it is often easy to find a 
scapegoat and regard the minority as 
being part of that scapegoat. A second 
general category might be the dictator-
ship where the leaders tire struggling to 
stay in power. 
Again, they may need to find some 
external clement so that they can unite the 
majority behind otherwise unpopular 
policies. 
There is also a third situation that gives 
us great concern: achieving justice for 
minorities during structural adjustment 
programmes. There arc immense prob-
lems in dealing with different ethnic 
minorities in certain ACP countries 
particularly in Africa, which is going 
through a period of major economic 
decline, and where you have structural 
adjustment programmes which often are. 
or have been, insensitive to rural com-
munities and to the particular needs of 
minorities. 1 think there is a growing 
recognition that these programmes have 
had their weaknesses and it should be 
acknowledged that more account is being 
taken of the conditions faced by ordinary 
people in assessing the way they have 
worked. This, of course, is absolutely 
critical for minority communities as well. 
Thinking particularly about Africa, 
apologists of one-party rule argued that 
¡his form of government was essential in 
forging national unity. One-party systems 
are now largely discredited but is there not 
some truth in the assertion that multi-party 
politics risk degenerating into ethnic 
division and conflict? How do you think 
democracy can he reconciled with respect 
for the rights of'minorities'.' 
- Many people would argue that true 
democracy is government o\~ till the 
people by all the people for all the people. 
The idea of democracy as being major-
itarian rule and 'winner-takes-all' is very 
dangerous, particularly in multi-ethnic 
societies. It is important, in our view, to 
work with people within the new de-
mocracies who arc not only trying to 
promote justice for minorities but also 
peaceful coexistence between commu-
nities. This should lead to political parties 
that cross ethnic boundaries and arc seen 
to be sensitive to the needs oi' the whole 
range of communities parties based on 
people who have not come together 
because of their language or their eth-
nicity, but because they have a common 
view about social issues and values. 
► Can you think of any practical 
examples from Africa tini! offer en-
couragement in that direction'? 
Unfortunately, I think there have 
been a number of discouraging signs from 
Africa, in places where it was thought 
that majoritarian elections would provide 
the answer but where, in the event, they 
raised more problems than they solved. II' 
you look at Angola tir. indeed, at Kenya, 
the picture is very depressing. On the 
other hand, it is interesting to look at 
what has happened in Zimbabwe. De­
spite all the difficulties they have had 
there, and till the potential for externally-
encouraged violence, they managed to 
halt theconflict indeed, the civil war 
that was emerging in the mid-1980s, by a 
process of power-sharing and a move to 
consensual government. 
'- One final question. How do ynu sec 
the MRG's activities developing in the 
future ? 
Well there is something which I 
should like to mention which might be of 
interest to some of your readers, Wc arc 
eager to work with partners in different 
parts of the world, and particularly in 
Africa; people who want to work in the 
same way as us in promoting the rights of 
minorities and peaceful coexistence be­
tween communities. If any of your 
readers arc interested we should be happy 
to hear from them. 
Interview by Simon HORNER The 18th ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers 
Heavy agenda includes trade cooperation, 
commodities, development finance and 
emergencies in Africa 
Open debate on the future of ACP-EEC 
cooperation 
Delegates from every European Com-
munity country and almost all the ACP 
States attended the 18th ACP-EEC 
Council of Ministers meeting on 18 and 
19 May. This year's host was the Belgian 
capital. Brussels, seat of the EC Commis-
sion, and the meeting sat down to a 
particularly busy agenda. 
The opening session was chaired 
jointly by Kigoma Ali Malima, Minister 
of Finance of Tanzania, and Helle Degn, 
Denmark's State Secretary for Develop-
ment Cooperation, and attended by 
many Ministers and State Secretaries for 
Development, Cooperation, Trade. 
Finance or Foreign Affairs, though a fair 
number of ACP delegations were headed 
by diplomats. 
Professor Malima began by paying 
tribute to the Lomé Convention as a 
model for the conduct of development 
cooperation. Against a background of 
world recession, he said, the developing 
countries were hard hit by the perennial 
problems of falling commodity prices, 
debt servicing, the social consequences of 
structural adjustment and, in many cases. 
the cost of rehabilitation after famine, 
drought and civil war. It was time to look 
at ways of implementing aid more effect-
ively. On a happier note, newly in-
dependent Eritrea had formally applied 
to join the ACP group and become a 
party to the Lomé Convention. 
Ms Degn, said in reply that Lomé IV 
was a unique contract linking stable 
development to respect for human rights 
and democratic values, and many ACP 
partners had introduced democratic 
changes which the EC welcomed. The 
Community had done its best to give 
countries undergoing special hardship 
more help than it was committed to by the 
Convention, while the EC Ministers 
meeting in political cooperation (the 
forum in which they discuss and take 
positions on foreign policy issues) had 
worked to help resolve conflicts. 
A diplomatic difficulty for the Council 
was created by the arrival of two deleg-
ations from Zaire, one representing the 
present government and one dispatched 
by Etienne Tshisekedi. who was ap-
pointed Prime Minister to oversee the 
process of democratic transition but was 
later dismissed by President Mobutu. The 
Council decided to recognise the first of 
these, but nevertheless reiterated its 
support for the chairman of the National 
Conference which was continuing to 
work for democratic reform in Zaire. On 
Eritrea, which was about to declare its 
independence from Ethiopia, Ms Degn 
reminded the meeting that the Com-
munity and its Member States had 
already pledged to recognise it as an 
independent state; indeed, some of them, 
and Ethiopia, had already done so. 
The EC Commission was represented 
by Vice-President Manuel Marin, who 
said it was looking at proposals for more 
effective implementation of development 
ACP - EEC 
aid and had already overhauled its 
working methods. An impressive figure 
of ECU 2 billion in payments was 
evidence of the improvement. Support 
for structural adjustment had, he said, 
been a bone of contention but payments 
under that scheme were now proceeding 
more successfully than transfers under 
Stabex. 
Trade cooperation 
The Council began its substantive 
work with a commitment from Ms Degn 
that the EC would work for a rapid 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of 
GATT negotiations in which the develop-
ing countries would receive special treat-
ment. The Community had encouraged 
the ACP countries to play an active part 
and press for concessions. It would try to 
persuade the ACP countries' trading 
partners to open their markets wider to 
tropical products. Since the new United 
States Administration had taken office, 
there had been many EC-US contacts 
with a view to reactivating multilateral 
negotiations, including other major part-
ners, in Geneva this summer and possibly 
■reaching a conclusion by the end of the 
year. The negotiating mandate of the 
ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors, 
whose chairman is Ernest Mpofu, Head 
of the Mission of Botswana to the EC, 
was renewed for a further year. 
The Council then turned to the conten-
tious issue of bananas. Last December the 
Council adopted arrangements for future 
imports into the European Community 
which certain Latin-American banana-
exporting countries fear (unjustifiably, 
according to the Commission) will cause 
a reduction in their exports to the 
Community. ACP representatives at the 
The ACP co-chairman of the Council, Kigoma Ali Malima, Minister of Finance of 
Tanzania, considers an agenda item with the Secretary-General of the ACP Group, 
Ghehray Ber hane (left) and the chairman of the ACP-EEC Committee of 
Ambassadors, Ernest Mpofu (right) 
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ACP-EEC Council said they appreciated 
the fact that the EC had invited the ACP 
group to join the GATT panel set up to 
examine the La tin-American objections. 
But there was concern at the instability on 
traditional markets, particularly France, 
which had recently asked the Community 
to implement measures to safeguard its 
own producers (in France's overseas 
departments, which are part of the EC. 
not the ACP). Mr Marin explained that 
the request had been made to protect the 
Community market against massive de­
flections, by countries outside Lomé, of 
exports of bananas which were not from 
traditional ACP producers. The sa­
feguard clause would therefore actually 
protect quotas delivered by ACP sup­
pliers. 
The Foreign Minister of Jamaica. Paul 
Robertson, interim chairman of the ACP-
EC consultative committee on bananas, 
stressed that decisions on production, 
transport and marketing in the banana 
industry required certainty as to the rules 
of the market, and called for greater 
clarity as regards transferability of de­
liveries between traditional supplier 
countries, the definition of operators and 
the workings of the licensing system. 
Measures to assist ACP suppliers in the 
form of income support and aid for 
restructuring, for which a proposal was 
still being considered by the EC Council, 
should, he said, enter into force with the 
new market regime in July. 
The Council briefly noted progress so 
far by the trade development project 
provided for in Annex XX to Lome IV. 
Helle Degn observed that trade liberalis­
ation, the abolition of protectionism and 
the opening of markets were vital to 
world economic growth, and looked 
forward to further practical work to 
achieve those ends. 
Stabex 
ACP countries had complained at the 
delays in paying transfers to offset losses 
in export earnings in 1992. Despite 
incomplete information as to the re­
sources available and the losses incurred. 
Ms Degn was able to confirm that there 
were not enough Stabex funds to cover all 
such losses. (In 1991 the shortfall came to 
some ECU 640 million, partly covered by 
a transfer to the system of an extra ECU' 
75m). Mr Marin said Stabex transfers 
would have to be recalculated as the 
forecasts for coffee and cocoa earnings 
had not been confirmed. There was ACP 
concern at the steadily declining rate of 
coverage and the disappointing rate of 
disbursement. The accumulating debt 
this was causing had virtually brought 
economic growth to a halt in some ACP 
countries. A decision had to be taken on 
whether to extend the 'all destinations' 
derogation granted to 13 ACP States 
under Lomé, whereby their exports to all 
countries, not just the EC. attract Stabex 
payments on certain conditions. The 
Council delegated its powers of decision 
on this matter to the ACP-EEC Commit­
tee of Ambassadors. 
Sugar 
In a review of developments in the 
sugar sector since last year, the Minister 
of Agriculture of Mauritius. Madun 
Dulloo, said that discussions on the 
guaranteed price for ACP sugar in 1993-
94 had not been concluded in time, with 
adverse consequences for ACP pro­
ducers, refiners, buyers and exporters. It 
was. however, gratifying that the final 
tranche of the ECU 30m marketing 
premium for ACP raw sugar was being 
disbursed. ACP countries were com­
forted by assurances that the guarantees 
in the Sugar Protocol would not be 
compromised by the GATT negotiations 
or the reform of the EC's common 
agricultural policy, but were frustrated to 
see that ACP sugar was still not getting 
access to the Portuguese market. Mr 
Dulloo thought Portugal could provide a 
market for Zambia, which now met all 
the conditions for accession to the Proto­
col. The quota for sweeteners should not 
be expanded to include the new artificial 
sweetener, inulin. Any disruption in the 
workings of the Protocol would upset the 
economic stability of ACP countries and 
could upset their progress towards poli­
tical reform and démocratisation. 
Replying for the Commission. Peter 
Pooley, Acting Director-General for 
Development, said it was impossible to 
fix a price for ACP sugar which was much 
higher than that paid to the EC's own 
producers. The Community was fighting 
to preserve the best features of the Sugar 
Protocol despite changes in world mar­
kets. With regard to inulin. the EC's own 
sugar beet growers shared the same 
interests and anxieties as the ACP's sugar 
suppliers and were therefore their natural 
allies. Before admitting Zambia to the 
Protocol, the EC looked forward to 
receiving assurances from that country 
that it could be relied on to deliver regular 
supplies in years to come. 
Commodities 
The dramatic collapse in commodity 
prices had. said Prof. Malima, severely 
reduced ACP countries' purchasing 
power and crippled them with debt; the 
development process in most of them had 
come to a halt. A joint declaration o\\ 
coffee and cocoa adopted by the meeting 
noted that the situation had been further 
aggravated by the failure of producers 
and consumers to conclude negotiations 
for agreements with economic clauses for 
those two commodities. It hoped that 
negotiations on a new International 
Coffee Agreement could resume and that 
an effective and economically viable 
Cocoa Agreement could be concluded. 
Development finance cooperation 
Without discussion, the Council tip-
proved the report of the ACP-EC Com­
mittee on Development Finance Cooper­
ation, covering financial and technical 
cooperation in 1991, joint evaluation of 
cooperation in 1991-92, the implemen­
tation of structural adjustment resources 
under Lome IV, regional cooperation 
and integration, the development of the 
least developed, landlocked and island 
countries, and a joint study on implemen­
tation procedures. A resolution on the 
last-mentioned issue stressed the import­
ance, if Lome was to operate smoothly, of 
full respect for the equality of the partners 
and of more effective co-management of 
projects and programmes, and called on 
national authorising officers, the Com­
mission and its delegates to discharge 
their responsibilities rapidly. 
Joint Assembly 
The ACP-EEC Joint Assembly held in 
Gaborone. Botswana, this year adopted a 
series of resolutions of which the ACP-
EEC Council took official note without 
any discussion of their content. These 
were fully reported in issue No 139 of The 
Courier. May'June 1993: suffice it to say 
here that they concerned the political and 
economic situation in various ACP coun­
tries, environmental issues, regional 
cooperation, famine and food aid. and 
commodities. 
Emergency situations 
One of the countries which featured in 
the Joint Assembly resolutions was So-
malia, and unsurprisingly the tragic 
events there also came up for discussion 
in the Council, where the ACP side 
applauded the efforts the international ACP-EEC 
community had made to scale down the 
violence in that country and appealed to 
the EC to step up its support for re-
construction. The EC and its Member 
States had contributed troops and money 
to the 'Restore Hope' operation, said Ms 
Degn. and would continue helping with 
rehabilitation if the situation in Somalia 
remained stable. The Minister of Ex-
ternal Economic Cooperation of Eth-
iopia. Abdulmejid Hussein, appealed for 
help for Somalis — many of them in EC 
Member States — who wanted to return 
home to help stabilise the country. 
Ethiopia and Eritrea had already started 
discussions on taking the first steps 
towards setting up a confederation, and 
the Minister was heartened to know that 
duced a discussion of the latest develop-
ments. He deplored Unita's rejection of 
the election results in Angola and the 
procrastination of the international com-
munity while Unita sought to overthrow 
the democratic process by violent means. 
The peace process in Mozambique, in 
contrast, now seemed to be on track. It 
was of paramount importance to set up 
mechanisms for disarming current or 
erstwhile belligerents so that they could 
not challenge democratically established 
authorities. In South Africa, ACP coun-
tries were anxious to see the establish-
ment of a provisional national executive 
representing all parties. All the countries 
in the region were grateful for EC 
assistance during last year's drought. 
Bananas are a vital export crop for many A C Ρ countries. The Commission did its 
hest to allay their concerns at the situation on the European Community's banana 
markets since new rules on imports were announced 
the people in control of north and south 
Somalia were disposed to do the same. A 
settlement in Somalia would lift a heavy 
burden from the shoulders of its neigh-
bours as well. 
Events in Angola in the last six months 
had disappointed the hopes of all sides. 
The EC and its Member States said UN 
resolutions must be observed, and were 
ready to offer help to the millions of 
victims of the conflict. All parties, the EC 
co-chairman said, must allow humani-
tarian assistance through the areas they 
controlled. 
South and Southern Africa 
Zimbabwe's Deputy Minister of Indus-
try and Commerce. S.K. Moyo. intro-
Helle Degn offered the Community's 
help in investigating the murder of ANC 
leader Chris Hani. Now that negotiations 
on the future of South Africa had been 
resumed, the Danish Minister would visit 
that country in June as an official 
observer for the EC. In Mozambique, 
demobilisation and reconstruction were 
starting, and the Community and its 
Member States would help the country 
rebuild. 
Future cooperation 
The second day of the ACP-EEC 
Council was devoted to a free exchange of 
views on the future of cooperation 
between the two sides, aaainst the back-
ground of the declaration the EC and its 
Member States issued last year on their 
development policy in the run-up to the 
year 2000. Their targets are to bring 
about the sustainable development of 
their partners, integrate them into the 
world economy and alleviate poverty, 
while contributing to the furtherance of 
human rights, good governance and 
democracy. Both sides expressed concern 
at the human costs of structural adjust-
ment and stressed the need to take 
account of health, food security, edu-
cation and training and the problems of 
vulnerable groups. ACP delegations ap-
pealed for EC help over debt — in some 
countries it swallows up three quarters of 
export earnings, which are themselves 
falling headlong because of the drop in 
commodity prices — and one EC deleg-
ation said it hoped consensus could soon 
be reached among creditors to reduce the 
developing countries" debt by half. There 
was agreement on the need to stimulate 
private investment and enterprise in 
developing countries: ACP countries 
would have to try harder to attract these, 
for example by setting up local capital 
markets and guaranteeing protection for 
private property, as competition for 
available funds from other parts of the 
world would be fierce. 
Human rights 
On promoting democracy and human 
rights under Article 5 of Lomé IV, it was 
felt that these were an essential part of 
sustainable development but that donors, 
rather than trying to introduce Western 
models, should fund internal processes of 
démocratisation and channel aid towards 
countries which practised pluralism, 
transparency and government account-
ability, although these were not set out as 
requirements in any international treaty. 
Ordinary people fighting for their rights, 
but with no influence in high places and 
no access to resources or training, should 
not be forgotten. There was a suggestion 
that Article 5 should be expanded to 
make express reference to the right of 
people to development, which ultimately 
meant a right to life. 
This last part of the proceedings, 
perhaps because no conclusions were 
required to be reached, heard some 
remarkably frank speaking on both sides 
about the relations between them, and it 
was seen as a fruitful precedent for future 
ACP-EEC Councils. The next Council is 
in fact to be held in Swaziland in May 
1994. ; Robert ROWE 
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EC Development Council adopts 
special initiative for Africa 
- More coordination of national and 
Community development work 
- Development cooperation to promote human 
rights 
- Guidelines for future cooperation with South 
Africa 
- Humanitarian aid and 'visibility' 
The world recession has not spared the 
developed countries and, particularly in 
Europe, governments face many compe­
ting calls on public funds. As one delegate 
to the recent meeting of the European 
Community's Development Ministers 
put it, aid for the poorer countries must 
continue, but 'every single ECU must be 
properly spent'. In terms of payments 
actually made, the European Community 
and its Member States account for 47% 
of all development aid, so the decisions 
taken by the Ministers in that single 
conference room will play a vital part in 
shaping the development policies of the 
whole world as the 21st century ap­
proaches. 
Denmark's State Secretary for De­
velopment Cooperation. Helle Degn. 
chaired the Development Council which 
met in Brussels on 25 May. The morning 
was devoted to an open debate on 
alleviating poverty and the coordination of 
development cooperation activities (po­
licies and implementation) between the 
EC and its Member States. 
A note from the Danish Presidency set 
the tone by pointing out that despite 
several decades of development efforts, 
poverty had not been reduced in develop­
ing countries. There was now. it said, 
growing acknowledgement of the need to 
integrate the poor into the mainstream of 
the development process. It was up to the 
Member States to decide how a coherent 
EC policy could be hammered out. 'As 
regards economic policies." the note went 
on. 'how can one ensure that greater 
weight is given to market forces, while at 
the same time maintaining an approp­
riate level of government involvement in 
order to obtain balanced economic 
growth and equitable distribution of 
wealth?' 
Among the Ministers and State Secre­
taries who spoke. Baroness Lynda Chal-
ker of the UK said her country favoured a 
practical, sector-by-sector approach to 
development coordination and agreed 
that assistance should focus on eradicat­
ing poverty. Human capital should be 
developed through expanded health and 
education programmes, with safety nets 
for the disabled and the aged. Georges 
Papastamkos. for Greece, said develop­
ment aid would not work if it perpetuated 
anti-development conditions: it must be 
directed towards freeing private resour­
ces and investment, in economies run on 
social market economy principles. Re­
spect for human rights and democracy 
must be insisted on as a condition of aid. 
Portugal's José Manuel Briosa e Gala said 
priority in lighting rising poverty must go 
to nongovernmental organisations and 
small projects, as macroeconomic meas­
ures had done little to create employment 
or redistribute wealth. His country in­
tended to devote 2% of its GDP to 
helping the least developed countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa, where the needs 
were greatest. 
Speaking for Ireland. Tom Kitt called 
for debt to be taken into account in any 
discussion of ways of alleviating poverty. 
and believed that pressure on govern­
ments to reduce military spending must 
be an integral part of the Community's 
future strategy. Hans-Peter Repnik of 
Germany said that participation and self-
help, close corollaries of democracy and 
human rights, were the key to fighting 
poverty. For Spain. Inocencio Arias 
believed that the Community's aid should 
complement, not duplicate, that of the 
Member States. And economic recovery 
could only take place in the context of 
democracy. 
Carmelo Azzara of Italy said priority 
should go to lighting poverty and social 
exclusion by enhancing food security, 
health care and training provision. Bel­
gium, according to Erie Derycke. wanted 
priorities to include migration and debt. 
Ministers, he said, should agree on levels 
and sectors where the EC had a com­
parative advantage over the Member 
States, or vice versa, in terms of expertise 
or scale. The French Minister. Michel 
Roussin, favoured encouraging economic 
growth, though without neglecting 
schemes to develop human capital. 
For the Netherlands. Jan Pronk said 
the 1990s were not the 1980s, and it was 
time to review the structural adjustment 
approach : more attention should be paid 
to job creation and measures to help the 
vulnerable in the fields of education. 
health and food security. He felt the 
Commission had recently concentrated 
too much on its own areas of competence, 
as for example the provision of emer­
gency humanitarian aid. often a cover to 
mask the political consequences til'other 
forms of aid. There should be a coherent 
policy for development cooperation; at 
the moment aid was having to be given to 
repair the damage caused by trade wars. 
The Member of the Commission re­
sponsible for Development. Vice-Pre­
sident Manuel Marin, said there was an 
increasing awareness of the need to foster 
human solidarity in combating poverty, 
which was a threat to world stability in 
terms of environmental damage, drug 
trafficking, population growth and dis­
ease. The World Bank had reported that 
one third of the world's population were 
living in absolute poverty. Thus no 
donor, however rich, could nowadays go 
it alone hut was there. Mr Marin 
wondered, the political will to coordinate 
official development aid? The present 
lack of coordination placed the EC in a 
weak position vis-á-vis other donors such 
as the United States and Japan. And it 
was up to the Council's Committees to 
make sure there was also a two-way 
exchange of information on development 
activities between the Member States and 
the Commission. 
Ms Degn wound up the public debate 
from the chair by saying that a greater 
contribution towards alleviating poverty 
would have to be made by till the 
Community's policies, and there should 
be closer dialogue with governments in 
the beneficiary countries so that they ACP-EEC 
could be helped to carry out their own 
anti-poverty programmes. 
The Development Council adopted the 
Commission's suggestion that policy 
coordination should, initially, be en­
hanced in the areas of health, food 
security, and education and training. As 
for sectors where policies were already 
coordinated, such as respect for human 
rights, family planning and support for 
structural adjustment, the focus now 
should be primarily on implementation. 
The Council then debated a special 
initiative for Africa tabled by the Danish 
Presidency. This provided for a ECU 
100 million action programme to finance 
post-emergency rehabilitation in certain 
sub-Saharan African countries, thereby 
bridging the gap between emergency aid 
and longer-term development assistance. 
The document does not, however, name 
the countries which are to benefit, and the 
amount earmarked falls far short of the 
ECU 273 million in EC funds allocated to 
rehabilitation in Angola, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea last year, not to 
mention the sum of ECU 1000 million for 
which the Commission had argued in its 
proposal for a rehabilitation programme 
covering all the developing countries. 
That proposal was in fact held over for 
consideration till the next Development 
Council. The Commission also feared 
that the ECU 100 million programme 
would take unduly long to execute, as the 
main financing source is to be the 
European Development Fund, the pro­
cedures for which do not make for rapid 
action. The Commission's rehabilitation 
programmes for other, non-ACP coun­
tries are in most cases jointly financed by 
the Member States. The Presidency's 
document was eventually adopted, but 
the arguments raised on both sides are 
bound to be heard again when the 
Commission's proposal reappears before 
the Council in six months' time. 
In a declaration on future development 
cooperation with South Africa, the Coun­
cil said the EC and its Member States 
would signal their desire to step up 
relations with that country as soon as a 
Transitional Executive Council was set 
up. The basis for assistance from the EC 
should be démocratisation, the rule of 
law, human rights, good governance and 
popular participation. Aid should go 
primarily towards supporting peace 
structures and initiatives and the trans­
ition to democratic government, focus on 
a limited number of sectors and en­
compass cooperation with and through 
NGOs. 
The Council adopted a declaration on 
human rights, democracy and development 
which was to form the basis for EC 
participation in the United Nations 
World Conference on Human Rights 
being held in Vienna in June. The text 
stresses the important role of develop­
ment assistance in promoting economic, 
social and cultural rights as well as civil 
and political liberties, and says the EC 
and its Member States are willing to 
consider the possibility of increased 
assistance to developing countries in 
which substantive positive changes in 
human rights and democracy have taken 
place. Areas in which development 
cooperation could be stepped up include 
the holding of free elections, the 
strengthening of the judiciary and the 
police, the peaceful settlement of con­
flicts, promoting the role of NGOs and 
the media, setting up independent human 
rights organisations and action to protect 
women, indigenous people and vul­
nerable groups. 
A set of conclusions on humanitarian 
and emergency aid welcomed the es­
tablishment of the European Community 
Humanitarian Office and stressed the 
need for openness, dialogue (between the 
1 Degn. 'cretary for 
•lopmcnt C 'il the 
EC and Member States) and visibility (of 
the Community as a donor) in the field of 
emergency aid, though the Dutch 
Government added a statement to the 
minutes saying that considerations of 
visibility should play no part in decisions 
on the channelling of such aid. The 
Council believed that greater advantage 
should be taken of the possibilities for 
cooperation with local NGOs and agen­
cies in recipient countries, and reaffirmed 
the need for close coordination with the 
UN system in emergency situations. 
A Commission progress report on 
follow-up to the UN Conference on the 
Environment and Development, produced 
for the meeting of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development in June, was 
noted. On women in development, the 
Council welcomed the efforts made to 
incorporate activities designed to prom­
ote the role of women in the implemen­
tation of the Lomé IV Convention. It 
asked population experts from the EC 
and its Member States to continue their 
work on family planning in population 
policies in the developing countries; the 
aim of European cooperation in this area 
is to ensure that population figures are 
consistent with sustainable development. 
Emergency situations in Africa were of 
concern to the Ministers, who decided to 
send a delegation of EC Development 
Ministers to the Sudan and press ahead 
with humanitarian efforts there in 1993. 
They supported the UN's political role in 
Somalia and believed that a contribution 
from that country's own people to es­
tablishing peace and security was the 
precondition for implementing rec­
onstruction aid. On newly independent 
Eritrea, the Council agreed that there was 
a huge need for rapid transitional aid and 
that Eritrea should join the Lomé Con­
vention as soon as possible. 
Development Councils seem tradition­
ally to end with an inconclusive discus­
sion of the question of untying Member 
States' development aid at the EC level, 
and this was no exception. In some 
quarters there is a feeling that conditions 
as to how aid is to be spent must be struck 
out of aid agreements in the interests of 
getting value for money, while others 
believe that that would only lead to a 
drop in the amounts of aid given. The 
Commission is now to draft a paper on 
the issue for discussion at the next 
Development Council, which is to be held 
in October.C R.R. 
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Much ado about... bananas 
The look of trepidation on the face of the elderly 
American lady tourist was obvious as the small LIAT 
aircraft descended steeply towards Canefie/d Airport 
although this may be too grand a description of the concrete 
strip one actually lands on. Fortunately there was the 
beautiful view of the Dominican countryside to distract her 
attention, at least partly, from the landing. Clearly she was 
wondering whether the bother of getting to Dominica, 
involving a transit in Antigua after a long and tiresome wait, 
was going to he worthwhile. While this situation in itself 
illustrates why so man)' Dominican spokesmen insist on the 
need for a new 24-hour airport providing direct access, the 
lady's momentary worries were likely to be very quickly 
dissolved soon after her arrival. The warm welcome 
extended to her. combined with the prospect of discovering 
the wide array of assets of the Caribbean's Nature Island, 
probably compensated for her short-lived discomfort. 
The current worries of the Dominicans themselves are 
neither short-lived nor likely to disappear in the near future. 
Their widespread unease stems from uncertainty over the 
future of their country's lifeline, threatened a: its very 
roots: their banana trade and industry looks to be in 
jeopardy. Apart from those too young to understand, 
virtually every Dominican today feels his country is the 
victim of an 'enemy' they rejer to as 'the Latins' their 
Latin American banana competitors. Everybody seems to 
know the main battleground, Europe, and seems familiar 
with the jargon even if it consists of acronyms such as 
GATT, the EC's CAP or notions such as the Single Market. 
All parties concerned have international allies, though some 
of these a/lies seem to have one foot in each camp. In every 
skirmish, many of which are fought through the media, 
'weapons' such as quotas, tariff harriers, panels and court 
cases are brandished. Let there he no mistake; this war 
between 'Eurohananas' and dollar bananas, leaves no 
Dominican, whether small farmer, civil servant, business-
man or housewife, indifferent. Indeed, over and above the 
banana producing and exporting community, all the 
inhabitants are uncomfortably aware that no other crop is 
currently capable of providing as many jobs or of raising as 
much income for the country. To them, it is not just the issue 
of 'if bananas do well, Dominica does well', even if that 
statement is true. In their view it is a question of life or 
death. Even when ravaged by hurricanes, as unfortunately 
happens from time to time, bananas have always managed 
to survive. Dominica without its bananas is as inconceivable 
as Mauritius without its sugar or Kuwait without ils ail. The 
Dominicans' main worry is, therefore: Are we, however 
small a producer, going to be pushed out of business '.' ' Given 
the sweet fruit's preponderance in the economy and 
omnipresence in the landscape, one can understand why 
there is such deep concern. 
10 DOMINICA 
Nature Island 
Please use the country's official name 
'The Commonwealth of Dominica' when 
writing to someone living on this island in 
the far north of the chain of the English-
speaking Caribbean Islands which col­
lectively are known as the Windwards. 
Most correspondence addressed simply 
to 'Dominica' gets sent to the Dominican 
Republic from where it will eventually be 
rerouted to its proper destination. Those 
responsible for this confusion - - two 
'Dominicas' in the Caribbean Sea — were 
in fact members of the same famous 
family! It was Christopher Columbus, 
the Italian explorer, who gave the now 
English-speaking island its name, the 
Lord's Day in Latin, having sighted it on 
Sunday November 3. 1493. Five years 
later, his brother Bartholomeo establi­
shed the city of Santo Domingo on the 
more northerly island of Hispaniola. The 
present-day Dominican Republic (Span­
ish-speaking), which occupies the eastern 
part of Hispaniola. subsequently took its 
name from this city. 
If your mail finally reaches its proper 
destination, it will have landed on one of 
the most rugged and lush Caribbean 
islands. Dominica has the shape of a 
rectangle rounded at both ends. It is 
46 km long and 25 km wide, with a total 
area of some 800 km
2. The terrain is very 
mountainous, including one of the high­
est peaks in the Caribbean archipelago, 
and is covered with dense rain forest 
through which no fewer than 365 rivers 
How to the sea. sometimes over spec­
tacular waterfalls. Needless to say, flat 
surfaces, beyond the size of a cricket 
pitch, of course, are difficult to find, as 
any builder — particularly of airports — 
can testify. The landmass. as seen from 
the sea, so impressed the Carib Indians, 
who wrested control of the island from 
the Arawak Indians, that they called it 
Waitukubuli or 'Tall is her body'. When 
independence was granted from the UK 
in November 1978. reverting to the 
original Carib name was considered but 
the idea was soon abandoned because the 
name was thought to be too complicated. 
The island is nevertheless home to some 
3500 Caribs, who live in a reserve on the 
north-east coast - - the last remaining 
community of Carib Indians in the 
Caribbean. Like its neighbours. Do­
minica has, throughout its history, been 
coveted by various European nations 
(principally France and the United King­
dom) and it 'changed hands" on a number 
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A partial view of the capital Roseau 
of occasions. It is situated, oddly enough, 
in the 'heart of France', its closest 
neighbours being the French Overseas 
Departments of Guadaloupe to the north 
and Martinique to the south, both of 
which are also banana producers. Despite 
this. Dominica ended up being a British 
colony prior to its independence. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, English is the 
official language, although a form of 
Creole very close to the Creole of 
Mauritius is widely spoken in this island 
of 72 000 inhabitants. 
Whilst Dominicans arc generally 
peaceful and easy-going, they have 
always had a propensity for lively local 
politics. In the period immediately fol­
lowing independence, the turbulence on 
the political scene seemed almost to vie 
with Hurricanes David and Allen which 
struck with disastrous effects in 1979 and 
1980 respectively. Political allegiances 
shifted rapidly. Parties split and new ones 
— sometimes short-lived — were created. 
Strikes and demonstrations raised the 
political temperature even further. Mat­
ters became clearer in July 1980 when the 
general election delivered a decisive 
result; a landslide victory for the Do­
minica Freedom Party headed by Eu­
genia Charles (see the interview which 
follows). The DFP took 17 of the 21 scats 
and. in so doing, ended the reign of the 
Dominica Labour Party, which had held 
power in the local legislature for almost 
two decades. An advocate of free enter­
prise. Eugenia Charles, who was pre­
viously a barrister, quickly imprinted her 
own firm and outspoken style on both 
local and international politics. In 1983 
she hit the international headlines when, 
in her capacity as chair of the OECS. she 
stood beside President Reagan and 
staunchly defended the US intervention 
in Grenada. 
Her irreverent nickname, 'Iron Lady', 
dates from that period, although many in 
Dominica refer to her more endearingly 
as 'Mamo' as if all the people were her 
children. Dame Eugenia, who was 
awarded her title in 1991. has won every 
election since that memorable July al­
though her majority has progressively 
diminished. Few observers would dispute 
her impact on Dominica's positive turn­
around since she came to power. Prior to 
Dame Eugenia, Dominica had a repu­
tation for decay and inefficiency. Many 
inhabitants emigrated and, out of embar­
rassment it is said, relinquished their 
passports. Today, while many Domi­
nicans still follow higher education or 
earn a living abroad — job opportunities 
remain scarce in this predominantly 
agricultural economy - they neverthe­
less remain proud of'back home', where 
they eventually hope to return to enjoy 
some of the good things in life. Who can 
blame them : there are many worse places 
than Dominica! 
A '»orried' business climate 
'Gramatically it may not be the proper 
word, but "worried" is certainly the best 
description of the current business clima­
te." accordine to Derek Davies of the 
Dominican Association of Industrv and 
Commerce. The Dominican ceonomv has 
indeed entered a downward phase, with a 
definite slowdown in real growth to onl\ 
about 2% in 1991. By contrast, in the 
second half of the 1980s, real growth 
averaged 5.5% (1986-90). a positive 
result which would have been even better 
had it not been lor Hurricane Hugo in 
September 1989 which severely damaged 
the banana and other crops. 'To some 
extent, people still live by the expec­
tations created by the banana boom in the 
kite 1980's.' explained the island's De­
velopment Coordinator, Cary Harris. 
'That was when the pound was strong 
and wc got good prices in our traditional 
UK markets. The absence of Jamaica 
from the market also gave us pleut y of 
opportunities." Despite the quick re­
covery after Hugo. l
l)91 saw a reversal of 
the trend and. in recent years, the 
worldwide recession combined with the 
uncertainty hanging over the future of the 
banana sector is likely to affect Domi­
nica's open and vulnerable economy even 
more adversely. 
Dominic;) is beautifully endowed b> 
nature, an endowment which offers a 
basis for further development of eco-
tourism, but the island is. at the same 
time, handicapped by its natural environ­
ment and in particular by its topograph}. 
Only about 30" n of the total land area is 
suitable for agriculture and as one drives 
around the attractive countryside one can 
only marvel at the steepness of the slopes 
which farmers endeavour to cultivate. 
Unfortunately, the result of stich efforts 
may be soil erosion. 
Overall, Dominica has a narrow re­
source base although it docs have limited 
hydroelectric potential. Il litis to cope 
with the problems of a small domestic 
market, high infrastructure costs and 
poor transport, notably as regards air 
access. Lying, as it does, in the hurricane 
belt, it is susceptible to natural disasters. 
And. as mentioned earlier, it is heavily 
dependent on a single crop bananas 
over whose future it has no control. Λ 
blunt assessment of the position can be 
found in an official report which states 
that 'geographical circumstances will 
always keep Dominica at the lower end of 
the prosperity stakes.' But perhaps this is 
a little too blunt. Dominica may not have 
the prospect of acquiring untold wealth 
but it has quite a lot ol' things in its 
favour: as a developing country, it litis no 
need to pass tiny democratic test (unlike 
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many others), it has no real military 
expenditure commitments as it has no 
army and it does not. for practical 
reasons, have any expensive prestige 
projects. What it does have, beyond a 
remarkable natural environment, is a 
well-educated population with a leader­
ship that makes it quite clear to the people 
that 'the world doesn't owe us a living'. 
What Dame Eugenia tells her people is 
this: 'If we are to make progress and 
survive in what is becoming an increas­
ingly hostile environment, we must work 
together and find ways and means of 
improving our performance in the va­
rious areas of economic activity.' 
Reducing dependence on bananas in 
the long-term, by expanding the econ­
omic base and promoting diversification, 
will depend greatly on the emergence of 
home-grown entrepreneurship. Mr 
Davies is convinced that 'investment will 
have to be Dominican before anything 
else'. The problem is. how does one 
'produce' entrepreneurs? Some in the 
traditional private sector have already 
successfully expanded into other sectors, 
such as soaps and lotions, but, overall, 
there is a lack of the managerial and 
technical skills which are needed for 
entrepreneur-led expansion. As Charles 
Maynard, who is Minister for Trade, 
Industry and Tourism, explained. 'Trying 
to convince emigrant Dominicans to 
return and invest back home is part and 
parcel of our investment strategy'. There 
are approximately 50 000 Dominicans in 
the UK and a similar number in the USA. 
Many of them have the experience as well 
as the savings and/or pensions to fill the 
local 'voids'. Minister Maynard en­
umerates as some of the main incentives 
for investment the combination of a 
stable political climate with an adaptable 
labour force, and in physical terms, the 
availability of water which also provides 
a relatively cheap source of energy in the 
form of hydro-power. In his view, there 
are many investment opportunities still 
available in the wider tourism and tour­
ism-related service industries, as well as in 
agro-industries. 
Airport bottleneck 
Access, whether by air or sea. is 
obviously vital for putative investors, 
both local and foreign. Recently, there 
has been considerable criticism of the 
steep rise in port charges, which threatens 
to hamstring entrepreneurs. As is often 
the case on islands such as this, stevedores 
and longshoremen can effectively hold 
their country to ransom. The efficiency of 
port operations is unlikely to be op­
timum, while charges for stevedores push 
up price levels overall. As regards sea 
transport, this situation exists in most of 
the Caribbean islands, but Dominica also 
has special problems in respect of air 
access. Today, it is difficult to find a 
politician or businessman who is not 
preoccupied by the airport issue. Their 
central complaint is over the lack of a 24-
hour airport facility capable of handling 
larger aircraft. Dominica currently has 
two airstrips. Canefield, which is near the 
capital Roseau, takes 19-seat Twin Otters 
while Melville Hall, which is 60 km to the 
north, can only handle planes of up to 50-
seat capacity. Neither is properly equip­
ped for take-offs or landings at night. 
Alleyne Carbon, Minister of 
Communications, Works and Housing 
'The only way for us to diversify... and 
to survive... is a new 24-hour accessible 
airport for medium-sized aircraft ' 
Getting to and from Dominica is very 
likely to involve changing planes in a 
neighbouring island. Loss of time, the 
risk of missing connections, luggage or 
produce going astray — all of these are 
obvious handicaps which hinder trade. 
Just imagine one's fresh, perishable 
produce missing its vital connection or a 
potential foreign investor stranded at an 
intermediate airport at a time when the 
maxim 'time is money' has never been 
more powerful. Most air services to 
Dominica are currently provided by the 
regional carrier LIAT. However laudable 
their efforts in providing regular services 
on time, they face quite a challenge in 
operating in the scattered Caribbean 
archipelago — operations which neces­
sarily involve constant island hopping. 
The many jokes which are made at 
LIAT's expense ('leave island any time', 
'luggage in any terminal', 'look im­
mediately for alternative transport'...) 
point, in a light-hearted way, to what is 
nonetheless a serious problem. 
The effects of not having a 24-hour 
airport have already been felt directly, for 
example in the closure of a data-proces­
sing plant. This happened because too 
much time was being lost in getting the 
processed data out. Some processed 
agricultural products have also suffered 
from the need to transship while, ac­
cording to Dominican sources, the loss of 
investment cannot be underestimated. 
According to Alleyne Carbon, who is 
Minister for Communications, Works 
and Housing; 'The only way for us to 
diversify successfully and therefore to 
survive economically is to find grant-
funding to finance a new, 24-hour ac­
cessible airport for medium-sized air­
craft.' His colleagues in Trade and 
Agriculture, and presumably in other 
departments as well, couldn't agree more. 
But given the particular problems of 
topography, any infrastructural invest­
ment of this kind is bound to involve high 
unit costs. To give just one example: it 
costs ECS 10.5 million ('In loan funding, 
as grants are hard to come by these days," 
stresses Minister Carbon) to bring water 
(even if it is omnipresent) to three 
communities totalling a mere 9600 peo­
ple. The airport, for which a site has been 
identified and surveyed in the north, at 
Woodford Hill, carries a total price tag of 
ECS700 million. To put this figure into 
perspective, the total amount budgeted in 
the 1991 public sector investment pro­
gramme was only ECS75.8 million ! The 
basic problem, as mentioned earlier, is 
that flat terrain is very scarce so a massive 
landfilling operation is required. Dame 
Eugenia, on good terms with the US 
administration since the 1983 Grenada 
crisis, secured a firm promise from 
President Bush that the US Army Corps 
of Engineers would undertake the earth-
moving work. This would have the effect 
of reducing the total cost of the new 
airport to about ECS366 million. The 
Gulf War meant that the Corps of 
Engineers was called upon to display its 
skills on a rather different 'battle ground' 
and, while remaining confident that the 
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Canejield airport near Roseau, closed at night like Melville Hall, and 
of limited capacity 
new Clinton administration will eventu-
ally honour the commitment, the Domi-
nican Government is currently facing a 
'chicken and egg' situation in its attempts 
to secure financing for the airport. Most 
donors are hesitant — although some are 
moving away from a flatly negative 
attitude — believing that the scale of the 
undertaking is out of proportion to the 
expected benefits. The Government re-
mains convinced that the project is an 
unavoidable necessity. They point out 
that infrastructure projects which were 
said at the outset to be 'too big' frequently 
had difficulties, shortly after opening, in 
matching their capacity to rising demand. 
Most donors, they assert, tend to under-
estimate the likely impact of new ac-
tivities. A classic example to illustrate this 
is the well-maintained network of sur-
faced feeder roads which crisscross the 
valleys and slopes. According to Minister 
Carbon. 'If we had stuck to the regular 
parameters to calculate the internal rate 
of return of these roads, without taking 
into account our rugged terrain and high 
average rainfall, we would have been 
stuck with gravel roads lit for transport 
with horses and donkeys but hardly for 
pick-ups collecting crops for exports! 
Fortunately, the EC was forthcoming 
and understood our special needs, so that 
today we have an excellent feeder road 
network mostly with privatised main-
tenance which not only serves our 
farmers, but tits in nicely with our 
tourism sector too." Given the passions 
which the airport issue arouses, and the 
frequency with which it comes to the fore 
in any discussion of local political issues, 
it is a story that looks likely to run and 
run. 
Survival through negotiation 
Convincing donors to come up with the 
necessary funding will depend on effect-
ive negotiating skills. As regards bananas 
and the wider issue of trade, such skills 
will be even more crucial. 'Our abilitv to 
Charles Maynard, Minister for Trade, 
Industry and Tourism 
'Our ability to survive at a time when 
trade has become such a crucial issue, 
will directly depend on our negotiating 
abilitv' 
survive at a time when trade has become 
such a crucial issue will directly depend 
on our negotiating abilitv.' stresses Min-
ister Maynard. In his view, 'the verv 
survival of this region requires us to 
negotiate as a Caribbean entity where key 
decisions should be taken at the regional 
or subregional level.' From a global 
perspective he emphasises that 'small 
countries have a right to exist, and free 
trade per se should not be allowed to wipe 
us out.' 
Today Dominica is certainly forced to 
monitor actively a number of situations 
related to free trade, and this puts quite a 
strain on its limited human resources. 
Closer to home, there is the issue of trade 
relations with the US. with the hitter 
seeking a lowering of the Carieom 
Common External Tarili". As Minister 
Maynard stressed. 'The pace is very 
important to us and can hamper us a lot. 
De facto, the US applies many non-tariff 
barriers, under the influence of certain 
powerful lobbies, and these make il verv 
difficult for us to enter the US market.' 
Also, from tin investment ami trade-
related point of view, the new NAFTA 
agreement litis already been 'eroded' 
just as the Caribbean Basin Initiative was 
'eroded', in the eyes of many Caribbean 
spokemen. Some sav that NAFTA even 
poses a threat to US investments in the 
Caribbean, as Mexico now appears 'the 
place to be' close to the market and 
with abundant cheap labour. To add to 
the geographical constraints, there is the 
prevailing 'just-in-time' industrial philo-
sophy which litis already been detri-
mental toa number of US investments in 
the Caribbean, for instance in electronics. 
Within Carieom itself, there is still 
considerable scope for expanding trade. 
Only about 10"., of the total trade of 
Carieom countries is currently intra-
regional. The region's integration process 
certainly seems to have been given new 
impetus since the far-reaching West 
Indian Commission Report was pub-
lished and the new Carieom Bureau 
became effective. Also close to home is 
the traile potential offered by Trench 
neighbours Martinique and Guadeloupe 
and that could be usefully exploited 
further. 
Banana 'split''? 
Most attention, however, is focused on 
more distant markets. Dominica has 
closelv to monitor events on the banana 
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'warfront' both in the European Com­
munity and in the wider GATT arena. 
Dominica is one of the ACP banana 
suppliers which has traditionally enjoyed 
preferential access to the EC market 
under the Lomé Banana Protocol. The 
island's fruit is sold, mostly in the UK 
and Italy, as 'Five Isles' Windwards 
bananas, being marketed together with 
the bananas of St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
Grenada ('Four Isles', while being more 
accurate, was apparently considered to be 
unsuitable for marketing purposes!)... 
The EC's banana market, with a total 
annual consumption of 3.7 m tonnes in 
1992, is a complicated one characterised 
by considerable fragmentation. There are 
those Member States — France. Spain. 
Portugal, Greece, Italy and the United 
Kingdom — who either produce bananas 
themselves (often in island territories 
such as Guadaloupe, Martinique, the 
Canary Islands, Madeira and Crete) or 
have their traditional ACP suppliers. The 
latter are those who have, or have had, a 
regular flow of supplies to one or other 
Member State of the Community and 
they include places such as Côte d'Ivoire, 
Cameroun, Cape Verde, Madagascar, 
Somalia, the Windward Islands, Belize, 
Suriname and Jamaica (there are also 
non-traditional ACP suppliers such as 
the Dominican Republic). Broadly 
speaking, these producers have, for a 
variety of reasons, high production costs 
combined with low productivity. The 
other EC Member States traditionally 
buy 'dollar' bananas — so-called because 
their production and trade is almost 
totally controlled by US fruit multi­
nationals. These imports were subject to a 
20% levy, with one vital exception -
Germany, which could import its total 
consumption of dollar bananas without 
any levy. However, the entry into force of 
the EC's Single Market on 1 January of 
this year meant that a new arrangement 
was needed for bananas, involving the 
ending of market partitioning within the 
Community. It was bound to be a 
problematic exercise given the intricacy 
of the existing trade relations. As ex­
pected, there were heated arguments; so 
heated in fact that nowadays, metaphori­
cally speaking, commenting at all on the 
issue resembles going for a walk in 
Bosnia. You get shot at from all sides! 
On 17 December 1992, the EC Agricul­
ture Ministers finally bit the bullet when 
they agreed on a new banana quota 
Maynard Joseph, Minister of 
Agriculture 
'Two out of every three Dominicans 
projit from the dollar that comes from 
bananas ' 
system that would regulate imports to the 
EC from 1 July 1993. The details of the 
regime were subsequently hammered out 
by the EC Council and published in a 
Regulation in February 1993. The deci­
sion in December was reached by 
majority vote, a fact which is significant 
since Germany, Belgium and the Nether­
lands opposed the scheme. Without going 
into too much detail, the key points of the 
new system are as follows: the EC's own 
producers and its traditional ACP sup­
pliers are allowed to continue selling their 
usual quantities of bananas on the EC 
Banana exports represent almost 60% of 
total domestic exports and are 
responsible for one fifth of GDP 
market without levy; other imports — in 
effect, mostly 'dollar' bananas — are 
subject to a global tariff quota of 2 m 
tonnes with an ECU 100 levy per tonne 
(except for non-traditional ACP sup­
pliers who effectively do not have to pay 
the levy, since they receive an ECU 100 
rebate); above that quota, a 'punitive' 
tariff of ECU 850 per tonne will be 
applied (except for any ACP supplier 
operating in this market bracket and 
who, again, will benefit from an ECU 100 
rebate). 
As soon as the content of the new 
market regulation was known to the 
media, fierce arguments broke out and 
the dust has yet to settle. The 'Latins', 
hand in glove with their US fruit com­
pany partners, seize every available 
opportunity to attack the new regime — 
not surprisingly since, in 1991, they 
exported 2.4 million tonnes of bananas to 
the Community. Germany is also reluct­
ant to accept the consequences of the new 
deal, fearing a substantial price rise for its 
banana-craving population. The banana 
regime has therefore been subjected to a 
two-pronged challenge — from Germany 
in the European Court and from Latin 
American producers before a GATT 
panel. On both sides, the arguments have 
spilled over from the purely economic 
into socio-political issues. The spectre of 
increased drug production as a possible 
alternative for banana growers has been 
raised. Some have even chosen to charac­
terise the controversy as a human rights 
battle, portraying the ACP/EC banana 
interests in a positive light as compared 
with the allegedly poor social conditions 
of workers in the big Latin-American 
plantations. 
A double challenge 
The argument is clearly not over and as 
for the final outcome, only time will tell. 
But from a strictly Dominican point of 
view, the importance of continued guar­
anteed access to the EC banana market 
cannot be underestimated. For Domi­
nicans it is, in the economic sense, quite 
simply a matter of life and death. Given 
the overwhelming role of bananas, not 
only in the economy, but in wider 
Dominican society, it is not difficult to 
understand the insistence with which they 
present their cases. Banana exports rep­
resent almost 60% of total domestic 
exports and are responsible for one fifth 
of GDP. Last year 60 896 tonnes were 
produced by some 6000 growers, not 
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labourers. 58 024 tonnes were exported, 
worth a total of ECS 82 million. Last 
year. Winban banana exports to Europe 
totalled 275 000 tonnes, of which more 
than 82% were sold in the UK while the 
remainder went to Italy. As Agriculture 
Minister Maynard Joseph put it; 'Two 
out of every three Dominicans profit 
from the dollar that comes from bananas 
because banana farming and exporting 
has such a tremendous spill-over effect on 
our whole economy. Failing to get the 
historic decision of 17 December 1992 
would have been a slap in the face no 
Latin would suffer from as badly.' 
Over and above the key issue of 
whether the new banana regime will hold 
under the heavy 'enemy' assault and the 
resulting uncertainty it has cast in peo­
ple's minds and hearts on Dominica, 
there is in fact no time to lose in facing up 
to the challenges posed by the new regime 
itself. The challenge is in fact twofold : 
growers here should strive to raise both 
their productivity and the average quality 
of their fruit. Spokesmen both from the 
Banana Growers Association (BGA) and 
from the Dominica Banana Marketing 
Corporation (DBMC) agree that with 
concerted efforts, both quality and pro­
ductivity can be raised. BGA Acting 
Executive Secretary Clifford St. Vill 
stressed the importance of 'making far­
mers understand it is not a fait accompli 
to be on the market, they must be aware 
of what goes on in those markets. 
Germany and the GATT keep the far­
mers pounding their heads to diversify, 
but nothing is as yet as profitable, nor 
provides such a regular income, as 
bananas.' Current average production is 
only about 5-6 tonnes per acre, yet 
pushing it up to about 10 tonnes per acre 
seems feasible to him if farmers learn to 
manage their production better, paving 
the necessary attention and putting the 
required amount of time into every aspect 
of it: regular distribution of fertilisers, 
careful selection of the 'follower' limiting 
the number of'suckers', proper mainten­
ance of fields, cutting down weeds, 
covering bunches in plastic for protec­
tion, careful clustered packing and trans­
port etc. 
DBMC General Manager Gregory 
Shillingford referred, in this context, to 
the problem 'of extending better produc­
tion practices to a large number of small 
farmers." He stressed that "quality and 
presentation will become key parameters 
Gregory Shillingford, General Manager 
of the Dominica Banana Marketing 
Corporation 
'.-.. quality and presentation will become 
key parameters in a highly competitive 
market' 
in a highly competitive market. While we 
as Winban suppliers now know our quota 
of A-grade bananas a total of 294 000 
tonnes, of which 71 000 tonnes is Domi­
nica's share there remains much 
uncertainty over the prices that will 
prevail for our produce; the UK was 
traditionally a high price market which 
will certainly attract Latin American 
competition. All parties concerned by our 
industry, be they the growers, govern-
Clifford St \ ill, Acting Executive 
Secretary of the Banana Growers 
Association 
'... making farmers understand it is not 
a fait accompli to be on the market...' 
ment. DBMC or Geest, have agreed that 
it must restructure to meet the new 
challenges and match the quality of the 
competitors.' Farmers seem to have 
understood the state of the quality play 
and in the first months of this year their 
concerted efforts have pushed quality 
ratings into the top brackets. As Agricul­
ture Minister Joseph put it. 'Farmers 
really impressed me by their response to 
the high quality standards.' Quality 
ratings have indeed gone up and use of 
the so-called cluster packing technique 
(packing boxes with clusters of 5-9 
'fingers' of banana, instead of full 'hands' 
of 14 fingers, stabilises fruit during 
transport) which is often a determining 
factor in delivering quality fruit to 
consumers, has sharply risen from 
only 26% of total banana exports at the 
end" of 1992 to 55"... in April 1993. By 
1 July till fruit was to be cluster-packed. 
The Windward Islands banana ex­
porters have a common research and 
marketing organisation, Winban, which 
negotiates on their behalf the terms of the 
exclusive contract held by Geest (a LIK. 
multinational) for marketing the crop in 
Europe. Both Winban and Geest face 
criticism from different quarters. The 
growers, through the DGA. feel that 
'Winban's current structure is not lit to 
do its work' and that Geest 'is reaping off 
the profits, but we are nevertheless 
condemned to work with them'. The 
DBMC argues. 'There mav be the percep­
tion that Winban litis not completely 
lived up to expectations and is under fire, 
yet Winban in its defence tugues that it 
made a great gain in pushing its share of 
the green wholesale price up from 40% to 
60%.' 
Describing the relationship with Geest 
as a love/hate one may be too strong a 
statement. Enjoying an exclusive market­
ing contract since the late 1950s. Geest 
has certainly done well, but as it is not in 
the business for charity but for profit, 
who can blame it? In Dominica, as in the 
other Winban partners, there is a certain 
amount of frustration, however, over 
who gets what share of the cake. The 
general opinion seems to be that they 
'missed the boat' -- quite an irony in a 
place where the weekly call of the Geest 
banana boat is so vital — of sharing the 
considerable profits Geest is making in 
the shipping and marketing of the fruit. 
This too is an issue that will depend upon 
the negotiating skills of the parties 
concerned, bearing in mind that all have a 
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solid interest in fighting for the survival 
and long-term viability of the sector. (It is 
worth underlining the fact that while the 
Winban quota provides a guaranteed 
market, it also, by definition, represents a 
ceiling on expansion with obvious impli­
cations when input prices increase.) 
Some note with a jaundiced eye that 
Geest has also a foot in the Latin camp, 
having acquired a Costa Rican plan­
tation. 'In fact, in the three months since 
the details of the new regime became 
known, Geest shares have jumped from 
66p a share to 474p a share,' observed Mr 
Shillingford. By contrast, he claimed that 
DBMC had lost ECS5 million in 1992 and 
that by early April prices had been below 
break-even for no fewer than 39 weeks in 
succession! Despite the apparent dich­
otomy, many are nevertheless convinced 
that a close partnership with Geest 
continues to be in Dominica's overall 
interests. 
Agricultural diversification and 
eco-tourism 
The banana war has certainly raised 
awareness of and interest in possible 
alternative uses for bananas. A whole 
variety of products are under consider­
ation: making banana flour, using the 
fruit as animal feed (to cut down current 
imports), using banana stems for cloth, 
producing rope from the dried stock, 
making high-protein jam from the flower, 
manufacturing banana chips, liqueur, 
puree and so on... not to mention banana 
porridge, on which many Dominicans 
have been raised! 
The new banana situation is, of course, 
also a further incentive to diversification 
with a view to reducing the country's 
dependence on its dominant crop. In such 
a predominantly agricultural economy, it 
is the farmers and agro-processors to 
whom one looks for results. Coconuts 
(for soaps and lotions), passion fruit, 
grapefruit, root crops, ginger and avoc­
ados are some of the crops being actively 
promoted (or in some cases rehabili­
tated). While Geest plays a role here too. 
by providing cargo space in its banana 
boats for other products, one again 
stumbles unavoidably on the airport 
issue. Film buffs who remember Domi­
nica's role in the Orchid House' will not 
be surprised to discover that the country 
has potential for exporting flowers such 
as anthuriums. ginger lilies and of course 
orchids. The problem is that, together 
Reminders of the past at the Cahrits National Park 
with other perishable crops destined for 
niche markets, they face a stop-over in 
Antigua. This increases the risk of a loss 
in quality — even with the refrigeration 
facility available there — and, of course, 
additional costs. 
whole island boasts only a single sei 
iffic lights 
Agriculture is closely tied in with tourism 
here. Virtually all the tourist spots are in 
farming areas and the excellent feeder 
road network provides access to visitors 
which allows increased possibilities for 
on-farm sales. Much of the diversifi­
cation in terms of vegetable and flower 
production has also been geared towards 
the hotels and restaurants. Agriculture 
Minister Joseph wondered 'what really 
stayed in a country as a result of tourism, 
considering what has happened in a lot of 
neighbouring tourism-based countries, 
where the cost of living as well as the cost 
to society has risen, and the quality of life 
has gone down." There is little reason to 
fear that those in Dominica who are 
directly involved in tourism will push it 
too far. The island is not competing in the 
'sun, sea and sand' bracket, but has its 
own attractions — which are atypical for 
the Caribbean region: nature above all, 
with a bit of history and a dash of no-
hurry, no-worry life style (the whole 
island boasts only a single set of traffic 
lights). It calls for a different type of 
clientele altogether; one that is not 
particularly in search of a tan lazily 
acquired on the beach, followed by long 
nights of disco dancing but whose pre­
ference is, perhaps, for mountain-hiking 
in a breathtaking setting followed by a 
refreshing shower under a waterfall. 
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Cruise ship calls have risen sharply from 130 calls and 65 000 passengers in 1991 to 
189 calls and 90 000 passengers last year 
At a time when the environment is so 
much an 'in" subject Dominica clearly has 
what it takes to attract nature lovers, bird 
or whale watchers, hikers and divers. Its 
still relatively unspoilt character makes it 
a destination which is out of the ordinary 
but which also raises a well-known 
problem: how much tourism can nature 
tolerate before it deteriorates in such a 
way as to deter the type of tourist which it 
caters for? 
The Director of Tourism. Marie-José 
Edwards, revealed that a study was being 
undertaken, 'in cooperation with the 
forestry division, to examine the max-
imum carrying capacity. But.' she con-
tinued, 'we are far from reaching our 
limits because of the bottlenecks caused 
by access. It is obvious, however, that if 
we destroy our nature in the broader 
sense, then wc will have nothing else to 
market.' Tourism as a business is fairly 
new to the Dominican scene, at least from 
the point of view of active promotion. 
Last year overall visitor arrivals totalled 
57 700. of which almost 4~ 000 were stay-
over tourists, the remainder being ex-
cursionists. Most tourists come from the 
Caribbean (57%). specifically the French 
West Indies, while the other main mar-
kets are Europe (21%) and the USA 
(16%). Stop-over tourists spent an 
average of USS 65 per day. The opening 
of the new Cabrits Cruise Ship Berth in 
the north, combined with the berth near 
Roseau, which is to be renovated, has led 
to a steep rise in cruise ship arrivals : from 
Marie-José Edvards. Director of 
Tourism 
'... if we destroy our nature in the 
broader sense, wc will have nothing else 
to market... ' 
130 calls and 65 000 passengers in 1991 to 
189 calls and 90 000 passengers a year 
later. Again the main attraction is not the 
classic Caribbean duty-free shopping, but 
eco-tourism. 
Growth in available rooms will be 
controlled, rising gradually from the 
current 570 units to 640 by the end of this 
year. The target is for 740 units by the end 
of 1995. Minister Maynard felt there is 
also a need for at least ime hotel with 
conference facilities: a Taiwanese invest-
ment seems to be in the pipeline in this 
context, which is linked, in fact, to the 
notion of economic citizenship (foreign 
investors, mainly Asian, can acquire 
citizenship given a certain amount of 
investment in the country). 
Other national assets such as sulphur 
springs could constitute the basis for 
further tourist specialisation e.g. in the 
form of a health spa in combination with 
local fruit juices and hiking jogging in 
natural surroundings. Siune niche mar-
kets have already been very successfully 
'tapped': 'In the space of four years we 
were tibie to put ourselves tit the forefront 
of the world scuba diving community, 
raising the numbers of (.livers from 400 to 
more than 2200." emphasised Ms Ed-
wards. A rich marine life, combined with 
caves and shipwrecks and the prospect of 
a 'champagne dive' to marvel al hoi 
underwater sulphur springs, has proven 
to be another winning combination. 
There is particular appreciation of the 
European Community's support for 
tourism, which is provided on a regional 
basis tit two levels through the OECS 
and in a wider Caribbean context through 
the Caribbean Tourism Organisation. 
Combined efforts in marketing, training 
and product development have helped lo 
give Dominica its own particular spot on 
the world tourism map. 
Fully conscious that 'the world doesn't 
owe it a living'. Dominica spares no effort 
in the drive to reduce its dependence on 
bananas. While seeking to become tm 
even more efficient quality banana pro-
ducer, because that is what nature con-
demned it to be. il is also diversifying 
wherever it can. Λ democratic society 
which enjoys good governance, this small 
middle-income developing country cer-
tainly docs not deserve to lake a tumble 
on the banana skin that could be dropped 
in its path by blind defenders of free trade 
principles. 
Roger DE BACKER 
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Bananas : 
'The real issue 
is the survival 
of our country' 
declares Prime Minister 
Dame Eugenia Charles 
A recently published biography entitled 'Eugenia— The 
Caribbean's Iron Lady'may refer to the Dominican Prime 
Minister's nickname acquired in the aftermath of the 1983 
Grenada crisis, but in the meantime the lady has become a 
'Dame'. A lawyer by training and a successful barrister 
thereafter, planter's daughter Eugenia Charles stepped into 
the country's very lively political arena in the late 1960s as 
leader of the newly created Dominican Freedom Party. In 
1975 she was elected for the first time as a Member of 
Parliament. In the ¡980 election, the first following 
independence in 1978, she led her DTP to a landslide 
victory, winning 17 of the 21 seats. The Dominican Labour 
Party, which had been in power for almost two decades, lost 
all of its seats, a fact some found difficult to swallow, as was 
clear from the failed coup by the former Labour Prime 
Minister in the following year. This earned him a 12-year 
prison sentence. 
The Caribbean's first woman Prime Minister came to the 
international forefront in 1983. As chair of the Organis-
ation of Eastern Caribbean States at that time, she stood on 
the White House steps with US President Reagan to pledge 
full support for the American intervention in Grenada. 
While her nickname dates back to those days, she remains 
the epitome of political firmness but always with the best 
interests of Dominica in mind. In the 1990 election she was 
reconfirmed for a third — and last, she says — five-year 
term, although her parliamentary majority has been 
reduced to only one seat. Today, Dame Eugenia Charles, 
who is in her early seventies, is more resolved than ever to 
win one last, decisive battle : securing Dominica's future in 
the banana trade and industry, which is both the country's 
lifeline and the basis for any further diversification. 
> Dominica is said lo have changed 
dramatically since the time you came to 
power in ¡980. 
- Well, we don't notice the changes 
because wc are living it every day and 
there is so much more to do. You don't 
feel anything has happened. 
► But what would you describe as being 
your principal achievement since then? 
- We have put some infrastructure 
into place. Thanks to the EDF. for 
instance, we have been able to do some­
thing about our roads, which were in an 
appalling state. In fact. I refused to 
promote tourism when we first came in 
because I thought that it was unfair to ask 
anyone to drive on the roads that we had. 
Once we had done that, we felt tourism 
was the second industry that we should 
look at, to try to gain some employment 
from it. We also brought electricity to the 
east coast and that led on to the establish­
ment of a good overall telephone system. 
But. while we have managed to achieve 
some results in communications, we still 
have not done enough regarding air or sea 
transport, and we recognise that these 
two sectors need further improvement. 
i - One of your main priorities was to 
diversify in order to lessen your dependence 
on bananas. How jar have you got? 
- Sometimes we feel we haven't 
achieved anything and at other times we 
see that some things have happened. But 
what gives us a negative impression 
overall is that we don't really command 
the market. There have been occasions 
when we have diversified into a crop that 
looks promising but then the market has 
fallen away and the grower feels let down. 
He does not understand that we don't 
control the market, and that we always 
have to anticipate the way it is going to 
go. And of course, that is something that 
can change pretty rapidly. You can be left 
out in the cold, because you have been 
preparing for a particular market only to 
find that it has changed in the meantime 
or that there are other countries that can 
produce much more cheaply than we can. 
So market data and market assess-
ment are vital at all times'? 
— Yes, but the problem we have had is 
that even the data and the assessments 
change so quickly. We started producing 
a very fine type of ginger — everybody 
thinks it is a good product — but then 
somebody else comes along who can 
produce it at a lower cost, or who is so 
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keen to win markets that he is willing to 
trade at a loss. That is something we 
cannot do because all our farming is small 
peasant farming, and the farmer can't 
afford to take a loss of any kind. When 
you have large estates, then you are in a 
position to sell below cost for a while until 
things pick up again. But small peasant 
farming doesn't allow for that kind of 
marketing adventure. 
Would you agree with some critics 
who say that the banana boom of the mid 
and late 1980s put you in a relatively 
comfortable position, and psychologically 
prevented you from embarking on further 
diversification ? 
- The farmer, even during the so-
called boom, has always felt he has not 
earned enough money for his bananas, so 
it didn't put him in a comfortable 
position. What makes the farmer want to 
continue with bananas is the fact that the 
marketing and shipping is well secured. 
He knows that every week, a banana boat 
will drop anchor in the harbour and every 
banana he has produced has a marketable 
export value and will be taken away. So 
that is the assurance that keeps him 
producing bananas. It is not possible for 
the moment to get any such assurance for 
any other crop. Whenever we talk to him 
about change, he will tell us: 'I have five 
acres in bananas. You tell me to put one 
acre in something else. How do I know 
when the time comes that I will be able to 
sell that something else?' 
It is also said that the profits arc to be 
made in marketing and shipping bananas, 
and that the country has not been able to 
tap properly into thai. 
- Well, we are trying. We have been 
talking for a couple of years now about 
going into joint ventures with Geest. We 
hope to have this in place before the end 
of this year so that we get more of the 
money from the marketing and shipping 
than is the case at present. We already get 
some benefit from the shipping side in 
that the freight that comes out from the 
UK on the banana boat is shared among 
the Windward Islands. We want to do 
more of this, also from the point of view 
of shipping out of the islands, and so we 
are working with Geest to have some 
share of these profits. We think that, with 
all the changes that are happening now in 
the banana world, we can't just forge 
ahead on our own. There are too many 
risks involved. We should use the fam­
iliarity we have with this particular agent 
to work together to iiet more benefit. 
Is it correct to describe the relation-
ship with Geest as a son of love bate one in 
which you are condemned 10 work to-
gether? 
— We aren't condemned to work 
together. Had we taken the step twenty 
years ago. we could perhaps have gone 
out on our own. but with what is 
happening on the European market now. 
I think we must avoid taking too many 
risks. We need to secure our position. We 
realise that Geest is a private company 
and they are looking after their interests. 
Their business is to make profit, not to be 
charitable to people, and so we have to be 
very firm in our negotiations with them to 
secure the best deal that we can. 
'We might not just be 
losing dollars, we might he 
losing a country too. I 
don't think that any 
European country, having 
gone through all the wars 
they went through, can 
want that to happen to a 
small island like ours ' 
Despite the Banana Agreement 
which gives you access to the European 
market, there is still a distinct feeling of 
insecurity in the country; a sense of not 
being sure about what is going to happen 
next. 
- The people in your media have put 
over the Latins' point of view so much 
that even our farmers are getting to know-
that the Latins think they will be able to 
break that agreement. That is what this 
insecurity is about. There is the threat of 
the GATT negotiations and the threat of 
legal action by the Germans and this is 
frightening the farmer here. All of this is 
of course bad for business. 
Everybody watches CNN: everybody 
knows what is happening and. of course, 
farmers often listen to the radio to hear 
the news from Caribbean stations and 
from the BBC. We hear all those declar­
ations from different quarters and I 
suppose we don't have a big enough voice 
to put our ideas over on the radio as often 
as they do. But we keep telling the farmer 
that if he can produce excellent quality 
bananas consistently, then he will con­
tinue to have a place on the market. 
How do you yourself value the 
Banana Agreement as it stands? 
Well, it is not what we wanted. We 
felt that the Latins should never have 
been allowed more than 1.4 million 
tonnes in the first place, because that was 
what they were producing before the 
Berlin Wall fell. They boosted their 
production knowing this time was 
coming, so they started supplying more 
than 2 million tonnes. Now thev have got 
2 million which 1 really think is too much, 
but I am prepared to live with it because 1 
feel both sides of the region have io live. 
Yet thev arc not prepared lo live with it 
because, even if thev don't mention it. 
they just feel we should nol he m the 
bananti business at till. Thev would like to 
throw us out completely, knowing verv 
well that if thev succeeded in doing that, 
they would be throwing out the countrv 
altogether; thev would be destroying the 
lives of 72 000 people, bul thev don't care 
about that. 
So ru» are talking about the survival 
of the country... 
Yes. that is the real issue heve: lhe 
survival of our countrv. The Latins are 
talking about losing some million dollars. 
We might not just be losing dollars, we 
might be losing a countrv too. I don't 
think that tiny European countrv. hav ine 
gone through till the wars they went 
through, can want that lo happen to a 
small island like ours. 
What other types oj diversification 
outside the agricultural sector do vou see 
as having a potential·' 
Tourism is the one wc arc looking at 
most. I don't think that eco-tourism goes 
together with charters. We want people lo 
come here who like the countrv. to make 
friends with the people here and to conic 
back eventually for that reason. So we arc 
not talking of mass tourism. I don't think 
we tire ready lor thai or that we will ever 
be ready for it. I would hope not. But I 
think there is money to be made mil of 
tourists who enjoy what wc have lo offer 
our people and our nature ami I 
think wc musi work increasingly on this. 
In the line of sports, for instance, there is 
tt lol to be done: this :s a good country for 
hiking and for those who like outdoor 
life. These could be tourists who can't 
spend a lot of mone) hut thev do bring a 
new vision into the place and it is good for 
us to have that sort of tourism. 
But we think also that light industry is 
something we should look at. I have 
always said I don't want factories to come 
in and employ 2000 people, because 
factories eventually close down. This has 
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happened throughout history. And to 
have 2000 people out of work at the same 
time in Dominica would be very bad for 
the country. So we want small factories 
employing 300-400 people, making some­
thing that you can sell elsewhere; some­
thing small and clean. We are not going to 
open factories that are going to pollute 
the air or the water. 
We think that we can also do a lot more 
in fishing, not only on a commercial basis 
but also for feeding ourselves. At the 
moment we are far too dependent on the 
importation of protein from outside. So, 
it would be a good thing if we could 
develop a fishing industry. We have an 
agreement at last with the European 
Community in this area and we hope that 
this will help us. First of all. it will give 
extra training to our people. We want 
them to be trained to go into better boats 
so that they can stay out fishing longer. It 
is not only very important for our foreign 
exchange but also for our health. We 
really should be able to pull this off with 
the sea surrounding us. 
^- Whatever spokesman you meet from 
the different sectors, you always end up 
hearing about the new airport. Apparently 
you had a verbal agreement with the 
previous US administration for pari of the 
works. What is the situation here? 
- Well, they were interested in it, and 
still are. We will be talking about it with 
them very soon. We have not asked for 
cash, because many countries are not able 
for the time being to give large sums of 
money, but we want them to use their US 
Army Corps of Engineers to do some of 
the work for us. If they could level the site 
of the airport, it would halve the cost for 
us. That in itself would help us to get 
other countries to support us further. We 
are not looking for a strip for wide body 
planes. We want a long distance, 24-hour 
airstrip, that we can light up. That would 
help us greatly in further enhancing our 
diversification. We want to be able, for 
instance, to get our flowers out. That is 
one of the sectors we could diversify into. 
Today, to send flowers to Antigua and 
hope they get off the ground without 
getting scorched is asking for a lot; some 
people are doing it and some of them are 
succeeding but with a lot of headaches. 
There are a lot of other exotic things 
which should go. but by air. So that 
airport is not only for tourism; it is for 
industry and trade as well. Also, if we 
want industry here, obviously we are 
talking about somebody who already has 
business in anoiher country. Nobody is 
going to build a factory here if he can't get 
in and out of the country easily, which is 
not the case today. 
l·- But the cost of building a new airport 
is so high compared to the size of the 
economy. Many feel that it is too big a 
project. 
- Yes. I know that some donors say 
this, but it is a step we must take if we 
want to be able to have the growth we 
need. And we can't achieve that with the 
existing two small airstrips. We will never 
make a fortune on the new airport, but 
without it we won't get investment which 
will result in job creation and foreign 
exchange revenue. 
K As one of the longest serving political 
leaders in the Caribbean, you have wit-
nessed many attempts to achieve 
breakthroughs a! regional level, be it with 
Carieom, the Windward Islands or the 
O ECS. Is there still a lack of political will 
to establish meaningful regional cooper-
ation ? 
- Carieom is finally taking hold of 
itself. It has recently really started to look 
at the things we can do together. I think it 
is wrong for Carieom to think in terms of 
an integrated country. You only need to 
look at how long it is taking Europe. That 
can be a lesson for us here. But I think 
that Carieom has begun to show where 
the weaknesses are so that it can begin to 
strengthen and restructure its own Secre­
tariat and improve the way they run it. I 
must say we are very fortunate to have 
Edwin Carrington as our Secretary Gen­
eral because he had a lot of experience 
with the ACP, when he had to pull 
together a lot more people than is the case 
in Carieom. I believe we are making 
major strides now because there is the will 
to do it. Looking at what is happening in 
the broader context, we cannot stay 
isolated. We have to get together on many 
issues if we are to get things done, even if 
it doesn't mean becoming one country. 
»- There was a very good report from 
the West Indian Commission, but many of 
its key proposals were not adopted. 
— We did not accept all the proposals 
because there is a cost to all of these 
things and accepting them all would have 
meant that we had to find a lot of money. 
So we took the ideas from it and looked at 
how we could restructure the Secretariat 
to achieve reasonable results. 
t* What do you think of the new 
Carieom Bureau ? 
I think it is going to work ; in fact, it has 
already worked. However. I have sug­
gested a refinement. I think we should 
divide the islands so as to give each of the 
three members of the Bureau respons­
ibility for three or four of them. He would 
then make it his business to get things 
done on time. 
>- On another level, there are also 
attempts to enhance cooperation based on 
solidarity between the smaller islands: the 
OECS which, unlike Carieom, already has 
a monetary union. There are those in the 
Windward Islands who want political 
union. Do you think that we might soon see 
a breakthrough in this area? 
— I am not sure that we are going to get 
the Windward Islands to unite politically 
because I don't think people are ready for 
it. I am one of those who have always said 
that there is no way we will go ahead with 
this unless the people concerned really 
want it themselves. They must not just 
accept it from their leaders ; they themsel­
ves must want it. I think we have to 
proceed with further integration in many 
more areas. I think we must have an 
integrated police force, for instance, 
because having a small police force in one 
island makes it difficult sometimes to 
discover what is really happening. In 
education, too, a lot more could be done. 
In fact our aid donors look at it that way 
too and want to help us here because they 
realise there are not enough experts, not 
enough qualified people here for every 
island to go its own way. 
p> On the international level you are 
increasingly being confronted with econ-
omic blocs, such as the new North Amer-
ican Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Given 
the widespread disappointment in the 
Caribbean over the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) in the past, how do you 
feel about NAFTA in the future? 
— I have no hope that NAFTA will be 
of any use to us. but then I did not think 
that the CBI would be of any use either. I 
said so at the time : that we didn't have the 
infrastructure to get a real grip and make 
use of the CBI. But I believe that what 
was good about the CBI is that the 
American Administration discussed it 
with us beforehand. For the first time, the 
US as an aid donor asked us how we felt 
they should go about it and, as a result, 
we were able to get some measures into 
the CBI which we had never had before 
from the United States. But I have always 
argued that the CBI was meant for 
countries that already have a platform to 
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Dame Eugenia Charles discussing with CEC Delegate Philippe Darmuzey. 
in the presence of National Authorising Officer C arv I larris 
'There are a lot of things that would not have happened here without 
the Lome agreement' 
way. but Dominica is so beautiful 
anyway, that as soon as you go inland 
vou have so much to sec. We have had 
some other verv good schemes, such as 
the microprojects, and 1 hope thev will 
continue because thev arc verv important 
for the community; thev add a new 
dimension to life in the village. 
&- You have said that this will be your 
last term in office. 
Yes. definiteh. After 15 years, 1 
think I've done my share. 
¡>- II 'hat sort of Dominica ilo vou tir cam 
of leaving behind you'? 
1 would like a Dominica where 
everybody has employment, everybody 
has work to do. I would like even bodv to 
have housing, not necessarilv luxurious 
but providing the basic needs running 
water, sewage systems and electricity. If 
you have those two things vou have a 
peaceful and happy country. 
take off from. Essentially, therefore, it 
would be places like Jamaica, Trinidad 
and some of the Latin countries that 
would benefit from it. Of course, I have 
always felt that we should not be lumped 
together with the Latin countries because 
they are too large, their problems are 
different and their economics arc also too 
different from ours. We really require a 
specific initiative tailored to our small 
scale and our particular requirements. So 
both at the level of Carieom and the 
OECS. we must look more and more at 
what our likenesses arc and try to put 
them together to give us strength. 
^ NAFTA sets out \ to achieve re-
ciprocal trade libéralisation. This, pre-
sumably, could be to the detriment of 
smaller countries'.' 
— Oh yes. it mav hurt us and 1 don't 
think it is going to help us small countries. 
Of course, we have to keep our eyes open 
for any opportunity, but I don't think we 
are really going to be able to take 
advantage of it. After all. we have free 
trade with the EC and we are not getting a 
lot out of this because so many of us 
produce the same things and even some of 
the members of the Communtiy have 
offshoots of their countries that produce 
those same things. 
p- Talking about the European Com-
munity, it is sometimes said that you are 'in 
the heart oj France'. situated as you are, 
herween Guadeloupe and Martinique. 
— France has been verv· good to us and 
we get a lot of assistance from them. 1 
think France recognises that we arc a 
close cousin but not a brother and so we 
have assistance. I think it is to France's 
benefit to make sure that we do not fall 
far behind the Trench islands. We siili 
have a lot of scope for enhancing trade 
with the DOMs. Sometimes difficulties 
arise with them, but I believe we are allie­
to come to a solution whereby we arc tibie 
to market our goods in Guadeloupe and 
Martinique without detriment to Trench 
farmers. 
► As far as the EEC at large is 
concernei/, how do you view Lomé cooper-
ation so far and how do you see it evolving ? 
Il has been very good so far but I feel 
that Lomé IV has tightened up a lot. 
making it more difficult for things to 
come through. I very much fear that this 
is a sort of preview of what may happen if 
there is a Lomé V. But we have, neverthe­
less, benefited a great deal from Lomé. 
There are a lot of things that would not 
have happened here without the Lomé 
agreement. I have always felt that the 
EDF is among the quickest donors in 
delivering aid. Once vou have agreed on 
what the facilities and the programmes 
arc. and what vou arc going to do with 
them, they are among the quickest. We 
have some feeder roads here that the EDF 
can be proud of. Each of them is also a 
tourist route, perhaps not planned that 
t» But the resource Inise ol the countrv 
is so small... 
Wc only have people, kind and 
water and we must do much more with 
our water. 
f> The economi' itself is supported bv 
only 20 000-30 000 people. 
Our workforce is about 22 000. 
"There is an unemployment problem 
among young people who have been 
educated to secondary school level. They 
find it difficult to find a job. It has a lot to 
do with attitude and we have a lot lodo to 
change that. Secondary education does 
not automatically give vou a job in 
government as many think. Government 
must keep its numbers down, given the 
limited resources, to be tibie to do olhcr 
things than just paying salaries. Wc have 
to look at our form of education and the 
motivation and attitude we instil in 
people so they realise that education 
doesn't just mean that vou end up silting 
behind a desk. You must also be educated 
to be a good farmer and you must have 
knowledge of arithmetic and English and 
of other things to be able to larm well. It 
means, for instance, if you want to export 
to the Trench islands as a larmer, vim 
need to know French. Changing people's 
attitudes and thinking is not a verv easy 
job to do. But we tire trying hard, because 
education has to suit the needs of the 
people and not just a historical way of 
life. Interview bv R.D.B. 
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'The strong must help 
the weak' 
An interview with 
Edison James, 
Leader of the Opposition 
Edison James became Leader of the Opposition in 
Dominica as a result of the 1990 election when his United 
Workers Parly won six of the 21 seats. He thereby— to the 
surprise of many — overtook, by a margin of two seats, the 
'traditional' opposition Dominica Labour Party, which is 
the country's oldest political movement. The UWP, by 
contrast, was established only in 1988. At the same time he 
helped reduce the overall majority of Dame Eugenia 
Charles' governing Freedom Party to only one seat. In 
power since 1980, when she won a landslide victory 
(virtually wiping out the opposition by winning 17seats), 
Dame Eugenia has subsequently seen her majority decline 
to its current narrow margin. Edison James nevertheless 
faces a difficult task in challenging the still widespread 
popularity of the 'Iron Lady' and the control which she 
exercises over the levers of government. During the election 
campaign, he confronted her with the UWP slogan of'Fear 
no more'. He is also critical of her alleged comment on the 
narrow outcome of the poll to the effect that she would show 
little interest in those constituencies that did not vote for 
her. 
A former manager of the Banana Marketing Corpor-
ation, Edison James is deeply concerned by the ongoing 
banana 'issue', which leaves no Dominican untouched. He 
also insists that he is an 'unequivocal believer in the 
democratic process', a statement which must be particularly 
appreciated when one recalls that a former Prime Minister, 
having lost his seat, was sentenced to twelve years 
imprisonment for a coup attempt which, fortunately, did not 
succeed. 
►- Following the last election, you 
became — to the surprise of many — the 
Leader of the Opposition, beating the 
'classic' opposition by two seats and 
helping to reduce the Government's overall 
majority to only one. What is the expla-
nation for this dramatic swing? Was it 
merely the result of your electoral system ? 
— If those people who were suprised by 
the results had been doing their work 
properly they wouldn't have been sup­
rised. because it was obvious that the 
Freedom Party was losing ground. Many 
people were disenchanted with the party ; 
its whole approach and attitude, espe­
cially that of its leadership, which dis­
played arrogance and tried to instil fear in 
the electorate. So it was obvious that they 
had become distanced from the people. 
But it was our view that that disenchant­
ment would not lead to their defeat if it 
had been left simply to the Labour Party, 
because people were not prepared to go 
back to what they had essentially dis­
carded just a few years ago. So we felt we 
had to present a new image to the 
population. A group of us got together to 
examine the situation, and to analyse 
whether it would be best to try to change 
things through the existing opposition 
structure or whether we had to come up 
with something new. We did a serious 
analysis of that, examined all the factors 
and decided — not at the first meeting but 
a little later on — after talking to people 
outside our original group of eight or 
nine, that the best thing to do was to 
create a new organisation. So in 1988, the 
United Workers Party was born. We 
began with a steering committee, which 
did the initial ground work around July 
ofthat year. In October we held our first 
Convention and by 1990 we faced our 
first election. In that poll, the Freedom 
Party Government survived by a mere 
26 votes, the margin by which they held 
the seat which gave them their overall 
majority of one. 
► In a small place like this, if you are 
talking about macroeconomic policy, can 
the policies be really different? 
— Probably not in terms of mac­
roeconomic policy, but in terms of how 
you relate to people and how you seek to 
provide for people, the approach can be 
very different. We take the view that in 
this country there will always be relatively 
strong and relatively weak people and. in 
the final analysis, the strong must help the 
weak. While we firmly advocate proper 
management and a meticulous approach 
to it. and while we think that efforts 
should be rewarded, we do not feel that 
everything must be sacrificed on the altar 
of profit making. 
► Therefore you adopt socialist po-
licies ? 
— We are not going to get caught up. 
and we have said this before, in any 'ism', 
be it capitalism, socialism or anything 
else. We believe, for instance, where 
essential services are being privatised in a 
manner which seeks only to maximise 
profits, that that is not the best approach. 
For a long time we had a situation where 
some public companies, while not func­
tioning properly, had developed a kind of 
monopoly situation, with consumers 
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tion. The point is that if these organis­
ations — these essential services — are 
put into private hands in this country 
solely for the purpose of making a profit 
at all costs, then the weak will need some 
measure of assistance. 
Can you give a specific example '.' 
- Well, let's take water, for instance. 
The water authority is being converted 
into a company with the intention of 
selling it off. There is also the case of the 
electricity company and we are hearing 
talk of the same happening to the 
national bank. 
Will the electricity company he sold? 
— There has been a serious discussion 
about that. 
So your thesis is that the present 
government is not mindful enough of the 
weak ? 
Indeed. There are always people 
who are not able to survive in a competi­
tive situation, so you have to be mindful 
of them. 
The newspapers are full of the 
ongoing debate about the banana issue. Do 
you think it is accurate to portray the 
Government as pro-Geest while the oppo-
sition favours the small farmers'.' 
The Prime Minister has declared 
quite unequivocally that she stands 
shoulder to shoulder with Geest. Our 
stand is not one of being against Geest. 
What we are saying is that if our industry 
is to survive, and if we are not to continue 
being the hewers of wood and drawers of 
water, then wc must get involved in the 
lucrative areas of marketing and ship­
ping. This has been articulated by every­
body else except Geest and the Prime 
Minister. And no matter how she tries to 
camouflage it by suggesting that wc are 
not ready, but that we will probably be 
ready for it in three years' time, this is just 
tin attempt to mitigate the impact. 
Is this just an opposition claim, or are 
others saying the same thing? 
- A recent Caribbean Development 
Bank consultancy study has recently 
recognised that these are areas that our 
industry can benefit from tremendously. I 
read this myself in the preliminary report. 
It is a study on the improvement of the 
competitiveness of the Windward Is­
lands' banana industry. So it is not a 
matter of we. the opposition, being 
against Geest. 1 want to make that verv 
clear. What we are saying is that we must 
get involved in those areas. The Geest 
General Manager was reported in the 
Saint Lucian press saving that we should 
not get involved in those areas. What that 
shows is that we are clearly on different 
wavelengths on this question, while the 
Prime Minister is on the same level as 
Geest. 
So you feel that not enough of the 
henefits which derive from the banana 
industry are coming back to the small 
farmers? 
— Much more can. and needs to. come 
back; much more. There is money in the 
banana business but the farmers here 
continue to struggle. We have been told 
that we have just to concentrate on 
producing bananas and let somebody else 
market them, that somebody else being 
Geest, in our context. But Geest is 
involved in banana production as well, in 
Costa Rica. Thev have shown in their 
own activities that they do not see the 
need for a division of labour in this 
regard, so why should we? 
So it is not just it question of 
American multinationals, operating in 
Latin America, versus British multi-
nationals? 
- The real producers in these Latin 
American countries tire multinational 
companies like Chiquita. Dole. Gecst and 
Fyffe. It is clear that today. Geest is on 
both sides of the divide in terms of the 
Windwards and the Latins. So. for us it is 
obvious that we must get off-shore, into 
the shipping and marketing of our pro­
duce. 
Aside from the banana issue, what 
are the other key sectors where you 
disagree with the approach of the Govern-
ment? 
Wc have taken issue with the 
Government regarding their hands-off 
approach to the marketing of our agricul­
tural products. The Government's stated 
position, as articulated by the Prime 
Minister when addressing farmers in 
1991. is that it is not Government's 
business to look for markets for farmers. 
Wc are saving 'It is your business because 
it is vou more than anyone else who are 
telling the banana growers to diversify.' 
In fact, the Prime Minister is on record as 
having said, since before 1980. that we 
should leave bananas before bananas 
leave us. So she has told people to 
diversity. When she was in Taiwan, she 
declared over the telephone that she now 
expects growers to go into other crops 
such as passion fruit, peppers, pumpkins, 
ginger and so on. There is nothing wrong 
with farmers going into other crops, 
whether exclusively or together with 
bananas, but if these crops arc not 
marketed then it is useless. So we si rough 
advocate that the Government establish 
links with private entrepreneurs in the 
potential market places. We arc looking 
at metropolitan countries such tis 
Canada. America and the UK. where we 
have Dominicans. Windward Islanders 
and West Indians. Wc could establish 
marketing relations with them and get 
them moving using whatever facilities tire 
available to the Government. Wc recogn­
ise that governments tire not necessarily 
the best people to be involved in this kind 
of operation but they tire in a position lo 
gel things started, to find partners and lo 
develop a team approach. 
Does the Government really disagree 
with what you say? 
I don't think il is a question of them 
flatly disagreeing with us. 'The point is 
thttt so far the Prime Minister litis said 
that it is not lhe Government's business 
to find markets for farmers. Wc have 
been articulating just such tin approach 
for ti long time. Thev have never really 
come out and opposed it. but I suppose 
that given the fact thai it is us that have 
challenged them on the .subject, some­
time will need to pass before they nunc in 
the direction of taking our advice. 
Do you think they will eventually 
come around? 
Yes. they tire already showing signs 
of coming around. In faci there is a 
document a kind of'immediate action 
plan' which I understand luis been 
produced by some Government tech­
nicians and which I tun led to believe has 
received the blessing of Government. In 
that document they advocate that kind of 
approach. 
Another hig issue that seems to be on 
everybody s mind, because it has to do with 
the future of the whole island, is the famous 
new airport. Is that going to become a 
political issue as well·? 
- Well, that is the airport that 1 am 
supposed to have stopped. It is said that I 
prevented that airport from materialis­
ing. There are different versions to this. It 
depends on what mood the Prime Minis-
24 ter is in at a given time and who she is 
talking to. Sometimes she says I stopped 
it; at other times she says 'No. they 
ignored him." What happened was that, 
during the election campaign, we wrote a 
letter to the Americans saying that in the 
absence of a development plan or any 
broader perspective, if they were to get 
involved in the earth moving, as the 
Prime Minister pretended they were 
going to do, they would simply be party 
to an election gimmick. We said in our 
manifesto that if you seek out partners to 
engage in such work, you also have to 
come up with your own contribution and 
suggest ways of raising the money. When 
the Government produced their budget 
after the election, they indicated that they 
were seeking to raise the local financial 
component of the airport by embarking 
on a scheme of selling passports to raise 
the money: what they called economic 
citizenship. The Freedom Party stated in 
their manifesto that the work would 
begin within a few months. It is now three 
years since the election and we have seen 
nothing yet. Of course, it has also been 
said that the airport did not come into 
being because the US Army Corps of 
Engineers went to the Gulf. That is what 
the Prime Minister said, but the war has 
been over for quite a while now. Then 
again, the Americans are now in So­
malia... 
Should you come to power, what is 
your feeling about the airport: does 
Dominica need it ? 
— It needs a certain type of airport — 
one which allows people who come here 
from Canada, America or wherever to 
avoid having to change plane en route. It 
would also be extremely beneficial for us 
if we were able to put our agricultural 
produce on a carrier here in Dominica 
without having to worry about transship­
ment through Antigua, Barbados or 
elsewhere. We have indicated that we 
support the construction of that type of 
airport facility here. We have always been 
for that even when our opponents said we 
were against it, but then that is the game 
of politics. 
In 1980, the Freedom Party had a 
landslide victory. Each successive election 
has seen their majority drop and in 1990 
they held on to power by only one seat. If 
this trend continues you could take power 
next time. 
- I am glad you have noticed that. 
That is probably why the Prime Minister 
is running away. She has declared that she 
will not be contesting a future election. I 
think she does not want to be defeated. 
Bearing in mind the recent report of 
the West Indian Commission, which some 
refer to as the blueprint for the long-term 
survival of Carieom, where do you, as a 
potential future leader of a Caribbean 
state, think the organisation should go 
from here? 
— It seems to me that when decisions 
are taken at Carieom level, the people of 
the different countries concerned are not 
as involved as they should be. They are 
not sufficiently informed as to what such 
decisions might mean to them. Decisions 
are mostly reached in secret and the 
Heads of State or Government come 
back to their countries and find that what 
they have decided, on behalf of their 
people, does not enjoy the kind of 
support that it should enjoy. The politics 
of the situation then dictates that they 
must have a second look. I feel that the 
approach has to be modified. If I were 
going to take an initiative at a Carieom 
meeting, I would first seek as broad-
based an input as possible in my own 
country, so that when I entered the 
negotiations, I was satisfied that I had 
strong support at home for the proposal 
which I was putting forward. And where 
new proposals are presented, we should 
all go back and talk to our people. Of 
course there may be proposals which do 
not require a massive popular input, but 
in general it is that kind of approach that 
has hindered implementation. Carieom 
has, nevertheless, had some successes, 
however difficult it may be to manage our 
differences. 
Is it easier to work on the OECS 
level? 
— Even when you come down to the 
level of the Windwards, you still find 
there is a lot of work to be done. I believe 
that in the context of the Windwards and 
OECS unity, there has to be much more 
interaction among the people of the 
different islands. They have to meet each 
other more and more, so that further 
unity comes from the bottom rather than 
from a study carried out over their heads. 
This kind of feeling and attitude must be 
built up, so that sometime, somewhere 
along the line, people come to say 'I am a 
Windward Islander.' But these sorts of 
exchanges and interactions among people 
have not been happening enough up until 
now. 
What are the other key political 
issues going to be in the coming months? 
- I think the economy. It is still in a 
tailspin and if you talk to people around 
the country, nobody seems to know 
where the next penny is coming from. 
Much has to be done to stimulate the 
economy. We have to look for new 
solutions. We ourselves have some posit­
ive proposals which I will be putting 
forward at the next budget address. We 
expect that by the middle of this year, we 
will be able to bring some Dominicans 
together, both local and from abroad, in a 
sort of 'think-tank'. The aim of this 
exercise is to analyse the situation further 
and to come up with some even more 
concrete proposals for our economic 
survival. 
' Many of your fellow ACP countries, 
African ones in particular, are going 
through a process of démocratisation. 
Coming from a country with a long 
democratic tradition, are there any hints or 
tips that you could give them ? 
- First of all I would say unequivo­
cally that both I and my party believe 
passionately in the democratic process. I 
cannot at this point in time conceive of 
any other system that I would want to 
subscribe to. I believe that if I am unable 
to persuade people that they should go 
along with my thinking, then I have 
failed, and I should not try to use any 
other means to get them to do what I 
want them to do. 
This could not a/ways be said of the 
whole of the opposition. 
— For myself and the United Workers 
Party that can be said, even if things may 
have been different as regards other 
opposition parties in the past. 
I also believe in the transparency of 
Government. Where a matter of national 
security is involved, then there may be a 
need, up to a point, to keep your cards 
close to your chest but, over and above 
that, the transparency of Government is a 
matter of principle. I am very worried and 
concerned when I hear that in so many 
parts of the world people take power 
through the barrel of a gun. Coups being 
coups, it is difficult to take control and 
expect to survive. In any case, it is so 
much better to leave when people ask you 
than to impose yourself on them against 
their will.o 
Interview by R.D.B. 
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Dominica and the European Community: 
a solid partnership 
by Philippe DARMUZEY * 
Dominica and Europe share five centuries of history 
but less than twenty years of cooperation. A formal 
cooperation partnership was initiated in 1976 within the 
framework of the Association between the European 
Community and its Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs). The first EDF-funded operation in Dominica, a 
programme for the construction of coastal roads, began 
in July 1977. The road paved the way to the former British 
OCT's independence in November 1978 and to the 
accession of the Commonwealth of Dominica to the 
Lomé Convention as a full member of the ACP Group. 
The EEC and Dominica have used these 17 years to 
build a model of cooperation, to jointly define the 
objectives, adapt the instruments, and decide on the best 
way of responding to the country's short-term difficulties, 
long-term challenges and structural constraints. This has 
taken practical shape in the four Lomé Conventions, 
through the full use of the integrated range of cooperation 
instruments available to Dominica. 
Central to Dominica's economy and to EEC-Dominica 
cooperation is the banana issue, allegedly a common 
'culture' heritage. It embraces both the trade and aid 
aspects of this cooperation. The banana has been the 
engine of growth, the determining factor for the definition 
of Dominica's development policies and economic 
reforms. 
Looking to the future, the combined forces of world 
trade liberalisation, the Uruguay Round negotiations and 
the development of the Single European Market all 
contribute to focusing attention on the traditional link 
between the economies of Dominica and the Community. 
and between the banana producers of Dominica and 
Europe. 
Adjusting to the present challenges of competition and 
economic diversification is the new ambition at the core of 
the Lomé IV National Indicative Programme and 
structural adjustment programme in Dominica for the 
period 1993-95. This is a major challenge, imposing on the 
partners a shift from the traditional project approach lo 
the more demanding reform-oriented policy dialogue. 
The European Community also pursues a genuine 
dialogue with Dominica on regional cooperation. Re­
gional integration, for a small island economy, party to 
sub-regional (OECS). regional (CARICOM) or future 
wider Caribbean groupings such as the proposed 
Association of Caribbean States, is another type of 
structural adjustment process. Dominica takes full 
advantage of the regional cooperation instruments of lhe 
Lomé Convention and shares with the other ACP 
partners of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean Stales, 
the Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Forum ' 
the benefits of the regional resources of the EDF. This is 
essential, in the Community's opinion, for Dominica 
together with its partners of the English, Spanish. Trench 
and Dutch-speaking Caribbean, to meet the competition 
requirements of the large regional trade blocs in the 
making in Europe. North America (NAFTA) -and Latin 
America. The European Community sees it as its mission 
to support such a regional integration process. 
This regional dimension of EEC-Dominica cooper­
ation has continued to grow over the last twenty years, lo 
the extent that Dominica's Ambassador to Belgium and 
the European Community is now also the Joint Rep­
resentative of the Member Stales of the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States. 
How were these basic features of Dominica-EEC 
cooperation translated into practical action'.' 
Addressing the major constraints 
to development 
Dominica is facing a series of problems 
typical of small island countries: the 
small domestic market, seriously limiting 
industrial opportunities: a narrow re­
source base: a high per capita cost of 
economic and social infrastructure; 
heavy external dependence: and vulner­
ability to external shocks, including 
natural disasters, particularly hurricanes. 
* Head of the Delegation of the Commission in 
Barbados and in the Eastern Caribbean. 
1 CARIFORUM. for Caribbean Forum, is the 
body established to group the 15 ACP Stales of the 
Caribbean region, ineluding the two newcomers 
(Haiti and the Dominican Republic), within the 
framework oi Lome IV regional cooperation. 
: NAFTA : The North American Free Trade Area, 
which encompasses the IS V Canada and Mexico 
Production in the agricultural sector is 
handicapped by the country's topog­
raphy and lack of economic infrastruc­
ture, which limits the availability of land 
for agriculture to about 30% of the total 
area. Population pressure is forcing 
farmers to cultivate steep slopes and this, 
together with inadequate farming tech­
niques, has resulted in soil erosion. 
Dominica has shortages of trained man­
power at all levels, thus hindering diversi­
fication. In implementing EEC-Do­
minica cooperation agreements, em­
phasis has been extensively placed on 
agriculture and rural infrastructure. Spe­
cial attention is being paid to the two 
main challenges confronting agriculture, 
the need to increase the quality and 
productivity of banana production and 
to enhance diversification into other 
crops. Complementary to agricultural 
support, efforts have also been directed 
under the Lomé IV National Indicative 
Programme towards supporting Domi­
nica's environmental strategy, especially 
as regards management capacity, the 
environmental dimension of rational 
land use and allocation, deforestation 
and waste collection, treatment and 
disposal. 
Taking full advantage of the 
Lomé instruments 
Dominica-EEC cooperation has been 
successful by ACP EEC standards in that 
there is hardly any instrument of the 
Lomé Convention which has not been 
used with a satisfactory performance 
record. 
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In terms of financial performance, all 
Lome funds of the past three Conven­
tions have been fully committed and 
disbursed at highly satisfactory rates. 
50% of Lomé IV National Indicative 
Programme resources were expected to 
be committed by the end of 1993 in 
combination with the entire Lomé IV 
allocation for Structural Adjustment. 
Since 1976, the European Community 
has committed some ECU 43.7 million to 
projects, programmes and operations in 
Dominica.
 3 Virtually all EEC funding is 
in the form of grants, the only exception 
being loans from the European Invest­
ment Bank (EIB), which tend to be very 
soft-term. 
National Indicative Programmes: predict-
ability of resources 
National Indicative Programmes 
(NIPs) negotiated for five years provide a 
reliable source of funding for Dominica's 
long-term development priorities. Funds 
have been concentrated heavily on road 
infrastructure, for the reinstatement of 
some 42 km of road on the east and west 
coasts (EDF IV); the reconstruction of a 
vital road link (16 km) across the centre 
of the island (EDF V). primary and farm 
feeder roads and the Geneva-Petite Sav­
anne road in the south-east of the island. 
The roadworks, carried out by direct 
labour, have been satisfactorily com­
pleted. "Training and experience was 
provided for Dominicans in the field of 
project planning and management, and 
road rehabilitation and maintenance 
techniques. The roads have to a con­
siderable degree removed obstacles to the 
movement of goods and people through 
improved transport and communications 
and better access to farmland, thereby 
supporting balanced economic, social 
and agricultural development. Continued 
diversification of Dominica's economy 
and the development of related agro-
industrial activities will be influenced by 
the expansion of the country's feeder 
road system. 
Agricultural diversification, to reduce 
dependence on the fragile banana crop, 
was the objective of two small EDF-
funded operations: 
— a successful pilot project for the 
production of patchouli on a 7-hectare 
' Indicative exchange rate: 1 ECU = 3.2 Eastern 
Caribbean dollars (ECS). 
plantation and the distillation of oil from 
the dried leaves (Essential Oils); 
— a lime rehabilitation project in the 
south-west of the island at Soufrière. 
The Lomé IV programme focuses on 
the continuation of efforts in the rural 
development sector (50%) towards agric­
ultural diversification and supporting 
economic and social infrastructure. En­
vironmental management, planning and 
projects are the other main focal area 
(35%). 
In addition to the above priorities, 
some resources were allocated under 
Lomé III to a tourism development 
project for the upgrading of access to 
tourist sites and the provision of pro­
motional material. Under Lomé IV, a 
tourism programme is being designed in 
areas such as ecotourism which reflect the 
linkages between the environment and 
tourism sectors. 
European Investment Bank: the long-term 
risk partnership 
Dominica has developed a long-term 
investment partnership with the Euro­
pean Investment Bank (EIB) in areas 
normally not eligible for EDF grant 
funding, such as industry, agro-proces­
sing, mining, tourism and energy. Domi­
nica's abundant water resources, a gift of 
nature, have been exploited with the 
assistance of the EIB. In cooperation with 
the AIDBank, a part-financing of a 
mineral water bottling plant (ECU 
0.7 million) was provided under Lomé II 
for 'Carib Spring' bottled water. After a 
successful start-up phase, this encoun­
tered difficulties as a result of the de­
terioration of market conditions in the 
southern Caribbean. Under Lomé III, 
the EIB, together with other multilateral 
(World Bank) and bilateral (France, 
Canada) donors, has contributed ECU 
3.8 million to the financing of the 
DOMLEC Hydro-Power project which 
harnesses the energy of the island's rivers 
and freshwater lake into increased hydro­
electric generation capacity (4.3 MW). 
Through the Caribbean Financial Ser­
vices Corporation. Dominica also bene­
fited from EIB financing for the renov­
ation of the well-known Fort Young 
Hotel in Roseau. 
The Agricultural. Industrial and De­
velopment Bank (AIDBank). Dominica's 
intermediary financial institution for the 
development of small and medium-scale 
enterprises, has received continued sup­
port from the EIB in the form of risk 
capital to increase its share capital (ECU 
0.8 million) and recently (1993) through a 
global loan of ECU 2 million. This will 
permit the AIDBank to keep carrying out 
its successful development role in the area 
of enterprise development. 
Centre for the Development of Industry 
Enterprise development, in the form of 
joint ventures with European partners 
and through technical and marketing 
assistance, is also being encouraged by 
the ACP/EEC Centre for the Develop­
ment of Industry (CDI). This has been the 
case for a number of small wood-working 
and furniture companies which take 
advantage of the country's valuable 
timber resources. 
The STABEX insurance 
Since 1979, Dominica's main exports, 
bananas and coconuts, have benefited 
from the guarantee mechanism offered to 
the ACP countries through the system of 
Stabilisation of Export Earnings 
(STABEX). This insurance for bad years 
triggers cash transfers to compensate for 
loss of earnings due to poor harvests or a 
drop in prices. It has so far (July 1993) 
compensated Dominica's shortfalls in 
earnings from bananas and coconuts for 
a total amount of ECU 8.468 million. 
This accounts for the following bad 
years : 
Bananas 
Coconuts 
1979 
1980 
1986 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1981 
ECU 2.893 m 
ECU 2.528 m 
ECU 0.505 m 
ECU 1.208 m 
ECU 0.673 m 
ECU 0.159 m 
ECU 0.502 m 
It is estimated that the STABEX 
insurance has added a 26% value bonus 
to the regular development assistance of 
the EEC to Dominica. 
Facing disasters: emergency assistance 
Emergency aid 
Dominica lies in the Caribbean hur­
ricane belt. The damage caused by 
Hurricanes David. Allen and Frederick in 
1979-80 and Hugo in 1989, and by 
torrential rains in 1981. was extensive: 
roads were washed away, public and 
private buildings were demolished or 
badly damaged, and crops were de­
stroyed. 
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Bananas have accounted for more than 90% of exports from Dominica to the EC 
in recent years 
Additional to STABEX cash transfers. 
Lomé resources for emergency aid. un-
doubtedly designed with countries like 
Dominica in mind, were tapped for the 
funding of building materials and med-
ical and other supplies totalling ECU 
4.4 million. 
ids contro 
Among the other disasters threatening 
the people of Dominica, like many other 
countries in the world, is the AIDS killer. 
The Community helps the Govern-
ment to cope with the situation through a 
small AIDS prevention programme 
funded from the budget of the Commis-
sion. The programme provided ECU 
12 500. most of which was used to 
purchase hospital equipment for Aids 
testing. 
Nutrition 
Food aid has in the past been chan-
nelled through international organis-
ations supported by the EEC from the 
Commission budget. Over the years, the 
bulk of the food supplies (including 
skimmed milk powder, vegetable oil. 
cereals and pulses), a lotal of 350 tonnes, 
has gone through Catholic Relief Serv ices 
to the local NGO. The Social Centre, 
from where it litis been distributed to 
specific target groups: pregnant and 
breast-feeding women, pre-sehool child-
ren and the elderly. 
In all. the monetary value of lood tud to 
Dominica has amounted to ECL
1
 
975 000. 
Counterpart funds from EEC food aid 
in the early 1980s were utilised to estab-
lish a fresh-water prawn farming project. 
The project, it should be noted, meets 
both the objective of agricultural diversi-
fication and that of improving food self-
sufficiency and meeting nutritional re-
quirements for the population. 
Reaching the people: NGO and micro-
project assistance 
Small development projects at grass-
roots level have mel with much success in 
Dominica and over ι lie past I 5 years over 
25 such projects have been funded. 
Typically, the EEC contribution per 
project, normally about 50% of t lie-
project cost, could be as high as ECU 
150 000. with the balance of funds being 
contributed by the local community in 
cash and in kind. To date, projects in the 
fields of community development, vo-
cational training, fisheries and health 
have been the focus for these small 
schemes. Some of the other areas covered 
have been construction of housing, adult 
literacy, teacher training, carpentry and 
the provision of educational material, to 
name but a few. Apart from enhancing 
living conditions for the community 
involved, microprojects draw on locally 
available skills in such areas as project 
supervision, exinstruction and carpentry. 
They also provide a form of moti vat ion to 
the local population, who then frequently 
become owners of the project. I he 
operations are designed and executed in a 
close partnership between local and 
European NGOs and through cofinan-
cing arrangements between NGOs and 
the European Community (Commission 
budget). 
Two programmes of microprojects 
were also completed under Lome 11 with 
EDF support. 
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Other instruments 
As discussed below. Dominica also 
Likes advantage of its trade arrangements 
and Fisheries Agreement with the EEC as 
well as the new Structural Adjustment 
Facility of Lome IV. 
Tuning up the engine of 
growth — bananas 
Of common concern to Dominica and 
Europe, the banana issue embraces both 
the trade and the aid dimensions of EC-
Dominica cooperation. 
The trade relationship 
Agriculture accounts for about 1/4 of 
Dominica's GDP and 60% of total 
merchandise exports. Bananas alone 
account for about 90% of agricultural 
exports and 60% of total exports. 
Under the Lomé Convention. Do­
minica benefits from duty-free access for 
manufactured goods to the EEC. as well 
as preferential arrangements for bananas, 
as discussed below. 
The European Community, by far the 
main client of Dominica, accounts for 
approximately two-thirds of Dominica's 
exports and one-fifth of Dominica's 
imports. 
Bananas have accounted for more than 
90% of exports from Dominica to the 
European Community in recent years. 
The Banana Protocol 
Under the Banana Protocol of the 
Lomé Convention, Dominica enjoys 
preferential access to its traditional 
market in the European Community. 
Exports for 1992 were 58 149 tonnes of 
fruit at an estimated FOB value of 
around ECS82 million. The subsidy 
implicit in the guaranteed banana market 
has been estimated to amount to about 
1/5 of the total value of Dominica's 
banana exports. The financial support 
deriving from the Banana Protocol is thus 
probably far more significant than re­
gular EC development aid to Dominica. 
The Single European Market for bananas 
Continued preferential access for ba­
nanas in Europe after the opening of the 
Single European Market on 1 January 
1993 was a major concern. This principle, 
which safeguards the interests of tradi­
tional ACP suppliers, has been agreed 
EEC-DOMINICA COOPERATION (1975-1993) 
Project/Programme/Operation 
Lomé I 
East and West coast road 
Essential oils development 
Technical training 
STABEX for bananas 
Emergency aid 
NGOs 
Lomé II 
Pont Casse-Castle Bruce road 
Lime rehabilitation 
Microprojects 
Scholarships 
Studies (aquaculture/floriculture) 
Geneva-Petite Savanne road 
Trade-tourism promotion 
STABEX for bananas & coconuts 
European Investment Bank risk capital 
Emergency aid 
Food aid 
NGOs 
Lomé III 
Feeder roads 
Geneva-Petite Savanne road 
Tourism development 
Scholarships 
Trade-tourism promotion 
STABEX for bananas 
European Investment Bank risk capital 
Emergency aid 
Food aid 
NGOs 
Lomé IV 
Agricultural diversification programme 
Microprojects 
Environment programme and management 
Tourism development 
Training 
Other 
Structural adjustment programme 
European Investment Bank risk capital 
STABEX for bananas 
Food aid 
NGOs 
Fisheries Agreement 
Total - National Programmes 
Regional Cooperation 
Regional EC-financed projects from which Dominica 
benefits directly or indirectly: 
University of the West Indies 
Training in environmental and allied health 
Training in project administration (CDB) 
OECS common services 
OECS tertiary education 
Caribbean Examinations Council data processing system 
Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (CARDI) 
Caribbean Food Corporation/CFC/CATCO investment, 
marketing, inputs 
Banana marketing. Moko disease control (WINBAN) 
Regional trade promotion/development 
Customs data collection (ASYCUDA) 
Regional tourism development 
Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) 
West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO) 
Caribbean Financial Services Corporation (CFSC) risk 
capital 
ECU 
2 250 000 
177 000 
50 000 
2 893 000 
3 900 000 
225 000 
2 284 000 
239 250 
154 150 
161 500 
32 300 
613 000 
15 570 
3 535 000 
1 000 000 
500 000 
500 000 
116 000 
4 250 000 
1 120 000 
620 000 
25 000 
10 000 
1 208 000 
3 800 000 
3 548 
174 000 
371 000 
2 250 000 
250 000 
1 750 000 
500 000 
250 000 
500 000 
2 000 000 
2 500 000 
832 000 
300 810 
150 000 
2 200 000 
19 500 000 
1 150 000 
980 000 
883 000 
6 809 000 
820 000 
10 243 000 
7 100 000 
1 120 000 
10 347 000 
1 000 000 
19 859 000 
5 935 000 
6 250 000 
3 000 000 
Total ECU 
2 477 000 
7 018 000 
3 499 7.70 
5 651 000 
6 025 000 
5 556 548 
5 500 000 
2 000 000 
3 733 000 
2 200 000 
43 659 000 
(approx. 
ECS139 700 000) 
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under the Lomé IV Banana Protocol. At 
the same time a joint declaration accepts 
that the Protocol should not prevent the 
Community from establishing a single 
market in bananas. 
After lengthy negotiations, the Euro­
pean Community Council was able to 
adopt, on 12 February 1992. a regulation 
establishing a common organisation of 
the market in bananas, based on a 
proposal from the Commission which is 
consistent with EEC obligations under 
the Lomé Convention. As a result. 
Dominica, like the other ACP traditional 
banana producers, will not be placed, as 
regards access to its traditional markets 
and its advantages in those markets, in a 
less favourable situation than in the past 
or at present. The traditional quantity of 
bananas from Dominica eligible under 
the new regulation is 71 000 tonnes, 
which is the amount exported in Domi­
nica's record year. This new regulation, 
which entered into force in July 1993, will 
apply until 2002. 
In addition, the Commission has pro­
posed the establishment of a special 
system of assistance to traditional ACP 
suppliers of bananas. This is intended to 
help them meet the challenge of new 
competition from the rest of the world. 
The banana competition challenge 
While Dominica has an obvious inter­
est in maximising the benefit provided by 
the preferential banana market, there is a 
need to improve the quality and produc­
tivity of banana production, which faces 
a growing challenge from its Latin 
American competitors. Concurrently. 
Dominica's agriculture should be re­
structured so as to enhance diversifi­
cation into other crops. This is a genuine 
structural adjustment challenge sup­
ported by the EEC. 
Adjusting to the new economic 
circumstances 
The Structural Adjustment Facility 
ECU 2 million have been mobilised by 
the European Community under 
Lomé IV to support structural adjust­
ment efforts in Dominica. The on-going 
structural adjustment process on the 
island hinges on different actions, carried 
out with support from the EC. which 
pursue closely interrelated objectives: 
— agricultural diversification, for which 
ECU 2.25 million have been earmarked 
in the Lomé IV NIP: 
— improvement of quality and produc­
tivity in the banana sector, supported by 
STABEX transfers for 1990 and 1991 
(approximately ECU 830 000): 
— restoration of external and internal 
macroeconomic balances, to which gen­
eral import programme finance from the 
ECU 2 million set aside for structural 
adjustment support will contribute. 
There is an obvious need to ensure 
consistency in the use of these various 
instruments (STABEX. Structural Ad­
justment support, NIP programme). 
The need for close coordination is, in 
particular, illustrated by the decision to 
allocate local counterpart funds gene­
rated by the structural adjustment foreign 
exchange facility to projects and oper­
ations geared to agricultural diversifi­
cation. 
A preliminary study was carried out in 
September 1992 for the design of the 
structural adjustment programme. 
A follow-up study will shortly be 
conducted to define a practical agricul-
Dominica-EEC 
Fisheries Agreement 
Fish, which ignore national borders, 
will perhaps be an essential factor of 
cooperation between the French islands 
and Dominica. In the framework of its 
inundate to negotiate international 
fisheries agreements on behalf of its 
Member States, the Community has 
become actively involved in discussions 
on this subject between the Government 
of Dominica and the neighbouring 
French Departments of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. Under the agreement,
1 a 
Protocol which was initialled in Roseau 
in 13 March 1993 entitles Dominica to 
compensation from the Community in 
return for catches made in its waters by 
fishermen from the French Depart-
ments. The agreement, which also 
includes provision for research and 
training in the fisheries sector, provides 
for a total allocation of ECU 2.2 
million for three years. 
1 The agreement itself was signed in Brussels 
on 14 May 1987. but did not subsequently enter 
into force, in the absence of the Protocol. 
ture diversification programme consis­
tent with and supportive of structural 
adjustment. 
The study should also address the issue 
of the linkage between agricultural diver­
sification efforts and quality and produc­
tivity improvement measures in the 
banana sector. 
The findings and recommendations of 
the study on this latter point could 
furthermore help define the terms for 
implementation of the special prog­
ramme of assistance to ACP banana 
exporters recently proposed by the Com­
mission, if it is adopted. 
An integrated use of instruments 
This is, therefore, a new type of 
partnership between Dominica and the 
European Community, m that: 
it constitutes a shift from the tradi­
tional project approach to the more 
demanding reform-oriented policy dia­
logue; 
¡I combines the use of the various 
instruments of the Lomé Convention 
(National Programme, Structural Ad­
justment Facility, STABEX, counterpart 
funds. Banana Protocol) in ti systematic 
and more coherent manner, 'lhe total 
resources combined for this programme 
amount lo about ECU 5 million. 
Supporting Dominica's regional 
integration process 
In addition lo being a member ol' the 
Organisation ol" Eastern Caribbean 
Sttitcs and of the Caribbean Community. 
Dominica also belongs under the 
Lomé IV Convention, lo the group of 15 
ACP partners of the Caribbean forum. 
Isolation, disparity of levels ol' develop­
ment, cultural diversity and vulnerability 
to external shocks and competition are 
the main challenges which require en­
hanced solidarity and regional cooper­
ation between Dominica and its Carib­
bean partners. Lomé regional funds are 
committed to these objectives. 
Regional cooperation 
Regional and sub-regional projects 
and programmes, additional to National 
Indicative Programmes, have benefited 
Dominica within the framework of the 
EDF regional programming for t he-
Caribbean. Under Lomé I. II and III. 
Dominica derived particular benefit from 
the following regional programmes: 
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- Agriculture: Research carried out by 
the Caribbean Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (CARDI). A 
study in the area of banana marketing 
was implemented for the CARICOM 
Secretariat and a study of crop diversifi-
cation was implemented by the Agricul-
tural Diversification Coordination Unit 
of the OECS (ADCU) which is based in 
Roseau. 
— Human Resources Development : Pro-
grammes in favour of the University of 
the West Indies, the OECS Tertiary 
Education Project, which contributes to 
the elaboration of an OECS education 
reform strategy and plan and will provide 
school facilities at Clifton Dupigny Col-
lege. New programmes to be implemen-
ted include the University of the West 
Indies student accommodation project, 
which will provide halls of residence at 
each UWI campus. 
- Regional Trade Promotion Develop-
ment: Major support is being received by 
the Eastern Caribbean States Export 
Development Agency (ECSEDA) set up 
in Dominica to provide assistance to 
OECS exporters. In the area of trade 
information and statistics collection, the 
EEC has also participated in the funding 
of the Automated System for the Collec-
tion of Customs Data (ASYCUDA). 
under which computer equipment has 
been installed and is being operated at the 
new customs office in Roseau. 
- Tourism : The OECS tourism develop-
ment project launched in 1992 provides a 
three-year programme of support in 
marketing investment, policy formu-
lation, planning and training. It coordi-
nates its operations with the larger 
Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO) 
tourism development programme, which 
includes professional technical assistance 
for the development of a major marketing 
campaign in Europe for the Caribbean 
destinations including Dominica, the 
'Nature Island'. 
- Transport: Programmes in sea (West 
Indies Shipping Corporation — WISCO) 
and air transport (Leeward Islands Air 
Transport — LIAT) were implemented 
under Lomé I and II. 
The Lomé IV Caribbean Regional 
Programme (CRIP), which is being es-
tablished under the umbrella of the 
Caribbean Forum, has identified pro-
grammes in six priority areas: agricul-
ture, trade, transport and communi-
cations, environment and human re-
sources development. 
Dominica — DOM cooperation 
Through the combined use of the 
European Regional Development Fund 
allocated to the French Departments of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe, and the 
EDF regional resources for the Carib-
bean ACP countries, Dominica is trying 
to develop its trade and interregional 
cooperation with the French islands in 
the sub-region. The European Com-
munity is strongly encouraging these 
efforts. 
The regional integration process 
Beyond the horizon of sub-regional 
cooperation, Dominica, like its partners 
in the wider Caribbean, has to face the 
increased competition forced on it by the 
creation of regional trade blocs in North 
America (NAFTA), Europe (the Single 
European Market) and Latin America. It 
is the Community's vocation, due to its 
own integration experience, to help Do-
minica participate in the process of 
deepening and widening Caribbean re-
gional efforts through a policy dialogue 
which can take various forms, such as: 
— at the sub-regional level, encouraging 
the initiative of an OECS economic 
reform strategy; 
— at the regional level, helping Carib-
bean decision-makers to assess the re-
gional dimension of national adjustment 
programmes and measure the costs and 
benefits of regional integration. This 
latter topic is the subject matter of a study 
which has been undertaken using EC 
structural adjustment resources in close 
cooperation with CARICOM, the Carib-
bean Development Bank, the University 
of the West Indies, the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank and other Central Banks. 
Dominica is a part of this policy dialogue, 
which could pave the way towards a 
better understanding of the island's 
interest in supporting or otherwise the 
projected Association of Caribbean 
States.
 
4θ P.D. 
4 Grouping all the countries of the wider Carib-
bean Basin as proposed by the West Indian Commis-
sion. 
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Hope at last 
You don't choose your neighbours, 
they say. and. over the past 20 years, in 
the bad times when the déstabilisation 
operations incontrovertibly launched 
from the surrounding countries have hit 
home. Mozambique has had frequent 
occasion to brood over the fact. A look at 
the map of Africa tells the whole story — 
the 3000 km-long Mozambique is on the 
Indian Ocean close to the epicentre of the 
upheavals which have shaken this part of 
the world and are still sending their 
tremors through it. 
It really has no experience of what 
internal peace and security are. Indepen­
dence, in 1975. came after a decade of 
armed struggle to which many fell victim. 
including Eduardo Mondlane. the his­
toric leader of Frelimo. the Mozambique 
National Liberation Front. And. free of 
the Portuguese yoke and now a sanctuary 
for the anti-apartheid movements, it 
immediately came under lire from the 
white regimes of Rhodesia and South 
Africa, which fretted that black indepen­
dence might be catching and directed an 
unflagging demolition campaign at the 
new state. 
In 1976. the Rhodesians set up a special 
unit of Mozambican half-castes and 
blacks to infiltrate the ranks of the ZAPU 
and ZANU fichters and attack the 
refugee communities in the border areas. 
A few years later, the South Africans 
formed their Portuguese-speaking Buf­
falo Battalion to raid Mozambique. 
Angola and Namibia and lhe Rhodesians 
gave military and logistical support to 
Renamo. Mozambique's armed resist­
ance movement, which had started guer­
rilla warfare. Some say even now that 
Renamo was the work of the kin Smith 
regime and Afonso Dhlakama. its chief, 
docs not try to hide the fact that he had 
Rhodesia's help. How could he? But he 
took it. he says, because no-one else, not 
the British nor the Americans whose code 
of freedom he claims to share, was willing 
to help him in his crusade for democracy 
and against the communist ethic of 
Frelimo leaders. 
Wc know that happened next. Mozam­
bique's life and economy were soon at a 
32 MOZAMBIQUE 
standstill and the Government was forced 
into the humiliation of the Nkomati 
Agreements, the accords with South 
Africa whereby the two parties were to 
stop helping their respective enemies, the 
ANC and Renamo. There is peace today, 
most certainly, and detente after all the 
laboriousness of the long-drawn-out 
talks in Rome, but may it not be due in 
part to powerful South Africa's realis-
ation of the pointlessness of its policy and 
its decision to start transferring power to 
the black majority? After all, it would 
only be the last tug on strings which date 
back at least to the 19th century, because, 
for 100 years at least, Mozambique has 
borne the stamp of relations with its 
neighbours in Rhodesia and South 
Africa, who were quick to see the attrac-
tion of its pool of workers for their gold 
mines. But its claim to fame was as a 
supplier of slaves, that most abhorrent of 
trades, which developed in the 18th and 
19th centuries and survived for 50 years 
after the Portuguese abolished it officially 
in 1836. In 'Mozambique — From 
Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982', 
Allen and Barbara Isaacmandans say 
that the country supplied almost 100 000 
slaves to Brazil alone between 1817 and 
1843 and a third of Cuba's slaves over the 
same period. All in all, a million Mozam-
bicans were reduced to slavery. 
Another brand of exploitation suc-
ceeded the Negro slave trade early this 
century, when contract workers were sent 
down the gold mines of Rhodesia and 
South Africa. The policy was made 
official in an agreement between the 
colonial government of Mozambique 
(self-governing since 1752, after being 
administered from Goa in India) and the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Associ-
ation, representing the South African 
mining industry. Under it, the Govern-
ment of Mozambique was to receive 13 
shillings per worker and sixpence for 
every month worked on top of the 12 
months of the contract. In addition, they 
were to be paid half of every miner's 
wage, in gold, at a fixed rate which was 
lower than the world gold price — thus 
allowing a fine profit on resale. 
Throughout the colonial era, miners' 
wages and the profit from gold sales were 
the territory's biggest source of income. 
In 1904, Mozambique supplied most of 
the labour in the South African mines — 
50 997 of the 77 000 workers — but its 
lead narrowed consistently as the sources 
• Town of lewer than 10 000 inhabitants 
Q Town of between 10 000 and 25 000 inhabitants 
• Town of between 25 000 and 50 0OD inhabitants 
A Town of between 50 000 and 100 000 inhabitants 
■ Town of more than 100 000 Inhabitants 
ffl KM. 
of supply broadened. By 1927, the figure 
was 107 672 Mozambicans out of 215 000 
miners, going down to 100 200 out of 
413 900 in 1961. And there are around 
60 000 of them there even today, es-
timates suggest, their contracts still an 
appreciable source of income for their 
country. In Rhodesia, the Tete Agree-
ment laying down annual consignments 
of 25 000 miners was soon overtaken and 
about 100 000 Mozambican contract 
workers were taken on every year. 
The policy of exporting labour, in 
which the people most concerned had no 
say, and similar forms of coercion whose 
purpose was to supply farm workers free 
of charge to the Portuguese planters, led 
many Mozambicans to flee to the neigh-
bouring countries, with lasting effects on 
traditional farming, which both lost its 
manpower and had its strength sapped by 
the meagre prices fixed by the colonial 
administration. 
Another thing still making its effects 
felt is the dependence of Mozambique's 
ports, which are far too large for national 
needs, on the neighbouring countries' 
shipping. In 1901. a clause in the Treaty 
with Witwatersrand made the supply of 
cheap labour contingent on part of 
Transvaal's trade going through the port 
of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). By 
1917. $700 000 was being made from the 
customs handling and transit of these 
goods and, with major expansion, half of 
Transvaal's import and export trade was 
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soon passing through Lourenço Mar­
ques, making a South African satellite of 
the city and the whole of southern 
Mozambique. Beira, the main ocean 
outlet for Rhodesia and central Mozam­
bique, was more dependent on Salisbury 
(now Harare). 
The fact that Mozambique is the only 
former Portuguese territory in Africa to 
drive on the left, as they do in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (all the others, with 
Angola in the lead, like Portugal, drive on 
the right) is a sign of how involved the 
three countries are. even today. 
Financial plight 
After 14 years of rival war, hundreds ol' 
thousand ol" deaths, the incalculable 
suffering of whole populations struck by 
the life-threatening famine which came 
with the war and the demolition of 
infrastructure and all the consequences 
that flew from it. Mozambique's fighters 
have now laid down their arms. Negoti­
ations opened in Rome in 1990 and. with 
encouragement from the country's chur­
ches and the painstaking support of the 
Italian Government and the United 
Nations, thev came to a successful con­
clusion two years later. On 4 October 
1992. the Government of Mozambique 
signed a peace treaty with those who had 
recently been 'armed bandits" and the 
cease-fire came very soon after, on 
15 October. Fighters from the two sides 
were separated and billeted in camps in 
preparation for the demobilisation of all 
those not to be recruited to the new 
national army. Demobilisation was sche­
duled for completion six months later, on 
15 April, to make way for the election 
campaigns and the elections themselves 
on 15 October 1993 at the latest. 
But by mid-April the 7000-strong UN 
peace-keeping force due to supervise the 
cease-fire still had not arrived, so the 
billeting of the fighters prior to de­
mobilisation had not started and this, in 
turn, delayed the whole election process. 
The only encouraging sign was that the 
Aldo Ajello 
( V Special Representative 
in Mozambique 
cease-fire held without anyone to enforce 
it. which savs a lot for the state of mind of 
the protagonists, who were all convinced 
that they could not win on the battlefield 
and had to thrash out their differences 
around the negotiating table. Their dam­
pened ardour is of course the best 
guarantee that Mozambique will not 
suffer the fate of. say. Angola. 
Aldo Ajello. the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General, put these 
potentially disastrous delays down to 
over-optimism on the part of the negot­
iators in Rome, who had made believe 
that transition could be verv rapid; and 
to the fact that neither the Government 
nor Renamo. nor ev en the UN. was yet in 
a position to carry out its undertakings. 
The head of the peace-keeping force said 
that the UN nitide ti mistake and under­
estimated the time it would take to deploy 
its units of soldiers and civilians in 
Mozambique. 
Yet it was till predictable, tor with till 
the UN troops around the world, in 
Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, So­
malia and Angola, it was difficult to find 
the manpower and the money for more 
peace-keeping operations. The bill for a 
year of the 'restore hope' operation in 
Somalia is more than SI.2 billion and the 
cost of peace-keeping forces in Mozam­
bique for IO
1: months is S332 million. 
The stime rich countries have to put their 
hands in their pockets yet again and it is 
easy to see why some of them are not so 
keen to do so. 
At the end of April, however, the 
lumbering UN machinery finally got into 
gear, with most of the troops ready and 
the demobilisation operations at last tibie 
to go ahead. But this was counting 
without the demands of Renamo. which 
had pulled out of the supervisory com­
mittee and the three other bodies set up 
under the peace agreements, on the 
pretext that it did not have the material 
resources whether of money, housing. 
transport or office equipment to 
perform its duties properly. 
This display of temperament masked 
the real problem, the financial plight of 
Renamo. whose leader was saved in the 
nick of time by a western chancellery a 
few months ago from the wrath of a 
Geneva hotelier whose bill he could not 
pay. Afonso Dhlakama proclaims that he 
has been tricked, that a secret chiuse in 
the Rome agreements guaranteed finan­
cing to help his movement con-
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The port of Beira, with its giant  Outer-operated cranes and wharves piled high with neatly-stacked rows of containers, plays a 
crucial role in the economy of the whole Southern African region 
vert into a political party and that a 
percentage of the funds earmarked for the 
UN forces is intended to be shared out to 
finance political activity, the amount for 
Renamo even being specified. 
Promises there certainly were, al­
though certainly nowhere near the 
S100 million or S150 million Renamo has 
sometimes claimed. It is actually expect­
ing between S10 million and $15 million, 
enough to publicise itself abroad and 
recruit the technical people it so badly 
needs from amongst the expatriate Moz-
ambican communities. 
Tiny Rowland, the head of Lonrho. 
who has major interests in plantations in 
Mozambique, has put his Maputo hotel, 
the Cardoso, at Renamo's disposal for 
representatives of the committees set up 
under the peace agreement. And the 
Government says it is acting in good 
faith, claiming to have spent something 
like $500 000 on logistical support for 
Renamo as well as havina handed over 
several official houses since the end of 
April. 
Have there been other 'gifts'? Who 
knows? But after a three-month boycott, 
Renamo was back on the supervisory 
committee at the beginning of June and, a 
fortnight later, the UN Special Rep­
resentative announced the opening of the 
first three billeting/demobilisation cen­
tres. There are to be 49 in all, 29 for the 
63 000 Government soldiers and 20 for 
Renamo's 21 000 underground fighters. 
But the camps — two (one for each side) 
in the province of Nampula and one in 
the province of Zambeze — are opening 
more than eight months after the date laid 
down in the Rome agreements. This has 
prompted government authorities and 
guerrilla leaders alike to say that the 
elections cannot be held before mid-1994 
and that this is bound to have financial 
implications. 
It costs roughly $1 million per day to 
keep the UN's peace-keeping forces in 
operation. There are already 5000 men in 
the field, with the biggest contingents 
from Bangladesh (1320) and Italy (1039), 
followed by Zambia and Uruguay (820 
each) and Botswana (720). Logistical and 
technical support is being provided by 
other countries including Portugal, Ar­
gentina and Japan (only its second 
mission abroad since the end of World 
War II). The original S332 million allo­
cation will not last long at this rate and it 
will once more be a case of relying on the 
generosity of western funders to provide a 
top-up, possibly in excess of S100 million. 
The second problem is demobilisation 
itself. Many of the fighters are unhappy 
with the idea of leaving the relative 
comfort of the towns to go first to the 
camps and then back to their villages, 
armed with only a few farm implements 
and a couple of months" rations. At 
Maputo airport, in early April, we saw 
one of them trying to escape. There is no 
other word for it. The sentry had to fire 
into the air to stop a government soldier 
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Daniel Tembe 
Minister of Trade 
who was running away, refusing to board 
a plane due to take him and his com­
panions from the familiar surroundings 
of the capital far away to a demobilis­
ation camp at the other end of the 
country. 
The national army is just as much of a 
problem. The Rome agreements fixed on 
a force of 30 000 men (24 000 in the army. 
3000 in the navy and 3000 in the air 
force), consisting of equal numbers of 
Government troops and Renamo figh­
ters, and the UN suggestion is that only 
6000 of Renamo's 21 000 combatant's 
need to be demobilised because 15 000 of 
them have to go to th&nevv Mozambican 
army. However, although there is no 
doubt as to the bravery of these men. they 
have given ample proof that their training 
is well below the level of troops in the 
Government ranks, where officers have 
often trained at military academies in the 
developed world. And how can officers 
and NCOs be trained for the navy and the 
air force in onlv a few months
0 
The dividends of peace 
Another major problem is the fate of 
the 4.5 million deslocados, the displaced 
persons, some of them refugees abroad, 
who will not go home unless the rural 
areas are safe. Many of Mozambique's 
roads are still mined, of course, but there 
is currently only one mine disposal 
brigade, a Community-financed team 
advancing at the rate of 2-3 km per dav 
along the 890 km of priority roads to be 
cleared so emergency aid can get through. 
And there are thousands of km of tracks 
and fields where mines will go on claiming 
victims for years to come, because the 
erstwhile enemies can no longer re­
member where they buried their lethal 
devices. 
That is not all. Not only is the 
countryside dangerous. It is also now 
lacking in any form of social infrastruc­
ture. 3995 rural schools. 68% of the 1983 
total, have been damaged or destroyed. 
1100 health centres pillaged and ab­
andoned and thousands of wells dyna­
mited. Deputy Planning Minister Tomas 
Salomão, who puts damage done be­
tween 1978 and 1990 at $50 billion, says 
that reconstruction must focus on the 
rural areas, the only places which can 
quickly be made fit to house the millions 
of Mozambicans displaced by the count­
ry's interminable conflict. But where is 
the money coming from'.' 'The foreign 
donors can help us and indeed they are 
already doing so. but there are limits to 
what we can ask. We have to bear the 
brunt of it ourselves.' he says. 
Like other political leaders. Tomas 
Salomão is counting on the dividends ol' 
peace, starting with agricultural recovery, 
to finance reconstruction. With the end of 
the region's worst drought for decades 
and the countryside at peace again, 
Mozambique could soon return to the 
position of self-sufficiency in food which 
it lost in the early 1980s. It could also do 
something about its annual trade deficit. 
Last year, for example, it exported $10 
million-worth of goods and imported 
$900 million-worth, but. 'with peace, our 
exports could be up tit the $500 or 
600 million-mark." ventures Daniel 
Tembe, the Trade Minister and National 
Authorising Officer for the EDE. 
But peace alone will not suffice. Rapid 
reconstruction of some of the infrastruc­
ture -is called for -17 of the 23 tea 
processing plants were wiped out. for 
example — if the countrv· is to boost its 
export capacity of traditional products 
such as tobacco, tea. cotton, sisal, sugar 
and the cashew nuts of which it was once 
the world's leading supplier. 
However, repairs are well under way in 
the transport and communications infra­
structure sector, where Mozambique 
Tomas Saloman 
Deputy Phi tmi tig Minister 
plays a crucial part in the region. The 
2.4 million-tonne capacity port of Beira is 
already back up to pre-independence 
levels, handling 1.3 million l of the 
5 million t of food aid sent to Southern 
Africa last year and notching up $15 mil­
lion in profits. The giant, computer-
operated cranes, the thousands of con­
tainers in neat rows along the quays, the 
packaging facilities which can bag 60 I ol' 
grain per hour and the plan for a 
2.5 million t oil terminal tire proof of the 
unique place which this port occupies in 
the economy of the nation and the whole 
region. Beira and the other two ports. 
Maputo and Nacala. and the railways 
linking them to Zimbabwe, Malawi, 
Zambia and South Africa, form the 
network which makes Mozambique one 
of the key countries in this pari of Allieti. 
But you don't choose your neighbours, 
as we said before. Take another look tit 
the map of Southern Africa. Even if 
Mozambique docs manage its peaceful 
transition to democracy, countries on 
which its prosperity ultimately depends 
South Africa, that is to say. Malawi 
and even Zimbabwe, indirectly could 
be seeing serious upheavals over the 
coming years which cannot but affect its 
domestic situation. 
But for once, tit least. there is hope that 
these outbreaks will be the last to afflici 
this hard-pressed country. 
Amadou TRAORE 
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President Joaquim Chissano 
'Mozambique is not another Angola' 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, at 54, is 
a veteran of African politics. He 
helped found the Mozambique Liber-
ation Front in 1962 and was secretary 
to its first president, Eduardo Mon-
dlane. He was one of the leading 
negotiators of independence with the 
Portuguese authorities in 1974 and the 
obvious choice for Prime Minister of 
the Government of Transition whose 
job it was to prepare for the break-
away. In 1975, after independence, he 
became Foreign Minister and, firmly 
entrenched in the post, represented his 
country abroad for II years, investing 
all his verve and rare linguistic talents 
(he is equally at home in Portuguese, 
French and English) in a moderate, 
realistic approach to diplomacy which 
was in complete contrast with the more 
radical style fashionable in Maputo at 
the time. 
In 1986, when President Samora 
Machet was killed in a (still un-
explained) flying accident, Joaquim 
Chissano took over. At the fourth and 
fifth Frelimo congresses, he helped 
engineer the change of ideology which 
led to the liberalisation of the 
economy, the development of the 
private sector and, later on, a new 
constitution setting up a multiparty 
system. 
However, the guerrilla movement 
launched by Renamo at the end of the 
1970s, initially with encouragement 
from Rhodesia and then, after the 
independence of Zimbabwe, from 
South Africa, gained ground through-
out this period, to the point where it 
brought the country's economic ac-
tivity to a halt. After fruitless attempts 
at settlement, direct negotiations be-
tween the Government and Renamo in 
Rome in October 1992 were successful 
and a peace agreement, opening the 
way to free elections under UN con-
trol, was forged. 
In this interview with The Courier, 
President Chissano talks about the 
difficulties of the post-agreement era 
and the country's longer-term pro-
spects. 
>· Mr President, the fighting has stop-
ped, but is peace as irreversible as the 
people like to think ? 
- Yes, I think they all do believe that 
peace is here to stay, for they all want 
peace and they are all doing their utmost 
to see it is consolidated. We have ap­
pealed to society at large, to all social 
organisations, churches included, to 
work for the consolidation of peace. A 
whole new state of mind is being created. 
But Mozambique is not an island and 
external influences could still come and 
change the course of things. If it was only 
up to us. however, the peace process 
would be irreversible. 
► But hasn 't your situation got a lot in 
common with the situation in Angola, Mr 
President, and aren 't you worried that the 
vinte terrible things might happen here? 
- Angola had elections before the 
conditions were right. The soldiers hadn't 
been demobilised and the country hadn't 
had time to set up a solid national army 
Ä'hich was united and not mixed up in 
politics. There were still close ties between 
the political parties and their partisans in 
the army at the time the elections were 
held. We don't want that happening here 
and we have been working to avoid it ever 
since the negotiations in Rome. We want 
a proper national army, which sticks to 
the constitution and the law, under the 
leadership of a Head of State who 
believes in peace and would be in no 
position to use the armed forces to 
overturn the regime even if he wanted to. 
And the domestic situation in Angola 
wasn't as provided for in the agreement, I 
believe, because there were still many 
unsolved problems and many fighters in 
the underground forces. 
►· Are you learning from Angola's 
mistakes ? 
— Not exactly, because we chose a way 
which enabled us to find answers to the 
sort of problems Angola stumbled over. 
Angola did not have enough time. And 
perhaps our process started the other way 
round, because we had discussions and 
changed the constitution before the 
negotiations with Renamo and we 
worked on the law on parties while those 
negotiations were going on. We already 
had a preliminary draft electoral law too. 
It was the basis for the discussions in 
Rome and we are going to pick it up again 
now. The political parties have been 
formed. So things are moving more 
slowly in this country, but everything is 
being covered. 
> All this cumbersome UN machinery 
is so difficult to get going here, isn 't it ? Is it 
the only way of consolidating peace? 
— Renamo only has confidence in the 
UN, unfortunately, which is why we 
agreed to call the Organisation in. We 
knew that UN machinery could grind 
slowly, because we had seen it working in 
other parts of the world. That is exactly 
what we expected. But we never expected 
it to take so long to get here. 
i> Is it delayed because money is short ? 
— My belief is that it is late because of 
the way it works. When we signed the 
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agreement, we expected to see UN troops 
arrive here a month later, in accordance 
with suggestions by the UN representat-
ives who came to observe at the negoti-
ations. But now the plan cannot be put 
into operation, although it was an emer-
gency, with the ceasefire to be kept up and 
peace maintained, and it cannot wait for 
all the palaver in the Security Council or 
the debates in the General Assembly or 
the discussions in the Budget Committee, 
where they really do take their time. 
Mercifully, for the past six months, we 
ourselves have managed to have the 
ceasefire respected here in Mozambique 
without the help of the UN peace-keeping 
forces, but if it had happened anywhere 
else, peace would have been shattered 
long ago. 
> With all these delays, when do you 
think the elections can take place now? 
- We shall sec. The electoral law will 
decide the date. We are doing the ground-
work for the elections at the moment, but 
the signs are that they will not take place 
before June 1994. 
Many of Mozambique's people have 
done nothing hut fight for the past 
14 years. Arc they going to be willing to lay 
down their arms for ι he hard job of making 
a living from their devastated land? 
- What the soldiers want Govern-
ment soldiers at least — is to settle down 
as civilians and have a job. so we have set 
up a resettlement committee to look after 
demobbed soldiers, \refugees and dis-
placed persons. The effort which the 
Government is making, in accordance 
with the peace agreement, has the support 
of the international community too. But 
the Government cannot do it all and we 
have made a general appeal for help with 
finding projects which will make it easier 
to reintegrate the soldiers. Wc arc also 
encouraging the soldiers to help themsel-
ves. As a one-time national freedom 
fighter myself. I have helped set up an 
association for demobbed soldiers, which 
will be looking after former Renamo 
guerrillas too. forming an interest group 
of something like 100 000 people. It will 
be running personal initiative schemes 
and we have already applied for financial 
support for them from such institutions 
as the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank. 
■> Finance - - just where the shoe 
pinches. Never before have the rich coun-
tries heen called upon for so much help and 
every crisis, ultimately, costs money, be it 
in Russia, the former Yugoslavia or 
Somalia. With resources in such short 
supply, what priority do you think will be 
given to Mozambique's projects '.' 
- Our projects will have whatever 
priority they get. That is all there is to it. 
And we shall be very grateful for any 
assistance we are given. Time and time 
again, we have said that donors will 
always give priority to whatever affects 
them most. A.nd as there is every interest 
in stabilising the situation in central 
Europe, they will tend to give that part of 
the world priority and think about Africa 
afterwards. So we are looking at a 
different formula which does not involve 
relying on charity and waiting for hand-
outs and we are trying to encourage 
private investment by Mozambican in-
terst groups. That will be quite another 
picture for the donors. 
«The elections will not 
take place before June 
1994» 
The Government is not the only one 
worried about the lack of financing, is it? 
Renamo loo is complaining about not 
receiving the promised funds and thinking 
it has been betrayed by the donors. 
I don't think Renamo is right here. 
It's too early to start complaining that 
promises haven't been kept. The con-
ference in Rome was only three months 
ago and it wouldn't be reasonable to start 
saying that the donors haven't stuck to 
their commitments yet. The plan was for 
the funds to be released when the soldiers 
were demobbed, in particular to help 
them settle down again in ordinary 
society. But they haven't been demobbed 
yet. 
■ How much are we talking about'? 
The figure mentioned in Rome was 
more than $200 million. 
Assuming that you can complete the 
process vou have got under way, how do 
vou see the future for Mozambique in a 
Southern Africa in the throes of change ? 
- Mozambique is one of the kev 
countries of the region and. with peace on 
our side, there will bea transformation. Il 
is worth remembering that even while the 
war was going on. we were able to 
continue providing a service to the 
countries in the region. We have airead} 
modernised and rebuilt the Maputo-
Zimbabwe railway — a difficult job and 
all done during the civil war and 
rebuilt the railway and the road between 
Beira and Zimbabwe. We have rehabili-
tated and modernised the port ot" Beira. 
we are doing the stime for the ports of 
Maputo and Nacala and we have com-
pleted more than half of the Nacala-
Malawi railway. We did till that during 
the war. With peace, we shall be tibie to 
do a lot more. 
Our countrv has always had great 
agricultural potential. If we can get 
everyone's shoulders to the wheel, wc 
shall be tibie to produce enough to feed 
ourselves and to export too which will 
be a good thing for the balance of 
payments tuut our per capita income. We 
think we can manage this in ten years til 
the most, hut some people say thai, tit the 
present rate of progress, it won't take 
anything like that long. 
You have been President lor nearly 
eight years now. haven't vou.' Will vou be 
standing again in the nest presidential 
elections'? 
I tun always being asked to stand 
again, but the parly siili litis lo meet In 
decide whether I should. Sonic people m 
the party take it as read, let me tell you. 
but I shall only stand if I am asked to 
stand, in the same way as 1 was askciì lo 
take lhe country's destiny in hand all 
those years ago. Thev till think I am going 
to stand, but we shall have to wait for the 
party to meet and discuss il. If the part} 
decided to pul up another candidale. I 
should be just as happy to suppuri him... 
You have led Mozambique through 
some hard times, haven't you.' 
- Very hard. 1 have been a member ol 
the party's leadership ever since ¡ι was 
formed 1 was elected to the central 
committee when 1 was 23. What we need 
arc candidates who tire worthy of the 
people's confidence and who devote 
themselves to the people's wellbeing. 1 
shall have the strength to wait for man} 
of those candidates to appear, howevci 
long it takes. 
Interview bv Α.Τ 
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Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO leader 
'We shall respect the voters' verdict' 
In pure guerrilla tradition, Maringue, the RENAMO 
headquarters, is out in the bush, an hour's flying time ft 
Beira. 
'om 
The Red Cross plane, the only aircraft authorised to 
touch down there, comes to a halt at the end of the 
overgrown runway, near the old 20-seater biplane which 
crafty South Africans recently managed to palm off onto 
the RENAMO for $500 000 and which has never flown 
since it was delivered. 
Paul Domingos, the chief RENAMO negotiator at the 
talks in Rome, bursts out of the yellowing savannah on a 
motorcycle to greet you. You are then guided along a 
narrow path, 50 cm wide at most, and after a good five 
minutes' walk, emerge into a huge, shady clearing, fringed 
with towering trees and dotted with houses and a large, 
straw-roofed rectangular hut — the meeting room. 
By chance, or by organised coincidence, Afonso 
Dhlakama, the President of the RENAMO, has called all 
the men in charge of the movement to Maringue that very 
day for a briefing, which he obligingly interrupts to receive 
the European Parliament delegation, headed by Henri 
Saby, the Chairman of the Development Committee. He 
introduces his RENAMO staff, who are proud to see that 
such guests have gone to the trouble of coming so far to talk 
to their leader. 
After the talk, Mr Dhlakama answered questions put by 
The Courier. 
► Mr Dhlakama, you now have to 
transform a guerilla organisation into a 
political party. How is this being done? 
Well, we have already started 
changing our movement into a political 
party but we're running into a problem of 
resources, namely money. As a political 
party we need to have representatives in 
the different European countries so that 
we can explain our policies, something we 
never really had the chance to do during 
the fighting because we were isolated 
here. Only the voice of the government 
was heard, and this spread disinform­
ation in the international community. 
The signing of the Rome agreement gave 
us international recognition, so it's easier 
to send delegates to represent us outside 
the country, although the lack of money 
is a very serious problem. But this change 
is taking place, indeed we can say that 
Renamo is in fact a political party since it 
has signed an agreement with the govern­
ment, an agreement setting out various 
principles that were agreed. The govern­
ment is the party holding power and 
Renamo is in opposition. The agreement 
confers on Renamo the status of a 
political party. 
► You referred to a lack of money. 
Who gives you money at present? 
— Nobody gives us money, that's why 
things are so bad. Nobody gives money to 
Renamo — if you could see how we live, I 
tell you some of our followers, our 
fighting men, go barefoot and in rags, 
they don't have anything at all. I'm telling 
you that we don't have telephones or fax 
machines for our representatives. There's 
no money. If someone was giving us 
money, we wouldn't have to endure these 
conditions. We don't even have the 
basics. 
► Is this why you recalled your rep-
resentatives in Maputo a few weeks ago? 
— Actually, this was not a question of 
money but of the whole process itself. I 
called my Maputo representatives here, 
provincial delegates are here as well, as 
you can see, together with the heads of the 
committees at Maputo for this meeting 
here, which is very, very useful. We are 
reviewing everything that's happened 
since the signing, the violation of the 
agreement, all the problems we have, and 
we are considering our strategy to make 
sure that our brothers in the government 
and Frelimo, and in the international 
community, help to resolve all these 
problems. That's why we're gathered 
here. 
After the meeting, the delegations and 
committees will return to Maputo to 
continue their efforts to find solutions for 
our problems. 
► Mr Dhlakama, the timetable agreed 
in Rome for the transition to democracy 
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seems to be slipping. Do you share that 
view.' 
No. What I mean is that the Rome 
agreement has been violated by Frelimo. 
It's been violated in various ways. For 
instance. Frelimo is putting, or has 
already put. some army battalions in the 
police force, which means that the police 
force is not independent of parties — it 
will continue to be the instrument of a 
party, as it always has been. It has always 
been an organ of the Frelimo party. This 
is one of the government's violations. 
There are others. Under the Rome 
agreement, Frelimo said it would provide 
Renamo with accommodation, trans­
port, communications, etc.. but the 
government has not done sc. To this day 
we haven't got proper representation 
throughout the country for this reason, or 
even accommodation for myself. 1 stay on 
here in the bush because the government 
hasn't provided the right conditions in 
Maputo. The fact that the government is 
not cooperating means that it is violating 
the agreement. But we are patient, we 
know that the government is nervous and 
that it was forced to accept democracy, 
freedom and elections. Frelimo didn't 
want this, it's uneasy. But we understand, 
we won't give up, we're going to make 
them understand that this is what de­
mocracy means. 
I'· From vour point of view, is the war 
really over or will the fighting start again if 
implementation of the agreement is held 
up? 
- I say no. I believe that there will 
never again be war in Mozambique. I 
believe this because only Renamo or 
Frelimo can wage war. If one provokes 
and the other responds, there is war. But 
if one always provokes and the other 
avoids reacting, there is no war. If we 
wanted war. we would have started it 
already because we've been provoked by 
the government on a number of occa­
sions. I said in Rome, on the day of the 
signing, that Renamo's guerillas would 
never resume the fighting, and I have 
repeated this message to ambassadors 
and to the United Nations. And 1 
reiterate it now. There will not be war 
unless in the future some third party or 
other people start a third war - but I 
think that fair, universal and democratic 
elections are the only way of stopping 
wars. But in this time of transition. 
Renamo is having to put up with these 
government tricks. There won't be a war 
such as the one in Aneóla - that's a 
terrible situation and people are still 
dying. That's why we are doing every­
thing we can. not to react to the govern­
ment's provocations, so that there won't 
be war. 
► Many people do indeed fear a rep-
etition of the Angolan situation in Mozam-
bique. Can von give assurances that, if you 
lost the elections, which is a possibility. you 
would respect the voters' verdict? 
- Certainly. Our principles are de­
mocratic principles. We know the con­
sequences of elections. We did not fight 
for power, we fought for democracy. If 
we lost the elections, we'd bow to the 
principle of democracy and recognise any 
party, whether it was the government or 
another party. We'd agree to go into 
opposition as long as the elected govern­
ment also recognised the importance of 
the opposition, the rights of the oppo­
sition; we wouldn't have any problem 
with that. But we should like to ask the 
government in turn to be patient if it loses 
the elections. After all. they are used to 
governing. They've been in power for 17 
years. They won't find it easy to respect 
Renamo when it wins the elections. 
> Do you have a programme of govern-
ment yet? 
- Well, we do have our programme, 
our general principles, but right now we 
tire working on our government's de­
velopment programme. If Renamo were 
elected, what it would do in the fields of 
health, education, the economy, trans­
port, finance, and till that. Our people are 
drawing up our ideas for each sector and 
department and soon they will be pub­
lished. 
> Mr Dhlakama. many of the officials 
you introduced today seem very young and 
inexperienced. Will they be able to rise to 
the challenge of governing Mozambique? 
— As regards government, running the 
part}·, taking part in elections, assuming 
office and governing on the basis of my 
democratic programme. I think that we 
are prepared. As regards my age. I don't 
think it affects my leadership. I started 
this struggle when 1 was verv young and I 
don"t see why it should be a problem. It's 
up to the people. If the people elect me. I 
shall carry out my programme. I think I 
could well be the first young African 
leader to govern democratically because 
I'd like to tell vou. Renamo is the first 
part}' of struggle in Allieti that was 
created to bring democracy to Africa. 
This is very important. I'll be the first 
such young leader in Africa; il will serve 
as an example for till the other African 
countries. 
► Won 't one of Renamo 's first tiisks ¡is 
a political party be to try to make its 
African neighbours forget its ¡hist links 
with Rhodesia and South Allieti '.' 
- This isn't a problem, no problem tit 
all. The past is the past. We did have a 
little help from Rhodesia but circum­
stances dictated this. We received their 
aid — I'd have liked to receive aid from 
the United States of America. Portugal. 
France and Brittiin, but the} didn't give 
us any, despite the fact that wc were 
defending the stime principles thai thev 
uphold: freedom, democracy and justice. 
Those governments made a mistake and 
so wc litui lo turn to Rhodesia and Sonili 
Africa for aid in the past, but that's a long 
time ago. Now that Renamo is a party 
among other parties we don't have links 
that could have implications for the party 
as was the case in the past. 1 don't think 
there is a problem 
► One last question. How do you 
explain the fad thai people in the areas you 
control, such as Inhaminga, are so de-
sperately poor that they even lack clo-
thing? 
Well, this is the situation we touched 
on earlier, the faci that people arc living 
in conditions of great hardship. Everyone 
living in our areas is suffering great 
hardship. It's dreadful in view of the fact 
that there are countries in Europe that 
make clothing or other things, pul them 
in warehouses and then destroy them 
when thev arc out of date, so thev do not 
have anything to send us. Here there are 
people who tire forced to use trcebark and 
such like. These conditions tire hard but 
the people are courageous and still 
believe in the future. And I as their leader. 
their long-standing leader. I tell them to 
look to the future. The present is full of 
suffering but in future there mav bc a 
better life, with clothes, soap and food. 
These people are hopeful. The end of the 
war has given them hope and so has the 
prospect of democracy. 
Interview bv Α.T 
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EEC-Mozambique cooperation 
by Glauco CALZUOLA * 
Mozambique, undermined by 16 years 
of civil war and the worst drought 
Southern Africa has seen this century, has 
just embarked upon a process of de­
mocratic transition scheduled to lead the 
country to its first multiparty elections. 
This follows the peace agreement signed 
by the Government and the Renamo 
opposition movement in October 1992. 
The path to democracy is slow and beset 
with obstacles of all kinds, but the 
Government is determined. It will call on 
external assistance if it has to, but it is also 
counting on the people themselves to 
transform Mozambique into a democ­
ratic, viable nation. 
It is to help it pick up this twofold — 
structural and short-term — challenge, 
that the European Community's aid (all 
instruments) is focused on four priorities. 
i.e. schemes to support the economic and 
social recovery programme (the PRES), 
regional development in Southern Africa 
(SADC). humanitarian reliefin emergen­
cies and a support programme for the 
post-war period. 
Community aid began shortly after 
independence. Initially (1978-1985). the 
EEC used the Commission's own funds 
to meet immediate needs in a country 
which was embarking on a process of 
independence hampered by the destabil­
ising effects of civil war. Since that time, 
with the signing of Lomé III (December 
1984) and Lomé IV (December 1989), the 
EEC has acknowledged the effects of the 
war. and recently the drought, by both 
providing assistance for a country which 
has nothing and helping cater for and 
manage the future through structural 
adjustment funds and support for de­
velopment strategies to reflect its par­
ticular needs. All in all, about ECU 393 
million has gone into 119 schemes under 
Lomé III and Lomé IV since 1985. 
Add to this the exceptional aid, food 
aid. NGO cofinancina and schemes ,_ 
financed as part of cooperation with the s 
non-associated developing countries " 
prior to the signing of Lomé III and H 
Mozambique has had more than ECU 
900 million-worth of Community re­
sources to date. 
Trade and commercial 
cooperation 
The country's economic performance 
very much depends on international trade 
and the Lomé preferential trade agree­
ments guaranteeing access to the Com­
munity market are important to the 
national economy, because they cover 
29% of its trade. In 1991, the European 
Community accounted for 28% of Moz­
ambique's exports and 29% of its im­
ports. 
The Community also encourages trade 
in Mozambique and all other ACPs with 
trade promotion measures and Stabex, its 
export revenue stabilisation fund. 
It has financed stands for Mozambique 
firms at international trade fairs and 
other events in Europe and Africa since 
1988 and has channelled a total of ECU 
22.7m-worth of Stabex support 
(Lomé III and Lomé IV) into the tea. 
copra, cotton and cashew nut sectors. But 
the results, alas, are still not very good. 
Despite the Government's economic 
liberalisation programme, trade develop­
ment is hampered by the enormous 
institutional constraints of hefty state 
centralism, combined with a formal 
economic sector which is dependent on 
inefficient state companies and a civil war 
which is paralysing the economy and 
preventing foreign investment. 
Development aid 
More than 45% of Mozambique's aid 
comes from the EEC and the Member 
States, making the European Community 
one of the country's biggest sources of 
assistance. 
The Community alone (Commission 
+ EIB) has provided ECU 928m. most of 
it (97%) in the form of grants, since this 
cooperation began, with 47% going to 
the national indicative programmes. 
* Acting EEC delegate. Mozambique. 
The EEC granted some ECU 56m towards the rehabilitation of the port of Beira, an 
important transit point for exports from the landlocked countries of the region 
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A sizable part of EEC aid to Mozambique consists of emergency aid to the 
population in need. Here the acting Delegate of the Commission Glauco Calzuolo 
(2
nd from left) is pictured with Euro MPs, Mrs Braun-Moser, Mr Saby and Mr 
Laroni (first from the right), in front of a relief aircraft supplied by the Community 
and operated by the Red Cross 
financing for regional projects of direct (ECU 5m). in Inhambane (ECU 4.5m) 
benefit to Mozambique and schemes run 
as part of cooperation with non-as­
sociated countries. Food aid accounted 
for 33% and EIB loans for 3% and the 
rest (17%) was emergency aid. refugee 
relief. Stabex transfers. NGO projects 
and other operations under specific-
budget lines (AIDs control, hunger in the 
world etc.). 
National indicative and regional pro­
grammes and the early projects (aid for 
non-associated countries) focused on 
rural development and self-sufficiency in 
food, transport and, communications, 
social development, support for the 
balance of payments and the support 
programme for the post-war period, all of 
which are priority areas. 
Rural development and fisheries 
This has been a Community aid 
priority since cooperation with Mozam­
bique began and Lomé IV has merely 
confirmed and clarified the ideas outlined 
before. 
The focus is on three main areas -
irrigation, integration (farming and fish­
ing) programmes and technical cooper­
ation (institutional support). Integrated 
development programmes have been 
sited in the province of Cabo Delgado 
and in the Moamba area (a total of ECU 
12m). with the aim of improving produc­
tion and the marketing of both agricul­
tural produce and artisanal fishermen's 
catches along the coast. A fourth project 
is being run in the Chimoio region (ECU 
7.1m) to get local potato production 
moving again. The indicative program­
mes have also included an important 
artisanal fishing scheme in the Inham­
bane area (ECU 7.5m) and institutional 
support for the sector. 
The results and problems of implemen­
tation of all these projects are similar, 
because, when the rural operations were 
designed, insecurity in the area was such 
that not enough was known about the 
real situation there. Then, the fact that 
there were too many projects led to 
activities being scattered and difficult to 
coordinate and the various project 
leaders were not equally efficient. Anoth­
er important thing is that all the Com­
munity's emergency aid and refugee relief 
has been for people in rural areas or in 
outlying areas around the towns. 
Transport and communications 
This is of great importance when it 
comes to ensuring the country's econ­
omic and political integration and open­
ing up the SADC countries to give them 
access to international markets. Rehabili­
tation of port, rail and road infrastruc­
ture is one of Mozambique's priorities 
and a large percentage of international 
aid is channelled into this sector. The 
Community is involved here too. trans­
port being a focal sector of the country's 
national indicative programmes and the 
SADC regional indicative programmes. 
A total of ECU 114m has been mobilised 
for a series of projects the biggest of 
which are the Beira port rehabilitation 
scheme (ECU 56m). the railway modern­
isation schemes in Nacala (ECU 25m) 
and Limpopo (ECU 15m) and the emer­
gency rehabilitation of the Beira-Inchope 
road (ECU 5.7m). Three further projects 
to rehabilitate a total 440 km of road 
(Nampula-Nacala, Boane-Sabie and 
Beira-Inchope) are currently being as­
sessed. The EEC is also financing a 
general study of transport and communi­
cations in Southern Africa, with a view to 
shaping a strateg}· for the coming years 
which reflects the new socio-economic 
realities and trends in the South African 
situation. 
Social development 
A number of Community schemes 
have been run in this area to rehabilitate 
war-damaged schools and various health 
centres and dispensaries. Because of the 
local insecurity, these were small, in­
dividual operations, but two large-scale 
projects are now under way too a rural 
telecommunications scheme (ECU 13m) 
and a study of repairs to health centres at 
national level. In particular, this latter 
scheme should make it possible to restore 
and maintain a basic level of services and 
ultimately ensure that treatment is avail­
able to till those living in rural areas. 
Aid for the balance of payments 
Mozambique has been trying hard to 
straighten out its economy through the 
PRES, the economic and social recovery 
programme which the Government 
brought out in 1987. and the Community 
has backed its action with: 
two sectoral import programmes, 
worth ECU 70m (Lomé III), aimed at 
encouraging imports of raw materials 
and intermediate products to stimulate 
local agricultural and industrial produc­
tion: 
— a general import programme, worth 
ECU 54.7m (Lomé IV). a substantial pari 
of it for petroleum products. 
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Emergency programme for the post-war 
period 
The Commission told the funders' 
conference in Rome (15-16 September 
1992) that it would be helping Mozam­
bique in this transitional phase leading up 
to the country's first multi-party elections 
by providing ECU 72m for five areas — 
the elections, demobilisation, the resettle­
ment of refugees, displaced persons and 
demobilised soldiers, the provision of 
social services and the rehabilitation of 
the basic infrastructure. Despite the 
efforts of the various parties involved, 
there are still many impediments to the 
peace process. However, the Commu­
nity's programme to provide medical 
assistance, distribute seed and other 
agricultural inputs and rehabilitate wells 
in rural areas to enable refugees and 
displaced persons to be resettled is taking 
practical shape with specific schemes to 
be run by NGOs. The Commission is 
currently financing technical assistance 
to help the Government in its difficult 
task of preparing the census and the 
elections — the equipment for which is  Mine-clearing operation funded by the 
Community aid to Mozambique (summ 
(30.04.93) 
Cooperation with non-associated countries 
Lomé III (6th EDF): 1985-1990 
National indicative programme 
Project allocation 
Special schemes for countries in 
Risk capital (EIB) 
Emergency aid and refugee relief 
Stabex 
Regional programme 
Lomé IV (7th EDF): 1991-1995 
National indicative programme 
Project allocation 
Structural adjustment 
Risk capital (EIB) 
Emergency aid and refugee relief 
Stabex 
Regional programme 
Non-Convention aid 
Food aid (1984-1992) 
Cofmancing with NGOs 
Support for victims of déstabilisation 
AIDS control 
Hunger campaign 
Human rights and démocratisation 
Other emergency aid 
debt 
Transfers related to fisheries agreements 
Total financial assistance 
EEC - Mozambique 
(all instruments): 
130 000 000 
30 000 000 
15 000 000 
30 760 539 
21 451 157 
65 333 700 
154 000 000 
30 000 000 
22 000 000 
22 163 000 
1 268 604 
7 650 000 
314 354 000 
9 112 150 
13 548 000 
3 373 000 
1 500 000 
580 000 
14 485 000 
ary) 
ECU 33 521550 
ECU 292 545 396 
ECU 237 081 604 
ECU 314 354 000 
ECU 7 980 000 
ECU 927 980 700 
also to be provided by the EEC. Studies 
are being run to decide on the rehabili­
tation priorities for the roads used to 
bring in food aid and medical assistance 
and the Commission is financing a 
programme to de-mine what the Red 
Cross and the WFP have designated as 
priority roads. 
Non-programme aid 
Food aid 
Agricultural output has dwindled be­
cause of the civil war, nationwide inse­
curity and the drought of the last few 
years. The food shortfall is now about 
600 000-700 000 t p.a. Food aid from the 
Community, currently accounting for 
33% of EEC allocations to Mozambique, 
is of fundamental importance in that it 
represents 40% of the volume of all 
external food aid. The rains returned in 
late 1992 and the Commission, which is 
anxious to revive domestic production, is 
now concentrating more on obtaining 
agricultural products and seed locally. 
Cereal market buffer stocks are also 
being financed under the Community 
programme for 1993 (approximately 
ECU 40m). which combines conven­
tional supplies from the European 
market with local purchases and special 
school-hospital canteen operations and 
will be meeting the food requirements of 
about 120 000 demobilised soldiers and 
their dependents over a period of six 
months. 
This outline of Community aid to 
Mozambique is not complete as it stands, 
because, in addition to the contributions 
mentioned above, the following have also 
been provided : 
— various forms of emergency aid and 
aid for displaced persons, mainly in the 
form of medical and humanitarian assist­
ance schemes, usually run through MSF. 
the ICRC and other NGOs (ECU 
51.6m); 
— various schemes cofinancée with 
NGOs (ECU 10m); 
— various health education and emer­
gency aid schemes in rural areas and 
around the towns to help the victims of 
déstabilisation (ECU 13.5m): 
— an AIDS control support programme; 
— a contribution to the tsetse fly control 
programme which is part of the campaign 
against world hunger (ECU 1.5m); 
— three projects (a cotton factory and 
vegetable cannery, the Matóla cement 
works and an ECU 15m line of credit to 
finance SM Es) financed by the EIB. : 
G.C. 
The Courier no. 140 Julv-Augusl 1993  43 Development from a different angle 
Trainees in the Directorate-General 
for Development decided to organise 
their own study trip to one of the ACP 
countries, the first venture of this kind. 
They went to Senegal. They describe 
their impressions, particularly of the 
Community cooperation projects and 
programmes there, in this article. 
In November 1992. trainees in 
DG VIII who were anxious to get first­
hand knowledge of the dynamics of 
cooperation between the ACP States and 
the Commission of the European Com­
munities got together and formed a Study 
Trip to Senegal Committee. Thus nine 
young graduates of different nationalities 
(German, Austrian, Belgian. British and 
Italian) and with different training (in 
agriculture, economics, law, political 
science and development science) behind 
them were able to go out to Senegal to 
supplement the training they had received 
in the various units of the directorate. The 
range of subjects which the group covered 
was an important factor when it came to 
approaching and analysing projects. In 
the space of 30 years. Senegal has forged 
close links with the EC and. having made 
full use of all the instruments and 
financial means which the Lomé Conven­
tion provides, is a model ol'cooperation. 
Our main concern in the field was to get 
to the heart of EC cooperation: to 
financial and technical cooperation. 
There is just one programme under the 
6th EDF. the Podor Region Develop­
ment Support Programme, which covers 
agriculture, rural development, infra­
structure, microprojects. SMEs. the pro­
tection of the natural environment, 
women, health and village water en­
gineering. A visit to Podor and all these 
integrated schemes provided much food 
for thought. 
Farming is the main activity there and 
the EDF is behind the various types of 
hydro-agricultural improvements which 
have been made to meet the national 
indicative programme aims of achieving 
self-sufficiency in food and combating 
desertification. Technically speaking, 
irrigated agriculture has been a success, 
but it is a different story as far as the 
people themselves are concerned, for the 
» L 
Stockbreeding, farming and rural development are some of the areas in which tin 
Community gives assistance in the Podor region 
peasant tradition is to organise things on 
a far smaller scale and the farmers have 
found management difficult in this case. 
Rice, a staple imported (cheaply, in the 
form of broken rice) from South East 
Asia, is now grown in the Senegal River 
Valley. Agriculture in this northern part 
of the country could not always be relied 
on, but there was considerable hydraulic 
potential (the Diama and Manantali 
dams), so hydro-agricultural improve­
ments were made and intensive rice-
growing introduced, rice, a potentially 
high-yield product which is suitable for 
irrigation, being seen as the crop to make 
the investment a paying proposition and 
ensure self-sufficiency in food. But rice is 
not without its problems. For example, it 
gradually depletes the soil, makes the 
farmer dependent on input and. with 
individual ownership, undermines tradi­
tional village solidarity. There are dif­
ficulties with marketing and price fixing 
too. 
Rice-growing is in fact a major prob­
lem in Senegal. As Mr A. Vanhacverbeke. 
the Head of the EC Delegation there, told 
us. 'anyone who finds an alternative to 
rice will get the first Nobel Development 
Prize.' 
The Community has recently financed 
PREMINA. a project designed to restore 
the natural environment, combating de­
forestation by using trees (eucalyptus and 
prosepis) as windbreaks on hydro-agric­
ultural developments. Bearing in mind all 
the tidvantages, this tree planting is a 
highly essential and profitable undertak­
ing, but windbreaks spell constraints for 
the tanners, who tire not read} for them. 
The most important thing, wc think, is lo 
run education timi training schemes lo 
make the local population realise how 
importtint the environment is to sus­
tainable development. 
Two other parts of the programme 
which attracted us particularly were those 
involving SMEs and microprojects. One 
has a commercial and one a social bias 
and they complement each other ami arc 
very popular, because they tire localised, 
autonomous and flexible and the assist­
ance and credit thev provide meet a 
considerable demand. They have also 
rekindled the Senegalese spirit of enter­
prise, which had laded because such 
structures were wanting. 
A visit to a health post (a kind of village 
pharmacy, run by a nurse) tinti a health 
centre (a kind oí' hospital, staffed with 
doctors and midwives) gave us the oppor­
tunity to see the genuine improvements 
which have been made in the health sector 
- many of which tire due to active 
involvement of villagers on the Health 
Committees. The number of patients has 
gone up and medicines tire within easier 
reach. 
One big problem is still that there is nol 
enough money to appoint more doctors. 
Traditional doctors (medicine men and 
healers) arc important too. wc saw. tun: 
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modern medicine and tradi­
tional medicine usefully com­
plement each other. 
It was very clear that 
women have an important 
part to play in all these areas 
of activity. Gone are the days 
when they were willing to be 
anonymous, for now they 
want to make an active contri­
bution to development and 
they are creating jobs of their 
own alongside all their tradi­
tional duties. We were able to 
join in some of their work in 
the market garden, the health 
post and the literacy hut and 
see how keen these women are 
to be involved in development 
projects. 
This is why it is important 
for project design to take 
account of what women do in 
addition to their traditional 
duties. 
Chores like collecting water and preparing food generally 
fall to women, whatever their age — which is why 
a great deal of Community aid is directed 
towards women 
Infrastructure and technology are not 
the whole story and so we also looked at 
the activities of' die non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that work alon­
gside those engaged in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation. The first thing 
we noticed was that NGOs from the 
North are heavily represented, either as 
consultants of countries or communities 
which are ploughing in funds or as 
partners of local NGOs. The only place 
where they are not so common is in the 
inhospitable region of Fatick and the 
simple reason for this is that NGOs, like 
all funders, are hesitant to invest where 
the prospect ol' obtaining positive results 
is rather limited. Were it not for ARAF. 
the Fatick Farmers Regional Associ­
ation, the area would have no inter­
national support at all. 
This merely confirms the all-important 
role of the local NGOs as reflectors of the 
keenness of farmers and fishermen not 
only to take a direct hand in improving 
their own lot. but also to be better 
represented politically. The time of scat­
tered village associations is past and 
departmental, regional and national as­
sociations are taking over, particularly in 
the farming community. The purpose of 
FONGS. The Federation of NGOs of 
Senegal, is to improve the operation of its 
24 regional and departmental peasant 
associations and to make sure that the 
voice of the farmers is heard on the 
national political scene. In particular, it 
has taken shares in the Senegal's National 
Agricultural Credit Bank (CNCAS). 
So village organisations are not just 
emerging in this country. They are there, 
striving to suggest ways of coping with 
the terrible evils of hunger, disease, a 
deteriorating environment, poverty and 
marginalisation and gradually getting 
organised nationally to represent a poli­
tical (counter) power. Initially, it was the 
work of one or two intellectual activists 
from the rural milieu, but now the 
associations are a genuine reflection of 
what the farming community wants. Let 
us hope that all this leads to a higher 
standard of living in rural areas and 
ensures that the peasant populations take 
more responsibility for their own future. 
By the end of our trip, we had all 
realised that development cooperation is 
complex and that the human factor is the 
first thing to make it so. Cooperation 
brings two groups from different cultures 
face to face — the devisors, designers and 
implementers from the West, who are 
anxious to help raise the standard of 
living of people in the Third World, and 
the recipients, who are mainly concerned 
with their personal survival or the better­
ment of their families. Sometimes there 
are misunderstandings between these 
groups and this is something which 
experience alone can help avoid. 
Then there is the innate 
complexity of development 
projects. Plans such as those 
relating to the Podor Hydro-
Agricultural Developments 
are intluenced by a whole 
series of factors, many of them 
involving far more than the 
recipients. In the case of 
Podor, the fixing of the pur­
chase price of rice and the 
marketing of vegetables and 
cereals depend on national 
State measures based on va­
rious considerations, one of 
which is the situation of the 
farmers in that region. 
Consultation of the re­
cipients during the design and 
planning of these projects is 
limited and they are only 
really involved in the actual 
implementation (theory and 
practice). 
So there is a whole series of factors 
affecting the way the projects develop 
which have nothing to do with the 
recipients. Some of them have to do with 
national politics and others with inter­
national politics (development cooper­
ation, international trade and diplomacy) 
— which of course does not make things 
easier. 
The funders" hands are not always 
clean here either. When it comes to 
fishing agreements, there are countries 
doing what amounts to buying Senegal's 
deep waters and the country's artisanal 
fishermen are getting nothing out of it. 
Senegal is strapped for cash and delighted 
with fresh money and foreign States are 
putting domestic and trade policy before 
cooperation. 
Given all the complexity and con­
tradictions, the best projects would seem 
to be small ones which involve few people 
other than the recipients themselves. 
They involve virtually no central State 
intervention or extra-developmental fac­
tors and the only complications are 
human ones — but the long-term success 
of such projects still depends on measures 
taken by the State. 
The complexity of development 
cooperation gives food for thought, but is 
no reason not to act. Quite the opposite. 
Remembering the complexity and the 
framework in which we are working, we 
must keep our sights set on Africa and do 
what common sense dictates.' 
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Democracy and development in Africa: 
Members of the European Parliament host an international conference 
'The Committee on Development 
and Cooperation (...) considers that 
démocratisation in the African coun-
tries is a long-term process taking 
many forms and that it is not for the 
(European) Community to impose its 
own model of democracy ; at the same 
time (it) hopes that certain funda-
mental democratic and human rights 
will be universally applied and there-
fore not be violated with impunity. ' 
This sentence from an official opinion 
of the European Parliament's Develop­
ment Committee, drafted by Belgian 
member Brigitte Ernst de la Graete, puts 
in a nutshell the gist of a two-day 
conference on democracy and develop­
ment in Africa recently held in Brussels. 
The occasion was organised on 10 and 
1 1 May by Parliament's Green Group, 
the ecologists. for academics, politicians, 
civil servants and development workers 
from many European and African coun­
tries. The brief was a wide one — to look 
tit the transition to democratic forms of 
government now taking place in many 
parts of Africa, to consider whether 
outsiders, particularly the European 
countries, were entitled to interfere and 
set political conditions on the granting of 
aid. and in the final analysis to discuss 
what democracy actually was. 
Forms of democracy and 
democratic transition 
The opening speaker in a well-or­
ganised programme was Achille Mbembe. 
professor of history at the University of 
Pennsylvania and contributor to the 
French current affairs weekly. Le Monde 
Diplomatique. Developments in sub-
Saharan Africa, he said, were not neces­
sarily signs of a transition to democracy. 
Extremely complex social struggles were 
under way, and a number of structural 
factors had to be borne in mind. 
First. Africa had been ousted from 
regular world markets, and its place in the 
international parallel economy was still 
not clear. There were historical pre­
cedents for the situation. The transition 
from slaving to legitimate trade in the 
19th century had left African states with 
enormous debts to their trading partners : 
they were still in that position. Violence 
and the risk of political communities 
collapsing had led to a militarisation of 
trade, destroying the balance between 
public authority and the pursuit of 
private gain. People"s notions ol' their 
religious, social and political identity had 
fallen apart. Achille Mbembe would not 
say Africa was on its way back to the 19th 
century, but he could see similarities. 
Secondly - - and this was a con­
troversial issue most economists 
agreed that structural adjustment pro­
grammes in Africa had failed. For the last 
15 years the economic independence of 
African countries had been eroded by the 
demands of their international creditors. 
In some countries, by the end of the 19>S0s 
the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund were running what Ach­
ille Mbembe called governments by 
proxy: and in the last four years thev had 
been intervening directly in areas such as 
privatisation and public spending reduc­
tion, or even running public finances 
completely through their nominees. 
This was not recolonisation, nor was it 
confined to Africa. What made Africa 
special was that the economic policy 
there was extensive migration. The social 
and economic importance ol" political 
frontiers was fading, as the de facto 
seizure of autonomy by parts of Zaire 
showed. As the old forms crumbled, new 
structures of violence were emerging 
witness the ravaging of Somalia. Angola 
and Mozambique by opposing armies 
and the creation of a paramilitary terror 
force, similar to Haiti's Tontons 
Macoutes. to protect the dictatorship in 
Togo. Forces like these tuose and sur­
vived because anyone with weapons 
could raise money through intimidation 
and expropriation in territorial entities 
not recognised in international law. Dr 
Mbembe was not optimistic for the future 
of democracy in the present circum­
stances. 
Taking up the theme llitil democratis­
ing Allieti meant more than just organis­
ing elections. Claude Akpokavie. a poli­
tical scientist from Ghana, reminded the 
conference that the post-colonial trajec­
tories of African States had been very 
diverse, except that in all of them the 
State had sought to occupy till the 
potential bases for private creativity. In 
his view, real democracy' would come 
Belgian Green MEP Brigitte Ernst de la Graete listens as Achille Mbembe paints a 
pessimistic view of the future of democracy in Africa 
being applied was the same as that usually 
imposed on countries defeated in war. 
However, ending interference in State 
control of a country's economy was not 
the answer either if that control was not 
made more effective first. 
The notion of the State in Africa was in 
crisis. The old model of the territorial 
State was beginning to look life-expired. 
Separatism had emerged as a force in 
Cameroon and Eritrea. Many peoples 
were searching for a new identity and 
with the rise of civil society, ordinary 
people fighting, not for power, but for the 
right to operate independently of 
whoever was in power. An importtull 
weapon of the weak was informili stra­
tégies of resistance such as spreading 
information by word of mouth: the fact 
that this was the form resistance usually 
took in Africa explained why there had 
been no big revolutions on that continent. 
Liberal democracy, in Claude Akpo-
kavie's view, was Jinked specifically to the 
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Industrial Revolution in Europe and the 
Western concept of modernity. Democ­
racy as understood in non-Western coun­
tries like Japan and India was quite 
different. The Left-Right model, for 
example, was specific to the West. Some 
attempts to plant Western models in alien 
soil had actually favoured dictatorship: 
when a Westminster-style system was 
bequeathed to Ghana, for instance, the 
extensive powers of personal patronage 
enjoyed by the Prime Minister under that 
system were not offset by any of the 
checks and balances which also form part 
of the British tradition but were not 
present in Ghana. 
The basic principles of democracy, 
however, were universal : the rule of law, 
institutionalised pluralism, one man/one 
vote, the possibility of alternation, ac­
countability, and an equilibrium of 
power between the State and civil society 
and between workers and employers. 
Democracy was a process which never 
ended, not a finished state. 
Mr Akpokavie offered the Ashanti 
empire of 17th to 19th-century Ghana as 
evidence that African societies had 
always been dynamic in their search for 
ways of involving all their members in the 
conduct of public affairs. It was up to 
Africans to devise an African form of 
democracy on the basis of their own 
experiences and history, not to return to 
the anachronisms of the 1960s. It should 
involve peasants as well as an urban elite, 
central government power must be de­
volved to the regions, which would foster 
policies that were not based on ethnic 
considerations, and government should 
talk to the real holders of invisible power 
(to the market queens who controlled the 
whole food economy in Ghana, for 
example, not just to the trade unions, who 
represented a very small proportion of 
workers). People-centred development 
should be the watchword. 
A teacher from the University of 
Durban. South Africa. Dennis Nkosi. was 
wary of the recipe for democracy (a multi­
party system plus a free-market 
economy) which he felt the West — 
especially the World Bank and the IMF 
— had handed to Africa in return for aid 
and support. Local, national and con­
tinental experiences should be taken into 
account in designing democratic models 
for Africa. As to South Africa, outsiders 
were wrong to give F.W. de Klerk credit 
for démocratisation: the white minority 
was still fighting to make sure power and 
privilege remained in its hands, only this 
time the chosen ploy was to try to impose 
a specific model of democracy with 
foreign support. The basis for real de­
mocratic participation. Mr Nkosi said, 
was the emergence of organs of people's 
power. 
After these academic contributions on 
the history and nature of democracy, the 
conference turned to an actual case study. 
Brigitte Améganvi. Secretary-General 
of the Togolese Human Rights League in 
France, asked whether the process under 
way in her country was a transition to 
democracy or a move backwards. All the 
concessions granted by the government 
of President Eyadema under pressure 
from the national conference of de­
mocrats were now, she said, being clawed 
back by an ongoing coup d'état. The 
regime had realised, from observing the 
example of Zaire, that popular move­
ments could be resisted, and there was no 
chance whatever of the elections in July 
being free and democratic. 
Justine Kasavubu spoke on behalf of 
UDPS, the opposition political move-
President, a system that had produced 
miserable results in France itself. Ms 
Kasavubu stressed the role of women in 
démocratisation, particularly as edu­
cators and as experienced operators in the 
parallel economy. They must help coun­
tries like Zaire recover their lost dignity 
by restoring values other than the power 
of money and rehabilitating respect for 
the notion of honest work. Men in Africa 
must be prepared to act as democrats in 
their relations with women, so as to 
release the potential of that still un-
exploited human resource. 
Interference and 'conditionality' 
In the interests of fostering democracy, 
have donors of aid to African countries a 
right or indeed a duty to interfere in the 
way they are run? This was the question 
addressed by a lawyer from the Associ­
ation for the Rights of Peoples, Olivier 
Corten. International law forbade resort 
to force in relations between countries 
except in self-defence or when authorised 
by the Security Council. Obviously, en-
Claude 
AKPOKAVIE 
Justine 
KASAVUBU 
Claude Akpokavie said it was up to Africans to devise an African form of democracy 
on the basis of their own experiences. Justine Kasavubu believed the West's 
contribution to democracy in Africa was to offer scraps from its own systems which 
had not worked 
ment of Etienne Tshisekedi. who had set 
up a government in Zaire in defiance of 
that appointed by President Mobutu. 
There was, she confirmed, a 'Dictators' 
International' in Africa centred on Zaire, 
Togo and Rwanda, with whom the West 
connived because it supported insti­
tutions, not people. The West's contri­
bution to democracy in Africa was to 
offer scraps from its own systems which 
had not worked, as when France sug­
gested that Zaire's opposition 'cohabit' 
- i.e. collaborate in power — with the 
forcing démocratisation in other coun­
tries met neither of these conditions. 
However, international law did allow one 
country to put economic pressure on 
another to secure, for example, the 
repayment of a debt. As to the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of another country, it applied to action to 
force a country to do something it was 
entitled not to do: merely to voice an 
opinion or issue a recommendation (on 
respect for human rights, say) was not 
interference or a violation of sovereignty. 
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As regards setting conditions for the 
granting of aid. international law left 
wide margins for manoeuvre. If an 
intending donor — for instance, the IMF 
— insisted on the appointment of certain 
of its nominees to political posts as a 
condition of aid. that would be regarded 
as constraint. But to respond to a request 
for aid by insisting that certain policies be 
followed in exchange did not legally 
constitute constraint. Any entity provid­
ing resources on request was entitled to 
seek assurances that they would be used 
in what it regarded as a proper manner. 
The right of peoples to self-determi­
nation had orginally been conceived as 
applying to countries under colonial or 
racist domination, but the concept had 
now evolved, Mr Corten said, to include 
the peoples of countries such as Haiti or 
Zaire who had been deprived of the 
government of their choice by an internal 
force, even if that force was actually in 
control of the country. And, in his view, 
there would be no legal obstacle to 
military interference by the United 
Nations in, say, Zaire if the Security 
Council regarded the situation there as a 
threat to international peace and security. 
No actual breach of international peace 
would need to have taken place first. 
In conclusion, the speaker believed 
that Article 5 of the Lomé IV Conven­
tion, which says, among other things, that 
'development policy and cooperation are 
closely linked with the respect for and 
enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights', did entitle the EC to put pressure 
for human rights improvements on re­
cipient countries as a condition of aid. 
'\ 
Ways of helping démocratisation 
The conference then considered some 
of the ways in which aid for démocratis­
ation is provided. Bernard Ryelandt of the 
EC Commission's Directorate-General 
for Development reported that aid from 
the European Development Fund and the 
EC budget went towards supporting the 
holding of elections, strengthening the 
rule of law (through funding for tin 
independent judiciary and police forces), 
aiding the press (on a non-partisan basis) 
and grassroots promotion of nongovern­
mental organisations representing civil 
society. This year there was ECU 16 mil­
lion in the budget for promoting human 
rights and democracy in the ACP coun­
tries, as well as an appropriation for Latin 
America. 
Marc Deneer, attaché at the Belgian 
Secretariat for Development Cooper­
ation, said that the principle his countrv 
applied in giving aid for démocratisation 
was that the policies concerned must be 
coherent, transparent, predictable and 
credible. Measures on the European side 
would only succeed if all the Member 
States and the Commission acted to­
gether. Belgium assessed the degree of 
democracy in a country by five criteria : 
the independence of the judiciary, free­
dom of expression and association, the 
rule of law. regular elections and account­
ability of the government. Individual 
projects were examined to see how far 
they enshrined democratic precepts (for 
example, protection for workers' rights). 
A further European contribution was 
made by Charles Condamines, director of 
the Panos Institute in Paris, an NGO 
which works to promote freedom of the 
press, especially in West Africa. In Africa. 
he said, critical newssheets and radio 
were burgeoning. But no more than 2% 
of development finance ever went to 
promoting information, and such funds 
always went from government to govern­
ment. Governments tended to say it was 
not their function to help the opposition 
publicise its views, or that governments 
should not interfere in commercial com­
petition by putting money into the media 
market, or that they would not support 
small undertakings which did not look 
viable -- in other words, precisely the 
types ol' independent outfits which were 
struggling to keep going. 
European press action 
Docs suspending aid to dictatorial 
regimes help to bring them down? Fran­
çois Misser, a correspondent on develop­
ment issues for the BBC and La Cité, said 
that as long as rulers had managed to stilt 
away enough funds to pay the army, as 
some had. they could stay in power 
indefinitely. And did elections spell an 
end to violence and oppression? Not if 
the losers rejected the result. In that 
event, were outsiders prepared and equip­
ped to enforce compliance? Even the 
Organisation of African Unity. Mr 
Misser said, had shown it was not 
enthusiastic about international action. 
Democracy came from within: perhaps 
Europe should concentrate on encourag­
ing governments to talk more to their 
trade unions, peasant groups and em­
ployers" associations. The press should 
also be asking whether real democracy 
was beine installed in some African 
countries, or if it was just a redistribution 
of privilege. 
Colette Braeekman, a journalist on the 
Belgian newspaper Le Soir, said that, as 
far as Africa was concerned, the Western 
media were only interested in its problems 
and in what the West was doing to help 
solve them. NGOs and pressure groups 
should do more to publicise their grass­
roots initiatives and the local input into 
them. Both Africa and Europe would 
gain from the increase in the flow of 
information if the developed world 
helped small rural radio situions and 
newspapers buy equipment and supplies; 
in many countries the government held a 
monopoly of these and effectively cen­
sored critical opinion by deciding who 
could use them. The courage of activists 
in Africa could teach Europeans ;> great 
deal about human rights. 
A French member of the Green Group. 
Marie Christine Aulas, said human rights 
activists in Madagascar had told her 
during a visit there that, whatever the 
regime in power, it was always the stime 
people who owned everything. As long as 
this basic economic issue was not tackled 
in Allieti, démocratisation was likely lo 
bc just a façade. 
Speakers from the floor contributed to 
a lively discussion which then followed. 
calling among other things for a lighten­
ing of the African countries' debt burden 
as an encouragement to reform, though 
Europe and other outsiders, they said, 
must not use their economic muscle to try 
to dictate the course democracy should 
take in Africa, which had its own tradi­
tions. The Development Committee's 
attitude to linking democracy with de­
velopment aid was set out in ils Opinion, 
which says, firstly, that il may achieve 
nothing: 'There is no necessary link 
between economic success and the nature 
of the political regime.' and. on the basic 
principle, that: 'While it may seem self-
evident that the Community should 
require its partners to respect funda­
mental human rights and freedom of 
expression, in politics as in other fields il 
remains the case that this requirement 
should be made out of human solidarity 
and not with a view to selecting the 
beneficiaries of a parsimonious aid sys­
tem.' In conclusion, it was generally 
regretted that the conference was nol 
being held in Africa Mrs Ernst, from 
the chair, explained that the Green 
Group simply did not have the funds to 
hold such a meeting outside Europe. 
R.R 
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National minorities 
'Minorities of all kinds — cultural, religious, linguistic, 
ethnic, and racial - - are ubiquitous in today's world. 
Almost all states have one or more minority groups within 
their national territories, and minorities frequently live on 
different sides of state borders. Consequently, the treat-
ment of minorities presents a moral and political problem 
with both domestic and international ramifications. It is of 
vital importance that statesmen and citizens pay more 
attention to this question... In addition, it is imperative that 
we think of practical solutions that are fair both to the 
minorities and to the societies of which they f orm a part'. 
One does not need to have an encyclopaedic knowledge 
of human history to understand what lies behind this plea 
by Professor Arendt Lijphart, writing at the beginning of 
the 1980s '. Men and women have always been social 
creatures, ready to band together to form clubs, clans, 
tribes and nations. But just as in science, every action 
must have an equal and opposite reaction, the formation 
of social groups or communities, based on common 
characteristics or interests, implies the exclusion of those 
who do not share those same characteristics or interests. 
Thus are the potential lines of dispute drawn. 
As we approach the end of the 20th century, it would be 
nice to believe that mankind had found a way of satisfying 
its inherent 'group reflex' without the accompanying 
mistrust of other groups which so often spills over into 
conflict. That we have made some progress can hardly be 
disputed. Aggression by one nation-state against another 
is forbidden and rights can no longer be acquired by 
* In the preface to a book entitled 'World Minorities in the Eighties', edited by 
Georgina Ashworth. Quartermaine House Ltd. Sunbury, UK, 1980. 
Pygmy villagers in Zaïre 
conquest. 'Battles' are more likely to be fought across a 
negotiating table, 'human rights' have been formulated 
and accepted, and people of different cultures com­
municate with each other in ways which previous 
generations could never have imagined. But these 
developments, welcome as they are, mean little to the 
people of Angola, Somalia, southern Sudan, Liberia, 
Bosnia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. They offered no 
comfort to the recent victims of war in Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Iraq and Nicaragua. The human 
race still has a lot to do to achieve the goal of peaceful 
coexistence. 
Of course not all conflict involve minorities, but in 
today's world, where fighting is more often than not 
taking place within the borders of established states, the 
'minority' issue is often a central component. And 
tensions between minority and majority communities are 
to be found in many other places even when open conflict 
is avoided. Oppression, discrimination, intolerance and 
prejudice pollute the atmosphere of too many societies. 
The 'minority question' is a highly complicated one. 
Even the definition of the term 'minority' poses problems 
and each 'minority situation' has its own unique 
characteristics which limit one's scope for drawing 
general conclusions. In this Dossier, we seek to unravel 
some of the complexities of this subject by describing and 
analysing the key issues and looking at a 'representative' 
sample of specific cases. 
This is clearly a sensitive topic and our external 
contributors have been asked to express their views freely. 
Some of these views may be controversial. Please feel free 
to write to us with your own ideas.o Simon HORNER 
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What are minorities? — some possible criteria 
by Lorenza SQUARCI * 
To understand the situation of mino­
rities, it is necessary first to consider what 
is meant by the word 'minority". The need 
for such a definition to be precise is 
perhaps not immediately obvious: it is a 
word which is in everyday use and most 
people have a fairly clear idea, in general 
terms, of what it means when they use it. 
Lawyers, however, have sought to establ­
ish the word's meaning within clearly 
defined limits. It is obvious that legal 
protection is likely to be all the more 
effective if there is no disagreement over 
what is being protected ! But definition, as 
is so often the case, poses problems. 
From a political standpoint, it is 
important to ensure the objectivity of 
legal definitions they should not 
exacerbate existing separatist tendencies 
within a state or contribute to rivalries 
between states. Any definition required 
for the purpose of protecting minorities 
must, therefore, aim to be as clear as 
possible. It is important to avoid de­
finitions which arc so broad us to be 
pointless, while those which are too 
narrow might run the risk of excluding 
certain situations and consequently, of 
depriving the groups in question of any 
protection that the law provides. 
It was not until the 20th century that 
the question of identifying minorities was 
really tackled. The authors of the League 
of Nations Covenant were the first to 
consider it. while subsequent peace 
treaties and conventions increasingly 
began to focus on the more general issue 
of human rights. In 1950. a UN sub­
committee was instructed actually to look 
into the protection of minorities and. 
with a view to establishing the parameters 
of the subject, this body reached the 
following conclusions : 
the term 'minority" referred to non-
dominant groups of a population which 
had and wished to preserve ethnic, 
religious or linguistic traditions or 
characteristics which were distinctly dif-
* The author, a political science graduate, is a 
trainee in DCI VT1I (Development) at the EC' 
Commission. 
ferent from those of the rest of the 
population: 
— these non-dominant groups had to be 
large enough to be able to develop such 
characteristics; 
— members of minorities should be loyal 
to the state of which they were nationais. 
According to Louis Wirth, a minority 
'is a group of people who. by virtue of 
their physical or cultural characteristics, 
are distinct from the other people in the 
society in which they live because of 
different and unequal treatment and who. 
therefore, consider themselves to be the 
subject of collective discrimination. 
Having minority status means being 
prevented from fully participating in the 
life of society'. 
A socio-political concept 
Despite these attempts tit a legal 
definition, the notion of minority should 
first be approached as a socio-political 
concept. When one talks of minorities, 
one should keep four things in mind. 
The first is the concept of community. ' 
For a minority to exist in reality, its 
members should have characteristics 
which both unite them with each other 
and differentiate them from the rest of the 
national society, so that thev form a 
distinct community of their own. 
The second important clement is also a ! 
quantitative one. A group which litis 
religious, linguistic or historical cohesion 
is only effectively a minority if it meets 
two conditions as to size. It should have 
enough members to give il ti certain 
significance at national level and it 
obviously should be smaller than the rest 
of the population so that the latter 
occupies a position of strength vis-à-vis 
the former. The result of this is that the 
possibility of oppression is inherent. 
A position of strength tends, above all. 
to imply economic and social advantages, 
so the true scale of the minority pheno­
menon is to be sought in an analysis of the 
place that minorities occupy in the 
economic and social system. Historically, 
certain linguistic, religious and other 
groups have been excluded from or 
exploited in the production process. It is 
worth noting that the reverse can also 
occur where a minority is in a (real or 
imagined) position of economic privilege 
and the majority reacts against this. 
European anti-semitism and the treat­
ment meted out to certain Asian com­
munities in East Africa tire examples of 
where this litis happened. 
The third component is a psychological 
phenomenon, thai of minority aware­
ness. For tin established, numerically 
inferior group to be a minority in the true 
meaning of the word, il needs lo bc aware 
of being ti minority. Minority awareness 
has a reciprocal element in that not only 
does the smaller group consider itself a 
minority, bui il litis io be treated as such 
by the majority the vital basis for 
oppression. Ami where I here is op­
pression, ti minority will assimilate the 
anxieties and frustrations of the domin­
ant group. 
Nation... Stut c 
In addition to the above socio-political 
elements, there are a number of practical 
circumstances which can be invoked in 
the identification of minority groups. 
One may. for example, refer to the 
concepts of nation and state which tire 
by no means synonymous. A minority, in 
this context, may be lhe'extension' of one 
or more sovereign stales beyond its 
borders the Magyars m Romania or 
the 'Austrians' in Italy. It is also possible 
to have minorities such as the Tibetans or 
Basques which arc 'nations' without 
states in the sense that they do not have 
tiny real ethnic links with the larger state 
entity to which they 'belong'. 
A minority may be identified by lan­
guage, religion or territory (an island or 
an area bounded by rivers or mountains, 
for example). 
For the purpose of identification, the 
question of the will of the group in 
question is relevant. Clearly, a minority 
cannot appetir on the political scene 
unless, as stated earlier, it is aware of it* 
existence and of having its own values 
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Objective factors such as political, reli­
gious or linguistic persecution are all that 
it takes to arouse such group awareness. 
Another approach may be to classify 
minorities in the light of the way they are 
officially regarded. They may be recog­
nised as self-governing states or regions, 
they may have specific linguistic or 
cultural freedoms or, in some cases, they 
may have no recognition at all. 
The right to self-determination is 
generally recognised but this is only 
feasible for minorities which are grouped 
territorially. Such communities can be 
treated differently from scattered mino­
rities, the latter generally having to be 
content with a personally-based system of 
protection (i.e. one founded on human 
rights). 
Definitions 
When one talks of 'minorities' there are a number of 
associated terms which come to mind. Words such as 'melting 
pot', 'assimilation' or 'integration' are often used to refer to a 
particular situation involving one or a number of minorities on 
the one hand and a majority community on the other. 
These are all expressions which are liable to cause confusion. 
Their potential for ambiguity arises from the fact that they are 
used both to describe a situation and to indicate a process. 
Given the complexity of the subject in general, with so many 
different forms of minority situation throughout the world, it 
is useful to seek clearer definitions of the relevant terminology. 
It is worth emphasising, in the context of these terms, the 
wide differences in the treatment or status of minority groups. 
There are a great many variables relating to language, religion, 
culture, skin-colour and so on, which enter into the minority/ 
majority equation. When in the face of such diversity one talks 
of 'losing an original culture', it should be recognised that it is 
normally a question of degree. The total loss of a culture 
rarely, if ever, happens. Equally unlikely is the complete 
preservation of an original culture uninfluenced by the norms, 
values or habits of the majority in a given society. 
Melting pot 
According to the Collins English Dictionary, 'melting pot' 
as a sociological term means 'an area where many races, ideas 
etc are mixed'. The Webster's dictionary includes the idea of 
racial amalgamation. 
The term, therefore, refers to a situation where minorities 
intermingle, brought together through similar social, political, 
economic or ideological goals. Each group may well retain an 
element of its own identity — at least during an interim phase 
— but in the longer run the original identity will 'fade' in a 
process of merging to achieve common objectives. The 
underlying idea is that something entirely new is created from 
the 'old' ingredients. 
Assimilation 
Drobizheva and Guboglo, in their study entitled 'Aspects of 
Interpersonal and Intergroup Communication in Plurilingual 
Societies', which was presented at a symposium on multi-
lingualism in Brussels on 13-15 March 1986, put forward the 
following definition of 'assimilation' : 'Disappearance of 
distinctive ethnographical features; objectively the loss of 
specific elements of material and non-material culture and 
subjectively the loss of feeling of belonging to a particular 
ethnic group.' Simultaneously, they say it involves 'acquisition 
of traits belonging to another culture, which replace those of 
the former, accompanied by the subjective feeling of belonging 
to the second culture'. 
For the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, to assimilate is 
to 'make like' or to 'absorb into the system'. Collins talks of 
'being changed into another under the influence of one 
adjacent to it'. But in the context of groups of peoples living 
together in a society, Webster's offers the most comprehensive 
description, referring to 'socio-cultural fusion wherein 
individuals and groups of differing ethnic heritage acquire the 
basic habits, attitudes and mode of life of an embracing 
national culture'. 
Assimiliation is, accordingly, characterised by the abandon­
ment or renunciation of one's original culture. In effect, 
minorities become absorbed (over time) into the wider society. 
Such a process does not preclude the possibility that the 'host' 
culture will be influenced or altered in some way but it is 
essentially 'one-sided'. 
Integration 
The difference between assimilation and integration may be 
a subtle one but it is nevertheless important. Drobizheva and 
Guboglo describe the latter as the 'formation of common 
features in an ethnically heterogeneous group'. 
The Concise Oxford speaks of 'combining parts into a 
whole' and indeed, refers explicitly to the ending of racial 
segregation. 
Likewise. Collins, which refers to 'the act of amalgamating a 
racial or religious group within an existing community. But the 
crucial point, elucidated in Webster's is that the incorporation 
which takes places into the society 'on the basis of common 
and equal membership of individuals' does not involve the 
complete extinction of pre-existing and differing group 
characteristics. 
Thus, in contrast to assimilation, integration is seen as a 
process which allows the minority to enter something (a group 
or society) which already exists, without necessarily involving 
the loss of Original culture'. Minorities may indeed choose not 
to integrate in given circumstances. Assimilation implies no 
such choice. 
Diversity in unity 
One further expression which is gaining in popularity is 
'diversity in unity'. It refers to those types of organisation 
(social, political, economic etc), specifically created to deal 
with situations where different nationalities, cultures or 
linguistic groups are required to work together. The aim is to 
allow for the differences to be maintained and respected — 
rather than to suppress them in the interests of some 'common 
cause'. Federalism is sometimes described as a system which 
seeks to maintain 'diversity in unity'. In practice, the Swiss 
confederal system provides a good example of this approach. 
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A further complication can arise in the 
case of a 'double minority", that is to say. 
a 'sub-minority' which is part of a larger 
group which, in turn, is a minority vis-à-
vis the wider society. 
Finally, it may be necessary to dis-
tinguish between indigenous and immigr-
ant minorities. 
Minority reactions 
Minorities are not identified solely in 
terms of their distinctive features. The 
way they react to their situation, if at all. 
is also important. 
Where minorities hope for peaceful 
cohabitation with the majority and with 
other minorities, there is cultural plura-
lism. This involves a desire for a united 
economic and political basis, combined 
with a tolerance of cultural, linguistic and 
religious diversity. 
Assimilation is also a possibility. This 
involves the agreement of, or perhaps 
more commonly, the acquiescence of the 
minority in a process which leads to 
absorption (over time) into the majority 
group, with a view to everyone being 
treated as an individual. The minority 
melts into the mass. Of course, this can 
only happen if the majority agrees (or 
acquiesces) as well. 
Alongside these visions of pluralism 
and assimilation, there are two other 
possibilities which involve the highlight-
ing, rather than the ironing out. of 
differences. 
First, there is the secessionist tendency, 
in which the minority seeks to obtain 
political and cultural independence. This 
is likely to develop where cultural plura-
lism or assimilation has failed. A second 
phenomenon, which is more unusual but 
by no means unprecedented, is where the 
minority goes beyond a desire for 
equality or separation, and instead seeks 
to dominate the majority. This requires a 
conviction of its own superiority on the 
part of the minority. 
Despite all efforts at classification and 
identification, it is clear from the com-
plexities outlined above that there arc no 
easy answers. If the issue of definition 
alone can throw up so many unanswer-
able questions, one may well ponder 
whether the 'minority question" can ever 
be solved. L.S. 
The basis of prejudice 
bv Christian GUYONVARCH * 
The drama of minorities is the drama 
ofmankind as a whole, in that it poses the 
problem of accepting differences in a 
shrinking world. What we mean by 
minority here is not necessarily a numeri-
cally smaller group (although it usually 
is). It is a community subject to domi-
nation and discrimination because of 
apparent or alleged ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural or religious particularities. 
The factors, and there are four of them, 
leading to prejudice towards minorities 
and tension between groups are psycho-
logical, historical, economic and poli-
tical. 
Psychological, historical and 
economic factors 
The psychological factor is inherent in 
the nature of man and the history of 
mankind. Apparent or alleged 'other-
ness', wherever it may be, has always been 
a potential danger for the person who 
sensed it, be it to his physical integrity 
(the 'mixed blood' phobia) or moral well-
being (the fantasy of degeneration). The 
danger is perceived as being all the greater 
when the prejudice has been handed 
down from one generation to another. In 
this case, the 'other' becomes a scapegoat, 
someone who takes the blame and, when 
times are hard, becomes the enemy. The 
more obvious the 'other's' differences (as 
regards colour of skin, religion, customs 
or language), the worse the discrimi-
nation against the minority tends to be. 
In periods of economic crisis and social 
tension, the risk of conflict with and 
prejudice towards minorities will be 
worse if there are historical precedents. In 
many cases, history will be rewritten or 
twisted in an attempt to show that the 
minority in question was to blame during 
periods of decline. The falsifiers take the 
opposite tack too and exaggerate the 
history of their group, with abundant 
reference to the notion of original purity. 
So history becomes a weapon used to 
justify discrimination or aggression. The 
aggressor always believes il is a case of 
legitimate self-defence, or that he is 
wreaking vengeance for past aggression, 
or that he is headine off future aeeres-
* The author is a member of the trench section of 
the Minority Rights Group. 
sion. History is of great importance in 
collective paranoia. 
The economic factor, by no means the 
least important, can come into play in 
two different circumstances in a 
context of economic competition or in a 
context of expansion. In lhe case of 
competition, the group which is the target 
of discrimination or aggression is accused 
of wrongfully having certain economic 
and social privileges, or. more simply of 
having the same rights as the majority. In 
the case of expansion, the minority will be 
the victim if particular raw materials 
found in the area in which it lives are 
exploited. This form of aggression is 
strongly resented by the native popu-
lations, whose way of life is closely bound 
up with their natural environment. Going 
beyond that, material prejudice in the 
shape ol" an attack on the environment is 
perceived as physical and moral aggres-
sion and, significantly, organisations 
which tiefend the right of indigenous 
peoples have linked I he righi of self-
determination lo the protection of the 
environment. 
Λ political factor — (he nation-
state aiming for unity 
The political factor lies in the inter-
nationalisation of tm approach to 
government which was initially confined 
to Europe and which docs nol counten-
ance lhe coexistence of different com-
munities the nation-state. 
The concept came lo the fore in 
Western Europe during the late Middle 
Ages, at the courts of the French timi 
English kings. The state, which was 
vested with the power to strike coin, raise 
armies and mete out justice, came before 
the nation, which was the community ol 
subjects in the time of absolute monarch) 
and the community of citizens thereafter 
The state commanded the nation. So tin 
nation-state was an ideological construe 
tion which brought civil war. the con 
quest of land and antagonistic empires ir 
its wake. It conformed to no ethical o: 
religious criteria. Territorial conques 
and the subjecting of more people to th-
authority of the central state were justi 
fied. in the view of those who held powei 
by the demands of the economy (control 
ling raw materials) or its universal mis 
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Statue of Queen Victoria in Mauritius 
The European powers have lost their empires, but the former colonies inherited the 
concept of the nation-state and have gone on applying it rigorously 
sion (evangelising souls or awakening 
minds). 
The United Kingdom and France. 
together with Spain. Italy. Portugal. 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, 
have lost their empires and Europe's last 
empire, the Soviet one. has just gone too. 
But the former colonies inherited the 
nation-state concept from the empires 
whose subjects they once were and they 
have applied it rigorously. And other 
concepts related to it -- territorial in-
tegrity, for example, and national so-
vereignty ' — have become the principles 
1 'National sovereignty' is a hybrid concept which 
has taken as much from the absolute monarchies 
as from the bourgeois revolutions of the late 18th and 
Wih centuries the theory that the people have 
replaced God as the source of sovereignty, although. 
■n reality, an elected oligarchy (or an illegitimate 
power) has succeeded the monarch in the exercise of 
11. The concept maintains the myth of a self-existent, 
sternal nation, which is therefore the subject of 
devotion and a source of irrational behaviour. 
of government of the new states. The 
paradox of the post-colonial era in which 
we now live is, of course, that the former 
colonies have reproduced exactly the 
mode of government from which they 
fought to free themselves. 
Although the nation-state was de-
signed independently of all ethnic or 
religious considerations, it was, as we 
have seen, soon confronted with the 
problems of administering a population 
which might well be heterogeneous from 
the point of view of language, religion or 
custom. Rare cases apart, the answer has 
always been the same — to glorify the 
'one-ness' of the nation, because nation-
state means united state. One state, one 
sovereignty, one nation, one motherland, 
one people, one language, one culture, 
one history and so on. The nation-state 
has no room for 'otherness' in its external 
manifestations or its public life. So the 
refusal to accept the 'other', anyone who 
does not conform to the standard 
national which the state requires, can be 
expressed in two ways — by physical or 
mental exclusion. Physical exclusion may 
involve population movement, expulsion 
or elimination — the crime of genocide, 
the typical solution of totalitarian states. 
Mental exclusion may involve a policy of 
assimilation which breaks down the 
solidarity and coherence of the minority 
group by removing or restricting the 
possibilities of collective expression at 
school, in the media, in the civil service, in 
the courts and so on. The policy of 
assimilation is typical of liberal nation-
states which only recognise the rights of 
the individual — an insidious way of 
imposing the culture and way of life of the 
majority on the minority. 
From nation-state to tribe-state 
Now that it is clear that people have the 
right to self-determination, more and 
more peoples and minority groups are 
putting up peaceful or violent opposition 
to the unitary approach of the nation-
states to which they are subjected. But a 
process similar to the one which occurred 
in the former colonies of the European 
empires seems to be emerging and some 
national minorities are adopting a un-
itary argument to justify the creation of 
ethnically homogeneous states — what 
might be called tribe-states, because it is 
no longer the state which determines the 
nation but the tribe which justifies the 
state. The tribe-state, a transformation of 
the nation-state, is based on homogeneity 
to the exclusion of all else and the far-
from-reality theory of independence and 
sovereignty. 
The policies of ethnic purification are 
related to this strategy of introspection 
and rejection of the 'other', which is all 
the more irrational in that it does not take 
the future into account. The aggressor 
forgets that today's enemy is tomorrow's 
neighbour and that ways of cohabitation 
have to be sought. 
If different communities are to co-exist 
peacefully, then frontiers must be less 
important, the nation must be demysti-
fied and the state must be made more 
relative. This drive for a better world can 
only be made through federal-style types 
of organisation in which differences are 
accepted and developed, not exacerbated, 
and are no longer thought of as a 
handicap, but experienced as an asset, o 
CG. 
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Political representation 
A good indication of the status and self-confidence of minority groups within 
existing states can be found in the way in which such groups are represented, if at all. in 
the political structures. In today's world, democratic systems predominate and. on the 
whole, democracy offers the most promising setting for minorities to mobilise 
politically. However, democracy comes in many different forms and. since there is 
obviously no simple 'minority' model either, the scope of the subject is clearly 
enormous. In this article, we focus on the way in which democratic structures cater for 
minority groups and. conversely, on the approach which minorities choose to adopt in 
mobilising within systems to ensure that their voice is heard. This article does not deal 
with the more thorny issue of minority 'representation" in non-democratic systems 
although it is worth noting that while in many cases, they are excluded altogether (and 
often oppressed), there can be circumstances, even in autocracies, where minorities are 
given some sort of "voice" in the system. Even powerful non-elected presidents cannot 
ignore public opinion entirely and they may feel it expedient, for example, to appoint 
minority leaders to ministerial posts in order to neutralise possible dissent. 
In discussing those systems of govern­
ment which are broadly viewed as being 
'democratic', an initial distinction can be 
drawn between the political structures 
which have been created and the way in 
which minorities choose to mobilise 
within them. Taking the structures first, it 
should be recognised that the right to 
stand for election combined with uni­
versal suffrage does not alone provide a 
guarantee of fair representation for 
minorities. In broad terms, a democracy 
should have two essential characteristics 
if a minority community is to have a level 
playing field for political participation. 
These are a democratic atmosphere and a 
system which fairly reflects the diversity of 
views in any given society. 
Democratic atmosphere 
The first of these, which some would 
argue is the more important, implies a 
general recognition that people have a 
right to express contrary opinions and 
will be given the opportunity to do so 
without fear of discrimination or perse­
cution. In fact, most democracies adhere 
to a set of human rights principles which 
purport to guarantee this freedom of 
speech and back it up with other norms 
which are also important for the effective 
functioning of democracy such as the 
secrecy of the ballot, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and the liberty of the 
press. Unfortunately, however, rules and 
reality do not always coincide and the 
mere existence of legal provisions does 
not necessarily mean that they will be 
properly implemented in practice. There 
is obviously a particular challenge, in this 
context, for new democracies where 
people are unused to. and perhaps uneasy 
about, criticism of those in power and 
where there mav still be a reflex to 
suppress such behaviour. But there is also 
a need to guard against slippage in 'old' 
democracies, whose voters may become 
complacent or disillusioned. Accepting 
the proposition that power is likely to 
corrupt those who wield it. voter passivity 
can lead to erosion of freedoms in a more 
insidious way. Participation is therefore a 
further essential element of a healthy 
democracy. 
It is obvious that minority groups are 
likely to face difficulties in countries that 
arc notionally democratic bul which fail 
to provide the necessary democratic 
atmosphere. There is little point in 
standing for election if one is effectively 
denied access to the media, for example. 
The ability to gel one's message across 
to the electorate is clearly essential and 
political parties in developing countries 
may face special difficulties because of 
lack of finance. The simple act of putting 
one's message on paper, printing leaflets 
and distributing them to the voters costs 
money which must be found from some­
where. And even if the cash can be raised, 
the impact of written tracts is likely to be 
limited in countries which have low 
literacy rates. In such circumstances, 
access to the broadcast media par­
ticularly radio becomes essential for 
effective campaigning. 
A further problem for opposition 
parties throughout the world is that rulers 
have the advantage of a government 
machine which may legally be required to 
be neutral but which, in practice, can be 
employed to deliver particular messages 
in favour of the covernimi elite. It seems 
likely, human nature being what it is. that 
governments will always be tempted to 
exploit this advantage, even in countries 
which appear to have a democratic 
atmosphere. The most effective con­
straint in such cases is public disapproval 
but this can only be engendered if the 
system is transparent and opposition 
forces have the means at their disposal to 
highlight the abuse. 
Finally, in the context of creating a 
democratic atmosphere, tolerance is a 
crucial element which must be nurtured. 
Political activists are human beings and if 
they are in danger of being subjected lo 
abuse or indeed violent attack they 
will be less inclined to campaign. People 
who have a strong commitment to a 
particular set of ideals, or a particular 
political movement, often find it difficult 
to understand how anyone can hold 
contrary views ! But if they refuse to listen 
to such views, or react forcefully against 
them, then democracy is undermined, 
This is something which is not always 
appreciated even by people living in long-
established democracies. 
Reflecting what the people want 
The second element which is likely lo 
be of importance lo minorities is the 
extent to which the 'democratic' system 
allows for them to be fairly represented in 
the elected bodies. At first sight, the idea 
that the composition of a parliament 
should reflect the views of the electorate 
and hence give minorities represen­
tation commensurate with then nume­
rical strength in tt society would seem 
both uncontroversial and relatively easy 
to achieve. Indeed, it is arguable thai a 
system which docs not ensure ti rep­
resentative legislature is not in taci 
democratic. But in reality, the question ol 
which system to choose can pose con­
siderable difficili l ies. 
In seeking to reflect the views of I he 
voters, one must have some idea of theii 
objectives when they enter the polline 
booth. For example. ;ue they interested in 
voting for a party or ;m individual'? Sonic 
countries have systems which tire weigh­
ted in favour of party voting bul offer 
little or no scope for individual candidate 
preferences. Others adhere to the fiction 
that it is only individuals that tire beine 
elected to represent a given tuca a ne 
make no provision for the overall part; 
balance in the country. 
Then there is the strategic question ol 
the kind of government the voters wish t< 
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'In seeking to reflect the views of voters, one must have some idea of their objectives 
when they enter the polling booth' 
see. Do they give priority to the election 
of a majority government? If so, then it 
may be justified to have a system which 
gives greater weight to the largest group 
in order that they can exercise power 
more freely. This, of course, means that 
each vote does not have an equal value. 
Alternatively, would they prefer to have a 
legislature which faithfully reflects the 
voting preferences of the population as a 
whole? This implies a proportional 
voting system and, in all likelihood, a 
coalition-forming process after the votes 
have been cast. 
Where systems are being considered, 
there is also an important choice to be 
made between presidential and par­
liamentary government. The former con­
centrates power in the hands of a single 
politician, the latter gives greater em­
phasis to a 'team' approach. 
It seems reasonable to assume that 
most minorities would prefer parliamen­
tary systems based on proportional 
voting, since, taken together, these two 
elements should improve their chances of 
oeing able to participate in the exercise of 
power. Proportionality ought to result in 
lair representation for them — although, 
f they represent a majority in a particular 
Kographical area of the country, a single 
Tiember system may also do this. Of 
uurse. this is something of a general-
iution -- small minority communities 
'all have less influence than larcer ones 
and even in the most 'representative' 
systems, substantial minorities may find 
themselves excluded where a homogen­
ous majority group holds the levers of 
power. 
In some democracies, special provision 
is made for the representation of mino­
rities in the form of'reserved seats'. Such 
an approach may be applauded if it is 
because the minority in question would 
otherwise be too small to reach the 
threshold required for representation 
under the prevailing electoral rules, such 
as in Germany (where Danish speakers 
have guaranteed representation) or in 
New Zealand (which has reserved Maori 
seats). But it can also be used as a pretext 
for a majority group to monopolise 
power, particularly where separate elec­
toral rolls are involved. The result may 
well be that minorities remain on the 
political margins. 
How minorities (and majorities) 
organise themselves 
Irrespective of the system that is 
adopted, there are various ways in which 
minorities may choose to operate within a 
democracy. The defining criteria for the 
formation of political parties vary con­
siderably from one country to another. 
At one 'extreme' there are states whose 
politics are purely issue-based (the term 
'issue' being confined in this context to 
substantive political questions relating to 
the economy, trade, transport, housing, 
health etc.). In western democracies, the 
usual pattern is the classic 'left-right' 
spectrum where people band together 
with others who hold similar views on a 
range of social and economic issues. 
There are also single-issue groupings -
people who give such priority to a 
particular subject (such as the environ­
ment) that they choose to organise 
politically on this basis. However, both 
'left-right' divisions and single issue 
politics share an important common 
characteristic, namely that the people 
involved organise themselves without 
reference to factors of race, creed, lan­
guage or colour. At the other extreme are 
those states where political affiliation is 
determined largely by attachment to a 
particular group whether it be a natio­
nality, tribe, religion or language com­
munity. There are. of course, a great 
many countries which fall somewhere 
between the two with issue- and group-
based parties both represented in the 
legislature. 
Almost by definition, minority issues 
are-likely to be low on the political agenda 
in countries whose politics are issue-
dominated. This is not to say that 
minorities do not exist, but the fact that 
they operate within wider political group­
ings points to a lack of grievance, or at 
least a belief that the system offers 
opportunities for any problems to be 
resolved. Where minorities choose to 
operate through their own political 
groupings, a sense of alienation from the 
mainstream can normally be presumed. 
In some cases, where the minority is 
geographically concentrated in a territory 
which is historically 'theirs', the main 
objective may be greater self-government 
or perhaps even full statehood. In others, 
it may simply be a question of defending 
the interests — and indeed, preserving the 
identity — of a community which is more 
widely dispersed within the society. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the way 
in which minorities choose to organise 
within democratic systems will depend on 
the local circumstances. To the idealist, 
the participation of minorities within the 
'mainstream', in a political environment 
which allows for but is otherwise blind to 
their ethnic, religious or other 'sep-
arateness'. would be the perfect solution. 
In practice, as illustrated by many of 
today"s conflicts in different parts of the 
world, there is a long way to go before this 
can be achieved.c S.H. 
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International legal protection 
A brief survey of the sources and 
instruments of international law reveals 
very little in the way of specific protection 
for minority communities. However, 
there are various international norms of 
more general application which could be 
invoked in protecting minorities. There 
are also potentially conflicting rules 
which might be construed as unhelpful to 
their cause. In this short article, we 
describe some of the more important 
norms in this area. 
Definition 
The limited provision for minorities in 
international law is reflected in the 
absence of a widely agreed definition of 
the term 'minority' for legal purposes. 
One possible definition was advanced by 
Jules Deschênes, a Canadian member of 
the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. He proposed the following: 
'A group of citizens of a State, constituting 
a numerical minority and in a non-
dominant position in that State, endowed 
with ethnic, religious or linguistic charac-
teristics which differ from those of the 
majority of the population, having a sense 
of solidarity with one another, motivated, 
if only implicitly, by a collective will to 
survive and whose aim is to achieve 
equality with the majority in fact and in 
law. ' 
The work of the Commission to which 
Mr Deschênes belonged did not lead to 
any legally binding international instru-
ment but his proposal is useful in contain-
ing the defining elements of minority 
'status" which most people would recogn-
ise and accept. 
The UN Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant 
Neither the UN Charter nor the Un-
iversal Declaration of Human Rights 
mentions minorities per se, despite at-
tempts at the drafting stage to include a 
reference in the latter instrument. How-
ever, the United Nations Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights does refer to 
minorities at Article 27. which says: 
'In those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denial the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own 
language. ' 
Most countries adhere to this Conven-
tion and are obliged, as a result, to 
guarantee the aforementioned rights in 
respect of the minorities in question. It is 
noteworthy that this provision does not 
place any positive obligations on states as 
regards the treatment of minorities (for 
example, guaranteeing state education in 
significant minority languages). It merely 
requires a policy of benign non-inter-
ference. 
UN General Assembly 
Declaration on Minorities 
More recently, the UN General As-
sembly has made a notable addition to 
the international normative thinking on 
this subject. At its session in December 
1992, the Assembly adoped a Declaration 
on Minorities which lays down, in much 
greater detail, the behaviour expected of 
governments in dealing with their mi-
nority communities (see the 'Meeting 
Point' interview with Alan Phillips of the 
Minority Rights Group). 
Article 1 of the Declaration goes 
somewhat further than Article 27 of the 
Civil and Political Rights Covenant in 
'requiring" states not only to protect the 
existence and identity of various mino-
rities (ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic) but to encourage conditions 
for the promotion of that identity. This 
implies a positive commitment to action 
on the part of states. Reference is also 
made in the Declaration to the full 
participation of minorities in the progress 
and development of their country, al-
though this provision is couched in the 
language of exhortation rather than 
obligation ('States should consider ap-
propriate measures'). For those engaged 
in the execution of development pro-
grammes, it is stated that due regard must 
be given to the interests of minorities. 
In the context of UN General As-
sembly resolutions, the reference made 
above to 'normative thinking' is import-
ant. Such resolutions do not have the 
force of law and the 'obligations" which 
they contain are. in reality, little more 
than recommendations or appeals for 
action. Despite this, they are sometimes 
regarded as legally 'persuasive', par-
ticularly when they have been adopted 
unanimously or by an overwhelming 
majority. Custom is still one of the 
principal sources of international law 
and, while a UN resolution may not in 
itself be legally binding, it may contribute 
to the development of customary law in 
the longer term to the extent that it 
reflects the consensus view of the state 
actors in the international legal system. 
Moving away from specific reference 
to minorities, the general corpus of 
international law contains some elements 
that are helpful to oppressed minorities 
and others that may hinder their efforts to 
achieve fair treatment. 
Human Rights 
On the positive side, human rights law. 
as reflected in the UN Declaration, the 
two international covenants (on civil and 
political rights and on economic, social 
and cultural rights) and in various re-
gional human rights conventions, offer 
protection in a variety of ways. Ittisic 
rights such as those pertaining to liberty, 
free expression, family life and so on arc 
extended to all people but they tire likely 
to have a particular relevance for mi-
nority groups whose position in society 
may be vulnerable. Of the various inter-
national human rights instruments, those 
established on a regional basis have a 
particular significance because they nor-
mally include institutional arrangements 
designed, in one way or another, to 
ensure state compliance. The most pow-
erful of these is the European Conven-
tion, which was the first major inter-
national treaty to allow individuals a 
right of legal challenge. Traditionally, 
only states (and nowadays, international 
organisations) enjoy legal personali!) 
under international law. The Africar 
Charter on Human and People's Rights 
which came into force in October 1986 
also allows a form of individual com 
plaint but this is hedged with variou 
restrictions. Uniquely, the African Char 
1er also makes reference to 'peoples 
rights'. These were included tit the m 
sistence of left-leaning governments whei 
the text was being negotiated and the 
include the rights to equality, free dii 
posai of wealth and natural resource
1
 
economic, social and cultural devclof 
ment, and a satisfactory environmen 
These essentially collective rights arc ι 
be found alongside the traditional ii 
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dividual ones and it is not difficult to 
understand why they were included, 
when one considers the continent's col­
onial past. It is difficult, nevertheless, to 
see how they could be meaningfully 
enforced. When a person is imprisoned 
without trial, it is normally possible to 
establish that a violation has occurred 
and that someone (usually in authority) 
was responsible. How does one decide 
when the collective right to a healthy 
environment has been breached and who 
does one blame when this can be es­
tablished? 
Even if the rules on peoples' rights 
could be enforced, it is doubtful whether 
they are of interest to minorities. The 
term 'peoples' almost certainly refers to 
the populations of existing states as a 
whole, and not to any particular ethnic or 
other group living within their borders. 
On the other hand, it is worth pointing 
out that a number of countries have 
incorporated the individual rights set out 
in the various international conventions 
into their own domestic laws. Often these 
are constitutionally entrenched. As a 
result, the possibility of direct legal 
redress, using local courts, has been 
extended. 
Self-determination 
The principle of self-determination 
offers further scope for the protection of 
certain minorities. This principle, at least 
arguably, now forms part of customary 
international law but its limitations need 
to be recognised. In the first place, it is 
extremely difficult for minorities within 
existing state boundaries to invoke it. 
Few states are likely to support norms 
ivhich might lead to their own dis­
memberment and 'self-determination' 
has tended, therefore, only to be applied 
to 'colonial' situations. The result, anom-
tlous though it may seem, is that while 
'he former colonies of Africa had a right 
:o self-determination, on the basis of 
boundaries put in place by the colonial 
Jovvers, individual ethnic groups or 
woples within those boundaries have no 
iich right. Nor, it would appear, do 
lispossessed 'nationalities' such as the 
v'urds. unless and until the central 
mthorities of the states where they live 
decide otherwise. 
Sovereignty/territorial integrity 
This leads us to the 'negative' aspects of 
Hernational law, at least from the point 
of view of minorities who are unhappy 
with their current situation vis-à-vis the 
central state. Despite the development of 
international rules regarding human 
rights and the rights of peoples to 
determine their own future, the more 
long-standing principles of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity still tend to be 
given precedence in practice. 
One of the effects of the sovereignty 
principle is that governments are ex­
tremely reluctant to become involved in 
events taking place entirely within the 
borders of another state. The rationale 
for inhibiting interference in the internal 
affairs of another country is difficult to 
criticise. Without it, the strong could 
impose their will on the weak, as states 
have notoriously done throughout his­
tory. The territorial integrity concept is 
clearly related to this, acting as a legal 
brake upon those who would seek ter­
ritorial acquisition by conquest. 
For minorities, the negative impli­
cations of these rules are clear. When 
oppressed, they will find it difficult to 
obtain international support. While fore­
ign politicians may sympathise v/ith their 
plight, they will hesitate to disturb the 
existing international order. 
Humanitarian intervention 
In fact, recent developments suggest 
that the 'absolute' nature of the so­
vereignty principle may be under threat. 
Various events, including the UN inter­
vention in Somalia, Cambodia and 
Bosnia and the assistance rendered to the 
Kurds through 'safe' areas inside Iraq, 
point to a less rigid application of the 
rule. Indeed, there is a growing, though 
by no means unanimous, view that the 
international community now does have a 
right of 'humanitarian intervention', 
which may obviously be of help to certain 
minorities in extreme situations. How­
ever, the extent of the change should not 
be overstated. Bosnia perhaps illustrates 
best the continuing power of the ter­
ritorial integrity reflex. With the disinteg­
ration of Yugoslavia, the old internal 
state boundaries suddenly seem to have 
acquired an immutable character in 
international law. It may be that boun­
dary redrawing would not solve the 
intractable problems of Bosnia-Herze­
govina but it is significant that no one in 
the international community is even 
suggesting it. Yet there must be few who 
seriously believe that this unfortunate 
country, even with highly autonomous 
Muslim, Serb and Croat cantons, can 
now be salvaged as a viable political 
entity. 
A further concern is that the inter­
national community, in the shape of the 
United Nations, does not always appear 
to act consistently. In some countries, 
internal strife and the suppression of 
minorities pass almost without comment. 
In others, the UN is highly active. Given 
that 'equality before the law' is supposed 
to be a fundamental juridical principle, 
this type of inconsistency does little to 
enhance the reputation of the inter­
national legal order. 
Problems in implementation 
The sovereignty principle can also 
serve to undermine the efficacy of human 
rights rules. It is all very well for countries 
to subscribe to conventions on this 
subject, but the evidence suggests that 
many fall short when it comes to im­
plementation. The various human rights 
instruments are full of grand ideals, but 
they are ideals which many ordinary 
people would have difficulty identifying 
in the behaviour of their governments. 
In fact, the most serious weakness of 
the international system as a whole lies in 
the absence of mechanisms for ensuring 
implementation. Very few international 
instruments provide individuals with the 
opportunity to obtain judicial redress and 
very few states are willing to go beyond 
voicing disapproval when the rules are 
broken — as they frequently are. In these 
circumstances, minorities would be ill-
advised to place undue reliance on the 
international system when their 'rights' 
are threatened. Having said this, it is 
better to have a flawed system than no 
system at all. Most governments are 
sensitive to criticism in the same way that 
ordinary people are. With one or two 
notable exceptions, they take no pleasure 
in being ostracised and this helps to 
ensure a higher level of compliance than 
might otherwise be the case. It is ob­
viously impossible to quantify, but it is 
almost certainly true that the human 
condition — and by extension, the 
condition of minority communities 
across the world — has benefited from 
the progressive development of an inter­
national legal framework. Flawed it may 
be, but it is the best that is on offer. O 
S.H. 
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The minority rights trap 
The countries of central and eastern 
Europe are trying to bring their peoples 
together, both within their borders and 
beyond, strengthening the ties with the 
motherland, as the Hungarian minority 
rights bill puts it. What is this unity to be? | 
Bringing peoples together, in all their
 
:
 
differences, means managing and some-
times forging relations between majority 
and minority and, clearly, such relations 
breed conflict. Not only do they ex-
acerbate every difference. They also put 
dangerous emphasis on the matter of 
territorial boundaries. Minority rights 
are a legitimate and urgent demand for all 
those men and women whose dignity has 
been trampled under foot, but they cause 
wars too. So what is the answer? 
If the international community cur-
rently has nothing to suggest, it is because 
its members, the states, are unable them-
selves to solve the problem of the multi-
national, multicultural state. The cause of 
all Yugoslavia's troubles is powcrlessness 
- powerlessness in humanitarian and 
political matters and most of all, perhaps, 
powcrlessness in theoretical matters. We 
have no model. Federalism is one way, 
but it is not the only one and it is not 
sufficient either, because it reproduces the 
problem of the nation-state, with the 
minority issue still intact, on a smaller 
scale. New institutional solutions are 
what is needed. 
Difficult to apply 
No-one is taken in when a state 
announces that it does not recognise 
minorities because it assimilates them or 
that it recognises specific rights for 
official minorities. When the Mace-
donian demonstration was going on in 
Athens in December, for example, more 
than 100 experts were busy at a con-
ference on the rights of minorities and 
peoples. The fire is at its gates and Greece 
has every interest in saying just what its 
minorities' rights are. But in what sense? 
Is the idea really to have all men equal? 
and if it is. why does the State currently 
make Greeks state their reliiiion on their 
* The writer of this article, which first appeared in 
Λ.' Month' (Debars. 16 Februar. 194?. page 2). is a 
philosopher and coordinator at the Ethics and 
Human Riehts Centre at the L'niversitv of Fribouru. 
by Patrice MEYER-BISCH * 
identity cards? ' Austria and Hungary 
are agitating for recognition of minority 
rights in the Council of Europe, but the 
reference unit is still the nation-state, or 
the motherland, even. The rights of ethnic 
groups, Volksgruppen, clearly bear the 
stamp of potential discrimination. Does 
bringing freedom mean drawing the 
ethnic boundaries first? 
Ensuring that the rights of members of 
minority groups are respected means 
identifying those minorities through va-
rious cultural features — which usuali}' 
have blurred edges. It means defining the 
ratio of minority to majority in a given 
area, for what is a minority group at 
national level may well be a majority one 
at regional level. And lastly, it means 
cataloguing people and ensuring them 
rights as members of an ethnic group. 
This is till perfectly legitimate, politi-
cally speaking, when it comes to organis-
ing support for the underprivileged and 
designing a contingency plan of com-
pensatory schemes deemed most likely to 
bring back equality. But it must not be 
conditional on rights which, by being 
human rights, are universal and un-
conditional. 
Who is to say that a particular person 
or a particular family belongs to a 
particular group, when till the charac-
teristics of languages, religion, housing 
and profession fluctuate in a thriving 
cultural osmosis? Recognition of mi-
nority rights is potentially discriminating 
in that it forces people to identify with a 
particular cultural community, which, 
given the profoundly varied and changing 
nature of cultural kinship, could be 
harmful. Choosing between one set of 
people and another amounts to self-
mutilation. Although there are bills to 
proclaim that the individual has the right 
to switch ethnic groups, switching in-
volves a whole process of changing status, 
instead of immediate and universal recog-
nition of official freedoms, and it docs 
nothing to alter the basic fact - that 
cultural identity is many-faceted. It is 
clear that many states want this muti-
1 Religious affiliation has traditionally been 
included on Greek identity cards. There is currently a 
debate taking place within the country as to whether ¡ 
this arrangement should continue. The Parliament 
recenllv voted lor its retention. 
lation, but the authors of the projected 
international instruments for the victims 
(people and communities) of what can be 
lethal discrimination do not. But how can 
manipulation be av oided when the recog-
nition of minorities actually invites it? 
The universalist approach 
through cultural rights 
We would be in stalemate were il nol 
for another, strangely neglected solution 
which fits in far better with the human 
rights tradition. The logical thing would 
be to define the immediate universal 
before looking tit the guarantees ol' 
particular and contingent situations. The 
legal intruments currently available ·' 
clearly contain three separate categories 
of rights universal rights and guaran-
tees which are merely statevi (equality, 
freedom of association, movement and 
religion and legal guarantees), universal 
cultural rights (lo cultural identity, one's 
own communication ¿nul information 
and the use of one's own language) and, 
lastly, just one specific collective righi (oí 
a minority to its existence), with the righi 
to special measures to guarantee the 
universal rights special administrative 
arrangements (the right to own-language 
teaching tit school, for example, foi 
minorities of a certain si/c) and the 
possibility of special political represen-
tation for minorities. The mention ol 
universal rights should perhaps be seen as 
a preamble. The definition of the second 
category, cultural rights, reveals a worry-
ing void, which hampers the legal and 
political development of the law applying 
to people who belong to minorities and If 
all the forgotten majorities. 
The fact that the human rights move 
ment stumbled over the definitions o 
economic and social rights has pushed tb 
whole issue of cultural rights (classified a 
the end of the second category) right int* 
the background yet it is the (dramati 
cally) missing key as far as the prescr 
: In particular, the draft convention on tl 
protection of minorities drafted by the Europe! 
Commission for Democracy through Law and l! 
draft protocol to the European Human Righ 
Convention guaranteeing protection for ethn 
groups produced by the Austrian Delegalion, plus, 
national level, the Hungarian bill on the protection 
minorities. 
58 DOSSIER 
claims are concerned. Cultural rights, as a 
specific category of human rights, tire 
under-developed -
1 and. although the 
spotlight is on them now. it is only in the 
restricted framework of minority rights. 
The vagueness which surrounds the right 
to culture has suggested that the series of 
needs to which this has been reduced has 
been more or less met as far as the 
majorities are concerned, in proportion 
to their level of development. This is a 
long way from human rights. 
Cultural rights have been caught in the 
minority rights trap, in that the call for 
the right to cultural identity is im­
mediately taken to be a particularist 
move, when in fact it is indivisibly 
twofold. Identity is both the right to be 
different and the right to resemble, the 
right to be particular combined with the 
right to be universal. So there are two 
(dialectical rather than contradictory) 
sides to every cultural right. We have the 
knowledge to provide adequate positive 
definitions of these human rights today. 
5 This was the subject of the eighth inter­
disciplinary conference on the objectivity oí' human 
rights held in the University of Fribourg (Switzer­
land). The conclusions may be obtained from 
Centre 9, route d'Englisberg, CH-1763 Granges-
Paccot. 
The advantage of a universalist ap­
proach is that it avoids the legal chiaros­
curo surrounding the definition of the 
subject of the right (belonging to a 
community). It makes for an immediate 
definition of rights applicable to people 
everywhere, regardless of their condition 
and this reduces the bellicose tensions 
attendant on all territorialisation issues. 
That is not all. The universalist ap­
proach is more in line with the re­
volutionary tradition of human rights, in 
that it contests the claim that the state has 
the legitimacy of the nation. The idea is a 
clear dissociation of the rule of law and 
the nation-state, which is often a usurper 
of the identity of the people. The duty of a 
state in which the rule of law prevails is to 
serve the identities which make up the 
many-faceted national unity. Its mission 
is to ensure that everyone has access to 
culture through education and untram­
melled involvement in cultural life, but 
this can no longer be a pretext for an 
official definition of culture. We can no 
longer entertain the idea of the state 
either monopolising culture or neglecting 
the cultural development which is a 
measure of the effectiveness of any 
democracy. 
If all human rights are definitions of 
freedom and the terms on which it can be 
Defining specific administrative guarantees — the possibility of using one's own 
1 language for administrative anil legal purposes, for example, or of teaching or being 
f taught one's language and its cultural values — means raising the problem of the 
practical recognition of new collective rights 
exercised, it is time we explicity recog­
nised the cultural dimensions of this 
freedom - - i.e. freedom of language, 
communication, movement, education 
and information, including the right to 
protection from disinformation. 
Political relays 
This universal basis, which is more 
solid and more in keeping with the 
multicultural reality of the vast majority 
of nations, could be the foundation for a 
more precise and efficient minority right 
— i.e. a category right, or specific 
guarantees to restore equality to cate­
gories of individuals under threat. The 
universalist approach is a vital counter­
weight here and the logical forerunner of 
instruments defining minority rights, but 
there can be no question of voiding those 
rights of all their substance. The fact that, 
say, the French state can see this ap­
proach as justification for its minority 
integration policy by no means entitles it 
to be less assiduous about recognising 
these rights once the universalist guaran­
tee has been accepted. 
However, the definition of specific 
administrative guarantees - - the poss­
ibility of using one's own language for 
administrative and legal purposes, for 
example, or of teaching or being taught 
one's language and its cultural values — 
raises the problem of the practical recog­
nition of new collective rights, par­
ticularly when it comes to politics. Rights 
of this sort can only really be claimed and 
guaranteed if there is a political relay in 
the legislative body, because, one way or 
another, there has to be a guarantee of 
cultural diversity being represented in 
parliament. 
So minority rights may appear to have 
the special twofold character of mixed 
category rights. They are human rights in 
that they lay down the conditions under 
which human rights are guaranteed to 
people in endangered cultural com­
munities and they belong with the rights 
of peoples in that they define the collect­
ive political form taken by such guaran­
tees. 
There is no question either of the vast 
— and vague — rights of peoples falling 
into the minority rights trap, although, 
properly controlled by human rights, 
they have the advantage of making for 
progress with the political definition of 
the people in the state in which the rule of 
law prevails, in particular through the 
consideration of cultural identities. 1 
P.M.-B. 
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The African tribal context : 
asset or liability? 
by Ola BALOGUN 
The political evolution of several African countries in the years following their 
accession to independence has been characterised by various kinds of internal 
tension that have sometimes evolved into intra-ethnic confrontations, leading in 
some cases to outright civil war. 
Past examples of such disastrous occurrences include the NigerianiBiafran 
civil war of 1967 to 1970, the prolonged series of internal conflicts which raged 
for over twenty five years in Chad beginning in 1963, the thirty year civil war in 
Ethiopia that recently culminated in the independence of Eritrea, the numerous 
upheavals that have occuredin Zaïre since 1960, the recurrent conflicts between 
Tutsi and Hutu populations in Rwanda and Burundi which have provoked 
numerous deaths over the past three decades, and the devastations provoked in 
Uganda by Idi Amins murderous rule. Closer to us in time, we are confronted 
with the vast human and material tragedies that have resulted from the on-going 
civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Angola. In South Africa, the 
violent clashes that periodically occur between the exclusively Zulu Inkatha 
movement and the rest of the black population continue to pose a dangerous 
threat to that country's evolution towards multi-party democracy. 
At a comparatively less tragic level, 
many of the shortcomings of adminis­
trative and governmental structures in 
Africa have been ascribed to a factor that 
is loosely defined as 'tribalism', a blanket 
term generally used to describe nepotism 
based on ethnic considerations. There is a 
pervasive perception in most African 
countries (which is unfortunately often 
justified by actual experience) that ap­
pointments to key governmental and 
administrative positions are frequently 
determined by ethnic considerations 
rather than on the basis of qualification 
or competence. From this perspective, to 
secure appointment to certain high po­
sitions in many African countries, it is 
more important to be from the 'right' 
ethnic group than to be qualified for the 
post, a situation that often leads to 
inefficiency and demoralisation in the 
public service. On the other hand, efforts 
by a number of African governments to 
provide an appearance of fairness in the 
pattern of public appointments by in­
stituting some form of quota system, (as 
in the case of what has come to be known 
as 'ethnic balancing' in Nigeria) have 
provoked controversy because of the 
widely-held belief that quota systems 
inevitably amount to placing obstacles on 
the path of qualified individuals whose 
Nigerian film producer. 
only sin is to belong to the 'wrong' ethnic 
group. 
For a variety of reasons therefore, (of 
which the perceived conflictual potential 
provides the most dramatic element), the 
blame for many of Africa's present-day 
woes has been ascribed by a wide range of 
both African and non-African observers 
to the ethnic factor. 
However, is ethnicity really the villain 
it has often been made out to be? If not, 
are there any particular circumstances 
that have combined to make the 'ethnic 
imperative' a threat to the nation-build­
ing efforts of the newly emergent African 
states? In order to answer these two vital 
questions successfully, we first have to try 
to define the tribal (or ethnic) pheno­
menon in its African context, so that we 
can then go on to try and understand the 
nature of its impact on the present-day 
African political and socio-cultural land­
scapes. 
What is a tribe? 
To begin with, what is a tribe? As­
tonishingly enough, this apparently in­
nocuous question has long been a source 
of much controversy and mutual incom­
prehension among commentators. The 
confused perception that is often as­
sociated with the term is typified by the 
way in which the Oxford dictionary first 
defines tribe as 'a group of people in a 
primitive and barbarous stage of develop-
ment, acknowledging the authority of a 
chief and usually regarding themselves as 
having a common ancestor', before pro­
ceeding to offer as a second definition: 
'kinds of political unit in some ancient 
States'... 
Obviously, the first definition reflects a 
prejudice that is widely shared among 
those who believe that the contemporary 
nation-state is the only valid model of 
political and social organisation for 
mankind, and that anything different is 
somehow primitive and archaic, if not 
'barbaric', as the Oxford dictionary 
bluntly implies. 
The second definition reflects a greater 
attempt at objectivity in that it attempts 
to come to grips with the fact that a tribe 
is essentially a political unit. This is 
indeed a definition that sets us on the 
right track, because fundamentally, the 
tribe is an organisational unit that en­
compasses a human group whose mem­
bers identify with each other on the basis 
of a shared culture. 
As a general rule, the members of a 
tribe speak the same language and share a 
common ancestry (or trace their origins 
to the same ancestral myth). Historically 
in Africa, a tribe or an ethnic group could 
by itself constitue a kingdom or a state if 
it were sufficiently large, but in many 
cases a tribe formed part of a larger 
political entity encompassing a number 
of ethnic groups, even though one might 
be dominant. Thus, the Soninke tribe 
formed the core ethnic group of the 
ancient kingdom of Wagadu (also known 
as Ghana) which held sway in the 
Western Sudan between the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, only to be subsequently 
absorbed into the successor state of Mali 
(which originated as a predominantly 
Mandinka entity) along with segments of 
other ethnic groups. 
Alternatively, members of the same 
ethnic group might be split up among 
rival political entities that either coexisted 
peacefully or engaged in armed rivalry 
with each other, as was the case with the 
various branches of the Nguni tribes of 
South Africa before the Zulu Empire was 
welded together under the forceful 
leadership of Chaka. Similarly, the 
Yoruba-speaking peoples of present-day 
Nigeria and the Benin Republic had 
branched out into a number of in­
dependent kingdoms by the sixteenth 
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century, although they recognised a 
common origin and shared the same 
culture and language. 
If we understand the tribe from this 
perspective, we are forced to draw a 
number of conclusions. The first of these 
is that the emergence of states or king-
doms in pre-colonial Africa in no way 
precluded the existence of tribal or ethnic 
entities within such states. In other 
words, the emergence of states as larger 
political organs did not negate the ex-
istence of tribal units. On the contrary, 
each state tended to rely on the organis-
ational structure of its component ethnic 
groups or tribes for the purpose of 
governance. 
The second is that there is nothing 
primitive or archaic about ethnicity, 
whether in Africa or elsewhere, even if the 
ethnic group as a socio-cultural unit has 
ceased to play a vital role in the western 
world with the emergence of the nation-
states that came into existence as from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Eth-
nicity is a simple fact of life that is 
inseparable from mankind's need to 
create institutions to serve as a frame-
work for social existence and organis-
ation, on a par with organs such as the 
nuclear family, the extended family, the 
village unit, the regional entity, or the 
modern industrial state. While it may be 
true that ethnicity has tended to have a 
greater importance in some cultures than 
in others, it is important to avoid an 
ethnocentric vision of the world that 
characterises anything different from 
.ine's own cultural heritage as 'backward' 
md 'barbaric". 
Thirdly, we need to recognise that the 
ethnic or tribal context represents a vital 
iimension of African modes of organis-
ition and self-perception. Historically, it 
i the ethnic or tribal framework that has 
Tovided (and continues to provide) the 
ssential framework for the cultural, 
piritual and artistic heritage of the 
Ifrican peoples. In fact, the ethnic 
'.ickground of the average African is as 
ssential to his way of life and to his 
verception of the world as state structures 
night be in societies where nationality 
■nd ethnicity have fused into a common 
tttity. 
Colonial conquest 
The dilemma and tragedy of present-
'fey Africa resides in the fact that in the 
wake of the colonial conquest of the 
continent by external powers in the 
nineteenth century, administrative en-
tities were created that arbitrarily lumped 
together various ethnic groups within 
borders that were not of their own 
choosing. As a general rule, these new 
administrative entities took no cognis-
ance of the prior structures of the 
societies on which they were imposed, 
sometimes separating segments of the 
same ethnic groups in neighbouring 
territories ruled by separate colonial 
powers. 
To compound matters, the new admin-
istrative structures that resulted from the 
colonial occupation of Africa, which 
were organised on an authoritarian basis, 
provided the essential framework for the 
emergence of the new nation states that 
acquired independence as from the 1960s. 
The new African states were thus con-
stituted on a basis that took no cognis-
ance at all of the cultural and historical 
heritage of their component peoples. Nor 
did the borrowed robes of western-style 
(or 'socialist' eastern-style) political or-
ganisation provide any real scope for 
representation of the peoples of the new 
nations along truly democratic lines or 
even along the lines according to which 
ethnic groups had coalesced in the past in 
Africa by conquest or association to form 
states. In other words, the new state 
structures were totally alien to Africa in 
concept and organisation, and could not 
hope to form a viable basis for mobilising 
the loyalties and energies of the popu-
lations that they encompassed. 
'Tribalism' as a social and national 
malady has thus been the inevitable result 
of state structures that have failed to 
reflect the true nature of African society, 
and of corrupt and purposeless leader-
ship in the new nation-states of Africa, 
rather than of the ethnic factor per se. It is 
not ethnicity that is to blame for Africa's 
woes, but clientilism. nepotism, and 
ineptitude on the part of the continent's 
ruling elites. 
The root of many of the internal 
conflicts that have plagued a number of 
African states since independence lies in 
the naked exploitation of ethnic dif-
ferences by greedy and power-hungry 
elites, in many cases armed and en-
couraged from behind the scenes by 
external forces anxious to capitalise on 
Africa's resources or to prevent the 
emergence of truly independent and 
nationalistic leaderships in Africa. The 
upheavals in present-day Zaïre, from the 
ethnic clashes that surrounded the ouster 
and assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 
1961 through the secession of Katanga to 
the current intra-ethnic massacres in 
Shaba province and elsewhere, are a 
direct outcome of the combination of 
external intervention and the self-serving 
schemes of a kleptocratic ruling class. A 
further example of the same kind of 
phenomenon is to be found in the 
immensely tragic civil wars that have 
devastated Mozambique and Angola at 
the instigation of foreign forces who have 
found willing tools in local tribal-based 
political leaders willing to unleash untold 
havoc on their own populations to satisfy 
an insatiable lust for power and wealth... 
In the end. far from being the root 
cause of instability in present-day Africa, 
ethnicity could, if properly harnessed, 
play a vital role in the much needed 
reorganisation of African nations to 
provide scope for genuine popular par-
ticipation in political decision-making. 
Far from being archaic and retrogressive, 
as has been suggested in some quarters, 
the ethnic and cultural roots of the 
peoples of Africa represent a key avenue 
for harnessing their loyalty and energies 
for the great tasks of nation-building, 
provided the ethnic dimension of their 
lives is woven into the very fabric of state 
construction. 
What appears to be required in Africa 
today is not a negation of the social, 
cultural and historical heritage of the 
African peoples, but an imaginative 
integration of those elements from the 
African past that constitute a valid basis 
for social organisation into new projects 
for nation building. The new African 
states can only prosper and progress as 
federations of peoples who can par-
ticipate in determining their own de-
stinies, rather than as artificial entities 
based on sterile imitations of institutions 
that have no roots in Africa. 
Thus, from the point of view of 
creating meaningful values in present day 
Africa and of preserving the heritage of 
the past, the ethnic dimension of life in 
Africa remains an asset that needs to be 
recognised and properly exploited, rather 
than arbitrarily discarded.G O.B. 
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Minorities and the European community 
In common with other regions of the world, the European Community has its share of minority situations and problems. 
A number of these are discussed in the case studies which appear at the end of this Dossier. In the three articles which follow, 
however, we take a more general look at the 'minority' issue in an EC context. The first two contributions focus on the 
policy aspects as they pertain to minorities both inside and outside the Community's borders. The third describes the 
particular situation of linguistic minorities living within the EC. 
A policy overview 
by Gerd TEBBE 
From time immemorial, the fate of 
minorities the world over has been 
marked by neglect and discrimination, if 
not by open suppression up to the level of 
genocide. Groups of people have had to 
suffer all kinds of hardship simply be­
cause of their religious beliefs, cultural 
traditions, native languages, ethnic orig­
ins or national affiliations which were 
different from those of the majority in a 
country rightfully considered as their 
common home. Attitudes such as mis­
trust and resentment, xenophobia and 
racism have in modern times been fed by 
the ambivalent concept of the nation-
state, which combines the idea of in­
dependence with a strong element of 
demarcation against outsiders. Hitherto, 
minorities have tended to be the first 
victims of excessive nationalism, wher­
ever it has arisen. Their oppression has 
often been the origin of major inter­
national conflicts. 
Apart from the obvious interrelation­
ship with the maintenance of peace and 
international security, it has been the 
growing concern for the promotion of 
human rights which has made the world 
increasingly aware of the need to protect 
minorities efficiently. The general oblig­
ation of the members of the international 
community to accept and protect the 
specific rights of persons belonging to 
minorities arises directly from their com­
mitment to international human rights 
standards, as laid down in the United 
Nations Bill of Rights. Thus, the rights of 
minorities are part and parcel of universal 
and indivisible human rights in general. 
* Administrator working in the Human Rights 
unit of the European Commission's Directorate-
General for External Political Relations. 
The United Nations approach 
Since its foundation in 1948, the 
United Nations has attached increasing 
importance to minority questions in its 
activities in the field of human rights. 
Building upon the UN Charter, which 
proclaimed international cooperation in 
promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion, as one of its main 
purposes, Article 27 of the International I 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
guarantees persons belonging to ethnic, j 
religious or linguistic minorities the right 
to enjoy their own culture, to practise 
their own religion and to use their own 
language. The adoption on 18 December 
1992 of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities by 
the UN General Assembly is the most 
recent landmark which emphasises the 
increasingly important role the United 
Nations intends to play in the field of 
protection of minorities. 
The efforts undertaken by the United 
Nations have been supported by regional 
action. Drawing from its unique ex­
perience in human rights protection, 
different Council of Europe bodies ad­
opted instruments on the protection and 
promotion of minority languages and on 
the rights of persons belonging to mino­
rities. The related work of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), which regards an adequate level 
of protection for minorities as an un­
alterable precondition for peace and 
security, culminated in the establishment 
of the office of a CSCE High Com­
missioner on National Minorities in 
1992. 
EC action 
The activities of the European Com­
munity in favour of minorities form part 
of the international pattern outlined 
above. The European Community and its 
Member States encourage and support 
the efforts undertaken at regional and 
international level to protect and prom­
ote the rights of people who belong to 
minorities. Within its ambit the Euro­
pean Community furthermore supports, 
by complementary measures, in accord­
ance with the principle of subsidiarity, its 
Member States' national efforts for the 
benefit of minorities inside the Com­
munity's territory. 
In the framework of European Poli­
tical Cooperation (EPC) the European 
Community and its Member States act 
jointly, both in multilateral fora and 
bilaterally vis-à-vis third countries, with 
the aim of ensuring effective protection 
both on a national and an international 
level. As an integral part of the Com­
munity's human rights policy, this ap­
proach is mirrored in the Declaration on 
Human Rights, adopted by the European 
Council in June 1991, which underlines 
'... the importance of respect for the 
cultural identity and the rights which the 
members of minorities enjoy and which 
they have to exercise in common with 
other members of their group'. 
The European Community, which 
participates in its own right in the UN, 
the CSCE and the Council of Europe, 
actively contributes, alongside its 
Member States, to the work of the UN 
bodies dealing with minority issues, 
including the Human Rights Commis­
sion and its Sub-Commission on Preven­
tion of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. They played an active role in 
the CSCE expert meetings on minorities 
held in Geneva in 1991 and in Warsaw in 
1993, and had considerable influence on 
the decision to create a special CSCE 
High Commissioner as well as on the 
shaping of his mandate. Within the 
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Council of Europe, the Community and 
its Member States permanently 
cooperate in improving existing stan­
dards and developing new levels of 
protection. 
On the occasion of the recognition of 
the newly independent states in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, the Community and its 
Member States have declared sufficient 
guarantees of minorities rights to be a 
prerequisite of their recognition. In their 
bilateral relations, the Community and 
its Member States discuss, whenever 
necessary, questions on the situation of 
specific minorities in the context of 
political dialogue, which they maintain, 
on an institutionalised basis, with a wide 
range of countries and groups of coun­
tries all over the world. The European 
Community financially supports a wide 
range of projects in third countries which 
help to improve the situation of specific 
minorities. 
Association, trade and 
cooperation agreements 
The importance the Community attac­
hes to human rights considerations in 
general and more specifically to mino­
rities protection in its relations with third 
countries is underlined by the insertion of 
references to that effect in association 
agreements as well as in trade and 
cooperation agreements with those coun­
tries. To avoid any impression of dis­
crimination among the Community's 
partners, the EC Commission has re­
cently defined general guidelines de­
termining the form of these references, 
which explicitly establish a mutual com­
mitment to respect human rights, which 
includes the rights of people belonging to 
national minorities, as part of generally 
accepted human rights standards. Such 
references can be found in all agreements 
recently signed with Central and Eastern 
European countries ; they will serve as a 
model for future agreements with other 
CSCE member states. In line with the 
above-mentioned 1991 Declaration on 
Human Rights, which states that respect 
for minority rights 'will favour... poli­
tical, social and economic development', 
the resolution of the EC Council of 
Ministers of November 1991 on human 
rights, democracy and development calls 
for the inclusion of such clauses also in 
agreements with developing countries. 
The protection of the rights of people 
belonging to minorities inside the Euro­
pean Community falls within the sphere 
Working together at school in 
the Netherlands 
'The Community has developed a range 
of actions to combat the recent rise of 
racism and xenophobia' 
of the national competence of its Member 
States, which are all parties to the 
relevant international instruments on 
human rights protection — the UN Bill of 
Rights, the CSCE human dimension 
documents and, especially, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, with its 
far-reaching individual complaint pro­
cedure. Within its ambit, the Community 
has, however, developed a range of 
actions directed towards the needs of 
specific groups found throughout the 
Community and designed to combat the 
recent rise of racism and xenophobia 
inside it, which constitutes a serious 
danger for the well-being of certain 
minorities. Such specific actions include a 
programme to improve the situation of 
migrant workers, (grant-aided) with 
nearly ECU 6 million in 1992, a scheme to 
facilitate the education of gypsy children, 
amounting to ECU lm in 1993, as well as 
financial support for the activities of 
nongovernmental organisations in 
favour of minorities. The European 
Community has also given budgetary 
allocations amounting to ECU 3.5m in 
1993 for projects on the preservation and 
protection of minority languages. 
The range of different instruments 
developed by the European Community 
and its Member States in the past to help 
minorities inside and outside the Com­
munity preserve their traditions and 
maintain their specific character is subject 
to regular evaluation. This should allow 
for necessary adaptations at the earliest 
possible stage in order to ensure as 
efficient a response as possible to any new 
challenges and circumstances that may 
arise, o G.T. 
Towards a new system of protection 
by Notis LEBESSIS * 
The perception of minority issues in the 
European Community has never been an 
easy matter. The Community and its 
Member States have, for example, had 
considerable problems with the resur­
gence of minority issues in the former 
Soviet empire now the situation created 
at Yalta has come to an end. These 
problems are of three different origins. 
— Some are the result of individual 
historical developments, all of which 
have culminated, sometimes through 
violence, in a nation-state, in which a 
political frame of reference and a 'cul­
tural frame of belonging' are super­
imposed, as the French philosopher Jean-
Marc Ferry put it. 
— Some, clearly, come from a different 
perception of where minority interests lie, 
which has more to do with history than 
with any vision of their future. 
— And some are related to a difference in 
the philosophical concept of citizenship, 
* The author is a principal administrator in the 
Forward Studies Unit of the Commission of the 
European Communities. The article is the written 
version of his recent speech to a conference on 
minority issues in Europe. 
either a Rousseau-type view of the social 
contract or more community-oriented 
approaches. Although there is inevitably 
something artificial about these standard 
ideological classifications, they are re­
flected in the definition and scope of 
minority rights in the Member States. 
They are therefore also behind the vary­
ing attitudes and sensitivities displayed 
by the Community countries recently in 
the attempt to strike a balance between 
the right of peoples to self-determination 
and protection of the territorial integrity 
of the state. These differences of concep­
tion seem also to be to blame for the 
snail's pace at which national policies on 
immigrant minorities are converging — 
despite the fact that convergence would 
both make the policies more effective and 
make it easier to create the European 
social area which will complete the 
unification of the markets. 
A challenge for the Community and the 
continent as a whole 
A resurgence of the minority issue in 
Eastern Europe, difficulties created by 
the new minorities emerging from the 
waves of immigration and an upsurge of 
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new regionalist movements (the Italian 
Leagues, for example) have come to add 
to the time-honoured calls for autonomy 
from one or two 'historical' minorities, in 
most cases by way of reaction to the 
campaigns waged by the central powers 
of nation-states attempting to unify their 
national territory. They represent a 
considerable challenge to the Com-
munity. 
Even supposing that, in a world where 
the force of interdependence gets more 
complex all the time, there is some point 
in distinguishing between those challen-
ges that are inside and those that are 
outside the Community, that distinction 
is of course bound to fade under the effect 
of the probable enlargement of the 
Community to include the countries of 
Central Europe — which means both 
those, such as Poland and Slovakia, with 
strong national minorities on their soil 
and those, such as Hungary, with large 
sections of 'their' population concen-
trated in places beyond their frontiers. So 
the Community and the rest of the 
continent of Europe are also concerned 
by the question of minorities and the 
challenges that go with it. 
Institutions and regulatory machinery 
which are ill-suited to interdependence 
make things worse 
In most cases, let us not forget, be they 
internal or external, these difficulties are 
underlaid with and above all aggravated 
by economic depression combined with 
internationalisation, making national 
systems of regulation inadequate and the 
crisis of representative democracies 
worse. And economic depression and 
internationalisation heighten the crisis of j 
integrating institutions such as the 
family, the school and the welfare state, 
those perpetuators of social links, and | 
fuel feelings of alienation and egoism. 
Take an example in the Community, 
where, when cultural minorities created ! 
by migration are also victims of social 
exclusion, there is a strong probability I 
that they will become inward-looking and 
radical and react by rejecting those 
sections of the native population with i 
whom they have to compete on the job or 
housing market. A climate of this sort 
impedes the Community's progress to-
wards integration and undermines its 
internal cohesiveness. The same goes for 
the countries of Eastern Europe, which 
also have to grapple with the problems of | 
transition to a market economy. 
Faced with these challenges, and de-
spite the above differences and diver-
gences, the Community already provides 
a framework and a model which can 
reduce, if not go beyond, the incompat-
ibility of a people's right to self-determi-
nation and desire for autonomy with 
maintenance of a national state system. 
We shall illustrate this briefly, before 
outlining an hypothesis involving trans-
posing this model and various legal 
arrangements from the Community to 
greater Europe. We shall then discuss the 
| Community's possible contribution to 
the emergence of a pan-European mi-
nority protection system and look at what 
action this might involve. 
The Community model — an 
example with limitations 
The Community extends the means of 
solidarity 
The Community's first contribution to 
bettering the situation of national mino-
rities involves expanding the framework 
and means of solidarity which it makes 
possible. With the internationalisation of 
techniques, the emergence of trans-
nationals and all the challenges of a 
profoundly inegalitarian and interdepen-
dent world, the Community constitutes 
its Member States' collective response to 
the need to boost prosperity and ensure a 
collective return to political control over 
the economy that will serve a proper plan 
for society. The internal market and 
economic and monetary union are ways 
to a general improvement of prosperity in 
the present conditions of interdepen-
dence and the politics of cohesion are the 
way to take solidarity far further than 
would ever be possible in states in 
isolation or, of course, in the weaker of 
them. 
What could Greece or even Spain do to 
support the Xanthi or Basque regions — 
to take two examples of places with 
minority problems — if they were not in 
the Community? Let us not forget that 
Community solidarity, in the shape of 
development aid, accounts for more than 
3% of Greece's GDP and something like 
11 % of its annual investment effort. 
The Community embarks on a new part-
nership to transcend the incompatibility 
between the call for autonomy and main-
tenance of the state framework 
Let us look at the consequences of 
expanding the terms of solidarity by 
reference to the Basque country, where 
the separatist movement and the creation 
of the Basque Nationalist Party go back 
to the end of the last century (1893) and 
the reaction to Madrid's abolition of 
administrative, legislative and tax free-
doms (the famous fueros of 1846). Now 
that Spain belongs to the Community, the 
Basque call for home rule — which Spain 
has to some extent gone along with — 
ceases to seem incompatible with or 
directed against the national system of 
the state. On the contrary, it is the state, 
as the political frame of reference, which 
enables the Basques to have the benefit of 
solidarity and access to a wider area, both 
of which would be out of the question 
without this double membership. By 
being a member of the Community, Spain 
is ensuring the internationalisation of it 
and its components, becoming the link on 
which such regions depend if they want 
'■ genuinely to increase their autonomy and 
reappearing as the guarantee of coher-
| enee vis-à-vis the interior and the ex-
terior, thereby being an essential inter-
face, in the eyes of the Basque authorities 
included. Do they not need a Spanish 
Prime Minister to thump his fist on the 
table and tell his equals how essential it is 
to channel more resources into cohesion 
policies? Belonging to the Community 
opens the way to a new partnership, in 
which three partners need each other. 
This is how it attenuates and, ultimately, 
makes it possible to go beyond the 
divergence between calls for indepen-
dence (going as far as separatist move-
ments) on the part of cultural com-
munities, and maintenance of the state 
framework. By supporting regional coop-
ration across frontiers, the Community is 
also making a happy contribution to 
bringing Spanish and French factions in 
the Basque country together. 
The Community can provide many 
more examples of cross-border regional 
cooperation calming tension between 
minority and state. With continental 
integration on the horizon, the Com-
munity's support for this type of initiative 
is gradually being extended to regional 
cooperation across the Community's 
external frontiers too. The existence of 
external third states in which some 
national minorities may sometimes find 
an echo does nothing to undermine the 
force of this, for if the state commands its 
minorities' respect, it is because it enables 
them to thrive. 
That, then, was an outline of the new 
possibilities of belonging to a larger 
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Community — which, despite its dif-
ficulties, is still a pole of attraction for the 
whole continent and beyond. 
A model for association and sovereignty 
sharing 
Now let us look at the legal, political 
and administrative aspects of the Com-
munity's treatment of minorities. Is the 
Community not the first free association 
of different peoples of unequal power 
who are nonetheless equal under the rules 
they have laid down for themselves? Is 
Luxembourg not a case of positive 
discrimination in favour of a 'minority' in 
as central a field as the sharing of 
sovereignty? 
Freedom of movement 
The dynamics of Community integ-
ration are far from being propelled by the 
action of the states alone and a legal 
system has to get into step with trends in 
society sooner or later. 
Left to the drive of economic forces 
alone, the dynamics of European integ-
ration (like internationalisation) even 
tend to trigger movements aimed at 
standardising or harmonising singular 
features which could fuel fears of loss of 
identity and encourage an identity com-
plex or even egoism on the part of the 
well-off. So the political powers have to 
step in, both to provide a framework for 
the forces of the economy and to ar-
bitrate. But the Community order — 
particularly the four freedoms of move-
ment and various aspects of the way the 
sharing of sovereignty is organised — 
contains what could be significant re-
sponses to the problem of minority rights, 
particularly for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, where the neigh-
bours are nearly always involved. What 
would be the point, say. of Romania 
preventing its Hungarian minority from 
producing a Hungarian-language news-
paper when the free movement of goods 
meant that (currently limited numbers of) 
papers from Hungary were already avail-
able? Think for a moment of what the 
implications would be for minorities and 
their collective rights and for the free 
movement of television programmes, 
students, films, tourists — and ordinary 
people. Does not freedom of movement 
always go with greater freedom in gen-
eral? A twist in history would give us an 
inversion of the traditions of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire — individual attach-
ment to a territory combined with recog-
nition of cultural pluralism. This could be 
achieved through either a genuine exten-
sion of the Community system to the 
countries of Eastern Europe (which will 
be joining the Community sooner or 
later) or a gradual transposition of it 
within the framework of a reworking of 
the architecture of the continent. 
Emergence of a pan-European 
system of protection 
The Community model, as we have 
seen, may not provide the answer to the 
minorities issue, but it is not entirely 
devoid of useful messages. There is still a 
long way to go before the Community can 
guarantee the rights of its historical and 
immigrant minorities. There is more to 
collective rights than free movement, 
decentralisation and greater solidarity 
and making progress with them means 
going beyond the problems related to the 
different conceptions mentioned earlier. 
The facts, and the methods of work 
forged from a combination of ideas and 
experience, invite and will probably lead 
the Community to make this progress. 
Driving force in the Council of Europe and 
the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe ? 
Various specialists have suggested that 
there is no point in the Community 
having legal instruments of its own. The 
more specialised Council of Europe has 
been busy with a remarkable piece of 
work in this field for some time now, 
devising European legal frameworks for 
the protection of the collective rights of 
minorities, plus the relevant control and 
arbitration machinery. It would be prog-
ress indeed if the Community joined the 
systems now being set up. 
Think how much faster the Council of 
Europe itself could go with coordinated 
involvement by the Member States of the 
Community (once they have fixed on a 
common philosophy). It would make the 
Community a real driving force in the 
Council of Europe. And the same goes for 
the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe, which now has the best 
prevention, mediation and dispute settle-
ment machinery — but has not yet had 
the opportunity to prove its efficiency. 
What it needs now is a driving force. 
Let us not overlook the greater cred-
ibility which progress in this field would 
bring the Community in its injunctions to 
neighbouring European countries where 
minorities are getting a bad deal. This of 
course harks back to the general principle 
of coherence which applies in everything 
the Community does. There is nothing 
speculative about it. There have been 
cases of our partners in Eastern Europe 
pointing to the treatment of minorities in 
the Community when we have invited 
them to respect the rights of their own 
minorities. 
Wielding political and economic influence 
in particular cases 
In addition to this contribution to the 
creation and consolidation of a pan-
European minority protection system 
with its own rules (some of them statu-
tory) and prevention, conciliation and 
arbitration machinery, the Community 
has other ways of helping improve the 
situation of Europe's minorities. 
First of all, it can use its political and 
economic influence to get the countries of 
Eastern Europe to join the European 
minority protection systems. Almost all 
these countries want to join the Com-
munity and are polarised by it and it was 
no doubt this prospect which, for ex-
ample, prevented Hungary from even 
thinking about the re-establishment of a 
state combining all the Hungarian mino-
rities now living in Slovakia, the former 
Yugoslavia and Romania. In some cases, 
this Community incentive may be offi-
cial. The association agreement with 
Romania, for example, contains a clause 
referring to the final act of Helsinki and 
the Charter of Paris, providing for 
association arrangements to be sus-
pended if minority rights are not re-
spected. This is obviously something 
which should be done whenever the 
Community is involved in a contractual 
agreement of this kind. 
The Community can also use its in-
fluence in special situations such as that 
of the former Yugoslavia. Whatever the 
shortcomings of its action in that inst-
ance, it would be unfair to overlook the 
effort it put into getting the combatants 
round the negotiating table. And there 
have of course been other attempts at 
arbitration too — with the Guimarães 
declaration and the follow-up to Pre-
sident Mitterand's proposal, to mention 
but two recent ones. The Community's 
influence in this kind of international 
arbitration will no doubt gain ground as 
the common external and security policy 
of European union takes shape and 
develops. O N.L. 
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Linguistic minorities 
in the European Community 
by Sylvia CARREL * 
The language map of Europe is a real mosaic, with scores of communities in north 
and south and east and west to bear witness to our continent's historic past and cultural 
wealth. 
The European Community has more than 40 native languages in everyday use, but 
for official purposes it uses only nine of them — Danish. Dutch. English. French. 
German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. Irish, despite being an official State 
language, is only a 'treaty language' in the Community. All the others — and they are 
spoken by almost 50 million Europeans, one in seven — represent what are usually 
called linguistic minorities. 
It is not easy to find one word to define all these 'other' languages. Their situations 
are very different, far too much so for them all to be grouped together under the same 
heading. Neither 'minority', nor 'less common", nor 'regional' really does the job. 
Here are some examples. Catalan is 
considered to be a lesser-used language in 
France and Spain alike, although in fact 
more people speak Catalan than Danish, 
which is one of the official languages of 
the Community. The Welsh do not look 
upon their language as a regional lan­
guage (and would be offended it it were 
treated as such), because they believe that 
Wales constitutes a nation in its own 
right. The Bretons, however, see nothing 
wrong with Breton being called a regional 
language, with Brittany as a region with 
its own specific language and culture 
within the state of France. 
When the European Bureau for Lesser-
Used Languages was set up in 1982 (see 
box), it fixed on 'lesser-used' as being 
both the most neutral and the most 
representative term. 
Five major categories 
of lesser-used languages 
It was difficult to find the right term to 
describe them, but the lesser-used lan­
guages proved fairly easy to divide into 
five categories, as follows: 
1. The languages of the two small 
Member States of the Twelve which are 
not official languages of the Community 
and are little used in international circles 
— Irish and Luxembourgish. 
2. The languages of small, stateless 
communities within individual Member 
States — for example. Breton in France. 
Friulian in Italy. Frisian in the Nether­
lands and Welsh in the United Kincdom. 
* The author is a press attaché at the European 
Bureau for Lesser-Used Laneuaees. 
3. Languages of small, stateless com­
munities living in two or more of the 
Member States — for example, Basque in 
France and Spain and Occitan in France, 
Italy and Spain. 
4. The languages ol' people who con­
stitute a minority in the country in which 
they live, but a majority elsewhere — for 
example. German in Belgium. Danish in 
Germany and French and Greek in Italy. 
5. The non-territorial languages tradi­
tionally spoken in a state but not identify­
ing with a particular area — for example, 
the languages of the gypsies and the Jews 
(Sinti. Romany and Yiddish). 
Over and above this division, it is also 
important to take the degree of accept­
ance, promotion and usage of these 
languages into consideration. It is some­
thing which varies considerably from one 
country to another. The Member States 
have reacted very differently to the 
minority language issue and their laws 
reflect the fact. 
Different situations 
Italy, the country with the most mi­
nority languages, does not yet have a 
framework law on them, despite the fact 
that Article 6 of the Italian Constitution 
says that the Republic 'shall take the 
relevant measures to protect linguistic 
minorities'. A bill was tabled and passed 
by the Chamber of Deputies, but the early 
dissolution of Parliament last year meant 
that there was no time for it to be passed 
by the Senate. The Italian political 
agenda has. not surprisingly, been domi­
nated by the recent upheavals, to the 
exclusion of much of the 'normal' legis­
lative activity. 
Any legislation so far has been ad hoc. 
providing separate arrangements for one 
or two linguistic minorities the 
German minority in South Tyrol, the 
Ladins in the Dolomites, the Slovenes 
and the people in Val d'Aosta. Linguistic 
policies have differed widely, as Paolo 
Carrozza of the University of Florence 
points out. There is total bilingualism in 
the Val d'Aosta, linguistic separation for 
the German- and the Ladin-speakers of 
South Tyrol and what he calls limitation 
of the school system for the Slovenes of 
Friulia-Venezia-Giulia living in the pro­
vinces ol' Trieste and Gorizia. French is 
officially recognised in the eastern part of 
Val d'Aosta and German in South Tyrol. 
And Val d'Aosta is slightly unusual in 
that both French and Italian tire spoken 
in public life, while Franco-Provençal is 
the language most commonly spoken in 
the street. 
Totally different, however, is the situ­
ation of Catalan in Spain. This language, 
which the inhabitants of Catalonia speak 
with stout national pride, is now in a 
strong position, almost up in the ranks of 
the so-called majority languages. And 
unlike the other languages of Europe 
which tire in a minority situation, it is in a 
majority situation on its own territory, 
where it is the working language of even 
the highest ranks of society. Catalan has 
tin abundance of literature and Catalonia 
is considered to be one of the four driving 
regions of Europe. 
The linguistic situation in Belgium is 
another example of the diversity of lesser-
used languages in Europe. The Belgians, 
of course, do not have a national lan­
guage which bears their name. The 
creation of four linguistic regions in 1962 
made the language situation and three 
languages French, Dutch and German 
- official. German is considered to be a 
minority language, however, not just 
because the German-speaking com­
munity is very small, but because, while it 
is the official language of the cantons of 
Eupen and Saint Vith. it is not yet 
recognised in the Montzen area. 
Lesser-used languages in 
the Community 
'The Community shall contribute to 
the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their 
national and regional diversity and at the 
same time bringing the common cultural 
heritage to the fore.' This is Article 128. at 
Title IX (Culture), of the Treaty of 
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The European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages 
A Community response to the language rights issue 
The European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages is a non-
profit-making association which was formed on the initiative of 
various members of the European Parliament and of cultural 
organisations involved in the promotion of 'other' European 
languages. 
On 16 October 1981 .following a series of motions on regional 
languages and cultures, the European Parliament took a 
fundamental step towards a Community strategy for lesser-
used languages, and towards the establishment of the Bureau, 
with its adoption of the Arfé Resolution. 
As part of its strategy for achieving ever-closer cooperation 
with the Community institutions, the Bureau, which has its 
headquarters in Dublin, last year opened a documentation 
centre in Brussels. In addition, it has committees operating in 
ten of the Member States — real local correspondents working 
in the field with various language minorities. 
Bureau policy, which can be summed up under four headings, 
is: ( I ) to seek legal and political support in Europe, the states 
and the regions ; (2) to seek finance for projects related to 
lesser-used languages; (3) to provide for exchanges of 
information and experience among groups involved in actively 
promoting these languages and (4) to set up structures to 
support the indigenous linguistic communities. Examples of the 
last mentioned include MERCATOR, a network of data bases 
relating to education, the media, legislation and general 
studies; the Secretariat de Coédition pour l'Enfance, which 
encourages the publication of children's books in minority 
languages; and Euroskol, a two-yearly meeting of primary 
school children at which the lesser-used language is the 
teaching medium. 
Since 1984, ¡he Bureau has published Contact Bulletin, its own 
quarterly review, this provides a link between the committee 
members in the different Member States as well as being a 
more widely distributed source of information on European 
minorities. 
An Eläjiä Eo-picíi öo Thaanffftcha Ne*mnítiorteeíi«n· 
CONTACT 0 
This publication is funded by the Commission of the European Communities 
The European Buraau to' Lanar Citad Language! 
Volume 8. Nos. 2 & 3 
AUTUMN 1991 
Our Community's Lesser Used 
Languages 
There is now α very real possibility that the new EC treaty, being drofteu m 
present, will for the firat time in the hi story of the Community contain articles 
covering the areas of culture and education. The Luxembourg Govern m e nt's 
proposal to incorporate cultural policy and conservation into the EC treaty-as 
part of the reforms at present under consideration at the Inter-Governmental 
Conference on Political Union-is, in many ways, a reflection of the recognition 
that Europeans share a precious common heritage that is not only worth 
preserving but is also a means of bringing people together. 
The passing of the EC Presidency put forward a proposal that a text be 
η Luxembourg to the Netherlands 
will in no way diminish this thrust for 
the recognition of the cultural 
dimension - including the languages 
and cultures of smaller groups. The 
Netherlands Minister for Culture, 
Mrs. D'Ancona, addressing the 
Committee of the European 
BroadcastingUnionfEBUJon lOApril 
in The Hague underscored the 
importance of Europe supporting 
culture, notjustat member state level 
but at community level also. She said: 
"... the European procesa of 
integration has also stimulated 
the awareness of nations of thelr 
own national and regional 
cultures and of the pluriform ¡tv 
of the European culture, which 
could possibly be threatened by 
unification and increase in scale... 
On the other hand, it is realised 
that the pluriform cultural 
heritage in Europe is served by 
the preservation of national and 
regional cultural cultures, and in 
thie connection of the national 
and regional governments' own 
roles and responsibilities". 
Another European politician who is 
thinking along the same lines is 
Ireland's Minister of State for 
European Affairs, Maire Geoghen-
Quinn TD. At the presentation of 
awards, to winners of an art 
competition organised by the Irish 
Committee of the European Bureuu 
for Lesser Used Languages on 30 May 
1991 MinisterGcoghan-Quinn stated 
that Ireland was the first country to 
included in the new EC treaty which 
would refer to educatii 
culture is concerned", the Minister 
stated, "we put forward proposals to 
the Commission concerning the te*t 
of the article which is to be proposed. 
There was a reference in our proposed 
text to lesser used languages. In the 
text the Commission proposed, there 
was a reference to the respect which 
should be accorded to the linguistic 
and cultural diversity of the 
Continued back page 
Maastricht and it refers to the diversity — 
regional as well as national — of the 
Member States, in which it is recognising 
the fact that less common cultures have 
the right to existence, over and above 
their support from the European Com-
munity. With the internal market and 
balanced development of the common 
policies in its sights, the Treaty will be 
broadening the scope of the EC in this 
way, but it clearly says that it will do this 
with due respect for a principle which is 
essential to the institutional balance of 
the new Union, namely, subsidiarity. 
This means running schemes to en-
courage minority-language culture and 
education, a drive which started long ago, 
even for the lesser-used languages. 
At Community level, the idea first 
came up officially in 1981, when the 
European Parliament adopted the Arfé 
resolution, the first step towards a mi-
nority language policy, since when there 
has been a whole series of resolutions and 
motions heralding directives and prac-
tical action. The Commission has been 
involved in this field for some time, with 
its contributions to various programmes 
put forward by the European Bureau for 
Lesser-Used Languages and by the lan-
guage communities themselves. 
Last year, the Council of Europe 
decided to give the European Charter for 
regional or minority languages the status 
of a convention — a very important move 
given that a convention is legally binding 
once a Member State has signed it. By the 
end of 1992, the Charter had been signed 
by 12 countries, only five of them 
(Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Spain) Member States 
of the Community. The French Govern-
ment has abstained and the United 
Kingdom and Greece have rejected the 
draft convention. The unification of 
Europe seems to pose problems for 
linguistic minorities. When the Dillinea 
report on minorities in the EEC was being 
discussed quite recently, the European 
Parliament Committee on Culture, 
Youth, Education and the Media sent the 
draft back and asked the rapporteur to 
rewrite it in the light of all the suggestions 
which had been made. 
Yet the so-called minority languages 
have the great responsibility of saving the 
world from linguistic monotony. And 
although the dollar does not speak 
Occitan nor computer programmes 
Basque, it would be wrong to forget that a 
language is quite different from a simple 
translation or imitation of a so-called 
majority language. Language is like 
DNA, a kind of genetic code of a people, 
which is why safeguarding a people's 
identity means defending and promoting 
its language.O S.C. 
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Creating marginalised dependent minorities 
Relief programmes for refugees in Europe 
by B.E. HARRELL-BOND * 
We have seen from the foregoing articles that there are 
many different types of minority situation, characterised, 
on occasion, by social cohesion but often, sadly, by varying 
degrees of tension up to and including outright conflict. In 
ex-Yugoslavia, the 'minority question' is an important 
element in the current turmoil as the different ethnic/ 
religious groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims) have 
split apart and proceeded to fight over previously- shared 
territory. 
Such conflict creates a particular minority situation 
which has not yet been covered in this Dossier— that of the 
refugee forced to flee his homeland and 'settle' in a 
neighbouring host country. Such people have very special 
needs but, in catering to these needs, there is a risk of 
alienation and suspicion ris à vis the host population. In this 
article, Dr Barbara Harrell-Bond of Oxford University's 
Refugee Studies Programme examines the case of the 
Bosnian refugees in Slovenia and Croatia. And she has 
some critical things to say about the possible effects of the 
so-called 'relief-model' which has been applied to these 
countries by external donors. 
The crisis of those uprooted by the war 
in Bosnia has prompted an outpouring of 
humanitarian concern from ordinary 
people as well as the mobilising of 
European non-governmental agencies, 
many of which have established offices in 
the neighbouring host countries. Un­
fortunately, however, if the situation in 
Croatia and Slovenia is typical, despite 
knowledge acquired elsewhere, humani­
tarian agencies are busy implementing 
relief programmes in Europe which are 
likely to have certain negative con­
sequences. Rather than providing the 
basis for encouraging tolerance of those 
in exile, these relief programmes are 
marginalising refugees and displaced 
Croatians as dependent minorities. As 
much of the money involved comes from 
Members of the European Community, it 
is relevant for Courier readers to consider 
their characteristics and impact. 
Precisely because the relief model is 
now being implemented in the context of 
Europe, humanitarian agencies are being 
provided with a unique opportunity for 
learning. Slovenia and Croatia are ex­
periencing at first hand what it means to 
be the target of such approaches and 
some articulate their resistance in re­
marks such as 'We are not Ethiopia', or 
'We are civilised !" If this resistance can be 
turned into dialogue, the situation pro­
vides an opportunity for the humani-
* Director. Refugee Studies Programme. Un­
iversity of Oxford. The author wishes to express her 
thanks to Ms Sue Elliot, who accompanied her on a 
recent trip to Croatia and Slovenia in response to an 
invitation by the Slovenian Government to advise 
them on refugee policy. This paper contains extracts 
from the report of that mission which Dr Harrell-
Bond and Ms Elliot wrote tocether. 
tarian regime to improve approaches to 
assistance everywhere, because the prob­
lems of the relief model appear all over 
the world — including in Ethiopia. 
There are many issues which would 
benefit from open discussion. For ex­
ample, while the sectarian practices of 
Christian humanitarian agencies often go 
unchallenged, the arrival in the region of 
large numbers ol" Muslim agencies has 
made the fear of proselytising a salient 
issue. At the same time, both Christian 
and secular agencies could learn a great 
deal from the humane and respectful 
'style' of giving by some of those Muslim 
agencies observed. 
Background 
Both Croatia and Slovenia have been 
recognised as independent slates and 
have become members ol" lhe United 
Nations within the last two years. At the 
same time as these new countries are 
responding to the challenges of re­
structuring governmental and economic 
institutions, and developing a new legis­
lative system, they are having to cope 
with the humanitarian crisis caused by 
the war. 
Very briefly, the war in Croatia began 
to displace people in December 1991. 
affecting both Croatia and Slovenia. 
A collective centre for Bosnian refugees in Slovenia 
68 DOSSIER 
Refugees from Bosnia began to arrive in 
both countries from April 1992. 
Although Slovenia has attempted to 
seal its border with Croatia since August 
1992, Bosnians continue to arrive. 
In Croatia, there are an estimated 
535 000 Bosnian refugees and Croatians 
displaced from the territories occupied by 
Serbian forces. Slovenia estimates that it 
is currently hosting some 70 000 refugees 
from Bosnia. While the majority in both 
countries are still 'spontaneously settled' 
(i.e. living with local families), the others 
are variously housed in available empty 
buildings. 
In Croatia, refugees are not barred 
from working and, even when they are 
living under camp-like conditions, there 
are no restrictions on their freedom of 
movement. In Slovenia, however, re­
fugees are not permitted access to gainful 
employment and freedom of movement 
from some of the collective centres is 
restricted. 
The relief model 
As documented in so many other host 
countries, imposing an internationally-
funded relief model results in practices 
which disadvantage both refugees and 
their hosts. Donor states rarely grant 
bilateral aid directly to host govern­
ments; it is normally channeled through 
multilateral, intergovernmental organis­
ations (IGOs) and/or through non­
governmental agencies (NGOs) based 
and staffed in the donor state. Donors, in 
exchange for aid, expect certain conces­
sions : for example, the right to determine 
what is purchased, and where. 
Since the mid-1980s, donor govern­
ments have demonstrated greater confi­
dence in the work of NGOs over IGOs, 
leading to increased competition for 
funding and complicating efforts to 
achieve cooperation at the field level. 
Donors expect their agencies to take 
major responsibility for designing policy, 
shifting the direction of accountability 
from the host government to the donors. 
Accountability is defined in terms of 
financial probity rather than the ef­
fectiveness of programmes in meeting the 
needs of the beneficiaries for whom the 
funding is intended. Very few relief 
programmes are subject to independent 
evaluation. 
The degree of media attention and the 
strategic interests of the donors are major 
factors which determine the amount of 
aid and the length of time that it will be 
available. In addition to government 
sources, NGOs raise money from the 
public, depending on images of helpless­
ness and dependence. These appeals 
influence the design of programmes 
which fail to account for refugees' own 
energies, skills and determination to 
reconstruct their lives. Perhaps it is the 
general assumption in the world of the 
donors that victims are without resources 
which contributes to the sense that 
ultimate responsibility lies with the fore­
ign agencies. 
The fact that Croatia and Slovenia, 
having decided to accept international 
aid, find themselves following the norms 
of the relief model has occurred as a 
consequence of the presumption that the 
crisis is temporary. Neither government 
has been able to persuade donors to 
invest funds in developmental projects 
which would go towards expanding social 
services and employment. 
Both countries have established special 
refugee offices. In Croatia, this office is 
directly responsible to the Vice-Pre­
sident ; in Slovenia, to the Prime Minister. 
In theory, responsibility at such high level 
centres of governmental decision-making 
is important. In practice, it has led to the 
isolation of these offices from govern­
ment ministries. For a successful refugee 
policy to be developed, there is need for 
greater cooperation and coordination 
with line ministries. 
As a number of studies have de­
monstrated, and as is becoming evident in 
Slovenia and Croatia, the relief approach 
is not only wasteful but has its own 
dehumanising dynamic. Relief program­
mes foster bureaucratic interests in main­
taining a dependent constituency. In the 
interests of 'efficient' distribution, relief 
programmes encourage the confinement 
of refugees in one place; they also 
encourage authoritarian styles of man­
agement. One of the most effective 
methods of 'control' (though inefficient 
in ensuring an adequate diet) is to keep 
refugees dependent on communally-
cooked food; a general practice in 
Croatian and Slovenian collective cen­
tres. 
The relief model also conditions the 
content of requests. The Slovenian Office 
of Immigration and Refugees requested 
funds for sewage system installation and 
other infrastructure in villages housing 
refugees. The request was not met. As a 
result, a strategy of requesting long-term 
development needs that also served the 
immediate demands of refugee influxes 
has been weakened. So the Office re­
quests fax machines, typewriters, com­
puters and vehicles — the paraphernalia 
for running a refugee relief programme. 
By doing so, Slovenia runs a doubly 
perverse risk : investing in an office whose 
future bureaucratic interest may be to 
maintain refugees on relief to justify jobs 
and all the associated structures. 
The following are some other charac­
teristics of the relief model : 
— By presuming that needs are uniform, 
it fails the most needy, creates greater 
social differentiation and wastes re­
sources, thereby needlessly driving up 
costs. 
— By presuming that the agencies which 
represent the international donor have 
superior knowledge, it ignores resources 
and institutional strengths of the host 
society, thus weakening them. 
— By failing to recognise the resources 
which refugees themselves bring to the 
situation, it inhibits the mobilisation of 
these resources and networks for the 
benefit of both the refugees and the local 
economy. 
— Relief programmes inhibit the in­
stitutionalising of efficient systems of 
accountability. They thus create opportu­
nities for corruption of refugees and their 
hosts, both individually and institution­
ally. 
Earmarking aid 
The pernicious impact of earmarking 
relief only for 'refugees' has been widely 
documented. In Croatia, such earmark­
ing has led to tension between refugees, 
internally displaced persons and local 
residents. Some local people already 
resent the fact that refugees are fed 
without working. Although still very 
isolated events, there have been attacks 
on centres in which displaced Croatians 
and refugees live. 
Displaced Croatians complain that 
they have become second-class citizens in 
their own country. One cited his ex­
perience of standing in a queue in which 
the Bosnians were all asked to step to the 
front because the aid in question had been 
earmarked for the refugees but not for 
displaced Croatians. 
The relief model is so often wasteful of 
resources that this seems to be an essen-
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'What could this man have heen yesterday ? A sower in the spring, a harvester in the fall... ? And today '.' . i 
refugee with a howl in his hand, queueing for soup. What a waste of human energy, I think, an abasement of 
dignity. ... a billion people capable of work with nothing or almost nothing to do for the duration of their "^»^ 
lives.... If they could be given worthwhile occupations, humanity could make dizzying progress. The world's 
wealth would he doubled. Pyramids of merchandise would rise in even the poorest countries. Granaries would 
overflow. Water would flood the largest deserts.' ν Ά 
(Ryszard Kapuscinski writing in 'The Soccer Har', London, 1991) """vv/
1-
tial characteristic. One refugee centre, in 
which two doctors and four nurses were 
taking care of a population of about 500, 
is located only a few minutes' walk from a 
medical centre. Yet funds are being used 
to install a small clinic with hospital beds 
in the refugee centre, rather than invest­
ing in the local hospital. 
Such an approach can create feelings of 
resentment towards the refugees among 
the local population. Moreover, when the 
centre, which was previously an army 
barracks, is closed, there is no guarantee 
that the facilities will be used again. By 
contrast, investment in the local medical 
infrastructure would benefit the whole 
population ol' the town. 
Inappropriate aid 
Another problem endemic to the relief 
model is the donation of inappropriate 
materials. This includes food with which 
people are unfamiliar (such as bamboo 
shoots) and which they do not know how 
to prepare. Inappropriate or outdated 
medicines arc also a frequent problem. 
More to the point, many, if not most of 
the needs concerned could met by pur­
chases within the country. 
Transfers of cash for purchase would 
stimulate the local economy'. It is said 
that if the funds were provided, local 
factories would be capable of producing 
all of the drugs needed. In Slovenia, some 
donated drugs were found to be out of 
date, entailing additional costs for the 
hard-strapped government just to destroy 
them safely. 
These governments have been faced 
with another problem generally as­
sociated with relief programmes: what to 
do with donated items which come in too 
small quantities to distribute equitably. If 
the government took the logical step of 
selling such items on the open market. | 
using che funds for its refugee budget, it 
would risk accusations of 'corruption'. 
Agencies such as OXEAM UK 
manage to avoid discouraging such spon­
taneous responses to human need by 
establishing methods for dealing with 
inappropriate contributions, either by 
selling them in their shops or by disposing 
of them. The cash raised bv sales in 
OXEAM shops is available for ap­
propriate assistance which makes use of 
refugees' own abilities and maintains 
their self-worth and dignity. 
Do Slovenia and Croatia need 
foreign agencies? 
Normally, line ministries have re­
sponsibilities for sectors such as health 
and education, but in Croatia and Slove­
nia a mushrooming number of agencies, 
both inter- and non-governmental, have 
arrived to assume 'responsibility' for 
managing the humanitarian crises. It is 
difficult for the governments to assess the 
professionalism of agencies or to reject 
them they represent access to donor 
funds. 
The relative accessibility of these two 
countries has also led to a myriad of well-
meaning individuals and groups collect­
ing material assistance (most of which 
could have better been purchased lo­
cally), driving across Europe, and on 
arrival, demanding the right to distribute 
to particular individuals in particular 
centres. One agency looked at children's 
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teeth. Instead of coordinating with the 
medical services, it gave children money 
to pay for dental treatment. In some 
cases, agencies have insisted on using the 
distribution of items for publicity (i.e. 
fund-raising) purposes. 
Perhaps the most bizarre example was 
the behaviour of an agency which links 
300 schoolchildren from one EC country 
with 300 refugee children. The Slovenian 
Office for Immigration and Refugees was 
unable to stop representatives from going 
to three centres to distribute chocolates to 
100 'linked' children per centre. Not 
surprisingly, since the centres housed 
more than 100 youngsters, a riot ensued 
in one, providing a unique 'photo oppor­
tunity' and wide press coverage. 
As usual in such situations, there are 
numbers of trained, highly motivated 
professionals, both refugees and hosts, 
who are fully capable of responding to the 
variety of needs presented by the humani­
tarian crisis, often within the framework 
of normal service delivery. From the 
beginning of the emergency, many of 
them undertook voluntary work, and 
locally-based NGOs (including religious 
ones) have been established to assist the 
uprooted. 
Despite some efforts by foreign agen­
cies to fund these local initiatives and to 
work in partnership with nationals and 
refugees, partnerships are invariably 
unequal. They have weakened the ca­
pacity of national institutions and have 
introduced competition for external sour­
ces of funding, undermining the basis for 
cooperative relationships among local 
people who are committed to the building 
of their own institutions of civil society. 
Humanitarian crises: 
an opportunity for building 
civil society 
The humanitarian crisis can be a 
catalyst for the development of those 
mechanisms and institutions of civil 
society that are needed in much of central 
and eastern Europe. The response to the 
initial crisis on the part of local non­
governmental groups, including church-
based organisations, has already been 
mentioned. The question of the nature of 
the post-socialist state itself is challenged 
by a crisis which focuses attention on 
humanitarian and wider human rights 
issues. Such issues — representing as they 
do a challenge to the basic morality of a 
society — can be used by the government 
Inappropriate and unpalatable food going to waste ? 
and the concerned public as a major 
'entry point' for addressing the wider 
issues of human rights, economic and 
political development and the need to 
strengthen further the institutions of civil 
society. 
Encouraging the development of the 
non-government sector, which is not 
controlled by but works in cooperation 
with and advises the government, can 
help to militate against the concentration 
of political power solely in the hands of 
the state, thus safeguarding a pluralist, 
democratic society. 
Conclusions 
The fate of refugees in Slovenia and 
Croatia is a long-term issue. They will not 
be able to be repatriated in the fore­
seeable future and the policy of returning 
refugees to 'safe zones' in Bosnia, al­
though still advised by some, is widely 
believed to be unworkable. 
If these countries were to adopt a 
developmental approach, one immediate 
action might be to phase out the relief 
programme and use budgets to fund the 
expansion of the current welfare system 
to include the refugees. Relief program­
mes tend to benefit only the few insti­
tutions providing the services, and it may 
well be more economical to give direct 
funding to the refugees, who would spend 
it locally. 
The social and economic costs of 
maintaining the present approach to 
refugees will — if they are not already — 
ultimately be higher than the co&t of 
adopting developmental strategies which 
use both external and internal sources of 
funding to strengthen the institutions of 
government and civil society. In Slovenia, 
moreover, given the relatively small 
number of refugees and the end of the 
emergency phase, international aid is 
now tailing off. The government is 
already being reminded that, 'as a Euro­
pean country, it must take responsibility 
for the costs of assisting refugees'. This is 
ironic given that the relief model, which 
cannot be sustained without outside 
assistance, was initially imposed on the 
country by the donors. 
There is, however, considerable fear of 
potential social disruption caused by 
absorbing refugees into the existing 
welfare system and promoting economic 
self-sufficiency by allowing refugees the 
right to work. It will require a great deal 
of sensitivity, courage and political will 
for either of these governments to break 
out of the present dependency/relief 
model. There is a general belief that if 
refugees can support themselves they will 
not return to their home country. In fact, 
experience suggests that the first people 
able to return home are those who have 
succeeded in securing themselves and in 
saving up for rebuilding their lives on 
their return. The repatriation of those 
who have been impoverished by a relief 
system only creates another relief crisis in 
their country of origin.O B.H-B. 
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Indigenous peoples 
by Jean-Michel CORHAY * 
The International Year for the World's 
Indigenous Peoples will be the oppor­
tunity to draw the international com­
munity's attention to one of the most 
neglected and vulnerable set of people on 
the planet. So said Antoine Blanca, the 
UN coordinator for this Year 1993. 
Every UN institution is anxious to re­
assess and improve the programmes and 
activities put on for indigenous peoples to 
make sure that the Year goes down in 
their history and particularly in the 
history of their fight for survival and 
recognition of their rights. The idea, the 
UN General Assembly announced, is to 
boost international cooperation to solve 
the problems which the indigenous com­
munities have to face with such things as 
human rights, development, the environ­
ment, education and health. An extensive 
campaign will be run to alert the public 
and to attract the international com­
munity's attention and inform it about 
indigenous peoples' problems and con­
cerns — especially as regards their tradi­
tional concepts of land ownership, re­
sources and the sort of development they 
want for future generations. 
A forum will be provided for indigen­
ous peoples to pass on their messages and 
ensure that others understand their cul­
tures and ways of life better. 'The UN is 
more and more inclined to recognise the 
validity of the global approach which 
these peoples want and which links up 
development and environmental issues, 
peace and human rights and more. The 
International Year must be more than a 
cascade of meaningless words. It must 
lead to proper progress.' is how Erica-
Irene A. Daes. chair and spokeswoman of 
the working party on indigenous peoples, 
put it. 
* The author is responsible for audiovisual 
matters in Belgium's Administration Genérale de la 
Coopération au Développement (AGDC). The 
article is an update of a paper published in Dimension 
3. the AGDC bulletin. 
Indigenous peoples are the descend­
ants of the original inhabitants of many 
countries and their cultures, religions and 
methods of economic and social organis­
ation differ widely. There are 300 million 
of them in the world today, in more than 
70 countries (see map). There are the 
Amerindians, the Inuits and the 
Aleutians of the polar regions, there are 
the Saamis (Lapps) of Northern Europe, 
the Aborigines of Australia and the 
Maoris of New Zealand. More than 60% 
of the population of Bolivia and about 
half the population of Guatemala and 
Peru are indigenous and China and India 
have an indigenous and tribal population 
of more than 150 million between them. 
In the 10 million-strong population of 
Myanmar (Burma), there are at least 
5000 groups which stand apart by virtue 
of language, culture or geographical 
situation. Some are hunters and gatherers 
and some live in the towns and are fully 
involved in the culture of their countrv. 
but they all have a strong feeling of 
belonging to a distinct culture with a 
special relationship with the land. 
The indigenous peoples — they may be 
called autochthones. Indians, abor­
iginals, natives or original inhabitants -
have different cultural, ethnic and reli­
gious backgrounds, but face identical 
problems despite this diversity. Through 
the effects of colonialism, the propag­
ation of non-indigenous religions, the 
inexorable advance of (above till, indus­
trial) development and the effects of 
modernisation more generally, the tradi­
tional cultures of indigenous groups have 
been eroded. Either their land has been 
confiscated or. even today, economic 
pressure forces them to give it up. So 
these people are among the world's most 
underprivileged groups, some of them 
threatened with extinction. Over the past 
decade or two. some indigenous groups 
have indeed fallen victim lo lhe most 
destructive side of development pro­
jects to build dams, irrigation systems 
and roads, ' mining and other ecologi­
cally damaging operations. Driven from 
their ancestral kinds, cut off from their 
traditional way of life and forced to 
' The abandonment of traditional trade transit 
routes across the Sahara with the building of roads 
and port infrastructure is the mam cause of the socio­
economic disintegration of the tuaregs. 
Young Masai in Tanzania 
Modernisation generally leads to the erosion of the traditional cultures 
of indigenous communities 
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integrate with the dominant national 
societies, they have been subjected to 
discrimination, marginalisation or alie­
nation ever since. For example, relentless 
felling of the tropical rainforests is a 
direct threat to the very existence of the 50 
million-strong indigenous population 
which lives in them. 
These peoples are directly concerned 
by a changing or deteriorating environ­
ment and they also have a crucial part to 
play in protecting it. For centuries, in 
fact, they have been managing and 
making rational use of land in the regions 
in which they live. Sales of medicines 
derived from traditional plants which 
they have discovered, processed and 
handed down from generation to gener­
ation are worth more than $43 billion 
annually. Of course, the pharmaceutical 
companies capitalise on their know-how. 
but rarely pass on a share of the profits. 
Ironically enough, critical issues, such 
as global warming, deforestation, de­
sertification and the holes in the ozone 
layer, are now at the top of the inter­
national agenda and the indigenous 
peoples of the world, long considered too 
primitive to adapt to the modern world 
and for centuries the victims of land 
confiscation, maltreatment and genocide, 
are beginning to '.ook like environmental 
wizards.
 : 
The preparatory technical conference 
in Santiago (Chile) in May 1992 recog­
nised the fact that many of the planet's 
most vulnerable ecosystems were in the 
traditional lands of the indigenous peo­
ples 'who have successfully developed 
lasting, ecological methods of managing 
resources and using the land'. 
Principle 22 of the Declaration of the 
UN Conference on the Environment and 
Development, held in Rio the month 
after, said that indigenous populations 
and communities had a vital part to play 
in environmental management and de­
velopment because of their understand­
ing of the environment and their tradi­
tional practices. It went on to say that 
states should recognise their identity, 
: The know-how which these peoples have had 
handed down to them enables them to manage 
complex ecological systems. They have devised viable 
systems of land use and resource management, 
including nomadic herding and farming, seed selec­
tion and various forms of farming-forestry, terrace 
cropping, hunting, cattle-rearing and fishing. They 
also know a great deal about medicinal plants, soil, 
vegetation, animals and the climate. 
A Tuareg family in Mali 
There is a need to alert the wider public to the situation of indigenous peoples and 
to the dangers which threaten their existence 
their culture and their interests, give every 
support and enable them to take an 
effective part in achieving self-sustaining 
development. 
Nonetheless, there is still a huge gap 
between the aims laid down at Rio and 
the lot of the indigenous peoples. So, 
throughout the UN's International Year 
of the World's Indigenous Peoples, these 
aims should be re-assessed and even 
better defined and, under the banner of 
'new partnership', all efforts should focus 
on the following four things. 
— Involvement of indigenous peoples in 
the planning, implementation and evalu-
ation of schemes affecting their living 
conditions and future. This should be done 
through meetings and consultations with 
indigenous organisations. 
— Projects designed for indigenous peo-
ples. Consultations between indigenous 
communities and governments and be­
tween indigenous peoples and the relev­
ant UN organisations will be the oppor­
tunity to promote such projects, which 
will receive aid from the UN's newly 
created voluntary contribution fund for 
the International Year for the World's 
Indigenous Peoples. 
— Knowledge of the laws which protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples. This means 
ensuring that the interested parties know 
more about : ( 1 ) I LO Convention No 169 
(1989), which promotes consultation 
between governments and their indigen­
ous peoples and tribes, with particular 
reference to collective and individual 
rights of ownership of land and natural 
resources in the areas traditionally in­
habited by these people; (2) the draft 
declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples on which the working party on 
indigenous populations, the Inter­
national Labour Organisation and other 
competent international legislative 
bodies are currently collaborating. In 
particular, this declaration should recog­
nise that indigenous peoples have the 
right to self-determination, of which the 
right to autonomy is an integral part, and 
proclaim that they have a right to 
protection against genocide, to keep and 
develop their distinct ethnic and cultural 
identity, use their own languages, own 
and do what they like with their tradi­
tional lands and territories, receive com­
pensation for confiscated land, be con­
sulted about development projects affect­
ing them, be autonomous in their internal 
and local affairs and take part, without 
discrimination and on an equal footing 
with all the other citizens, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the 
state.o J-M. C. 
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WHERE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LIVE 
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some of the 
world's 
indigenous 
peoples 
1. Arctic 
Aleut 
Chipewyan 
Inuit 
Saami 
?.. Sub-Arctic 
Cree 
Dene 
Nascapi 
Ojibwa 
North America 
3. Southern forests 
Algonquin 
Haudenosaunee 
(six nations) 
Huron 
M icmac 
Potawatomi 
Shawnee 
4. South-East 
Cherokee 
Chickasaw 
Creek 
Seminole 
5. Great Plains 
Arapaho 
Cheyenne 
Pawnee 
Sioux 
6. North-West Plateau 
Nez Perce 
Wasco 
Yakima 
7. California 
Cahuillia 
Porno 
Serrano 
8. Grand Bassin 
Shoshone 
Ute 
9. South-West 
Apache 
Dine (Hopi) 
Navajo 
Zuni 
10. North-West 
Pacific Coast 
Bella Coola 
Chinook 
Haida 
Salish 
Tlingit 
11. Central America 
Bribri 
Cakchiquel 
Choi 
Cliuj 
Cora 
Guyami 
Hmchol 
Ixil 
Kekchi 
K una 
Lacandon 
Lenca 
Maya (descendants) 
Miskito 
Nahua 
Pipile 
Quiche 
Rama 
Seri 
Sumu 
Tarahumara 
Yaqui 
Yucatec 
Zapotee 
12. Caribbean 
Akawaio 
Bari (Motilones) 
Choque 
Guajiro 
Kanna 
Kogi 
Otomac 
Paez 
Yarawato 
Yukpa 
South America 
13. Amazonia 
Aguaruna 
Amarakaeri 
Amuesha 
Arara 
Arawak 
Ashaninca 
Asurini 
Gavião 
Kayapo 
Kreen-Akarore 
Matsigenka 
Mundurucu 
Nambikwara 
Kwakiuti Parakana 
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Quichua (Eastern) 
Sanema 
Secoya 
Shipiho 
Shuar (Jívaro) 
Tulkano 
U fai na 
Waimiri-Atroari 
Waorani (Auca) 
Wayana 
Xavante 
Yagua 
Yanomami 
14. A-tato Grosso 
Borboro 
Botocudo 
Ge (Central) 
Guato 
Kaduveo 
Kaingang 
Karaja 
Kayapo (South) 
Tupi 
15. Gran Chaco 
Ache 
Ayoreo 
Chamacoco 
Chiriguano 
Guana 
Mataco 
Mbaya 
Toba-Maskoy 
16. Lon· plateaux. 
Western Andes 
Cayapas 
Colorados 
17. High Andean 
plateaus 
Aymara 
Huancas 
Kolla 
Mojo 
Otavalo 
Quechua 
Sal asaca 
Uros 
18. Patagonia, lhe Pampas 
Aracuanian 
Mapuche 
Ranquel 
Tehuelche 
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Asia 
19. North amt 
Central Asia 
Hui 
Manchu 
Miao 
Mongolian 
Taiwan Aborigines 
Tibetan 
Uighur 
Yi 
Zhuang 
20. South Asia 
Bins 
Chenchus 
DalTlas 
Dandami 
Gadabas 
Garos 
Gond 
Hos 
lrula Kurumbas 
Juangs 
Kadras 
Kameng 
Khassis 
Khonds 
Kolis 
Lohi ι 
Mundas 
Naga 
Oraons 
Pathaii 
Savaras 
Sholegas 
Toda Kotas 
Vedda 
21. Chiuagong 
mountains 
Chakma 
Marma 
Tripura 
22. South-East Asia 
Chin 
Hmong 
Kachin 
Karen 
Kedang 
Lisu 
Semai 
Shan 
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Africa 
23. Sahara. Sähet 
Fulani 
Touareg 
24. South Sudan 
Dinka 
llamar 
Kawahla 
Lotuko 
Mondari 
Nuba 
Ν lier 
Rasliaida 
Shi II uk 
Za ude 
25. Southern ¡torn 
of Africa 
Barabaig 
Eritrean 
Maasai 
Oromo 
Somali 
Tigrayan 
26. Kalahari Desert 
San 
27. /turi Forest 
Efe 
Lese 
M but i 
28. Australia and 
the Pacific 
Aborigène 
Arapesli 
Asmat 
Bangsa 
Bonloc 
Chamorro 
Dani 
Da yak 
Hanunoo 
Hawaïen 
Iban 
Ifugao 
Kalinga 
Kanak 
Kayan 
Kedang 
Mac-Enga 
Maori 
Mundugumur 
Penan 
Rapa Nui 
Tanitian 
Torres Strait 
Islanders 
Tsembaga 
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Some examples of minority situations 
In this final section of the Dossier, 
we look at a number of specific 
'minority'situations in both ACP and 
European Community countries. As 
Alan Phillips of the Minority Rights 
Group points out in his interview (See 
'Meeting Point'), there are estimated 
to be more than 7000 minority com-
munities living in the world today. It is 
not possible to explain or analyse all 
the circumstances which lead to the 
emergence of minorities or which have 
an impact on their current existence 
within larger, usually state, entities. 
But in the case studies which follow, we 
seek at least to highlight the diversity 
of the subject, by describing a range of 
very different situations. Some of 
these involve conflict; others are 
trouble-free. They cover a range of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic ques-
tions and are intended to show, in brief 
terms, ¡lie historical background as 
well as the present slate of play. Taken 
together, they reveal some possibilities 
for peaceful coexistence but also, 
sadly, the scale of the challenge facing 
those who would seek to confront 
prejudice and bring an end to the 
mutual suspicion which still character-
ises so many minority situations. 
The Balkans and 
Central Europe 
For students of history who prefer a simple life, the Balkans 
have always spelt trouble. Trouble in the literal sense in that this 
turbulent area has seen more than its fair share of political 
intrigues, ethnic disputes and full-scale wars. Trouble also in the 
intellectual sense because of the complexity of the issues. 
Strictly speaking, the Balkans do not include countries such 
as Hungary or the Czech Republic (which are more properly 
regarded as part of Central Europe). In the context of a 
discussion about national minorities, however, these two 
contiguous regions share many common features. In particular, 
they both contain a patchwork of nationalities, religions and 
linguistic groups often thrown uncomfortably together within 
national boundaries fixed by external powers. 
In the 19th century, as the grip of the declining Ottoman 
Empire loosened, the Balkans and Central Europe increasingly 
became a focus of nationalistic ambition and great power 
rivalry. In 1914, a political assassination in Sarajevo provided 
the spark that ignited the First World War. When the guns 
finally fell silent four years later, both the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires had been dismembered and, in the 
subsequent Versailles Treaty, the political map of the region was 
changed beyond recognition. But despite the creation of many 
new states, the underlying instability remained, with long­
standing local rivalries exacerbated by the presence of 
significant national minorities inside the boundaries of many of 
the new countries. The Second World War, which might have 
served to bring the peoples of the region together against an 
external power, instead aggravated the problem as some 
'nationalities' ' chose to ally themselves with Germany while 
others fought against them. This latter circumstance is part of 
the explanation for the bitterness which characterises the 
fighting between today's warring factions in ex-Yugoslavia. 
In the subsequent four decades, what might be described as 
'totalitarian stability' prevailed as most of the area fell under 
Soviet tutelage. Yugoslavia, although not part of the Soviet 
orbit — and potentially the most serious flashpoint — was held 
together by the dominant personality of Marshall Tito. 
When Tito died. Yugoslavia did not immediately collapse, 
but the situation began to unravel as it became clear that the 
central (communist) state was unable to reconcile the competing 
claims of the country's various nationalities. When communism 
itself crumbled, the whirlwind was not long in coming. It began, 
on a relatively small scale, in Slovenia, moved on with increasing 
force into Croatia and has now engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Elsewhere, the ending of the communist system and the 
break-up of the Soviet Union had the positive effect of clearing 
the way for democracy. At the same time, however, it has 
removed the (admittedly coercive) constraints imposed by 
Moscow, which had prevented internal dissent and ensured 
frontier continuity. 
As Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance have discovered in their 
efforts to bring peace to Bosnia, map-making in the region can 
be an unrewarding experience. It is possible nevertheless to 
identify different types of 'minority' situation, of varying 
degrees of complexity. In some parts, there are clearly defined 
territories occupied by 'nationalities' which are relatively 
homogenous but which are, or were, subsumed into a larger 
state. These may be either 'self-standing' such as the Slovenes, or 
peoples who have a close kinship with a neighbouring state such 
as the Albanians of Kosovo and the Moldovans (ethnically 
linked to the Romanians). Elsewhere, there are minorities living 
in less neatly definable territories but who, nevertheless, are in 
the majority in a given area. Examples of this situation include 
1 The term 'nationality' is used loosely to describe groups of peoples who form 
communities on the basis of a shared ethnic, linguistic or religious identity. 
A present-day victim of Balkan rivalries. A Croatian woman 
returns to find her home destroyed 
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the Hungarians in North West Romania or the Serbs of Eastern 
Croatia (who 'detached' themselves from the rest of the country 
in last year's fighting, displacing many resident Croats in the 
process). Finally, there is the case, best illustrated by Bosnia-
Herzegovina, of complex intermingling. 
In an ideal world, none of these minority situations would 
have any practical significance since it should be possible for 
people to get along together, respecting each others' differences. 
Yugoslavia, however, shows how different reality can be. And 
once fighting has started, 'ethnic cleansing' takes place and 
atrocities occur, the prospects for reconciliation rapidly 
diminish. 
Although the focus today is on the unfolding tragedy of 
Bosnia, there are numerous other potential trouble spots in the 
region. The aforementioned Albanian population of Kosovo is 
obviously in an uncomfortable position within the boundaries 
of Serbia-Montenegro. The territorial integrity of newly-
independent Croatia has been shattered by last year's fighting 
around Vukovar. There are large Hungarian minorities in 
Serbia, Romania and the former Czechoslovakia. The recently 
recognised 'ex-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' is viewed with 
suspicion by Greece, which has its own province of Macedonia. 
The Turkish minority in Bulgaria is under pressure. 
These are just a few examples which illustrate the potential for 
further conflict. And while some still express the hope that the 
so-called 'new international order' may ultimately provide a 
basis for peaceful coexistence, many analysts are dismayed by 
the response of the international community in general and the 
'West' in particular to the Yugoslav crisis. There is a real fear 
that the ethnic battles, currently contained within the borders of 
the former Yugoslavia, could spill over into neighbouring 
countries. This may be unduly pessimistic, but the situation is 
obviously fraught with uncertainty. Perhaps the only thing that 
we can safely predict is that the 'Balkan question', which has 
played such an important part in European history over the 
centuries, will continue to trouble us for the foreseeable future.O 
S.H. 
The Maroons of Jamaica 
Jamaica, which is itself a nation formed out of peoples of 
varying ethnic backgrounds, plays host to one of the more 
unusual minorities in the form of the Maroon communities. The 
Maroons have a fascinating and turbulent history which 
includes the intermittent waging of war against the British 
colonial authorities, working with the British to quell slave 
revolts and the acquisition of a special status which is still 
recognised today by the Government in Kingston. 
In fact there are two distinct Maroon communities living in 
Jamaica's mountainous hinterland. The Accompong Maroons 
live in the bleak Cockpit Country while, 150 km to the east, the 
Blue Mountains are home to the so-called Windward Maroons. 
The Maroons are not an indigenous race. Indeed, like the 
majority of Jamaicans, they are of mainly African descent and 
their unique lifestyle and status is something of a historical 
oddity. The story begins with escaped slaves during the period of 
Spanish occupation (1510-1655). At that time, the colonists 
were settled in the coastal areas and it was natural that escapees 
should take to the mountains to avoid recapture. When an 
The Blue Mountains of Jamaica — home to the 
Windward Maroons 
English expeditionary force under Admiral William Penn 
attacked Jamaica in 1655. the Spanish, before abandoning the 
island, liberated and armed their remaining skives who also 
withdrew to the interior. The idea was that they should harry the 
new colonial occupiers with guerilla warfare until such time as 
the Spanish could return. In the event. Spain never did recapture 
Jamaica but the plan otherwise succeeded beyond the wildest 
expectations of those who had formulated it. For the former 
slaves and their previously escaped 'compatriots' were to prove 
a thorn in the flesh ol'the British for almost a century and a half. 
Over the same period, thev developed for themselves a 
distinctive culture and social system, many of whose charac­
teristics survive even in today's modern world. 
The term 'Maroon' derives from lhe Spanish word 'cimarrón' 
meaning 'wild' or 'untamed'. Certainly, to European eyes, the 
lifestyle of the early Maroons may have seemed primitive but the 
term probably owes more to their reputation as formidable 
enemies. During the First Maroon War. which dragged on from 
1690 until 1739, British troops found themselves battling on 
unfamiliar and unfavourable terrain against a people who were 
among the earliest exponents of guerilla action. The Maroons, 
fighting on 'home' territory, were fully adapted to local 
conditions and. although the British ultimately gained the upper 
hand, their losses in both men and material were high. The 
legendary exploits of the 'Queen Nanny' who fought the British 
from her Blue Mountain stronghold have made this priestess a 
folk hero, not just of the Maroons but of Jamaica as a whole. A 
peace treaty concluded after the First Maroon War guaranteed 
both lands and freedom to these mountain people. 
Thereafter, until the abolition of slavery by the British in the 
early 19th century, the position of the Maroons was somewhat 
ambivalent. In 1760, in accordance with the terms of the 1739 
Treaty, Maroon forces were called upon to assist in the 
suppression of a slave revolt known as Tacky's Rebellion 
(Tacky being the name of the slave leader who was killed by a 
Maroon marksman during a running fight). But the Maroons 
also absorbed into their society a regular flow of'Breakaways' 
- slaves who had escaped from the British plantations and 
taken to the hills. 
By 1795. relations between the Maroons and the British had 
deteriorated and the Second Maroon War began in that year. It 
was reputedly sparked off by the fact that runaway slaves were 
used to administer floggings to two Maroons convicted of pig-
stealing. This time, the British were less accomodating in victory 
and several hundred Maroons were deported after the hostilities 
had ceased, despite guarantees that this would not happen. 
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Since the early 19th century, relations between the Maroons 
and the central government have been largely peaceful. Today, 
they still live in their remote mountain communities, retaining 
their identity, traditions and distinct society. They have their 
own local institutions which, in a throwback to their fighting 
past, are still headed by 'colonels'. Jamaican independence in 
1962 brought no significant change to their status, with the new 
government in Kingston continuing to recognise their auto­
nomy. Except in cases of murder, Jamaican laws are not applied, 
they are exempted from various taxes and their lands are 
protected. 
Some older Maroons still speak Coromante, a language of 
African origin, although its survival is threatened by the 
pervasive influence of radio and television. 
The unique history and culture of the Maroon peoples mean 
that it is difficult to draw any general conclusions which might 
be applicable to other minority situations. But it is worth 
recognising that the relationship they have with the Jamaican 
government is trouble-free principally because the latter 
recognises their right to exist as a distinct society. This is a 
situation which many minorities in other parts of the world 
would doubtless envy, o S.H. 
Northern Ireland 
Over the past 15 years, the euphemistically-named 'troubles" 
in Northern Ireland have brought considerable suffering to the 
province. Violence in the form of terrorist acts has also spilled 
over into Great Britain, the Irish Republic and even, on 
occasion, the European continent. The Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), which claims responsibility for many of these attacks, 
seeks a united Ireland and, by extension, the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the province. It regards the British 
presence as a form of colonial occupation. Other splinter 
Republican groups have also been involved in terrorism from 
time to time. On the other side of the divide, there are certain 
'Loyalist' organisations that have resorted to violence in pursuit 
of their goal of maintaining the political status quo. The 
republicans come from the Catholic population in Northern 
Ireland, who are a minority in the province (over a third of the 
population) but a majority in the island of Ireland as a whole. 
The loyalists are from the Protestant community (60% + in 
Northern Ireland). 
It is widely recognised that only a very small proportion of the 
Northern Irish population is involved in bombings and 
shootings and the majority in both Protestant and Catholic 
communities do not support the activities of the terrorists. And 
while the anguish of individual victims cannot be understated, 
the scale of the violence needs to be put into perspective. There 
are cities in the United States and in many parts of the 
developing world where 'normal' violent crime poses greater 
risks. But the fundamental problem in Northern Ireland which 
remains unresolved is the deep sectarian divide between the two 
religious communities. 
The schism in the Catholic Church at the time of the 
Reformation which led to the rise of Protestantism was a source 
of conflict in many parts of Europe. Where one or other 
religious group found itself in a minority in a particular country, 
it was frequently the victim of discrimination and persecution. 
In Britain, it was the Protestant tendency that ultimately 
prevailed, while Ireland remained largely true to Catholicism. 
The Protestant population of Ireland can trace their origins 
back to immigration, mainly from Scotland, during the early 
17th century. Few would deny the suffering endured by the 
Catholic majority at various stages in the unequal relationship 
between the two islands. The activities of Oliver Cromwell, who 
was Lord Protector of England during that country's brief 
flirtation with republican government in the middle of the 17th 
century, were particularly notorious. In 1800, Ireland was 
joined to Britain and towards the end of the century the 'Irish 
Question' became a recurring theme in British politics as the 
franchise was extended and the Irish electorate voted increas­
ingly for 'Home-Rule' candidates. Economic power in Ireland 
during this time was vested mainly in the Protestant land­
owning class. 
During the struggle for Irish independence which culminated 
in the establishment of the Irish Free State (later to become the 
Irish Republic) in the early 1920s, the Protestants, who were 
concentrated in the north, fought to stay within the UK. The 
result was partition with six of the counties of Ulster remaining 
in the Union. These counties, however, contained a significant 
Catholic minority. The Constitution of the Irish Republic does 
not recognise this division and lays claim to the six counties. 
This is a serious bone of contention for the Northern Irish 
Protestants. 
It is widely acknowledged that Catholics in the new province 
continued to suffer from discrimination, in both political and 
economic spheres. Resentment among the minority built up 
until, in the late 1960s, large-scale civil rights protests spilled 
over into violence. British troops were sent to maintain order 
but their position was compromised when 13 Catholic 
protestors were shot dead by soldiers during a riot. The IRA 
(which had been intermittently active ever since partition) 
resumed its campaign of violent action and this has continued 
ever since. Protestant para-military organisations subsequently 
entered the fray. As a result, bitterness and suspicion on both 
sides has increased. From time to time, hopes have been raised 
by the spontaneous revulsion of ordinary people to the violence. 
For example, in the 1970s a women's peace movement emerged 
which brought many Protestants and Catholics together, but the 
momentum of the movement was subsequently lost and the 
violence has continued. 
Although laws have been passed in Westminster outlawing 
religious discrimination in the province, the conditions for a 
genuine rapprochement of the two communities do not seem to 
be very favourable. Today, the vast majority of Northern Irish 
people vote on sectarian lines although, on the Catholic side, the 
moderate SDLP decisively outpolls Sinn Fein, which has links 
with the IRA, while Protestant voters tend to favour the Ulster 
Unionists over the more radical Democratic Unionists. The 
Alliance Party, which is the only significant non-sectarian 
grouping, usually polls about 8% of the votes. 
In other parts of Western Europe, where religious conflict is 
largely a thing of the past, the situation in Northern Ireland is a 
source of bafflement. Outsiders find it impossible to understand 
why religious affiliation should remain the defining feature of 
Northern Irish society when its significance, in terms of 
economic power relations, access to employment and so on, has 
all but vanished elsewhere. 
For some, the closer cooperation which exists between the 
British and Irish governments is an encouraging sign. So too is 
the trend towards a more integrated Europe — the Maastricht 
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Treaty establishes a European Union as well as the concept of 
European citizenship which extends to all Northern Irish people 
irrespective of their national or religious loyalties. But the gap 
between the two communities is very wide indeed and there is a 
limit to what can be achieved by external initiatives whether in 
London. Dublin or Brussels. A genuine and lasting solution to 
the Northern Ireland problem must ultimately lie in the 
reconciliation of the two hightly polarised communities, whose 
political objectives (maintenance of the Union and the 
establishment of a United Ireland) are so clearly incompatible. 
Unfortunately, there seems little prospect of this happening in 
the foreseeable future and until it does, a political settlement 
would appear to be impossible, D S.H. 
The Ndebele of Zimbabwe 
This year marks the centenary of a celebrated event in 
Zimbabwean history, an uprising in 1893 in the course of which 
1000 people lost their lives opposing a British colonial army. 
Only part of Zimbabwe's population is celebrating the 
anniversary, however, because the dead they commemorate 
belonged to the country's minority ethnic group, the Ndebele. 
whose relations with the majority Shona are at a low point. 
Their rivalry goes back a long way. 
The ancestors of the people nowadays known as the Shona. 
members of the Bantu group, first moved into the land occupied 
by present-day Zimbabwe in the 10th century AD. from north of 
the Zambezi river. They were farmers and successful traders 
who set up a powerful state centred on Great Zimbabwe in the 
south-east, followed after 1450 by a succession of other, more 
loosely structured kingdoms. For centuries these vied for power 
with each other and with Portuguese invaders coming in from 
Angola and Mozambique, until, in the first half of the 19th 
century, the Ndebele made their appearance in Zimbabwe. 
The Ndebele were a group which emerged victorious from 
conflict between the Zulu tribes of what is now Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State in South Africa. Boers migrating 
northwards in search of land forced them to flee into southern 
and western Zimbabwe, which they conquered and took from 
the Shona in 1840. Ndebele territory was smaller than that of the 
Shona kingdoms which still remained, but was ruled with an 
iron hand, and folk memories of Ndebele severity in enforcing 
obedience from their Shona subjects are confirmed by the 
accounts left by white missionaries of the period. 
In 1890 the British occupied Zimbabwe and colonists began 
to pour in from South Africa. Both Shona and Ndebele were 
driven from their land, robbed of their cattle and pressed into 
forced labour. Neither henceforward had any say in the conduct 
of the country's affairs. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 
drove both off land they had cultivated for generations and 
racial discrimination was institutionalised in all aspects of life. 
The two groups were lumped together by the white ruling 
authorities as 'natives" and the differences of culture and history 
between them disregarded. 
Nationalist resistance movements which emerged in the early 
1960s were not originally based on membership of one or other 
ethnic group, but it was not long before the Zimbabwe African 
National Union was seen primarily as a Shona party and the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union as predominantly Ndebele. 
At independence in 1980. after the common oppressor of both 
groups had lost power, some of the Ndebele began lo feel that 
their interests were being made to take second place to those of 
the Shona. who outnumbered them by more than four to one. 
Intermittent but violent war was waged by dissidents in the 
Ndebele"s traditional territory, Matabeleland, from 1982. The 
rising was put down with heavy- bloodshed by government 
troops from the Shona-speaking north, and enmity between the 
two ethnic groups greatly increased. The fighting finally ended 
in 1987. when ZANU and ZAPL
1 concluded a unity accord. In 
1989 the parties merged, and since that time the Shona leader 
Robert Mugabe has been President, with Joshua Nkomo of the 
Ndebele as his Vice-President. 
In independent Zimbabwe both Shona and Ndebele arc 
official languages, with English widely used for official purposes 
and in the mediti. The country's second university, after that m 
the capital. Harare, is being established in Matabelelend's 
largest town. Bulawayo. Efforts are being made lo document 
and honour ZAPU members who died alongside their ZANU 
comrades in the liberation struggle bin not those, including 
many civilians, who were killed in the war m Matabeleland. and 
a sense of grievance and mistrust persists among the minority at 
the seemingly unshakeable hold on power of a ruling party 
dominated by the Shona. with help from Ndebele politicians 
whom some of their own ethnic group ciò noi hoki in high 
regard. A number of disti fleeted Ndebele academics, journalists 
and others have recently joined together to set up an opposition 
political party. Their public pronouncements cast the govern­
ment in Harare in the role of an external power indifferent to 
Matabeleland's concerns, though there is no talk of separatism 
or secession. The degree of support these new nationalists enjoy 
has vet to be tested in any election. 
An .\dehele village in the Matetsi region of Zimhuhwt 
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On a different definition of the term, there is a case for saying 
that another national minority in Zimbabwe (and some other 
post-colonial countries) is constituted by the white people who 
live there. Those that disliked the idea of majority rule and were 
able to leave did so at independence; most of those that remain 
are natives of the country. In Zimbabwe they form 5% of the 
population and, since reserved white seats were abolished, are 
not specially represented in parliament. But that is another, 
equally complicated story. G R.R. 
Schleswig-Holstein 
The great 19th-century German statesman Bismarck used to 
say only three people in the world had ever understood what the 
Schleswig-Holstein question was about: 'The first one went 
mad, the second died, and then there's me ... and Eve forgotten.' 
Joking apart, it was a question serious enough to provoke some 
five centuries of wars between two countries which are now 
fellow members of the European Community: Germany and 
Denmark. 
There is a swathe of territory across the middle of the 
peninsula of Jutland in northern Europe, between the North Sea 
and the Baltic, known as Schleswig. In the mediaeval period it 
was a dukedom held by the King of Denmark ; Danish-speakers 
lived in the northern half, which abutted on Denmark, and 
German-speakers in the south. To the south lay another 
dukedom. Holstein, which was wholly German-speaking but 
also belonged to the Danish Crown. As well as the internal 
frictions which these arrangements generated, the two duke­
doms lay in a militarily and commercially important position 
and were constantly fought over by the neighbouring powers. 
As for their inhabitants, from the outset of Danish 
domination the German-speakers in Schleswig and Holstein 
understandably resented taking orders from an alien potentate 
in distant Copenhagen. However, in European history until the 
late 18th century, the concept of being a citizen of this or that 
country did not exist ; people and the lands they lived in (with the 
notable exception of Switzerland, be it said in passing) owed 
allegiance and obedience only to whatever king, lord or bishop 
ruled them. Only with the French Revolution and the rise of 
nationalism in the early 19th century did ethnic groups start 
fighting to organise themselves into nation states as understood 
today. 
The dominant power to the south, Prussia, was gradually 
bringing one German-speaking territory after another under its 
sway, and turned its attention to Schleswig-Holstein. The 
Danish-speakers in Schleswig had no wish to become German 
subjects; nor did the Germans there and in Holstein want to 
remain vassals of Denmark. The battle for possession went on 
up to and including the First World War, at the end of which 
Schleswig and Holstein were held by Germany. However, 
Schleswig was still occupied by the two different language 
communities. By treaty it was divided in half and the northern 
part, entirely Danish-speaking, was ceded to Denmark. As for 
the ethnically mixed border area, in a referendum held in 1920 
each parish was invited to say which country it wanted to belong 
to, and a dividing line between the two countries was finally 
worked out. This line was still only a compromise, since, to 
avoid creating enclaves, a few parishes which had opted to be 
German were given to Denmark and vice versa. A settlement 
agreeable to both sides was not finally reached until after World 
War II. 
All is quiet on the Schleswig-Holstein front now. The 
communities who found themselves stranded on the wrong side 
of the border in the 1920 referendum still live there, but in peace. 
The peoples are racially indistinguishable, there has been much 
intermarriage, they profess the same religion, and in neither 
country is there any official criterion for defining whether a 
person is Danish or German beyond an affirmation by the 
individual concerned that he or she wishes to be so considered. 
So it is not easy to give precise figures, but there are now 
approximately 20 000 Danes living in German South Schleswig 
and a similar number of Germans in Danish North Slesvig (as 
the territory is called in Danish). The members of the two 
communities are nationals and citizens of the countries they live 
in, not of those whose language they habitually speak and whose 
culture they espouse. 
In both countries the cultural rights of the respective 
minorities are recognised and protected by law. In each country 
private schools operating in the minority languages are funded 
by the state, on the same basis as schools teaching in the 
majority language. Naturally the majority language is also 
taught in such schools, and in practice the members of the 
minorities are bilingual. Television and radio programmes from 
the 'mother' country also help to preserve cultural links, and the 
minorities have their own newspapers and sports and cultural 
associations. 
In their daily lives, both minorities in this predominantly 
agricultural area make their living in the same ways as their 
neighbours, from farming in rural areas and from trade and 
services in the towns. 
Political parties representing their special interests have 
emerged on both sides of the border. In Denmark a party which 
cannot win a majority in an individual constituency is eligible to 
receive one of the 40 additional, non-constituency seats in 
Parliament, provided it can attain a threshold of 2% of the 
national vote. The party representing Germans in Denmark 
cannot muster even that 2%, so has no voice in the national 
legislature, but an office which the Federation of North Slesvig 
Germans has set up in Copenhagen receives a special subsidy 
from the state to help it represent its members' interests to 
parliament and government. The party set up by the Danish 
minority in South Schleswig is exempt from the 5% threshold 
for parliamentary representation applying in Germany, and has 
one seat in the Schleswig-Holstein state legislature, the 
Landstag. 
Denmark and Germany do not interfere in the affairs of the 
speakers of their languages on the other side of the border, or 
provide any special facilities for them on their own side. A Dane 
of German nationality, for example, who wants to study at a 
Danish university is treated exactly like any other applicant 
from outside Denmark. Although some members of the 
minorities cross the border to work in the country whose 
language they speak, they enjoy no privileges other than those 
given under EC legislation to any national of the Community. 
It might, indeed, be said that, by making the concept of the 
nation state less strong, the process of wider European 
integration has done as much as anything (local diplomacy and 
rising material wellbeing, for instance) to calm the passions and 
ambitions that for centuries used to drive this part of Europe 
into war. If only it could serve as a model for other, less happy 
parts of the continent.O R.R. 
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Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in 
Rwanda and Burundi 
Rwanda and Burundi are two tiny countries landlocked in 
central-eastern Africa. They have similar characteristics and 
similar natural, sociological and economic constraints, includ­
ing small size, rapid population expansion and poor per capita 
income, which puts them at the bottom of the LLDC category. 
There are also structural barriers to development, in the shape 
of: 
— dependence on the outside world, i.e. they are subject to 
variations in the price of coffee (which accounts for the bulk of 
their export revenue) and their external debt is mounting: 
— demographic pressure, which threatens self-sufficiency in 
food and makes major social investments necessary; 
— their landlocked position, which makes them dependent on 
transport facilities in the countries around them and pushes up 
production costs. 
These economic constraints are aggravated by ethnic 
problems. The Tutsi minority (numerically, at least, at 
approximately 14% of the current population) has held power 
in both countries, to the detriment of the Hutu majority (an 
estimated 84%) and the Twa (a Pygmy tribe, approximately 
1%). 
After independence, which the two countries gained in 1962, 
their paths separated, with the Tutsi remaining in power in 
Burundi and the Hutu taking over the Presidency and the 
Government in Rwanda. 
The two countries may have opted for different political 
solutions, but they both saw frequent clashes between their two 
main tribes. An unprecedented exchange took place, when Hutu 
took refuge in Rwanda and Tutsi exiles moved into Burundi. 
Tutsi from Rwanda went to many other countries too, including 
Uganda, where the ethnically related Hima tribe lives. 
The determined struggle between the two ethnic groups 
becomes even more incomprehensible when one discovers that 
the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa all speak the same languages -
Kinyarwanda, Swahili and French in Rwanda and Barundi. 
Swahili and French in Burundi. 
More astonishing still is that the fighting went on despite the 
fact that for centuries the different groups shared political 
institutions and a social and religious system apparently without 
any serious obstacles to mixed marriage and inter-breeding. 
The political role and sacred nature of the monarchy and the 
cattle-based system of feudal dependence represented values 
espoused by the whole population and. until colonisation (in the 
early 20th century), the rift between the groups seems to have 
been more social than ethnic. Some writers have said that the 
break was engineered by the Westerners' policy decision to 
ensure a balance of power by focusing on one group. Are thev 
right? 
Rwanda 
The advent of European values and religious conversions 
aroused an awareness of social disparity in this country, which 
was reflected, some suggest, in the finding that ethnic identity 
made cultural identification easier. 
But the situation of the minorities in both countries continued 
to be a source of hope and anxiety alike. In 1959. Rwanda began 
a revolution which toppled the Tutsi monarchy, did away with 
Belgian tutelage and. in 1961. set up the Republic. Independence 
and separation from Burundi were proclaimed together, in 
1962. 
The Hutu move to power heralded a period of disorder, which 
forced a large number of Tutsi to flee. This went on happening 
regularly afterwards and. in October 1990. expatriate Rvvan-
dans (Tutsi refugees and Hutu opposition, who joined forces 
under the banner of the FPR — the Rwandan Patriotic Front) 
attacked and took control of the northern part of the countrv. 
Those in power reacted by making many arrests, but 
international pressure forced them to : 
— free the political prisoners: 
— set up a multiparty system; 
— agree to a timetable for local, national and presidential 
elections; 
— allow a transitional government to be set up, bringing 
together opposition parties and the former single party (the 
MRND); 
— negotiate a peace settlement with the FPR, the first stage of 
which was the signing of a ceasefire agreement, effective from 
31 July. This followed negotiations in Arusha in Tanzania, a 
country which has done its utmost for peace in Rwanda. 
Hard-line Hutu factions contested the overtures nitide to 
other Hutu clans (particularly in the South) and to the Tutsi, 
and started fresh action against both. Most of the victims in the 
north west, the President's region, were Bagogwe (a Tutsi sub-
tribe). 
Government accords came up against problems. A plan for a 
government of national unity involving the FPR was signed in 
January 1993 and only needed the President's agreement, but 
procrastination and the announcement of further massacres in 
the north west prompted the FPR to start lighting again, which 
it did on 9 February. With the Rwandan army in difficulty, the 
Government strove to get the negotiations going again. They arc 
still in progress and they should, it is hoped, lead to a peace 
agreement and. most important, the establishment of a political 
system in which all tribes can be represented, without 
discrimination, in the Government and in the institutions. 
Rwandan refugees receiving vocational training 
in M uger a (Burundi) 
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Burundi 
After 30 years of independence and Tutsi pre-eminence, 
Burundi has now come to presidential and national elections 
which should be the opportunity to emerge peacefully from 
three decades of single party rule and tribal clashes, the most 
serious of which were in 1965, 1972 (400 000 dead) and 1988 
(5000 victims, according to official figures). 
After this last massacre, President Buyoya realised that 
national reconciliation meant that power, hitherto concentrated 
in the hands of the Tutsi minority, had to be shared fairly and a 
commission of leading political, religious and military figures 
(12 Hutu and 12 Tutsi) was accordingly invited to tackle the 
problem of national unity. This led to presidential elections, 
which were won by Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu — clear 
indication of a strong drive to build a society with less tribal 
division. The results of national elections held on 29 June 1993, 
which should give a further indication of political trends, were 
not available when The Courier went to press. 
The Twa 
The future of the Twa, a Pygmy tribe making up only 1 % of 
the population of Rwanda and Burundi, is another problem. 
They are the traditional allies of the Tutsi, but are held in 
apparent contempt by the two countries' main ethnic groups, 
which attract far more of the political observers' attention. 
The Hutu are, typically, farmers and the Tutsi mainly 
herdsmen, but the Twa have stuck to the forests and a nomadic 
way of life as hunters and gatherers, which cuts them off from 
the rest of the country. The effect is to marginalise this tribe of 
artists (they are potters, dancers and musicians), for whom 
survival is becoming more and more of a problem. 
This is less a question of political representation than of a 
cultural minority which is disappearing altogether, for the Twa 
refuse to integrate with ethnic majorities which shun them. They 
have tended to cut themselves off and their socio-political 
isolation (they practise endogamy, for example) is handicapping 
their chances of survival — which depends on the way the 
majority groups behave.O Bruno GATTA* 
* Mr Gatta is an official in DG VIII (Development) at the Commission of the 
European Communities. 
Cameroon 
English or French? Cameroonians divided 
Cameroon, like other African countries, is deeply divided. On 
top of the usual political and institutional reasons for the rifts — 
which unfortunately appear to be widening — the rivalry 
between the French and English linguistic groups provides a 
further divisive element. 
For a long time, bilingualism was Cameroon's international 
trademark : a good example of the peaceful coexistence of the 
languages of Shakespeare and Molière. Things have changed, 
however, and for the past ten or more years it has been a source 
of deep resentment between the English- and French speaking 
parts of the country. But is it really the language question that is 
keeping them apart? Or is the English-French debate just a 
pretext for disagreements which are actually rooted elsewhere? 
Some English-speaking Cameroonians claim that they were 
cheated in the reunification of 1961 and in the subsequent moves 
IOOOO 
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Cameroon - an African country with a European 
language divide 
from a Federation to a United Republic and then to the present-
day Republic of Cameroon. 
In support of this argument, they point first to the fact that, 
although English is a joint working language alongside French 
under the Constitution, it has lost ground, notwithstanding 
efforts to encourage bilingualism such as two-language teaching 
in a number of schools and the rule that either language may be 
used in the civil service. The English-speakers' second grievance 
is the actual role — or rather lack of a role — which they have 
had in the running and practical management of the state. Their 
third complaint relates to the management and use of the 
economic resources of western Cameroon combined with the 
question of regional development. 
Resentment has mounted since the erratic beginnings of 
Cameroon's democracy. The English-speakers are again calling 
for a return to Federation but the Government rejects both the 
idea itself and any discussion of it. 
Despite the obvious friction, the scale of the problem deserves 
to be questioned, particularly if one looks at it in the context of 
what has happened in countries such as Canada and Belgium, 
where there are 'competing' linguistic groups. 
In fact, one could argue that the problem of the English-
speakers in Cameroon is not so much a 'national minority' issue 
as one which relates to the state institutions and the way in 
which they operate. After all, there are similar strained relations 
between the central authorities and other regions of the country, 
and these have nothing to do with the language question.O 
L.P. 
The Tuaregs 
The Tuaregs are a topical subject of discussion and one better 
understood for a little history. 
These people are Berbers descended from the first inhabitants 
of North Africa. They have their own writing and a language 
shared by the various brotherhoods. The Arab invasions of the 
7th and 11th centuries overwhelmed the Berber tribes along the 
coast, but the Tuaregs remained free by staying inland and 
defending the Sahara. Nowadays, there are Tuareg groups 
living in each of the main mountain areas of the Sahara — the 
Hoggar, the A'ir, the Tassili and the Ajjer — as well as in the 
dried-out desert lands of the Sahel. They are divided for the 
most part between Niger, which has the largest Tuareg 
population, Mali, with the second largest, and Algeria, although 
there are a few small communities also in Libya and Burkina 
Faso. 
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Their traditional way oflife and nomadic existence are currently 
threatened by political and economic developments and by 
drought, the scourge of the deserts of western Africa for several 
years now. The pace of their lives has changed and many aspects 
of their culture have disappeared. Their social hierarchy has 
altered and their nomadic existence with it. so their day-to-day 
life is different too. The change is such that the whole future of 
the Tuareg community is now in doubt. 
There arc many reasons for this. The lorries which arrived to 
haul goods across the Sahara in the 1950s and 1960s are one of 
them, for there are now machines in place of the camels which 
used to carry millet, dates, salt, tea and other items in the big 
Tuareg caravans. The nomadic way of life, the trade and 
therefore the means of subsistence of the Tuareg people are 
clearly threatened. 
Then there is drought, which has decimated herds of camels, 
sheep and goats, dealing another body blow to the nomadic way 
of life. 
And. with the independence of the countries in which they live 
(Algeria. Mali and Niger). Tuareg freedom of movement was 
suddenly limited by border restrictions. The arrival of black 
governments in Niger and Mali in 1961 did not. from a Tuareg 
perspective, help matters - the Tuaregs traditionally had 
slaves, most of them black, and. although the hierarchies are 
now crumbling, the slavery issue still rankles with black people. 
In consequence, stratified systems of administration were 
established with the Tuaregs firmly at the bottom of the scale. 
The Governments of Mali and Niger now have the problem of 
Tuareg dissidence to cope with. The situation began to 
deteriorate after the drought of 1984. when a wave of Tuareg 
immigrants headed for Algeria. The Algerian Government 
persuaded them to go back to their country of origin but the 
return was marred by unfortunate circumstances (the move was 
ill-prepared and aid provided by France was diverted). In 1990. 
Niger put down a Tuareg revolt. In the pursuit which followed, 
the 'rebels" crossed into Mali which was thus also drawn in. A 
'Tuareg hunt' developed in response to the rebellion which was 
now firmi ν under wav in both Nieer and Mali. 
In April 1992. the Mali Government and the Bureau for the 
Coordination of the United Azaouad Movements and Fronts 
signed a National Pact, providing for a ceasefire and conferring 
internal autonomy on the North region, where the Tuareg 
community constitutes an important part of society, as well as 
integrating Azaouad fighters in the Malian army. Despite what 
can still be visible tension, the trend is towards peace and a 
political solution to the problems. 
In Niger, the riots started later and the Tuareg formed the 
A'ir-Azaouak Liberation Front (FLAA). This was recognised in 
January 1992 by the Niger Government, but the latter opposed 
any suggestion of autonomy for the northern part of the country 
because of the proximity of Libya, the Trans-Sahara highway 
linking Algiers with the Bight of Benin (the 'uranium' road) and 
the fact that there were important uranium mines in the area. 
There is hope, however, for Mahamane Ousmane, the new Head 
of State (a civilian, democratically elected in March-April this 
year) seems anxious to negotiate and the FLAA is extending its 
truce indefinitely. 
Nomadic tradition and geographical spread make the Tuareg 
issue difficult to address. Autonomy would mean that they 
could take over their own administration, but where would thev 
do it and what would their political culture be',  L.S. 
Brittany 
Brittany is on the Atlantic Coast of Western France, in 
Western Europe. It is 34 000 km
2 in area, which makes it 
roughly the same size as Belgium, and has a population of about 
3 900 000. which puts it between the Irish Republic and 
Norway. 
In 56 BC. this strongly Celtic part of Gaul was conquered by 
the Romans and known as Armorica, but the old culture 
reasserted itself in the 2nd-7th centuries AD. when Celts moved 
in from Britain - hence the name Brittany. By the time of the 
Carolingians. in the 9th century, it was fighting to keep its 
independence, finally establishing its historic boundaries after 
repelling Norman invasions in the early 10th century. Organised 
as an independent Duchy, its thriving maritime trade gave il 
regular prosperity, particularly in the 15th century, when il had 
all the hallmarks of a modern state, with its own currency, tax 
system, courts, parliament and diplomatic corps. 
The Capetian kings cast envious eyes on Brittany ('France's 
El Dorado', as they called it in the 16th century) and the French 
armies overran it at the end of the 15th century. The Breton 
army was defeated in 1488 and Brittany was annexed to France 
in 1532 under a Treaty of Union between two sovereign states 
which mysteriously disappeared from the royal archives in 
Paris. However, the Bretons kept special rights until the 
Revolution abolished them in 1789, at which time the name 
'Brittany' disappeared from the political and administrative 
nomenclature. It only reappeared in 1972. 
An economy still prosperous when the 1 7th century began 
was to be ruined by the protectionism of Colbert. Louis XIV's 
finance minister, and the Napoleonic period, when Brittany's 
traditional maritime relations with the British Isles and the 
Iberian Peninsula ceased. 
Brittany has its own language. Breton (Brezhoneg). the only 
Celtic language spoken in continental Europe and still used in 
the western parts of the region by 250 000-300 000 people and 
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understood by 500 000-600 000. It has been written since at least 
the 7th century AD and printed since the late 15th century and 
has a wealth of literature. Some people in the rural parts of 
eastern Brittany speak Gallo, a Romance dialect similar to the 
Oil dialects of northern France (Norman, Picard, Poitevin and 
so on). 
Brittany currently has to contend with a number of problems 
arising from its minority situation and its position on the 
periphery of both France and the European Community. 
Economically speaking, it leads France's farming and fishing 
sectors, both of which are in serious difficulty. It has relatively 
little industry and what there is could well disappear. And, like 
other regions, it suffers from the lack of a regional development 
policy and from centralisation at every level (political, 
administrative, economic and cultural). 
From the mid-19th century right up until the 1970s, the 
tendency was for young people to leave, which caused serious 
problems for the region and led to Bretons spreading across the 
globe (there are about 1 million of them in the Paris area and 
30 000 in New York alone). According to recent statistics, the 
move began again in the mid-1980s, with Greater Paris, where 
40% of the country's new jobs are created, as the main 
destination. 
Brittany suffers from having no real political power. The 
Regional Council of Brittany, a body elected by universal 
suffrage since 1986, does not have the power to enact laws or 
regulations in any of the areas vital to the region and its budget is 
very small too. And the most industrialised region, around 
Nantes, which is historically a part of Brittany, has been 
separate since 1941. 
Breton language and culture are taught to only a few children 
(0.3% of the primary school intake), under unreliable 
conditions. Breton is not much in evidence in the media (75 
minutes per week on just one TV channel). The money allocated 
to it is minimal and, since it has no official status, it cannot be 
used by the public administration or in any official documents. 
In January 1993, a committee was set up, with the help of the 
majority of Breton MPs and local representatives, to get France 
to sign and ratify the Council of Europe's Charter on regional 
and minority languages and it organised a peaceful meeting of 
2000 people in Quimper on 6 March. 
The next 20 or 30 years will no doubt be decisive when it 
comes to deciding whether the Breton minority will gradually be 
assimilated into the dominant French culture or whether it can 
add more pages to its thousand years of history. The political 
integration of Europe can help a lot if it allows for the emergence 
of a new form of citizenship founded on pluralism and respect 
for all — even minority — cultures.O 
Yves JARDIN* 
* The author is a history teacher at the Lycée ol' Douarnenez in Brittany. 
New Caledonia 
Melanesiane from South East Asia had been living in New 
Caledonia since 3000 BC by the time James Cook discovered it 
in February 1774. The island was annexed by the French in 1853 
and turned into a penal colony, where prisoners soon 
outnumbered free men. Frequent uprisings by the indigenous 
people, the Kanaks, were suppressed forcibly and ultimately, in 
1878. reservations were created for the Melanesian population. 
In 1946, New Caledonia and the surrounding islands became 
a French overseas territory. In 1952, the Kanaks formed the 
Caledonian Union, which dominated the political life of the 
institutions there until the 1970s and, by virtue of being the main 
component of the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front 
(FLNKS), is still one of the leading lights on the political scene 
today. 
But the Melanesians did not get the vote until 1957 and, in 
1958, the Europeans set up the Caledonian Assembly to defend 
the policy of keeping the territory in the French Republic. 
With the nickel boom of the 1970s, many Europeans settled in 
Nouméa and the surrounding area. Tension between the two 
main — European and Melanesian — communities mounted, 
notwithstanding the institutions and the economic and social 
plans which had been put in place. 
The statistics show that Europeans were in fact in a minority, 
representing 33.6% of the total population as against the 
Kanaks' 44.8%. But it was the Kanaks who suffered economic 
and political marginalisation, putting them in a minority 
situation in their own country. The roles were reversed and 
cohabitation was bound to be difficult. 
There had to be an end to the years of attacks which resulted 
in the deaths of both policemen and members of the FLNKS. In 
1984, the tension during elections for the Territorial Assembly in 
Nouméa was such that the French Government sent out troops 
to man barricades. 
The Matignon agreements were signed after the presidential 
elections of 1988. They were the work of the French 
Government, the RPCR (the Assembly for Caledonia in the 
Republic, i.e. the anti-independence Caledonia RPR, represent­
ing the majority of Europeans) and the FLNKS (pro-
independence, representing the majority of the Melanesians). 
Their provisions included a 10-year moratorium prior to a 
referendum on self determination. The main aims were civil 
peace and a fresh economic and social balance for the territory, 
with political, economic and social responsibilities for the pro-
independence Melanesians from the start — a logical step after 
the creation of the three administrative provinces. 
The three provinces are: 
— The Loyalty Islands, almost entirely inhabited by Mela­
nesians (98.1%, as against 1.3% Europeans); 
— North Province, which, despite a large European population 
in some districts (Koumak), is 78.7% Melanesian and 15.7% 
European. This province has been in a position to move firmly 
into the international economic scene since a major nickel 
mining company was bought from Jacques Lafleur ' in 1990. 
New Caledonia is, in fact, the world's fourth biggest nickel 
producer and the Caledonian economy is dependent on the 
world market; 
— South Province, which is 44.3% European and 25.8% 
Melanesian. 
Ethnic and political divisions reflect the division of the 
territory itself, with North Province and the Islands controlled 
by the FLNKS and South Province by the RPCR. So running 
the provinces is a lesson in political management within the 
framework of what, in March 1993, Louis Le Pensee
2 called 
'decolonisation within the Republic'. Today, more than ever 
before, New Caledonia's future lies somewhere between self-
government and independence. O L.S. 
President of the South Assembly and President of the RPCR. 
Former Minister for the Overseas Departments and Territories. 
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The Katsina Arid Zone Programme 
Improving the environment and the quality of life 
In tracing the evolution of EC develop-
ment policy under the Lomé Conven-
tions, the Katsina Afforestation Project 
(KAP) in northern Nigeria represents an 
important milestone, being one of the 
first projects in which the Community's 
concern about environmental degrad-
ation in the ACP states became manifest. 
Launched in 1987 in response to what 
is certainly the worst environmental 
problem facing Nigeria — desertification 
— KAP was completed last year with ail 
but one of its targets exceeded. A second 
phase, known as the Katsina Arid Zone 
Development Programme (KAZP), has 
just begun with a major allocation of 
ECU 25 million from the seventh EDF. 
With KAP proving an effective model 
for other projects in the fight against 
desertification, a certain sense of relief 
prevails — a far cry from the days when 
the Nigerian government, overwhelmed 
by the magnitude of the problem, ap-
peared at a loss as to how it could best 
deal with it. 
Geographically the extreme north of 
Nigeria where Katsina is located is in the 
Sahel. Indeed the Sahelian climate and 
vegetation extend further south to 
Kaduna. Often plagued by severe 
drought, the process of environmental 
degradation here, like elsewhere in the 
region, started long ago but did not 
become a source of worry until the 1970s, 
when a rapid increase in the population 
and in the number of livestock translated 
into a dramatic shrinkage of arable land 
and fodder. Fears of serious outbreaks of 
communal conflict, as living standards 
fell and rural depopulation accelerated, 
led the Nigerian government in 1982 to 
approach the European Community for 
assistance. 
The Nigerian request came at the right 
time. Policywise the EC was disposed to 
finance projects in this area, and funds 
were available under the Lomé II Con-
vention. 
T>vo million trees 
Although the report eventually com-
missioned by the EC and Nigeria, recom-
mended in 1984 the planting of 2 million 
trees in five local government areas of the 
then Kaduna State — Daura. Katsina. 
Mani, Kankiya and Dutsin Ma ' — it was 
the decision to secure the closest collabor-
ation possible at the local level, adopt 
several afforestation models and give 
farmers a choice of which model they 
consider the most appropriate for their 
farms that was to prove crucial in the 
success of the project. 
Covering an area of about 
16 000 sq km. the Project envisaged the 
establishment of 85 shelterbelts (blocks of 
6600 trees, each measuring 2000m χ 
30m) on communal lands to reduce wind 
erosion of top soils and stabilise loose 
sands in areas most affected by the 
desertification process. It adopted three 
afforestation models from which farmers 
could choose : trees on farmland to reflect 
the traditional practice of leaving a few 
trees standing after clearing, windbreaks 
at the edges of farms to protect crops; 
and woodlots at corners to provide a 
permanent source of fuelwood and poles. 
Together with an infrastructure com-
prising a headquarters (an office com-
plex, stores, a workshop, staff housing 
etc.), wells and plant nurseries, the 
Project was costed at ECU 13.4 million. 
The European Community provided a 
grant of ECU 9.4 million from the fifth 
EDF while the Nigerian government 
undertook to pay the salaries and wages 
of local staff and labour (amounting to 
ECU 4 million) during the four years of 
the Project. 
Over 25 indigenous and exotic plant 
species (most of which are valuable as 
sources of fuelwood. fruits, fodder, medi-
cines, etc.) were used and 14 235 farmers 
took part in the Project. The farmers were 
carefully selected and trained in close 
collaboration with traditional rulers. 
Each farmer was responsible for planting 
and tending the trees and managing his 
1 Katsina State was carved out of Kaduna Slate in 
1987 and. following the reform of local government in 
1991. the five local government areas became 
nineteen. 
farm as he saw fit. He was provided with 
seedlings and extension services. 
In order to minimise the pressure on 
the vegetation cover, the Project intro-
duced efficient mud stoves imported from 
the Republic of Niger, which were found 
to save between 40° » and 50"o on 
fuelwoods, and set up a programme to 
train local blacksmiths in their manufac-
ture. 
Targets exceeded 
Although KAP was extended for an 
additional year, by the end of the original 
1991 deadline it had exceeded all but one 
of its targets: 94 shelterbelts instead of 
the 85 planned. 7225 windbreaks and 
4548 woodlots as against 6250 and 4325 
respectively. Only' 2462 'trees on far-
mland' were realised instead of the 3915 
earmarked, because, according to the 
Project managers, the farmers felt in-
creasingly reluctant to use the indigenous 
plant species with which they were 
provided: these grow more slowly than 
the exotic ones. 
An assessment of the survival rate ol' 
the trees has been put at 46%, which, 
experts say, corresponds with the norm 
for agroforestry programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The widespread participation ol far-
mers in the Project was not only dictated 
by personal economic interest but also by 
a much greater awareness in the project 
area of the cause of desertification and 
the importance of vegetation cover to 
human and animal life. 
Despite Katsina's location in the Salici 
and the drought it suffers, man litis been 
recognised as the main cause of defores-
tation. As the Emir frankly pul it : 'There 
is no desert encroachment here, there is 
desert creation'. Having admitted that 
much, there was a willingness and de-
termination to tackle the problem head-
on at all levels, for as well as EC finance 
and technical support, the Federal, State 
and local governments and the popu-
lation at large farmers, women's 
groups and school children were till 
involved. 
Awareness of the environment 
The Federal Government, as already 
indicated, paid the salaries and wages of 
local staff. The State Government, on the 
other hand, acquired the land for shelter-
belts and paid compensation to their 
previous owners while local government 
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provided extension workers, land for 
nurseries, etc. 
Federal and State officials in Nigeria, 
from the Head of State through 
Governors to ministers, have always 
shown keen interest in tree planting. But 
such exercises are rarely followed up at 
the grassroots level, mainly because of 
ignorance. The importance attached to 
extension services under this Project 
ensured that that gap was plugged in the 
project area. Indeed one of the most 
striking things about KAP, which should 
serve as an example to agroforestry 
projects, is the effective campaign it 
mounted against desertification and the 
enthusiasm it engendered for tree plant­
ing. 
In 1988, a programme was devised to 
create awareness of the environment 
among students by setting up Young 
Foresters' Clubs in post-primary insti­
tutions where boys and girls are taught 
about plant species and planting tech­
niques. By 1991, 47 secondary and tech­
nical schools had set up their own clubs. 
These have a combined membership of 
well over 10 000. Members are en­
couraged not only to pass on their 
knowledge to their parents, the majority 
of whom are farmers, but also to put it 
into practice around their schools and 
homes — a practice which has already 
resulted in some schools becoming self-
sufficient in fruit and vegetables. In 1990 
a Women's Programme was begun, under 
which women are given seedlings and 
encouraged to plant around their com­
pounds. So far 48 women's groups, with a 
combined membership of over 2000, have 
been formed in villages and hamlets in the 
project zone. It is now very common to 
see compounds surrounded by fruit trees 
of all kinds. 
Consolidation of achievements 
The second phase, the Katsina Arid 
Zone Development Programme, which 
began this year, is aimed not only at 
consolidating and expanding what has 
been achieved but also at ensuring an 
integrated, environmentally sustainable 
rural development. This has become 
necessary because KAP has revealed that 
tree planting alone cannot counterbal­
ance the loss of forest cover, much less 
roll back the desert. If the people's living 
standards are to improve, the area's 
capacity to carry an ever-increasing 
number of livestock and support in­
creased agricultural production has to be 
strengthened. There would thus be, 
among other things, small-scale irrig­
ation schemes, investments in water 
supply, rural roads, storage and electrifi­
cation, as well as in small-scale credit 
facilities. 
As with KAP, all levels of government 
are expected to make some contribution : 
the Federal and Katsina State Govern­
ments, for example, will fund the pay­
ment of the salaries of the local staff for 
the four-year duration of the project. This 
will cost the governments -N- 17 million 
and-N- 3.4 million respectively. The Pro­
ject will seek to reach the widest number 
of people. Associations, committees, 
village groups and individual farmers will 
be asked to take full control of the 
management of their various projects. O 
Augustine OYOWE. 
The Courier no. 140 - July-August 1993  85 DEVELOPING WORLD 
1993 Human Development Report 
'90% of the world's people lack 
control over their own lives' 
'Many of today's struggles are more than struggles for access to political 
power. They are struggles for access to the ordinary opportunities of life — land, 
water, work, living space and basic social services'. 
This statement, by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
Administrator. William Draper, sets the 
tone for the latest Human Development 
Report ' which was published at the end 
of May. The Report, prepared by an 
independent team of economists for the 
UNDP, shows that ethnic minorities, the 
poor, rural dwellers, women and the 
disabled often have little power to change 
their lives. Overall, the authors conclude 
that some 90% of the world's population 
lack control over their own destiny. 
The chief architect of the Report, 
M uhhuh id Haq, who is Special Advisor to 
the UNDP Administrator and a former 
Minister in the Pakistan Government.
 
2
 
argues that the basic message of human 
development has not changed : economic 
growth is imperative for a nation's 
development but this growth must be 
translated into the lives of the people. 
'Income is essential." Dr Haq continues, 
'but it is only a means, not the sum total 
of human life.' 
To emphasise the point, the Report 
once again ranks countries according to 
the Human Development Index (which 
has been featured in The Courier in its 
coverage of previous Human Develop-
ment Reports). This Index combines life 
expectancy, educational attainment and 
basic purchasing power into a single 
indicator of human development. The 
latest calculations reveal once again that 
the countries with the highest incomes are 
not always those with the highest HDI 
ranking. In 1993. Japan ranks first on the 
HDI although it is only sixth in terms of 
real GDP per capita {See also Table 1). As 
in previous years, we reproduce the 
rankings for the ACP and EC countries 
(Table 2). 
In addition to providing updated 
statistical information which is designed 
to chart the trends ol human develop-
ment across the world, the authors of the 
Report seek each year to break new 
ground by focusing on specific aspects or 
topics of current concern. Last year, the 
1 Published in Ensilish bv Oxford University Press. 
2001 Evans Road. Can. NC 2\M?. USA. 
: See the 'Meeting Point' interview in the last issue 
oi' The Courier. 
emphasis was on reforming world mar-
kets. Among the new themes highlighted 
as 'targets for change' in the 1993 Report 
are the exclusion of minorities, 'jobless 
growth' and centralised power. 
Minorities excluded 
To highlight the exclusion of ethnic 
minorities from full participation in 
economic and social benefits, the Report 
ranked the white. African-American and 
Hispanic populations of the United 
Slates on the HDI as if they were separate 
countries. The white population would 
rank first, ahead of Japan, while African-
Americans, with lower life expectancy, 
income and education levels, would come 
in at 31st place (the same as Trinidad and 
Tobago). Hispanics in the USA would 
occupy 35th position. Studies of other 
countries reveal similar divergences with 
many other groups such as women and 
rural dwellers excluded from particip-
ation. Overall, according to the Report. 
'it seems likely that fewer than 10% of the 
world's population participate fully in 
political, economic, social and cultural 
life'. 
Five pillars 
To promote societies built around 
people's genuine needs, the Report calls 
for the following five new pillars of a 
people-centred world order: 
- New concepts of human security that 
stress security of people, not just of 
nations and territory. This means ac-
celerated disarmament, using defence 
cuts to boost human development. It 
means a new role for the United Nations, 
increasingly intervening to provide 
human security in areas such as in the 
former Yugoslavia and Somalia, where 
people are fighting within countries 
rather than between countries. 
New strategies of sustainable luutuin 
development that weave development 
around people, not people around de-
velopment. 
— New partnerships between state and 
markets, to combine market efficiency 
with social compassion. 
- New patterns of national and global 
governance. Inflexible nation states, it is 
asserted, cannot cope with the globalis-
ation of markets on the one hand and the 
rising aspirations of their people on the 
other. Needed here are greater decentral-
isation of power, more involvement by 
NGOs and more empowerment of the 
poor. 
— New forms of international cooper-
ation, to focus foreign aid directly on the 
needs of the people rather than on the 
preferences of governments. 
Most importantly, the 1993 Report 
focuses on participation as a key to 
human development. 
Economic participation 
The Report calls for 'people-friendly' 
markets, allowing people to participate 
fully in their operation and to share 
equitably in their benefits. The starting 
point for economic participation is jobs, 
and the Report shows that till over the 
world, economics arc growing but the 
Table 1 (Source UNDP) 
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number of jobs is not keeping pace, 
resulting in 'jobless growth' (see Table 3). 
From 1960 to 1987. for example, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom saw 
their economies more than double in size 
but employment rates actually fell. The 
phenomenon is said to be particularly 
devastating in developing countries. Less 
than one-third of the increase in output in 
such countries in the 1960-87 period is 
reported as having come from increased 
labour; more than two thirds resulted 
from capital investment. Over the same 
period, the labour force in the developing 
world rose by more than 400 million, 
creating 'legions of unemployed'. On the 
positive side, the Report shows how, in 
some countries (particularly in East 
Asia), land reform and investment in 
human resources have led to substantial 
job growth. 
One possible way of making economies 
work better and increasing opportunities 
for participation is to reduce state regu­
lation, unleash private creativity and sell 
off inefficient public enterprises. While 
the Report applauds reforms of this kind, 
it stresses that care is needed in undertak­
ing them so as to avoid abuses. A section 
on the 'seven sins of privatisation' warns 
of the need for full disclosure to prevent 
corruption and for anti-monopoly meas­
ures aimed at ensuring, among other 
things, that economic power does not 
simply pass 'from one ruling elite to 
another'. 
Political participation 
If people cannot travel large distances 
to the seat of government in order to 
share power, the Report argues that 
government can and should move to­
wards people by decentralising. It states 
that one of the few ways of measuring 
decentralisation is by studying where 
government money is actually spent. By 
that measure, it is suggested that a lot 
remains to be done. On average, central 
governments in developing countries are 
said to delegate less than 10% of total 
national spending to local governments, 
and less than 6%i of social expenditure. 
This contrasts with the situation in 15 
industrialised countries which were 
studied, where 40% of all spending and 
25% of social spending was delegated to 
the local and regional authorities. 
The UNDP points out that it is not an 
easy task to change the patterns of 
centralised government. Citing Chile, 
Indonesia. Morocco and Zimbabwe, 
which have moved towards decentral­
isation through the creation of near-
autonomous local government, the au­
thors note that even these countries have 
devolved relatively little actual power. 
Table 2: Human Development Index 
All ACP and EC States 
Country 
High human development 
France 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Barbados 
Ireland 
Italy 
Spain 
Greece 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Bahamas 
Portugal 
Dominica 
Medium human development 
Mauritius 
Grenada 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Seychelles 
Suriname 
Jamaica 
Fiji 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Belize 
Dominican Republic 
Samoa 
Botswana 
Guyana 
Vanuatu 
Gabon 
Low human development 
Cape Verde 
Swaziland 
Solomon Islands 
Lesotho 
Zimbabwe 
São Tomé and Principe 
Congo 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Papua New Guinea 
Zambia 
Ghana 
Cameroon 
Namibia 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Haiti 
Tanzania 
Comoros 
Zaire 
Nigeria 
Liberia 
Togo 
Uganda 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Ethiopia 
Malawi 
Burundi 
Equatorial Guinea 
Central African Republic 
Mozambique 
Sudan 
Angola 
Mauritania 
Benin 
Djibouti 
Guinea-Bissau 
Chad 
Somalia 
Gambia 
Mali 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
Sierra Leone 
Guinea 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years) 
1990 
76.4 
77.2 
75.7 
75.2 
75.8 
75.2 
74.9 
75.1 
74.6 
76.0 
77.0 
76.1 
71.6 
71.5 
74.0 
76.0 
69.6 
71.5 
72.0 
70.0 
69.5 
73.1 
64.8 
70.5 
70.0 
67.5 
69.5 
66.7 
66.5 
59.8 
64.2 
69.5 
52.5 
67.0 
56.8 
69.5 
57.3 
59.6 
65.5 
53.7 
59.7 
54.5 
54.9 
54.4 
55.0 
53.7 
57.5 
53.4 
55.7 
54.0 
55.0 
53.0 
51.5 
54.2 
54.0 
52.0 
49.5 
48.3 
45.5 
48.1 
48.5 
47.0 
49.5 
47.5 
50.8 
45.5 
47.0 
47.0 
48.0 
42.5 
46.5 
46.1 
44.0 
45.0 
45.5 
48.2 
42.0 
43.5 
Adult 
literacy 
rate (%) 
(1990) 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
99.0 
97.1 
97.5 
93.2 
96.0 
99.0 
85.0 
97.0 
86.0 
96.0 
96.0 
89.0 
94.9 
98.4 
87.0 
93.0 
84.0 
92.0 
95.0 
83.3 
92.0 
73.6 
96.4 
67.0 
60:7 
66.5 
72.0 
24.0 
78.0 
66.9 
63.0 
56.6 
69.0 
80.2 
52.0 
72.8 
60.3 
54.1 
40.0 
53.8 
53.0 
65.0 
61.0 
71.8 
50.7 
39.5 
43.3 
48.3 
50.2 
38.3 
66.0 
47.0 
50.0 
50.2 
37.7 
32.9 
27.1 
41.7 
34.0 
23.4 
19.0 
36.5 
29.8 
24.1 
27.2 
32.0 
28.4 
18.2 
20.7 
24.0 
Mean 
years 
of 
schooling 
(1990) 
11.6 
10.6 
11.5 
11.1 
10.4 
10.7 
10.0 
8.9 
8.7 
7.3 
6.8 
6.9 
8.0 
6.2 
6.0 
4.7 
4.1 
4.7 
4.6 
4.6 
4.2 
5.3 
5.1 
3.9 
4.6 
6.0 
4.6 
4.3 
5.7 
2.4 
5.1 
3.7 
2.6 
2.2 
3.7 
1.0 
3.4 
2.9 
2.3 
2.1 
2.3 
2.2 
0.9 
2.7 
3.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.9 
1.7 
2.0 
1.0 
1.6 
1.2 
2.0 
1.6 
1.1 
1.1 
0.8 
1.1 
1.7 
0.3 
0.8 
1.1 
1.6 
0.8 
1.5 
0.3 
0.7 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.9 
0.8 
* With the exception of Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu, for which the UNDP does not provide fi 
country may conceal wide disparities within that country as between rich and poor, men anc 
and different regions and ethnic groups. 
Real 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPPS) 
(1990) 
17405 
15695 
15804 
18213 
16781 
16381 
19244 
8304 
10589 
15890 
11723 
7366 
6604 
11235 
8770 
3910 
5750 
4081 
4000 
4191 
3927 
2979 
4427 
3470 
3647 
3300 
3000 
2404 
1900 
3419 
1464 
2005 
4147 
1769 
2384 
2689 
1743 
1484 
600 
2362 
1058 
704 
1786 
744 
1016 
1646 
1400 
1324 
933 
572 
721 
367 
1215 
857 
734 
524 
657 
1248 
369 
640 
625 
700 
768 
1072 
949 
840 
1057 
1043 
1000 
841 
559 
836 
913 
572 
645 
618 
1086 
501 
^ures. Figures fo 
women, rural ar 
Human 
development 
index 
0.971 
0.970 
0.964 
0.957 
0.955 
0.952 
0.943 
0.928 
0.925 
0.924 
0.923 
0.902 
0.877 
0.875 
0.853 
0.819 ' 
0.794 
0.787 
0.785 
0.761 
0.751 
0.736 
0.730 
0.720 
0.709 
0.697 
0.689 
0.586 
0.586 
0.552 
0.541 
0.533 
0.503 
0.479 
0.458 
0.439 
0.431 
0.398 
0.374 
0.372 
0.369 
0.327 
0.318 
0.314 
0.311 
0.310 
0.289 
0.286 
0.275 
0.270 
0.269 
0.262 
0.246 
0.222 
0.218 
0.194 
0.186 
0.182 
0.172 
0.168 
0.167 
0.164 
0.159 
0.154 
0.152 
0.143 
0.140 
0.113 
0.104 
0.090 
0.088 
0.087 
0.086 
0.082 
0.080 
0.074 
0.065 
0.045 
an individual 
d urban areas 
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Table 3 (Source UNDP) 
Jobless growth: GDP and employment, 1975-2000 
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According to the Report, 'the re­
sources controlled locally are small, local 
decision-making powers are narrow and 
many local appointments are imposed 
from above'. Yet even with their limi­
tations, the experience of the above-
mentioned countries is said to show that 
decentralisation can bring government 
closer to the people and improve their 
lives. 
Group participation 
The authors of the Report observe that 
when people organise, by definition they 
increase their level of participation and 
often increase influence over their own 
lives. They point out that the dramatic 
shift towards democracy across the de­
veloping world has led to an explosion of 
participatory movements and non­
governmental organisations. NGOs 
today are said to benefit more than 250 
million people, compared to 100 million 
in the early 1980s. The expansion of NGO 
activity has been supported by aid donors 
who, apparently dissatisfied with the 
performance of much of the official aid 
that has been provided, are channelling 
more of their money in this direction. 
Over the past 20 years, the Report 
states that grants by NGOs in the North 
(most of it from government sources) to 
developing countries jumped from just 
over SI billion to 55 billion a year. 
The UNDP goes on to stress the variety 
of roles performed by NGOs including 
the promotion of democracy, reaching 
the poorest in society in circumstances 
where governments have been unable to 
do so, and helping to empower mar­
ginalised groups. 
The example of labour unions, such as 
Solidarity in Poland and the Congress of 
Trade Unions in Zambia, is cited. Both of 
these played a central part in opposing 
one-party states and gaining multi-party 
elections and, in both cases, union pre­
sidents went on to be elected as Presidents 
of their country. 
Another example, taken from Zim­
babwe, is of the agricultural groups that 
were supported by the NGO Silveira 
House. These groups succeeded in in­
creasing crop yield by as much as tenfold, 
allowing farmers to break out of sub­
sistence agriculture and move into a cash 
economy. In Bangladesh, the Grameen 
Bank extended loans to almost one 
million people in 23 000 villages, and was 
able to show in the process that credit for 
the landless poor not only creates busi­
nesses and jobs, but can yield a loan 
repayment of 95%. 
In Ecuador, the Report mentions the 
case of the Indian Federations that are 
helping indigenous people to gain secure 
title for their land, resulting in both 
material benefits and increased standing 
in civil society. 
However, the authors stress that the 
growth of NGOs and their impact can 
obscure the fact that they still operate on 
a relatively small scale. The $7.2 billion in 
grants channelled through Northern 
NGOs to Southern NGOs is said lo 
account for 13% of official aid and 2.5% 
of total resource flows to developing 
countries. As Mahbub ul Haq says, 'this 
is not a criticism of the role of NGOs, but 
a reminder of stark reality: NGOs can 
supplement the role of governments, but 
they can never replace it.' 
*** 
Although lhe Human Development 
Report was first published in only 1990. 
this annual publication has rapidly es­
tablished itself as a key source of data and 
sharp analysis about development issues. 
The latest Report maintains the tradition 
of frankness which was established at the 
outset. The central message remains the 
same — that development must centre on 
people, and the authors put forward 
concrete proposals for achieving this 
goal. It must be said that national 
authorities will not always find it com­
fortable reading. But this fact alone 
means that it is almost certainly worth 
reading.' ed. S.H. 
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Grand corruption in Third World development 
by George MOODY-STUART * 
In the European Community this year there have been 
loud calls for 'good governance' and for stamping out 
corruption in high places, spurred by the collapse of one 
Member State's government amid accusations that leading 
politicians had for years benefited from covert financial 
links with big business and organised crime. An organis-
ation dedicated to openness in the conduct of public affairs, 
called Transparency International, has recently been 
launched in Berlin. 
But suspicions of high-level dishonesty are not confined to 
Europe, unfortunately. The author of the article below is a 
businessman with 30 years' experience of work in the agro-
industrial field in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
He maintains that the abuse of public power for private 
gain, at the very top, puts a high surcharge on business, and 
consequently development, in many Third World countries 
— and he believes the problem is getting worse. 
Corruption — 'The misuse of public 
power for private profit' — has probably 
existed for as long as there has been 
public power. To eliminate corrupt off­
icials and avaricious businessmen it 
would probably be necessary to change 
human nature; but an increasing number 
of people in both North and South are 
now actively discussing the problem and 
refusing to accept that corruption is 
inescapable. 
The last three years have produced an 
unprecedented number of business scan­
dals in the developed world, to an extent 
that nobody could now think of corrup­
tion as a problem of the South alone. 
However, there is an important distinc­
tion between internal corruption of the 
kind which may occur within any country 
and the international variety which so 
seriously affects the development of the 
South. This article is not concerned with 
businessmen who defraud their own 
shareholders, creditors or employees, nor 
with customs officials, policemen or 
minor officials who seek 'tips' to make 
the wheels go round. It is concerned only 
with what is sometimes called 'grand 
corruption' — the practice by which 
senior officials, ministers and, all too 
frequently, heads of state require pay­
ments before approving major purchases 
and developments. It seeks to answer very 
briefly four questions: 
— how widespread is grand corruption? 
— how does it work? 
— what damage does it do? 
— what are the possible solutions? 
How widespread? 
It is difficult and potentially dangerous 
to generalise about a subject which is 
* Former president of the Group of Seven for 
European Private Sector Cooperation with the ACP 
and currently chairman of the British ACP Associ­
ation. 
essentially secret in its nature and which 
covers a wide diversity of countries. I 
believe that 30, even 20, years ago grand 
corruption was confined to a small 
number of countries — Mexico, Ghana 
and the Philippines were notorious in the 
1960s. In the last ten years it has 
multiplied enormously. Of the 20 de­
veloping countries which I know re­
asonably well, of which ten are in Africa, 
there are only two which are not seriously 
tainted. For some years I have made a 
habit of asking business friends about 
their own experiences, both in countries 
which I know and in those I do not, and it 
is very rare indeed for a country to get a 
'clean' verdict. 
It is important to recognise that, even 
in those countries where grand corrup­
tion is rife, there are senior officials and 
ministers who are absolutely honest. 
They deserve appreciation and admir­
ation, particularly when they may receive 
poor salaries and can see their colleagues 
'earning their pensions' by self-enrich­
ment. It is not surprising that such men 
are becoming less common. 
How does it work? 
Grand corruption generally arises 
from the interaction of governments, as 
buyers, and the private sector, as sellers. 
Opportunities arise through the sale of 
capital goods, major projects, on-going 
supplies or consultancy services. The 
potential beneficiaries are those in a 
position to make or influence govern­
ment purchasing decisions — heads of 
state, relevant ministers and senior off­
icials. The principal losers are the general 
public and the funding agencies, not only 
because goods or services cost more than 
they should but also for more complex 
reasons described below. The suppliers 
may emerge as gainers or losers. 
Three main factors seem to influence 
the suitability of a transaction for grand 
corruption. They are: 
a) Size. The bigger the purchase or 
project, the bigger the potential 'take'. 
b) Immediacy. Politicians and even off­
icials in the South know that their terms 
of office may be brief. A pay-day at some 
remote time is not very interesting. 
c) Mystification. A high technological 
content is attractive because it makes 
price comparisons very difficult. A cargo 
of cement has a calculable value on a 
given day but who knows the fair price for 
a sophisticated piece of military equip­
ment? 
Applying these criteria, one reaches an 
order of attractiveness which puts air­
craft, military supplies and telecommuni­
cations at the top of the list; major 
industrial, agro-industrial and civil en­
gineering projects in the middle ; and on­
going supplies and large consultancy 
contracts towards the lower end. 
'But surely', it will be argued, 'large 
and reputable companies do not bribe 
people?' Indeed they do not. However, 
they may appoint an agent or rep­
resentative, who is likely to be a man of 
high standing in the community in which 
they wish to do business, sometimes a 
lawyer, a banker or a senior businessman. 
He can provide a range of valuable 
services, such as obtaining visas, meeting 
visitors at the airport, arranging accom­
modation and transport, advising on 
local finance and taxation — and making 
appointments with the top officials and 
ministers. In return for all of this he may 
receive a success-related fee, perhaps five 
or even 15 percent of the value of the 
business secured. What reputable com­
pany needs to bribe anybody when it has 
an agent capable of ensuring that 'things 
run smoothly'? 
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The late President Fe niin a n il Marcos oj 
grand corruption in hrs\day. Grund corrupt 
of countries, but in the last ten ι 
'But again", lhe sceptic will say, 'there 
are mechanisms to prevent over-pricing 
such as International Competitive Bid-
ding.' Apart from the fact that there are 
many situations, some of them entirely 
legitimate, in which ICB can be shown to 
be inappropriate, it does no more than 
make life a little more difficult for the 
agent and his clients. The common 
practice of short-listing, welcomed in 
principle by almost all sellers, makes it 
unlikely that the corrupt buyer will be 
defeated by ICB. In the last resort, if his 
favoured supplier does not get the busi-
ness, he can always abort the tender 
('changed priorities'. 'shortage of 
finance', 'alteration to scope of work') 
and start asain. 
the Philippines, a country notorious for 
ton used to be confined to a snudi number 
IIÌ'S it litis multiplied enormously 
It is not. of course, suggested that till 
contracts are manipulated for corrupt 
reasons. However, nobody should doubt 
that present practices leave major North/ 
South contracts potentially wide open to 
grand corruption. 
What damage does it do? 
The most obvious, but almost certainly 
not the most serious, effect of grand 
corruption is that major items of im-
ported goods and services are frequently 
costing countries of the South as much as 
15% more than they should. Estimates 
have been made indicating enormous 
sums lying in Swiss bank accounts to the 
credit of Third World leaders: and even 
if. as is sometimes claimed, a proportion 
of this money trickles back to the coun-
tries which have orginally suffered from 
its loss, it is believed that much has been 
used to inflate the property markets of 
Europe and North America. 
Far greater damage arises from the fact 
that the availability of bribes can se-
riously distort the decision-making pro-
cess. The principal criteria in deciding 
from whom a purchase will be made 
should be quality and cost, with other 
considerations such as credit terms and 
delivers taken into account. When per-
sonal gain becomes a factor, il rapidly 
becomes the factor and all others pale 
into insignificance. 
Two main areas ol'damage arise trom 
lhe suspension of sound and critical 
decision-making. The fusi is thai the 
wrong suppliers or contractors tire liable 
to be chosen. The second, which has led 
lo some of the worst development cata-
strophes, is that totally unnecessary or 
inappropriate purchases tire made. 
Grand corruption litis opened lhe way 
for major contracts (o be won by com-
panies which would have had little hope 
of winning them in fair (i.e. uncorrupt) 
competition. Il is healthy for long-
established suppliers to lose business 
sometimes to newcomers, particularly 
those from the emerging powers of Asia; 
but the South cannot afford to waste its 
scarce resources on shoddy supplies or 
projects which are so badly executed that 
they fail, whatever their source. 
Even more costly than choosing the 
wrong supplier or contractor is choosing 
supplies or a project which are not needed 
at all. The supplier from the North may 
argue that il is only good salesmanship 
when he can persuade a buyer from the 
South that he needs aircraft or communi-
cation systems or generating plani or 
food processing factories: but when the 
buyer's judgment is grossly distorted by 
the seller's agent's 'persuasion', the 
damage can be enormous. Commissions 
may add 10 or 15 percent to costs; but in 
a failed project or a useless purchase the 
total cost has to be written off. often with 
extra losses arising from attempting to 
rectify the unrectifiable. 
The question of moral damage also 
demands consideration. Some business-
men from the North argue that no moral 
issue is involved 'Africans believe that 
for a big man not to get rich is a sign of 
weakness or stupidity'. In none of the 
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countries of the South which I know well 
is the taking of bribes regarded as 'OK', 
however common it may be, although it 
may be viewed with less repugnance than 
in the North. The mass of uneducated 
people have little idea what is going on. 
The educated minority only appear to 
object very strongly when distorted deci­
sion-making causes obvious loss — the 
new road breaks up or a sugar factory is 
built where no-one can grow sugar-cane. 
But whether grand corruption is recog­
nised with resigned acceptance, with wry 
amusement or as part of local custom and 
practice, it is by definition outside the 
law. If a head of state, a minister or a top 
official can break the law, where can the 
line be drawn? 
There are moral effects on the suppliers 
too. Many of those who work in North/ 
South transactions are justifiably proud 
of the contribution which they make to 
development, supplying more efficient 
equipment, providing better infrastruc­
ture, growing more crops, improving 
medical services or whatever. Grand 
corruption is something that they have 
learned to live with but it is not surprising 
that some of them begin to wonder 
whether any South decision-maker is 
influenced by any consideration other 
than his own pocket. Regrettably there 
are some countries where such a conclu­
sion appears to be justified. 
What are the possible solutions? 
Businessmen in the North usually 
regard grand corruption as an unpleas­
antness for which the South is respon­
sible. Its rapid spread through so many 
countries in recent years makes this 
highly improbable. I believe that grand 
corruption is largely the responsibility of 
the North and it is largely the respons­
ibility of the North to find the solutions. 
Some large companies have systems of 
self-regulation. In the case of one highly 
reputable multi-national this takes the 
form of a statement of business prin­
ciples, combined with a letter, to be 
signed annually by every chief executive 
within the group. The letter states, inter 
alia, that: 
— 'neither the company nor its author­
ised representatives has been party to the 
offering, paying or receiving of bribes; 
— 'no payments have been made which 
knowingly violate the laws of the coun­
tries in which the company has operated : 
— 'no receipts or payments of, or derived 
from, company moneys or other assets 
have been either unrecorded or falsified 
when described in the relevant books and 
records and no other improper account­
ing practice has been adopted in the 
period under review'. 
Clearly it would be impossible for an 
honest chief executive to sign such a letter 
if his company had directly or indirectly 
been a party to grand corruption. The 
option of'preferring not to know' (or 'the 
ostrich syndrome') is closed. 
However, a system of voluntary self-
regulation cannot be sufficient to meet 
the present problem, as many companies 
would fear unequal competition if they 
committed themselves to it. Why should 
not such a declaration, combined with an 
appropriate audit certificate, become 
mandatory for all companies entering 
into contracts with the South? 
Ideally these provisions would be given 
the force of law throughout the North. It 
is strange that bribery, which is a criminal 
offence when committed in any of these 
countries, is not generally an offence 
within such a country if committed by 
one of its citizens outside his own 
country. The fact that the USA's 
courageous Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (1977) seems largely to have failed 
should not discredit the concept of 
effective legislation. If others had fol­
lowed the Americans' lead, the present 
picture might have been very different. 
The introduction of the necessary 
legislation would take some years but 
fortunately there is an alternative method 
of applying pressure to the sellers. A high 
proportion of major North/South trans­
actions are dependent on finance from a 
third party, ranging from export credits, 
through bilateral loans to loans and 
grants from multilateral agencies, of 
which the World Bank and its affiliates 
are much the most important. Why do 
not these financial agencies determine 
that, from a future date, any supplier who 
does not complete the necessary declar­
ation and provide the appropriate audit 
certificate will not be eligible to compete 
for contracts financed by them? This 
would have the great advantage of 
applying to companies of all national­
ities, whether or not national legislation 
was in place. There would doubtless be an 
outcry from some South countries which 
object to any form of conditionality; but 
what is wrong about a financial insti­
tution taking steps to see that its money is 
used for the intended purpose rather than 
being diverted to a private bank account? 
Grand corruption will not be easily 
eliminated, but the newly-formed Trans­
parency International believes that it can 
be greatly and beneficially reduced. If the 
task seems formidable, it may be worth 
recalling the words of the Anglo-Irish 
statesman. Edmund Burke: 'The only 
thing necessary for the triumph of evil is 
for eood men to do nothing.' G.M-S. 
The availability of bribes can seriously distort the decision-making process. When 
personal gain becomes a factor, all others pale into insignificance 
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On corruption 
Corruption, long the supposed 
province of the developing nations 
(which is no excuse for its forward 
progress), has suddenly surfaced, 
like an impetuous Etna, to plague 
the many democratic governments 
now prey to its scourge. But corrup­
tion is no newcomer to a modern 
world where finance dominates 
economics and politics, as Jean-
Claude Waquet « points out in a 
work on cupidity, morals and power 
in Florence in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. 
Part one begins with a detailed 
history of this phenomenon, in 
which it appears that the shortage of 
writing on corruption in France 
under the kings should not be taken 
to mean that there was no corrup­
tion. 'By no means,' Mr Waquet 
says. 'In the first half of the 17th 
century, under Henri IV and Louis-
XIII, office could be bought. Can­
didates not only bought the po­
sitions themselves, but may well also 
have bought the people who could 
help them get the jobs. The fact that 
this is passed over in silence reflects 
an approach to the writing of his­
tory, which recognises, but does not 
make a problem of, the existence of 
corruption.' 
Little has been written on corrup­
tion outside France either. How­
ever, from a long-standing body of 
research, Mr Waquet singles out the 
work of the German writer Jakob 
Van Klaveren, who has this to say : 
'Corruption is no more than the 
exploitation of public office in ac­
cordance with the laws of the 
market. Jobs become a particular 
form of enterprise, whose output is 
the public service and whose clien­
tele is those who are administered, 
and judges sell sentences just as 
government dignitaries sell places in 
the State apparatus.' This is fraud 
elevated into a system and it is 
indissociably linked to a particular 
stage of constitutional development. 
It depends, Mr Waquet maintains, 
on two important conditions being 
met, i.e. that the State organisation 
gives its employees considerable 
freedom of action and the system of 
norms is not such that civil servant? 
are specifically required to display 
integrity. Van Klaveren 's approach 
points us to an economic and there­
fore amoral definition of corrup­
tion, with corruption associated 
with the absence of centralisation 
and moral stringency which, he 
believes, prevails in some standard 
forms of organisation such as oligar­
chic republics and constitutional 
monarchies. 
But he believes that corruption is 
incompatible with democratic and 
despotic forms of government in 
which institutional change and 
threats of punishment combine to 
keep the civil servants in step. The 
British monarchy in the first half of 
the 17th century was, in his view, a 
good example of a corrupt regime 
involving great freedom for its 
1 Jean-Claude Waquet - De la corruption 
Librairie Arthème Fayard. Paris, France. 
employees and enormous permissi­
veness, he says. 
Today, 'studying corruption 
means first highlighting particular 
cases and gauging the harmful ef­
fects such disruptions have had 
upon the smooth running of the 
machinery of state and the wellbeing 
of the people it administers.' Mr 
Waquet says. Corruption was once a 
vice and the corrupt were dis­
honoured and chastised, but corrup­
tion now tends to be seen as a 
technical term used mainly to refer 
to malpractice by employees of the 
state. And the risks are higher now 
for those who try to combat it than 
for those who are guilty of it. This is 
the 'justice of the master,' the author 
says, in that corruption is no longer 
just infringement of the law, but 
means acts that may well be ini­
tiated, practised and covered up by 
people in high places. 
Mr Waquet's conclusion, basi­
cally, is this. 'The state is lo be seen 
in all its frailty here. It is by no 
means free to eliminate corruption 
unilaterally. It is the responsibility 
of the official authority to eradicate 
the evil, but not its responsibility 
alone. Public servants are involved 
too and they, ultimately, must 
imbue themselves with a sense both 
of wrong and of duly provided 
the example comes from the top, i.e. 
from the state. Corruption cannot 
be approached as either the hap­
hazard, insignificant outcome of 
events of varying degrees of serious­
ness, or a platform for a pointless 
declaration of the vices of those in 
power, or, finally, a setting in which 
social developments take their auto­
matic course and the individual 
disappears behind all-powerful 
structures.' 
And, he adds, corruption should 
not be thought of as an incurable 
disease either, for history teaches us 
that, between the late 18th century 
and the start of the 20th century, 
part of the world was won over to 
integrity.o L.P. 
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Dairy development 
in the Caribbean 
by Gerald PROVERBS * 
Before 1945, the development of agric­
ulture in the English-speaking Caribbean 
was based on the production of export 
crops for the UK market. This system 
saw the introduction of many crops 
including sugar, cotton, tobacco, cocoa, 
bananas and coffee as well as lesser-
known commodities such as spices 
(nutmeg, clove, etc.) root crops and 
pimento. 
Livestock production up to the 1920s 
was relatively insignificant except for 
oxen, mules and water buffalo, which 
were the beasts of burden ploughing the 
fields and hauling crops to the factories 
and export products to the ships. Milk 
and meat were produced in a haphazard 
manner. Meat was available when oxen 
were slaughtered because of age or illness. 
Similarly, only when excess milk was 
produced by the cows bred for bullock 
production was fresh milk available. 
However, the quantity of fresh milk could 
never be guaranteed for any length of 
time. 
Relatively little or no money was spent 
by the various commodity producer 
associations to further the development 
of animal agriculture and because of their 
influence on the colonial administrators 
there was little or no interest in establish­
ing a policy to assist in the development 
of food animal agriculture. Then, in 1938, 
the West India Royal Commission called 
for greater attention to be paid to the 
production of milk, meat, eggs and 
poultry to improve the nutritional status 
of the population of the West Indies. 
Agricultural Policy Committees were 
subsequently set up in individual coun­
tries. As a result, concerted efforts were 
started initially in Antigua, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad to develop animal agriculture 
further. 
The next major step was the establish­
ment of the Caribbean Research Council 
by the Anglo-American Caribbean Com­
mission in 1946. The Commission was 
made up of representatives of the then 
colonial powers in the Caribbean, includ­
ing the United States of America. Be­
tween 1940 and 1960, many programmes 
* Leader Animal Production Programme. 
were started, especially in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago and to a lesser 
extent in Barbados and Guyana to 
improve their dairy industries. These 
efforts were the foundation for the 
emergence of the progressive dairy indus­
try which saw milk production reach 
116 000 tonnes by 1990. 
Jamaica and Guyana together pro­
duced 63% or 73 000 t of regional pro­
duction for 1990. Even at this level, 
Carieom is only meeting 47% of its 
annual consumption. The remainder is 
met from imported powdered, condensed 
and evaporated milk. In 1989, the liquid 
milk equivalent of 248 1 of powdered milk 
and 13 000 t of condensed and evap­
orated milk was imported into the region. 
This clearly demonstrates that though the 
region has made dramatic strides in 
developing a dairy industry Carieom 
governments still rely on cheaper sub­
sidised milk products from the developed 
countries to feed many of their citizens. 
Independence for the Carieom coun­
tries began in the early to mid 1960s, at 
which time the responsibility for livestock 
policy shifted to the individual govern­
ments. However, before independence, 
many of the then colonies, especially the 
more developed ones, had established 
policies to put their fledgling dairy 
industries on a firmer footing in the 
expectation that, some time in the fore­
seeable future, the region would produce 
sufficient milk to meet the demands of its 
population in large part if not in full. As a 
result, the individual countries working 
in concert identified the constraints to 
building a sound dairy industry and then 
set about addressing these constraints 
through a set of discrete research and 
development activities. 
The constraints identified and given 
high priority status were: the develop­
ment of a dairy breed suitable for the 
prevailing tropical environment and tech­
nology level ; the introduction of artificial 
insemination to improve existing cow 
herds while the more long-term breed 
development project proceeded ; and the 
introduction, evaluation and distribution 
of improved tropical forages (grasses and 
legumes) on which a larger percentage of 
milk could be produced. 
Dairy breed development 
In the late 1940s, Dr P. Lecky started 
his historical work on developing the 
Jamaican Hope, which was declared a 
dairy breed in 1952. This work was 
beginning to show success when, in 1955, 
the Trinidad and Tobago Department of 
Agriculture invited Dr Lecky to Trinidad 
to advise on a breeding programme to 
produce a type of dairy cow that would be 
adapted to the climate, available forage 
and management skills. As a result of this 
consultation, the Department of Agricul­
ture embarked on the dairy-cattle cross­
breeding programme based on a Friesian-
Zebu cross. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, milk 
production increased and calving inter­
vals decreased both in Jamaica and in 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
Artificial insemination 
While the breeding programmes were 
going on in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago, it was decided that an artificial 
insemination (AI) service would comple­
ment the breeding programme. Up to 
that time, pure-bred bulls were routinely 
imported from the UK or the USA for 
natural service. In the early 1950s, an AI 
service was initiated in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago; Barbados and 
Guyana were next to follow, starting their 
service in the late 1950s. The AI service 
initially provided fresh extended semen 
on a daily basis throughout the countries. 
This programme proved to be extremely 
successful and the results satisfied all 
parties concerned. With this success, the 
policy makers readily adopted a move to 
using frozen semen. 
Consequently, in the 1960s, the AI 
service began in Jamaica using frozen 
semen imported from the USA and 
Canada. Soon after, Barbados and Trini­
dad and Tobago began importing semen 
from Canada and the UK. It was only in 
1987 that Guyana began using imported 
semen in its AI programme. 
Farmers quickly recognised the im­
provements they were obtaining in milk 
production from their upgraded cattle 
and so the demand for semen from 
quality Canadian and American Holstein 
bulls continued to grow. However, before 
the ecotypes developed by the cross­
breeding programme in Trinidad or the 
Jamaica Hope could be distributed to a 
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larger number of farmers, many of the 
regional governments decided that it was 
more appropriate to import pure-bred 
Holstein cattle from North America. 
Improving tropical forages 
Between 1920 and 1940, Jamaica 
looked at evaluating and selecting forages 
for dairy cattle production. Researchers 
found that Guinea grass (Panicum ma-
ximum) was preferred to Elephant grass 
(Pennisetum purpureum) for pasture and 
that Guinea corn (Sorghum valgåre) was 
better suited for silage than corn (Zea 
mays) or Guinea grass for silage. Then, in 
the late 1950s, pangóla grass (Digitaria 
decumbens) was introduced to the region. 
Because of its high palatability and 
positive response to nitrogen fertiliser, 
pangóla became the forage of choice for 
the region's dairy farmers. 
Fertiliser and dairy concentrates were 
inexpensive then, and farmers tended to 
ignore recommendations to try other 
grasses and legumes available from the 
various Ministries of Agriculture. How-
ever, in spite of the farmers' lack of 
interest in forages, work continued in 
Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trini-
dad. When fertiliser and dairy concen-
trate became considerably more expens-
ive in the 1970s, there were other grasses 
and legumes available to farmers for use 
in their forage systems. 
It was at this point that the Caribbean 
Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (CARDI) and the University of 
the West Indies (UWI) began to play a 
significant part in diversifying the forage 
base for milk production. By 1979, forage 
seed production and pasture establish-
ment had become the cornerstone of 
CARDI's Animal Production Prog-
ramme. This work was in large part 
funded by IDRC and the EDF under 
Lomé II. 
Importation of Holstein Cattle 
In an effort to increase milk production 
at a faster rate, regional governments, 
with aid from the various donor agencies, 
imported large numbers of pure-bred 
Canadian and American Holstein cows 
and pregnant heifers. Thousands of 
Holstein cattle arrived in Barbados. 
Guyana. Jamaica and Trinidad, to the 
delight of Caribbean dairy farmers. 
Between 1963 and 1973. Jamaica im-
ported 11 000 Holstein dairy cattle and. 
between 1961 and 1982. Trinidad im-
ported 7 500 dairy cows, most of which 
were Holsteins. Barbados imported over 
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700 Holsteins between 1967 and 1990 and 
Guyana imported over 1500 Holstein 
cows in the same period, the last group 
including 800 pregnant heifers. 
Caribbean governments began selling 
up small dairy units about the same time 
in their efforts to increase milk produc-
tion. Most of the cattle imported were 
destined for these farmers, who were led 
to believe thai they would overnight 
garner large profits by switching to the 
imported cattle. This was not to be the 
case. 
Many of the farmers sold their cross-
bred ecotypes and bought Holsteins. 
With their arrival, the farmers' problems 
increased; the cattle immediately showed 
severe intolerance to the tropical heat and 
humidity and susceptibility to tick fever, 
which resulted in deaths, abortions and 
depressed milk production. Lower nutr-
itional planes suitable to the Jamaica 
Hope and the other ecotypes prevented 
the Holsteins from reaching their milk 
production potential. Difficulties in get-
ting the cows re-bred resulted in extended 
calving intervals. 
The Governments of St Lucia and 
St Vincent, with donor funding, imported 
Friesians and Brown Swiss from the UK 
in the 1970s to establish dairy enterprises 
in their countries. Problems similar to 
those described above were experienced 
and lhe financial losses were very high. 
At no time during this period did any of 
the other Carieom governments seriously 
look to Jamaica as a source of a tropical 
breed of dairy calile lhe Jamaica 
Hope. It is indeed unfortunate that such 
vast sums of money have been spent 
importing large numbers of the main 
temperate breeds of dairy cattle over the 
past 25 years. During this time. Carieom 
dairy farmers could have become more 
efficient producers with Jamaica Hope 
cows in their herds. The Jamaica Hope is 
capable of producing 1700 litres of milk 
per hectare when fed 0.4 kg concent itile 
per litre of milk at a slocking rate of fiw 
cows per hectare. Such levels of produc-
tion have never been achieved by any ol' 
the temperate breeds even when sup-
ported with skilled intinti gement and high 
quality feed stuffs. 
What does the future hold ? 
It litis been suggested that Carieom 
countries should aim to provide a mi-
nimum of 570ml of milk per day for each 
child ol' school age. as well as each 
pregnant and nursing mother. If this 
nutritional target is to be met. dairy 
farmers should be producing over 412 
million litres of fresh milk now. Al the 
present time the region is producing less 
than 30% of its minimum requirements 
and continues to look to the industrial 
countries to provide the remainder. 
The current GATT agreements tire 
calling fora reduction in subsidies, which 
means that world prices of skimmed milk 
powder and bulter oil are expected to 
increase significantly since producer sub-
sidies on milk in the US and EC are in 
excess of 60%. This creates a major 
opportunity for the region's dairy indus-
tries to expand. G.P. 
Technical Centre for Agricultural 
Postal address: I'.O.B. 38(1 
and Rural Cooperation (CTA). "de Rietkampen 
6700 A.I \\ aj;i'nin};in. The Netherlands. Tel.: (0) 
... Galvanistraat 9. 6716 Α Π P.de 
8380 60400 Telex 30169 
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La France et l'Afrique, Vademecum pour 
un nouveau voyage (France and Africa, 
Guide for a new journey). Compiled by 
Serge Michäilof; Karthala, Paris, 1993 
This collection, ' which sets out the 
conclusions of a working party formed at 
the request of Edwige Avice, France's 
former Minister of Cooperation, was 
produced under the direction of Serge 
Michaïlof, the head of various agencies of 
the Caisse Française de Développement 
over the past 10 years and a consultant to 
a large number of organisations, includ­
ing the World Bank, in more than 30 
countries in the South before that. His 
books include 'Les apprentis sorciers du 
développement (Sorcerer's Apprentices 
of Development; Editions Economica, 
Paris, 2nd edition, 1988) and a practical 
guide to project analysis, which he co-
wrote with Manuel Bridier (also Editions 
Economica, Paris, 4th edition, 1987). 
Mieux aider le Sud and Pour un nouveau 
dialogue avec l'Afrique, two associations 
with no ideological or political affili­
ations, were reluctant to see the fruits of 
the working party lost and decided to 
carry on the work of the independent 
personalities — from very different ho­
rizons, but all familiar with Africa — who 
had been involved in it. This book is the 
result. It goes beyond specific analyses of 
France-Africa relations and looks at 
general issues. Is Africa on the verge of 
the abyss? With industrial failure, ag­
rarian crisis and educational collapse to 
cope with, is aid not overlooking the 
poorest members of society? Is the 
structural adjustment they are supposed 
to need just make-believe? Is regional 
integration just another fad? The conclu­
sion is a plea for a different sort of 
cooperation. 
Is Africa doomed? 
The general feeling is that Africa is not 
doomed and that, although it may not 
have any outstanding comparative ad­
vantages, it is not saddled with un­
avoidable disadvantages either. 
1 The book is the work of Serge Michaïlof and 37 
others — 13 representatives of development insti­
tutions (primarily the Caisse Française de Dévelop­
pement), 11 university teachers and research workers, 
six consultants, two representatives of the private 
sector and two from NGO's, plus a soldier, a 
journalist, a civil servant and a former minister. 
The usual, despairing explanations of 
Africa's economic crisis, however, are 
pronounced unconvincing, partly be­
cause any analysis of the efficiency or 
inefficiency of African institutions is 
inevitably bound up with an historical 
and socio-political analysis of the nature 
of economic and political power and the 
aims and strategies of the dominant 
groups in the state. 
Here, the domestic constraints include 
unearned income, discussed by Jacques 
Giri, and mechanisms which represent a 
pitfall for economic development, dis­
cussed by A. Bonnessian. 
Serge Michaïlof points out that 'there 
are excellent African managers who make 
a fine job of running western firms and 
can give a clear picture of everything that 
prevents them from doing the same in 
Africa'. One historical explanation for 
this could be that these are economies in 
which people have always had incomes 
which they do not have to earn and feel 
that it is better to go for unearned income 
than boost productivity. Although un­
earned income is beginning to be a thing 
of the past, the economic set-up is still the 
same and adjustment destabilises by 
threatening the domestic accumulation-
redistribution machinery which is often 
at the heart of the local internal balance. 
The search for the mechanisms which 
have been and still are a pitfall as far as 
economic development is concerned 
starts with the historical assessment 
according to which the economic and 
political systems of the post-colonial 
world continued with and perfected the 
colonial economy, thus condemning it in 
a competitive world. This made economic 
production and diversification a prob­
lem, particularly once the trade sectors 
became profitable in the 1970s. 
Mr Bonnessian outlines the five main 
pitfalls as situations in which : 
— newly independent systems relied on 
tribes which were close to the colonial 
population and therefore geared to 
administration, so an opposition grew up 
amongst tribes which were keen on trade 
and industry and the tribes which held the 
power wanted to create an economy 
which they themselves controlled; 
— the laws which developed were geared 
to exceptions and everything not ex­
plicitly allowed was banned and every 
ban included derogations which could be 
bought; 
— domestic savings were systematically 
discouraged by the relative lack of returns 
outside the unearned income sectors and 
by constraints on productive activity : 
— an average capital drain of more than 
60% of the total amount of foreign 
capital entering the country; 
— this had led to a conservative, patro­
nising, anti-liberal social structure. 
Yet there are models for successful 
emergence from underdevelopment el­
sewhere. The Asian successes are proof 
that it can be done if people are willing to 
adapt to others and do not wait for others 
to adapt to them. 
Robert Hirsh takes the palm oil and 
rubber industries as illustration of the 
fact that, ultimately, what distinguishes 
the countries of Asia from the countries 
of Africa is the way they interpret the 
world market. The Asians see it as a 
system of regulation to which they always 
have to adjust, while the Africans all too 
often see it as the cause of their problems 
— even if those problems have been 
brought about by their own policies. 
How can the African crisis be overcome? 
First of all, the state and the economy 
have to be separate. 'Public' has to stop 
meaning 'State' and the welfare state, an 
unrealistic concept for Africa today, has 
to give way to a state which lays down the 
rules of the game and allows independent 
operators to meet the fundamental needs 
of society. 
Serge Michaïlof suggests that crying 
for better terms of trade will not provide a 
way out of the crisis. Greater competi­
tiveness is the only answer. 
In their analysis of agricultural export 
industries, Michel Griffon and Isabelle 
Marty emphasise the fact that there is no 
practical hope of any lasting reversal of 
the trend in the prices of agricultural raw 
materials. And competition between pro­
ducers threatens the viability of agree­
ments designed to control supply. So 
gradual, systematic adjustment of the 
export sectors is the realistic choice. 
There is no practical hope of restrain­
ing price fluctuation either, so the coun­
tries have to make their industries flexible 
enough to cushion price shocks. They 
also say that, in the present state of the 
market, countries which systematically 
use the exchange rate as an instrument of 
adjustment are also those whose agricul­
tural income is declining. 
The Courier no. 140— July-August 1993  95 Other contributors discuss whether 
competitiveness should be restored by 
adjusting real terms — i.e. squeezing 
production costs until African businesses 
can compete again — or monetary terms. 
But they all stress that it would be wrong 
to overlook the benefits of devaluation in 
situations where it is impossible to 
compress domestic costs which strongly 
affect competitiveness. And not devalu­
ing means that none of the benefits of 
position need be held up to question. 
Some people feel that boosting the 
competitiveness of businesses also — and 
necessarily — means taking direct steps 
to rationalise production and improve 
the productivity of the factors. 
There are political considerations here 
too. Mr Bonnessian analyses the am­
biguity of recent democratic movements, 
in which he sees ethnic challenging of 
unequal power-sharing as often emana­
ting from the most productive groups in 
society. Ethnic rivalry is also economic 
rivalvy, for access to money is at stake. 
Those who raise challenges may have two 
contradictory aims — replacing the 
previous regime and turning the same 
predatory system to their own ends or 
changing the rules of the game to make 
economic initiative the road to fortune. 
Only the latter is compatible with de­
velopment. 
Where will economic growth come from? 
Regional integration, exports to the 
world market or domestic and essentially 
urban demand? 
Brazil's and Mexico's experience of 
industrial policy has led Claude Sicarol to 
attach greater priority to looking for 
export activity than to setting up big 
regional units. Others point out that, even 
if people in bad faith suggest that regional 
integration exists on a defacto if not de 
jure basis, it is more essential now than 
ever it was for states to cooperate with 
each other, particularly given that fron­
tiers are permeable. 
Conversely, and with some degree of 
innovation, Michel Griffon, Isabelle 
Marty and Jean-Marie Cour point to the 
role of domestic needs and urban demand 
especially, maintaining that the growth of 
domestic demand should in future do 
more for economic growth in general 
than for exports. Why? 
Assumptions about the growth of 
external outlets and prices are not en­
couraging, while domestic demand pro­
spects are linked to the rapid growth and 
solvency of the urban population. Ex­
perience suggests that urban demand 
does indeed bring growth in its wake, 
because, provided the economic activities 
of the town can absorb new arrivals at a 
steady rate, there is a long period during 
which there is no increase in the relative 
poverty of poor urban social categories. 
Jean-Marie Cour has no hesitation in 
saying that the main driving force behind 
sustained and sustainable growth is 
urbanisation. The stimulus is in fact the 
regional demand for money (other than 
home consumption) and the best service a 
country can do for its farmers is to find 
them solvent customers — mainly city-
dwellers. 
Little may be known about the trends 
in real inter-African trade, but 5-7% 
long-term growth is there for all to see, he 
points out. Urbanisation is the main 
driving force behind the growth and 
diversification of private spending. The 
total average per capita spending is two or 
three times as high in the town as in the 
country and the outlay in terms of cash is 
three or four times as high. The need to 
spend more is what powers the growth of 
productivity and of migrants' incomes. In 
some conditions, the permanent system 
of urbanisation resulting from relatively 
stable rates of migration makes the 
economy grow faster than the popu­
lation. 
He has no hesitation either in counter­
ing the demographic projections of the 
countries and international institutions 
which systematically assume net mig­
ratory flows of nil or rapidly approaching 
nil. Population redistribution, he says, 
has to be considered as a form of 
continent- or world-wide accumulation 
of capital. 
Aid — quantity or quality? 
Serge Michaïlof claims that, when it 
comes to aid, quantity is not so important 
as quality. The abundant resources sho­
wered on Africa in the 1970s did nothing 
to facilitate economic upswing and the 
ODA target of 0.7% of GNP is not 
significant, he says, if only because it 
includes the cost of wiping out the debts 
and, therefore, the weight of all the 
mistakes of the past. In particular, the 
total amount of (non-project) aid for 
adjustment should be considerably re­
duced to the benefit of targeted aid for 
particular sectors. 
Jean-François Bayart has something to 
say about structural adjustment too. In 
his eyes, the continuation of programmes 
authorises the multilateral institutions to 
pay back to themselves the loans which 
they have very liberally granted to poten­
tially insolvent debtors. 
Jean Hanoi notes satisfactory develop­
ment as far as the financial indicators are 
concerned, but still no economic growth. 
The real economy runs from the con­
sequences of the financial austerity cures 
and tax nostrums prescribed by the 
funders. And it all leads to a distortion of 
procedures and a system of condition 
management, with the funders pretend­
ing that the state is a better pupil than the 
facts suggest and the state is seeming to 
apply the letter rather than the spirit of 
the criteria of implementation. 
Elliot Berg's more general claim is that 
there is too much aid in too many 
countries of Africa and that too much of 
it is tied. 'Less aid and less donor 
interference in economic and political 
affairs are what is wanted from now on.' 
Why? Because aid shrinks the political 
will to undertake reforms and prevents 
responsible policies, because it reduces 
the need to make vital choices. 
* * 
This book is vital to anyone wanting a 
proper understanding of relations be­
tween France and Africa and relations in 
Africa itself. Not all of it breaks new 
ground, but some of the associations of 
ideas are particularly instructive. We 
have not attempted to cover it all in this 
article, but simply to look at one or two 
aspects of what is a comprehensive, 
multi-faceted work swarming with ideas 
and free of all allegiance. Some readers 
will see in it a discussion of the patronage 
of French cooperation while others will 
find evidence of a vast interest in the 
CFAF zone in Jones Dowe's article 'Free 
for all in CFAF City'.o 
Dominique DAVID 
ooo 
Continued on inside back cover 
96 NEWS ROUND-UP 
THE CONVENTION AT WORK 
Barbados: ECU 250 000 for the Bar­
bados National Development Found­
ation. 
EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
Following favourable opinions from 
the EDF Committee, the Commission 
has decided to provide grants and special 
loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to 
finance the following operations: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Nigeria: ECU 10.5m for a telecom­
munications maintenance training pro­
gramme designed to improve NITEL's 
upkeep of its technical facilities. 
Rwanda: ECU 9.92m to rehabilitate 
and extend drinking water supplies in 
East Bugesera, with a public distribution 
system catering for domestic needs and 
animals in Gashora and Kanzenze. 
Burkina Faso: ECU 7.1m to supply 
electricity in three towns (Diebougou, 
Kongoussi and Nounao) as well as 
drinking water in Diebougou. The power 
supply should help to raise the standard 
of living, make small traders more dy­
namic and improve the efficiency of 
productive activities, such as market 
gardening. 
Kenya: ECU 1.97m for the St Austin-
Kabete road. The aim is to halt the 
deterioriation of the road so that traffic 
can continue unimpeded. This stretch of 
7.5 km, to the west of Nairobi on the 
Northern Corridor, links up with two 
other road projects recently financed by 
the EC — the Westlands-St Austin and 
Kabete-Limuru sections. 
TRADE PROMOTION/ 
STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT 
Trinidad and Tobago: ECU 9.7m to 
support the structural adjustment pro­
gramme and implement a general import 
programme. The structural adjustment 
programme which the Government has 
been undertaking since 1983 was stepped 
up with the change of government in 
1987. The new administration which took 
over in December 1991 is continuing with 
the economic reforms. 
Tanzania: ECU 55 million as specific 
resources for structural adjustment. 
All ACPs: ECU 40 million (global 
commitment authorisation) to finance, 
using the expedited procedure, technical 
cooperation operations and schemes to 
develop trade and services, including 
tourism, in the ACPs and OCTs. 
ENTERPRISE 
Jamaica: ECU 7 million (ECU 6.1 
million in loans and ECU 900,000 in 
grants) for a credit programme for small 
and micro-businesses, to cover 9% of the 
annual demand in this sector. This will 
help to boost the volume and accessibility 
of credit. 
Guyana: ECU 250 000 to develop 
credit facilities for SMEs. 
HEALTH 
Namibia: ECU 13.5m for an integrated 
health programme to improve the man­
agement of the financial and adminis­
trative infrastructure and run health 
projects in each of the country's four 
regions. 
Senegal: ECU 1.7m to support the 
second phase of the national AIDS 
control campaign. 
Uganda: ECU 20m for a health pro­
gramme. 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
Portuguese-speaking countries of 
Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea 
Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and 
Principe: ECU 3.5m to train some 900 
middle-ranking statisticians. 
Sierra Leone: ECU 1.9m to support 
the central accounts department. 
Zambia: ECU 1.85m for a services 
support programme. 
Mauritania: ECU 1.562m for insti­
tutional support for the Ministry of 
Planning. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Congo : ECU 200 000 as support for 
the legislative elections which are ex­
pected to take place soon. 
Malawi : ECU 1 998 254 as assistance 
for refugees. 
Senegal: ECU 22.5m for the St Louis 
regional development programme. 
Burundi: ECU 1.95m to support the 
electoral process in the final phase of 
démocratisation, embarked upon by the 
Burundi Government with the recog­
nition of the international community. 
SADC countries: ECU 5 million for a 
regional training programme to help 
improve food security in the Southern 
African Development Community area 
at national, regional and SADC level and 
to support moves aimed at increasing 
agricultural output and reducing poverty. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT BANK 
New support for private sector 
The European Investment Bank has 
signed the first agreements with five 
European Community financial insti­
tutions for financing equity and quasi-
equity participation in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the 
ACP countries. The funds will be drawn 
from a total ECU 15 million made 
available from risk capital resources 
provided for under the fourth Lomé 
Convention. 
The financial intermediaries partici­
pating in this financing scheme are 
initially limited to one per Member State. 
Agreements have been signed with the 
Commonwealth Development Corpor­
ation (CDC) in the United Kingdom, the 
Compañía Española de financiación del 
Desarrollo (COFIDES) in Spain, the 
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwick­
lungsgesellschaft (DEG) in Germany, the 
Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschap-
pij voor Ontwikkelingslanden (FMO) in 
the Netherlands and the Société de 
Promotion et de Participation pour la 
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Coopération Economique (PROPA­
RCO) in France. A further three agree­
ments are expected to be signed shortly. 
Loans 
The EIB has made the following loans : 
Jamaica: ECU 9m for extending and 
upgrading Jamaica's power transmission 
facilities. The loan is for the installation 
of two new 69 kV lines (totalling 16.4 km 
overhead and 1.7 km underground) and 
for the reconductoring of an existing 
69 kV line of 8.3 km. The works are part 
of a wider energy programme scheduled 
for completion by the end of 1995. Costed 
at ECU 150m, the programme is co-
financed with the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and other 
public and private sector financial insti­
tutions. 
Barbados: ECU 10m for works to 
protect the environment on the south 
coast of the island. The loan agreement 
was signed by Sir Brian Unwin on his first 
day as the new EIB President, and 
Erskine Sandiford, the Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance and Economic 
Affairs of Barbados. 
The funds from the EIB are made 
available to the Government of Barbados 
under the fourth Lomé Convention, and 
are to be on-lent to the Barbados Water 
Authority, a public company responsible 
for the management, allocation and 
monitoring of the island's water re­
sources. This is the largest loan ever made 
by the EIB in Barbados, where total EIB 
financing to date amounts to ECU 25.4m. 
and civil unrest in the northern parts of 
the country, had to be backed up by a 
greater effort for the Tuareg people who 
lived there. 
President Konaré and the Commission 
representatives also had a frank exchange 
of views on the political and economic 
situation in western Africa and the 
continent as a whole. This featured 
African integration issues, particularly 
Community support for the Senegal 
River Valley Development Organisation 
and Community cooperation in the 
forthcoming negotiations of the second 
Lomé IV financial protocol. 
EEC-Mali cooperation under the first 
financial protocol was going well. Mali 
had ECU 136 million in grants under the 
indicative programme (1990-94Ì as well 
as structural adjustment support allo­
cations which, to date, were worth ECU 
40 million. There had also been financial 
assistance amounting to some ECU 
800 000 from Community aid counter­
part funds to help run the elections. 
President Alpha Outnar Konaré of Mali 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
VISIT 
Jacques Delors, the President of the 
Commission, and Manuel Marin, the 
Commissoner responsible for develop­
ment and humanitarian aid, met Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, the President of Mali, in 
Brussels on 2 June. 
They discussed Mali's prospects and 
the political and economic constraints 
facing the new democratic regime which 
took power following the elections in 
1991 and 1992. 
Political change had indeed to go hand 
in hand with economic reform, and the 
application of the National Pact, which 
put an end to a long period of problems 
EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL 
COOPERATION 
Over the past two months, the Com­
munity has, within the framework of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
expressed its views on various inter­
national events. These include the follow­
ing: 
29 April: 
Statement on Togo 
The Community and its Member 
States have taken note of the timetable 
for elections proposed by the Togolese 
authorities. They do, however, feel that it 
will be not be possible to conduct a 
successful electoral process in Togo 
unless prior agreement has been reached 
between all political forces, given lhe-
tense situation which has prevailed there 
for many months. 
These elections should really be held in 
a climate of peace and openness, and lhe 
inhabitants of Lomé who have lieti 
should be able to participate. 
17 May 
Statement on Togo 
The Community and its Member 
States regret that the political forces in 
Togo have not so far been able to reach 
an agreement making possible the re­
sumption of a free and open electoral 
process in a climate of renewed peace. 
NEWS ROUND-UP NEWS ROUND-UP 
The Community and its Member 
States think that the holding of elections 
. in the present situation would not allow 
the people of Togo to exercise their 
freedom of choice. 
The Community and its Member 
States would not, therefore, be able to 
help in organising the poll or to send 
observers during the elections. 
17 May 
Statement on Chad 
The Community and its Member 
States are deeply concerned at the recent 
events which have occurred in the south 
of Chad where members of the army have 
committed serious violations of human 
rights. They especially deplore the fact 
that civilians have fallen victim to these 
human rights violations. 
They strongly urge the Chad author­
ities to take all necessary steps to restore 
order and security in the country. They 
also urge the Chad authorities to imple­
ment further measures to prevent human 
rights violations based on the findings of 
the investigation commission into these 
events. 
The Community and its Member 
States believe that it is necessary to 
establish a climate of peace and security 
in order to achieve the objectives of 
greater democracy in Chad announced by 
the National Conference, the holding of 
which is welcomed by the EC, and they 
call upon the government and all political 
forces to facilitate dialogue and collabor­
ation which are indispensible in this 
connection. 
2 June 
Statement on Malawi 
The Community and its Member 
States have followed closely develop­
ments in Malawi since the announcement 
of the referendum to decide whether 
Malawi should maintain the existing 
single-party system or adopt a multi­
party system. 
The Community and its Member 
States were pleased to note that many of 
the suggestions put forward by the 
United Nations concerning the conduct 
of the referendum have been adopted, 
even though some key recommendations 
were resisted until a late stage in the 
referendum timetable. 
The Community and its Member 
States feel bound to draw the attention of 
the Malawi Government to certain im­
portant areas of concern. There are 
numerous reports of harassment and 
intimidation in various forms: physical 
maltreatment of individual multi-party 
advocates, obstruction, and cancellation 
of meetings. It is worrying that no 
responsible government representatives 
have made any public effort to restrain, 
for example, the activities of the Malawi 
Young Pioneers. Another concern is that 
the advocates of multi-party democracy 
have been denied satisfactory coverage of 
their views on the Government-con­
trolled media, particularly radio, as 
foreseen in the Regulations for the 
referendum. 
In light of the above, the Community 
and its Member States believe that the 
Malawi authorities have failed to reach 
acceptable standards of democratic cam­
paigning, thus calling into question their 
commitment to increased respect for 
human rights. Such action could lead 
international opinion to the conclusion 
that the referendum did not take place in 
a free and fair climate. 
Nevertheless, the Community and its 
Member States are encouraged by the 
fact that advocates of both systems of 
government have now committed them­
selves to continued participation in the 
referendum process. For this reason, the 
Community and its Member States are 
providing international observers and 
financial support for the referendum. For 
this support to be maintained it is 
imperative that the remaining part of the 
campaign takes place under circum­
stances that permit the true views of the 
Malawi people to be reflected in the vote. 
Finally, the Community and its 
Member States recall that respect for 
human rights and for the rules of good 
governance remain the necessary con­
ditions for the resumption of normal 
cooperation. 
(The people of Malawi have since 
voted by a clear majority in favour of a 
multi-party system). 
8 June : 
Statement on Somalia 
The Community and its Member 
States express their deep concern over the 
events in Mogadishu in recent days and 
condemn without reservation the pre­
meditated killing and wounding of Pakis­
tani soldiers who were conducting a 
weapons verification inspection with 
UNOSOM II. They express their regret 
and sympathy to the people and Govern­
ment of Pakistan, and especially to the 
families of those who lost their lives. 
The Community and its Member 
States reiterate their full support for the 
United Nations in its efforts to bring 
peace and stability to Somalia. They look 
forward to the publication of the Se­
cretary-General's enquiry into the recent 
incident and the role of the factional 
leaders involved. 
The Community and its Member 
States call on all Somali parties, move­
ments and factions to respect the 
ceasefire, to comply with the agreements 
on political reconciliation they entered 
into in Addis Ababa in March and to 
cooperate fully with UNOSOM II so that 
it can fulfil its essential humanitarian 
mandate. 
9 June : 
Statement on Burundi 
The Community and its Member 
States welcome the good conduct of the 
presidential elections in Burundi on 
1 June 1993. They express the hope that 
the outcome of these elections will be 
respected by all the parties concerned. 
They trust that the President-elect and the 
Government which emerge from the free 
and democratic parliamentary elections 
scheduled for 29 June will continue along 
the path to démocratisation and re­
conciliation embarked upon by President 
Buyoya. 
25 June: 
Statement on Nigeria 
The Community and its Member 
States deplore the arbitrary decision of 
the Nigerian military government to 
annul the Nigerian presidential election, 
suspend the National Electoral Commis­
sion and thereby stop the promised 
transition to civilian rule. Reports from 
international observers suggest that the 
elections gave Nigerians a fair and 
adequate chance to express their choice 
for a democratically elected civilian 
government. 
The Community and its Member 
States have consistently supported the 
programme for a return to democratic 
civilian rule, and had expected this 
process to be completed and power to be 
handed over to a democratic civilian 
government by 27 August. The Com­
munity and its Member States call upon 
the Nigerian authorities to reconsider 
their decision to annul the election. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
Independence 
for Eritrea 
The people of Eritrea voted almost 
unanimously in favour of independence 
on 23-25 April 1993 and, on 24 May, the 
flag of independent Eritrea was raised at a 
moving ceremony before a proud and 
enthusiastic populace. After 30 years of 
war, the 52nd state of Africa was born. 
Three heads of state General Ahmed 
Al-Beshir of Sudan, Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon of Djibouti and Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia — were there, in addition to a 
large contingent of representatives from 
the Community Member States and other 
countries. The Ethiopian head of state's 
speech on the future of cooperation 
between his country and Eritrea was very 
warmly welcomed and the crowds were 
moved by his account of the painful 
experience of war and the need for 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to join together to 
build a future of peace and progress. The 
Presidents of Sudan and Djibouti stressed 
their relations with the new state and their 
keenness for cooperation with it, includ­
ing at regional level. 
Eritrean President Issaias Afwerki 
responded with interesting details of the 
tasks which lay ahead and emphasised the 
promising prospects for reconstruction, 
démocratisation (a four-year period of 
transition) and, of course, the future 
cooperation with Ethiopia. 
Giovanni Livi, the EC Commission's 
Director for Eastern^ and Southern 
Africa, presented the Commission's good 
wishes to the new president and his team. 
On the international front, both the 
OAU and the UN said that Eritrea would 
be admitted to their organisations as 
speedily as possible. The new country 
appears to want to establish good re­
lations with its neighbours, without 
depending on certain Arab countries. The 
goodwill was mutual as far as joining the 
Lomé Convention was concerned and 
Eritrea had already applied to accede to 
the ACP's Georgetown Agreement. 
EMERGENCY AID 
Rwanda: ECU 3m as emergency aid 
towards programmes of assistance oper­
ated by humanitarian organisations for 
the victims of armed conflict. 
Sudan: Aid for displaced persons in 
southern Sudan. 
The EC Commission has decided to 
allocate ECU 300 000-worth of emer­
gency aid to refugees in southern Sudan, 
to be targeted at some 35 000 displaced 
persons in Ashwa, in the Eastern Equator 
province. 
The people involved, who came from 
Kongor, Bor and Bahr el Ghazal, fled 
from the Khartoum Government's off­
ensive against the Sudan People's Liber­
ation Army, which began in the spring of 
last year. Many of them had only re­
turned from Ethiopian camps in 1991. 
They are suffering from severe malnutr­
ition and their camps lack sanitary 
facilities and basic medical provision. 
ECHO, the European Community 
Humanitarian Office, is to have the 
French NGO Action Internationale 
Contre la Faim (AICF) as its operational 
partner in this scheme. The Community 
aid consists of 60 000 t of skimmed milk 
powder and 60 000 t of oil (Unimix and 
sugar to be supplied by UNICEF), as well 
as medicines, medical equipment and 
sanitary facilities. A medical-nutritional 
programme for children is to be provided 
in addition. It involves running a nutr­
itional survey and setting up four feeding 
centres which can supply food of a 
medical-nutritional nature, if necessary. 
Violent fighting between the different 
ethnic groups has prevented food and 
humanitarian aid from international 
sources from reaching its destination in 
Sudan for the last four months. The 
emergency aid had, in fact, been planned 
for 1992, but the AICF had to ask for 
delivery to be postponed because of 
security problems in the area. 
In 1992-93, the Commission sent some 
240 000 t of food aid to Sudan as well as 
ECU 6m to pay for the aid to be 
transported into the Interior of the 
country. A further ECU 4m was provided 
in non-food emergency aid over the stime 
period of which ECU 2.2m-worth went lo 
the southern part of the country, where 
delivery has proved to be extremely 
difficult. 
There are currently seven other Com­
munity emergency medical assistance 
operations under way in southern Sudan 
(involving, in particular, Médecins sans 
Frontières, Save the Children, the AICF 
and the CCM). Between them, these are 
worth a total of ECU 1 335 000. 
FOOD AID 
On 14 April, the Commission took decisions to provide the following sums for 
storage and early warning schemes. 
Nicaragua: ECU 94 600 through CARITAS 
Kenya: ECU 323 544 through UNHCR 
On 20 April, the Commission took a decision to provide food aid, as set out in the 
chart which follows : 
Country/ 
Organisation 
Lesotho 
Mauritania 
NGOs 
UN RW A 
ICRC 
Cereals 
(t) 
10 000 
5 000 
100 000 
8 000 
60 000 
Milk powder 
(t) 
9 000 
700 
Sugar 
(0 
1 200 
1 000 
Vegetable 
oils (t) 
5 000 
700 
5 000 
Other producís 
ECU m 
6.0 
1.7 
3.0 
The total value of these schemes is an estimated ECU 90 311 000. 
On 19 May, the Commission took a decision to provide food aid as set out in the 
chart which follows : 
Country 
Mozambique 
Ecuador 
Cereals 
(t) 
114 500 
1 700 
Milk powder 
(t) 
927 
180 
Butter oil 
(t) 
105 
Sugar 
0) 
466 
Vegetable 
oils (t) 
3 000 
180 
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"Caribbean Spedar 
From April 23rd to 25th in Port of Spain (Trinidad & Tobago), the CDI organized the first pro-
fessional meeting on non-metal minerals in the Caribbean. This successful initiative highlight-
ed the experience accumulated by the CDI in this field and provided practical confirmation 
that the Centre's new sectoral and regional approach is already functioning smoothly. The CDI 
delegation also visited projects receiving the Centre's assistance in several countries in the re-
gion. This edition of Partnership is therefore devoted to a special file on the Caribbean, review-
ing the CDI's action in three sectors chosen for priority interventions in this area : non-metal 
minerals, agri-foodstuffs and the wood and wood product industry. 
The CDI's sectoral strategy 
"LEVERAGE AT REGIONAL LEVEL" 
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Back from the important mission he led 
to the Caribbean in April 1993, Mr Paul 
Frix, Director of the CDI, analyses the 
sectoral initiatives taken by the Centre to 
exploit the region's industrial possibilities 
and to meet the expectations of local 
companies. 
W
hat overall conclusions can be 
drawn from the "non-metal miner-
als" meeting organized by the CDI 
in the Caribbean ? 
Mr Paul Frix : The high level of atten-
dance by industrialists and economic op-
erators in the region, which exceeded our 
anticipations, indicates the interest 
aroused by this CDI initiative. In three 
days, over twelve projects eligible for 
support from the CDI were identified, 
which is a considerable achievement. 
Some of these projects are also particular-
ly interesting from a regional point of 
view because they involve trade and inte-
gration possibilities between different 
countries, some of them having certain 
raw materials, others having energy re-
sources. During visits to Trinidadian 
companies already successfully assisted 
by the CDI, the participants, both Euro-
peans and those from other countries in 
the region, were able to make a first-hand 
appraisal of the potentials in this sector 
and the support possibilities offered by 
the CDI. 
These meetings follow on from the ses-
sions organized by the CDI in Mauritania 
in December 1992 for the ßshing industry. 
What is the Centre's particular strategy 
in organizing these kinds of professional 
contacts ? 
Mr Paul Frix : What must be underlined is 
the fact that in the case of the Caribbean 
the integration measures pursued by the 
Centre are both sectoral and regional in 
nature. The CDI adopted a coherent ap-
proach to the sector's prospects in each 
country, so as to identify concrete devel-
opment possibilities; it then mobilized Eu-
ropean partners in the sector, who made 
the journey to talk to ACP entrepreneurs 
on the spot. This formula allows us to car-
ry out evaluation or promotion activities 
common to several of these small coun-
tries, which are in fairly similar situations 
- whereas otherwise their modest size 
makes it difficult to justify extensive indi-
vidual operations. This approach not only 
generates economies of scale but also has 
a leverage effect on the region as a whole. 
Another essential benefit gained from the 
seminar was that it drew attention to all 
the different forms of assistance which the 
CDI can offer in the Caribbean. The Trini-
dad & Tobago authorities and local finan-
cial institutions revealed their interest in 
setting up a support structure for compa-
ny management and development, to 
channel on a regional scale the concrete 
support made available to local industries 
by the Centre. This kind of project is in 
CDI Director Mr Paul Frix at the conclusion of the Port of Spain 
Meetings. Capitalising beller on lhe experience accumulateli in 
certain sectors and improving lhe dissemination of lhe results 
keeping with the analyses conducted on 
the reform of our antennae system : you 
cannot work in the same way in the Carib-
bean as in large African countries, for ex-
ample. It is necessary to find procedures 
and approaches suited to the geographical 
and economic situation of each area. 
In conclusion, the measures taken by the 
CDI at sectoral level are beginning to 
move into gear and produce results : they 
make it possible not only to avoid spread-
ing out our efforts too thinly but also to 
capitalize on the experience acquired in 
certain sectors by applying this experi-
ence more effectively in various regions 
to which it can be objectively transposed. Caribbean: non-metal minerals 
A PROFESSIONAL MEETING 
FOR AN EXEMPLARY SECTOR 
The Caribbean archipelago is particularly well endowed with non-metal mineral resources, 
and several islands have substantial deposits of excellent quality (*). These riches can be 
exploited not only to satisfy regional demand but also to sell on export markets, well within 
the reach of local operators. The three days in Port of Spain, which brought together 18 
European enterprises and 54 companies, financial institutions and promotional bodies from 
the region, were organized with four objectives in mind : evaluating resources, markets and 
specific constraints and, of course, generating new projects and partnerships. All with very 
positive results. 
Family porti 
T
his professional meeting for the 
whole of the Caribbean was the logi­
cal consequence of the successes 
achieved by the CDI in its support for the 
priority development programme for 
non-metal minerals, introduced back in 
1989 by the government of Trinidad & 
Tobago. Four workshops were set up to 
enable the participants to debate the sec­
tor's attributes in detail, together with its 
current weaknesses and the remedies to 
be applied. 
1. Evaluating resources 
The first round-table discussion high­
lighted the need for a more systematic 
evaluation of resources at regional level, 
from both the quantita­
tive and qualitative 
points of view. In spite 
of the existence of natu­
ral resources in the re­
gion and sometimes in 
their own country, a 
good many entrepren­
eurs in the Caribbean, 
who often do not know 
each other, import their 
raw materials from out­
side the area. In Port of 
Spain, the pooling of 
information, often for 
the first time, on the 
potentials in different 
countries has allowed 
significant progress to 
be made in this connec­
tion. One company in 
Barbados, for instance, 
which used to import 
crushed limestone from 
the United States, has 
now decided to obtain 
its supplies from Jamai­
ca, whilst Trinidad & Tobago abrasives 
have found new outlets in Jamaica. 
Obviously, exploiting indigenous non-
metal minerals would allow imports to be 
replaced to a large extent. The secretariat 
of the Carieom (Caribbean Community) is 
already considering carrying out a global 
evaluation of the sector in the region, and 
the CDI and several economic promotion 
institutions in Port of Spain have said that 
they are prepared to contribute towards 
this initiative. The participants also called 
for the creation of a sectoral liaison com­
mittee represented in each Carieom coun­
try to promote synergies in the develop­
ment of their activities. 
Non-metal minerals constitute a varied 
family, including sand and silica, lime­
stone, clay, china clay and feldspar, baux­
ite (of which Jamaica and Surinam are the 
world's second and eighth largest produc­
ers respectively) and gypsum. Whilst then-
most common outlets are in the building 
industry (excluding bauxite), they are also 
used in the manufacture of many sophisti-
cated products such as electrical insula-
tors, paints and pesticides, PVC, steel, 
paper, glass, etc. 
2. Identifying markets 
In the non-metal minerals sector, most of 
the efforts by the local authorities and the 
CDI have so far been focused on the de­
velopment of products which are relative­
ly basic and therefore have a limited val­
ue added (see "Processing on the spot" 
article, p. 3), mainly intended to meet the 
demand on the local or regional market. 
Various studies, notably those by Profes­
sor Jan Baeyens of Leuven University 
(Belgium), an expert associated with the 
CDI who has extensive experience in the 
region and enjoys the 
trust of local entrepren­
eurs, have however 
brought to light a prom­
ising development op­
portunity : the frequent­
ly superior quality of the 
minerals available in the 
region (marble in the 
Dominican Republic, 
limestone in Jamaica, 
china clay in Guyana, 
pozzuolana in Antigua, 
etc.), would justify selec­
tive extraction and more 
advanced processing on 
the spot, with a view to 
finished products of 
greater value that can be 
sold on the world mar­
ket. 
The participants were 
also favourably im­
pressed by the visit to 
The Carribbean archipelago (NB. three countries belonging to the zone and located on the coasts of the Central 
and South American mainland are not shown on this map. These are Belize (to the west), and Guyana and 
Surinam (situated to the south-east of this map)  (*) See inset : "Family Portrait" Caribbean: non-metal minerals 
Trinidadian companies having already 
embarked upon this path with the help of 
the CDI, such as Coosal's Construction 
Cy or Sand Products Ltd (see inset P.4). 
They were able to observe on the spot 
that companies can make rapid and sub­
stantial improvements to their industrial 
installations, their production and their 
turnover. "However", emphasizes Profes­
sor Baeyens, "given their geographical and, 
therefore, geological limitations, these coun-
tries will never be able to achieve a determi-
nant position on these markets : consequently, 
their investments must be carefully calculated 
with a view to attaining competitiveness on a 
medium scale. But with the high potential in 
terms of available outlets, these resources 
could be profitably exploited and products 
with a higher value added developed within a 
very short period of time". 
3. Overcoming specific 
constraints 
The major constraint holding back the 
competitiveness of products from the 
minerals sector in the Caribbean is the 
dissuasive cost and poor organization of 
freight (infrequent and excessively slow 
sea transport, and harbour installations 
unsuited to bulk transhipments). Taken in 
isolation, the small volumes shipped by 
each company make transport costs an in­
tolerable burden from the point of view of 
exporting. Consequently, one of the major 
benefits reaped from the excellent con­
tacts established during the seminar was 
without any doubt the elaboration by pri­
vate entrepreneurs of a project to create a 
regional consortium through which they 
could not only group together their mari­
time shipments but also pool their mar­
keting efforts. 
4. Contribution by 
European partners 
For the European participants, this meet­
ing in Port of Spain enabled them to as­
sess the sectoral potential in the region 
and the possibilities of technical and com­
mercial partnerships with local entrepren­
eurs. "If the simplest way for ACP entrepren-
eurs is to set up a joint venture with an exist-
ing company which can provide all the neces-
sary services, a preliminary stage could be 
that of seeking out a technical partnership -
During a workshop led by 
Professor Jan Bayens, a 
CD1 associate expert (1st 
on the left) 
"Ressources can be ex-
ploited and higher value 
added products developed on 
a very rapid Innescale" 
Processing on the spot for export 
^\&?&> malenah 
Finished ^**N^^ 
product value ^">N¿ 
LEVEL 1 
2-10USS/T 
LEVEL 2 
10-50 USS/T 
LEVEL 3 
50-300USS/T 
LEVEL 4 
>500US$/T 
SILICA-SANDS 
Extraction 
Raw and screened 
material 
Drying, sizing, 
dedustsing, 
bagging 
Abrasives, 
Silica flour 
Processing 
Refractory boards 
(incl. other minerals), 
Lime-silica bricks 
Sanita ryware 
(+ imported resins) 
Silicium Carbide * 
Glass (hollow, sheet...) * 
LIMESTONE-DOLOMITE 
Extraction 
Crushed, screened 
raw aggregates 
Selective extraction 
Chemical grade limestone, 
Marble, 
Micronisation, 
Soil amendment, 
Flux for steel, 
Asphalt filler 
Processing 
Marble products, 
Lime+ hydrate, 
Pozzuolana cement 
Organic calcium salts, 
PCC (precipitated calcium 
carbonate), 
CaOCl2 (calcium 
hypochloride) 
CLAYS 
Extraction 
Raw clay 
Préparation, kiln 
Bricks / blocks 
Processing 
Ceramic tiles 
Ornemental 
earth ware, 
Expanded clay, 
Porcelan 
* Only feasible on a large scale (not in the Caribbean) 
NB : These three raw materials are also the basic constituents of cement 
The table above gives a classification of of this sector. Extraction companies, in the 
non-metal mineral products, prepared by absence of a proper evaluation of their re-
the CDI to evaluate the industrial devel- sources and appropriate technologies, 
opment potentials of three important and sometimes used to offer minerals of excel-
abundant raw materials in the Caribbean : lent quality but mixed in the form of 
sand and silica, limestone and clay. It is cheap aggregates or ballast for road build-
based on a subdivision into four levels ac- ing. With the help of the CDI, they have 
cording to the value of the finished prod- now been able to introduce a more ad-
ucts on the local and world markets. vaneed policy of selective extraction and 
processing, as is the case in Trinidad with 
At present, local production is almost ex- Coosal's Construction Cy or Sand Prod-
clusively at levels 1 and 2, with a relative- ucts Ltd (see profile on p. 4). 
ly low value added. Marketing is limited 
to domestic outlets, with a modest pro- Following the successes achieved, the CDI 
portion of regional trade. The support now wants to encourage, whenever pos-
provided by the CDI has so far essentially sible, the development of level 3 and 4 
concerned the development and improve- productions with a high value added, for 
ment of products of this type, so as gradu- which there are interesting potential nich-
ally to establish the sound industrial foun- es on the regional or even extra-regional 
dations essential for the future expansion markets, Caribbean: non-metal minerals 
with the support of the CDI - that could sub-
sequently include marketing support, before 
finally establishing a joint venture proper", 
argued Mr G. Davies, Managing Director 
of Ash-Tec Engineering (UK) - a partner 
company in three CDI-assisted projects -
in his presentation to the seminar. It must 
also be underlined that local engineering 
is of a very high quality and a plant can 
be largely constructed in the region's 
own workshops on the basis of drawings 
and specifications provided by the tech-
nical partner. 
Twelve new projects 
Apart from the sectoral and structural ad-
vances that we have just detailed, these 
meetings also led to the spontaneous 
emergence of twelve projects involving 
Euro-Caribbean partnerships, a remark-
able achievement for the first get-together 
of this kind. These projects will receive 
aid from the CDI, whilst other potential 
partnerships are also being studied. In 
fact, these exchanges have had a substan-
tial multiplier effect : many companies 
not present at the seminar have since 
shown a great interest in the dynamics 
generated there, and the CDI is consider-
ing ways and means of following up and 
consolidating the results of the operation 
by organizing "mini-workshops" focus-
ing on the strong points to be developed 
in certain countries, such as marble in the 
Dominican Republic. 
Sand Products Ltd - Trinidad & Tobago 
Profile of a successful diversification exercise 
The Sand Products production facilities 
More complex products, generating a high added value and foreign currency earnings 
Sand Product Ltd, a family concern based 
in San Fernando, is a good example of the 
progress that can be made in the non-
metal minerals sector in the Caribbean. 
Until 1991, SP produced abrasives and ag-
gregates for the local building industry. 
When CDI technical assistance was first 
provided in 1991, following a complete di-
agnostic study on the production unit, im-
provements to the sand drier allowed ca-
pacity to be increased by over 30%. A se-
ries of tests then demonstrated that it was 
possible to develop the crushing of lime-
stone, silica and bentonite. The technical 
recommendations made by the CDI expert 
then served as terms of reference for the 
establishment, with assistance from the 
Centre, of a technical partnership with the 
British firm Ash-Tec Engineering, which 
drew up the plans and specifications for 
this diversification and advised SP execu-
tives on acquiring part of the additional 
equipment required from Europe (fans, 
valves, motors, bagging machine, etc.), in-
cluding second-hand machinery for recon-
ditioning. The metal structures themselves 
were provided by local suppliers, allow-
ing savings of over 60% to be made on the 
cost of a turnkey plant. 
Following this investment, SP now pro-
duces crushed limestone (an additive used 
in feedingstuffs in particular), a complete-
ly dust-free abrasive - an unrivalled prod-
uct in the region - and silica-based insulat-
ing panels. It is hoped to begin producing 
crushed silica, used in oil drilling and de-
tergents, sometime this year. All these 
products, being much more elaborate, 
generate a high value added and foreign 
exchange earnings, thanks to export out-
lets. 
To find out more, 
Further information on the meeting in 
Port of Spain (details of the participants, 
final report, etc.) can be obtained from the 
CDI by contacting : 
♦ Mr G. Tatepo, Officer for the Caribbe-
an, Projects and ACP Network Division. 
Mr J.-M. Delchambre, Head of the 
Interventions and EC Network Division. 
In the non-metal minerals sector, the CDI 
has several technical and economic stud-
ies available on appropriate technologies 
for ACP entrepreneurs and on European 
technological offers for sand and aggre-
gate, silica bricks and blocks, abrasives, 
pozzuolanic cement, stabilized earth 
blocks, etc. 
The CDI and the non-metal minerals sector in the Caribbean 
Of 30 projects assisted by the CDI in 1992 
in this region (including Belize, Guyana 
and Surinam), a third were in the non-
metal minerals sector (1). The assistance 
provided embraced four diagnostic stud-
ies (upgrading installations) and feasibil-
ity studies (for increased production and 
diversification), assistance to enable four 
local entrepreneurs to travel to Europe 
(search for technical partners and second-
hand machinery, visits to factories) and 
two cases of technical assistance (improv-
ing quality, increasing production and di-
versification). 
Of these 10 projects, 8 are in Trinidad & 
Tobago, where the effects are now being 
felt of the dynamics generated by the in-
dustrial priority given to this sector by the 
local authorities. An integrated develop-
ment programme, assisted by the CDI 
from the initial study stage, is aimed at re-
ducing imports of raw materials, stepping 
up exports and creating jobs. It has high-
lighted the island's potential in the extrac-
tion and on-site processing of limestone, 
sand, silica and clay. 
(1) As opposed to only 15% of all CDI interventions in 
ACP countries, which reflects the importance of this 
activity for the region. Caribbean 
ON THE SIDELINES OF THE MEETING 
French overseas departments 
in the front line for 
Euro-Caribbean cooperation 
T
he CDI delegation made use of 
the trip to the Caribbean to take 
stock of the region's specific eco-
nomic and geographical features. "The 
Caribbean is traditionally polarized towards 
America - which also makes it a particularly 
interesting platform for European investors 
wishing to move into this continent - but its 
trade links and industrial relations with Eu-
rope are undeveloped", indicates Mr Paul 
Frix, Director of the CDI. "However, there 
is a European market close at hand : the 
French overseas departments of Guadeloupe 
and Martinique. There is a potential for 
trade between these countries and this dis-
tant part of the European Community, but 
the local operators do not really know how to 
tackle the problem. The CDI could play its 
interface role here by, for instance, establish-
ing links for closer cooperation with existing 
economic and industrial promotion institu-
tions in the French overseas departments, 
along the lines of the agreements that we 
have with several European regions to en-
courage EC-ACP partnerships. This is a 
broad avenue to be explored and we would 
never have been able to identify it without 
visiting the area". 
Textiles : the next regional 
priority for the CDI f 
Í
n addition to non-metal minerals, agri-
foodstuffs and wood, the Centre is also 
currently examining the possibility of 
adopting the textile industry as the fourth 
front for its interventions in the region. 
There are numerous very active textile 
companies in the area - especially in 
sportswear and leisure wear - and this sec-
tor is regarded as a priority development 
field by many countries. For instance, the 
Jamaican government has just adopted its 
"Target Europe" programme, to which the 
EC has allocated a support budget of 3 mil-
lion ECU, designed to encourage adapta-
tion of supplies and the marketing of Ja-
maican products on the new Single Euro-
pean Market. The CDI hopes to make good 
use of the extensive experience that it has 
acquired in this field in Burundi, Madagas-
car and Mauritius. 
First steps towards a CDI link-up in the Caribbean 
" iMEHB 
PORT OF SPÄH IHM m πτί 
T
o review the positive results of 
the non-metal minerals profes­
sional meeting in Port of Spain 
and the action now to be taken in this re­
spect, Dr Lenny Saith, Minister for Plan­
ning and Development of Trinidad & 
Tobago (on the left), who chaired the 
opening meeting, received Mr R. An­
drews (in the centre) and Mr P. Frix (on 
the right), respectively member of the 
Joint Executive Board and Director of 
the CDI. The Minister was also keen to 
see the CDI develop its assistance in oth­
er fields, especially through 
the creation of a local compa­
ny support structure whose 
interventions could possibly 
take on a regional dimension. 
The CDI representatives also 
discussed this matter with 
Mr G.M. Pemberton, Manag­
ing Director of Development 
Finance Ltd (DFL), and sev­
eral of his colleagues. DFL, a 
Trinidadian development in­
stitution which has the EIB 
(EC), the DEG (Germany) 
and the CDC (UK) among its 
shareholders, is ready to con­
tact other local and regional 
financial institutions that 
may be interested in joining in the crea­
tion, with CDI assistance, of a company 
support organization covering the 
whole region. The Centre may also be 
able to involve European cooperation 
agencies in the project, which could be 
quickly launched on modest but directly 
operational bases. For his part, the rep­
resentative of the Commission of the Eu­
ropean Communities in Trinidad & To­
bago, Mr E. Perez Porras, said that he 
was very interested in this initiative. 
Belize : two CDI evaluation missions 
W
ithin the framework of the 
CDI's mission to the Caribbean, 
Mr P. Keene and Mr O. Perez 
Diaz attended the Conference on Invest­
ment organized in Belize City by the Bel­
ize Chamber of Commerce on April 28th 
and 29th 1993. They seized this opportu­
nity to present to an audience of local in­
dustrialists the different possibilities of­
fered by the CDI and the European Com­
munity's development policy in general. 
In effect, the CDI's services are relatively 
underused in this country of 190,000 in­
habitants. The Centre therefore took the 
initiative of arranging for two project 
evaluation missions in Belize in June. The 
first mission concerns the timber indus­
try, which has considerable potential in 
this country : although Belize and Guyana 
are the only two ACP countries in the re­
gion with substantial resources of this 
raw material, the processing industry is 
virtually non-existent there, whilst a 
number of Caribbean countries with little 
timber of their own have developed ex­
tremely dynamic furniture manufacturing 
industries. The other mission will exam­
ine the expansion possibilities of compa­
nies processing fishery products (espe­
cially lobsters and prawns). The third 
promising sector in the view of the CDI is 
fruit juice manufacture : Belize is one of 
the rare Carieom countries to have an in­
dustry producing concentrates to make 
fruit juices, but unlike several of its neigh­
bours it manufactures little fruit juice of 
its own, thus missing out on a chance to 
develop export markets. Caribbean: wood and wood product industry 
PROSPECTS RIPE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
Mahogany, teak, pine, bamboo, rattan, ce-
dar, rubber trees : some Caribbean countries 
- Guyana, Belize, Surinam and Trinidad ■ 
abound in tropical timber species of high 
quality. Generally speaking, the region offers 
substantial possibilities for industrial timber 
processing, but these are largely underused. 
A sectoral study carried out in 1991 for the 
Eastern Caribbean States Export Develop-
ment Agency (ECSEDA) and financed by 
the CDI opens up significant future pros-
pects for the timber processing and furniture 
manufacturing industries in the countries of 
the OECS
 
(1). As an extension to this analy-
sis, a three-year assistance programme for a 
dozen companies is currently under negotia-
tion, for a total amount of 1.8 million ECU, 
which could be financed mainly by the resi-
due from the Lomé III regional programme. 
Needless to say, the CDI would be prepared 
to provide its customary range of assistance 
in this connection. 
For the other countries, there are three 
companies in particular which have recently 
implemented or are about to introduce sub-
stantial expansion/diversification pro-
grammes with the help of the CDI. 
(1) Organization of Eastern Caribbean States : Antigua, 
St Vincent, St Kilts, Grenada, St Lucia and Dominica. 
Heirloom Furniture Co Ltd -
Jamaica: a new European 
partner and client 
H
eirloom Furniture Co Ltd 
(HFCL) in Kingston is a company 
manufacturing wooden furniture 
which in 1991 had a turnover of 720,000 
ECU on the regional market and in the 
United States. It supplies furniture to ho-
tels in the Caribbean in particular. Direct-
ly employing 132 workers, the company 
lins a skilled staff and excellent equip-
ment, manufacturing products with a 
A classic style item of furniture produced by Heirloom 
Furniture (Jamaica) 
A fruitful commercial and technical partnership with an Irish 
company 
quality finish. On the other hand, produc-
tivity is still low and production planning 
requires substantial rationalization. 
At the beginning of 1992, the CDI commis-
sioned n consultant to seek out potential 
EC partners interested in technical or com-
mercial cooperation or in acquiring a hold-
ing in the company. The consultant identi-
fied an Irish firm, Castlebrook Crafts, for 
which HFCL now makes reproductions of 
fine old furniture in mahogany. Excellent 
commercial and technical cooperation has 
been established between the two compa-
nies, and the CD1 has just provided HFCL 
with assistance on the technical and mar-
keting aspects, so as to enable it to cope 
with this further expansion. 
Precision Wood Working Ltd-
Guyana : diagnosis for 
expansion 
A
ctive since 1985 in a country with 
substantial forestry resources, the 
family concern Precision Wood Working 
Ltd (PWW) employed 76 workers in 1991 
for a turnover of 416,000 ECU, of which 
82% was exported to neighbouring coun-
tries and the United States. Using local 
raw materials, it produces household, ex-
terior and office furniture and furniture 
parts. The company wished to introduce 
an extension programme and therefore 
needed an in-depth expert appraisal of its 
production capacities. The CDI, which had 
already provided the company with start-
up and marketing assistance, commis-
sioned the Irish consultancy firm Vernon 
& Associates to carrv out an audit in 1992. 
Toucan Match Co Ltd - Belize: 
revival thanks to second-hand 
equipment 
I intervention bv the CD1 helped the family 
firm Toucan Match Co. Ltd (TMC), specializ-
ing in the manufacture ol matches for Ilio lo 
cal market, to find o way out ot ,i dilemma 
with which it had been faced since the SOs : 
whether to struggle on u ith low performance 
equipment, especially from the point ot view 
of quality consistency, which limited its po-
tential and compromised is profitability, oi-
to make modernization investments estimat-
ed at 1.5 million ECU, the excessive amortiza-
tion on which - given the size ol the domestic 
market - had prevented the company from 
tinding any source ot financing. 
In 1991, therefore, the CD1 selected a German 
consultancy firm, LM Matchconsult, to seek 
out reliable second-hand equipment meeting 
the needs of TMC
 
m. LM Matchconsult found 
the necessary machinery in Germany ami 
Brazil, which allowed the cost to be brought 
down to about a third of the brand-new price. 
This equipment was acquired by Toucan 
Match thanks to a loan granted by a private 
bank in Belize. In 1992 and 1993, a CDI tech-
nical assistance programme enabled lhe ma-
chinery to be installed and brought into ser-
vice and the staff to be trained lo operale il 
Even before finalization of the operation, pro-
duction at TMC, which today employs 42 
people, had risen from 3,000 to 30,000 boxes 
of matches a day and it should reach 120,000 
boxes when fully on-stream. 
(1) The cost ol Ihis mission, 30,1)00 ECU, was shared between 
the ('DI and BMZ Itile Germen Ministry lor Cwnemlhm). 
The production line at Toucan Match (Belize) 
Equipment costs slashed by two-thirds Caribbean : Agri-foodstuffs 
CREATING AN INDUSTRY 
FROM A BY-PRODUCT 
The nutmeg tree, which originally 
came from Indonesia, is highly prized 
for the flavour of its fruit's kernel, the 
nutmeg. Today, this spice constitutes 
the main economic resource of Grena-
da and its population of 82,000. But re-
cently, the flesh of the fruit, a sub-
stance neglected so far, has become the 
star of a new agri-foodstuffs business 
offering original products of exception-
al quality and with a high value added. 
The spearhead of this expansion is the 
liquor "La Grenade", a drink with its 
roots in tradition. 
"■ TT ntil 1989, Sibyle La Grenade, like 
■ ■ many of her compatriots, made a 
wA range of products based on the 
nutmeg fruit (jam, jelly, syrup) in her 
small family company. But the firm was 
also the fortunate heir to the secret formu-
la for the nutmeg liquor "La Grenade", 
passed down from generation to genera-
tion within the family since 1773
 
(1). 
Industrializing tradition : 
a delicate operation 
The company's total output, for its whole 
range - then 3,000 litres a year - was sold 
on the domestic market, where it had an 
excellent reputation. But with constantly 
growing demand, the La Grenade family 
decided to move on to manufacturing on 
a semi-industrial scale and founded De 
La Grenade Industrie Ltd (DLGI). The 
CD1, interested in these plans to create an 
outlet for an agri-foodstuff with a very 
high value added using a raw material -
the pericarp of the nutmeg - that is abun-
dant but generally regarded as waste with 
no commercial value, co-financed techni-
cal assistance by two consultants to im-
plement the project to modernize the 
DLGI (selection and installation of equip-
ment, recommendations on manufactur-
ing processes, organization of supplies, 
product formulation, etc.). "Changing over 
from small-scale to semi-industrial scale man-
ufacturing, whilst safeguarding the natural 
qualities, originality and flavour behind the 
product's success, poses delicate and complex 
In the first quarter of 1993, the turnover in "Morne Délice" products was twice that 
for the whole of 1992 
problems", underlines Mr Paul Chotard, 
CDI Technical Resources Officer. 
Keen marketing acumen 
The operation was a resounding success : 
the investment of 450,000 ECU now al-
lows the new company to produce 45,000 
litres a year, for a turnover of 900,000 
ECU, of "which 800,000 ECU is exported to 
the other countries in the region. The 
products, situated at the top of the range, 
are enjoying considerable success 
throughout the Caribbean. "1 zoas very im-
pressed by the marketing acumen of the people 
running the company", reports Mr Jean-
Marie Delchambre, Head of the CDI's 
Interventions and EC Network Division, 
From the fruit of the nutmeg tree is extracted the kernel -
the nutmeg - and the red husk around the kernel (mace, an-
other highly appreciated spice). Until now, the pericarp was 
used only for jam-making by housewives or small cottage 
industries 
who is just back from a 
visit to the island. "They 
have introduced a very dy-
namic strategy taking ad-
vantage of the presence of 
numerous tourists to en-
courage them to discover 
and appreciate the brand, 
called "Monte Délice", so 
that when it is distributed 
in their country it will al-
ready have a positive image : 
guided visits to the new fac-
tory, which even has a small 
museum, promotional pack-
aging in the form of sam-
ples of the whole range in 
very attractive wicker bas-
kets, distribution of individ-
ual portions, with a full-
colour leaflet describing their numerous uses, 
in hotels and soon on certain airlines, etc". 
A pioneer setting a trend 
In April 1993, the CDI financed the com-
pany's participation in the International 
Food & Drink Expo (IFE) in London. Sev-
eral major distributors showed an interest 
in the "Morne Délice" range, but it also 
emerged that launching a new product on 
these highly competitive and saturated 
markets requires solid publicity logistics 
currently beyond the reach of the DLGI. 
The CDI is therefore going to direct its fu-
ture assistance towards the search for a 
European commercial partner capable of 
ensuring that the brand penetrates these 
markets. 
The development of the project is not 
threatened in any way by this obstacle, 
however, because the dynamism of the 
DLGI - today headed by Dr Cécile La Gre-
nade - has generated such an increase in 
demand on the regional market that the 
company has no difficulty in disposing of 
its production. Last, but by no means 
least, the DLGI experience is now being 
copied by several small-scale companies 
in the country, which are busy improving 
their own nutmeg-based products and 
preparing to move on to industrial manu-
facture. 
(1) Date on which a Dutch missionary gave it to Captain 
Louis Ln Grenad« in exchange for a passage on his boat. In Brief 
CDI NETWORK 
New sectoral 
professional meetings 
♦ From June 21st to 25th 1993 in Mombasa 
(Kenya), the CDI organized professional 
meetings for the fishing industry in East 
Africa, bringing together entrepreneurs in 
the region operating in this field and Europe-
an companies interested or already involved 
in partnerships. We shall give details of the 
results of this seminar in the next edition of 
Partnership. 
* In October 1993 in Dakar (Senegal), the 
CDI is also to organize professional meet-
ings for the animal and poultry feed indus-
try in West Africa. 
For further information, contaci the CDI, Mr 
Paul Chotard, Technical Resources Officer, 
Interventions and EC Network Division. 
CDI News 
♦ On May 5th 1993 in Châlons-sur-Marne, 
the IRCOD - the regional development coop-
eration institute of the Champagne-
Ardennes region (France) - organized an in-
formation session on support and partner-
ship instruments for companies in the region 
and Mediterranean and ACP partners. The 
session was also attended by the Caisse 
française de développement (ex-CCCE) and 
PROPARCO, UNIDO (United Nations Industrial De-
velopment Organization), the EClP (Cheysson fadlities 
- European Commission) and the CDI, represented by 
Mr F. Matos Rosa, the Centre's Officer for European 
Relations. 
* A seminar on interventions by the European Devel-
opment Fund was organized in Milan by the ICE (Ital-
ian Foreign Trade Institute) on the occasion of BORI-
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Partnerships between companies 
in the South of France and in ACP countries 
From May 11th to 14th 1993 in Marseilles (France), the ADEC1 - the 
regional association for the development of international industrial 
cooperation in the Provence, Alpes and Côte d'Azur region - and the 
CDI organized inter-firm meetings at which 9 African entrepreneurs 
(whose travel costs had been financed by the CDD were able to meet 
industrialists from the region and representatives of the Caisse 
française de développement (CFD, formerly the CCCE), together with 
CDI representatives Mr Matos Rosa, Officer for European Relations, 
and Mrs Mary Jane Caudron and Mr H. Sow, Geographical Officers. 
The main results obtained from these meetings : 8 technical, commer-
cial or financial partnership agreements signed and financial aid 
worth some 500,000 ECU under negotiation with the CFD and the 
CD1. The African promoters came from Madagascar, Benin, Burundi, 
Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, and the proposed partnerships 
concern agri-foodstuffs, paper, optics, bicycles and diving-suits. (On 
the photo: ACP and EC promoters, representatives of ADECI and EC 
cooperation bodies, and Mr Matos Rosa of CDI -2nd from right) 
President of Proexca, a particularly dynamic 
body responsible for the external economic 
promotion of the archipelago, signed a 
cooperation agreement with Mr Paul Frix, 
Director of the CDI. Proexca aims to 
increase the role ol the Canary Islands in 
connecting the European Community and 
Africa, with which it has very closo con-
tacts. The priority sectors are fishing, agri-
foodstuffs and building materials. Within 
Proexca, Mr A. Bravo will be given respon-
sibility for relations with the CD1. Two sem-
inars have been held in Las Palmas and 
Tenerife, under the sponsorship of the 
Board for Industry, Foreign Trade and Con-
sumption run by the Canary Islands gov-
ernment. Attended by three hundred peo-
ple, these seminars presented the EC aid in-
struments which could be used by Canary 
Islands companies to develop their relations 
with the outside world and especially with 
the ACP countries. 
Coordinating and 
managing the CDI 
agreements in Spain and 
Germany 
TEC 1993 (International cooperation, development 
and investment exchange), held within the frame-
work of the Milan Fair. The seminar was directed by 
Mr S. Pappalardo of the Italian Foreign Trade 
Ministry, Mrs A.M. Sommaruga, of the ICE, and Mr 
F. Cupini of the European Commission. During the 
meeting, which was attended by around 60 people, 
Mr A. Armani and Mr P. Baldan of the CDI presented 
the concept of the industrial partnership and details 
on intervention by the CDI. 
♦ A Euromeeting Forum for the marble sector took 
place in Carrara, Tuscany (Italy), on May 24th and 
25th 1993. Designed to promote the internationaliza-
tion of European companies in this sector, this initia-
tive involved the ICE (Italian Foreign Trade Institute), 
the European Commission and the CDI, represented 
by Mr P. Baldan of the CD1 European Relations Unit, 
who spoke to the European producers present on the 
mandate and intervention procedures of the CDI. 
New cooperation agreement 
between the CDI and 
PROEXCA (Canary Islands) 
During a CDI mission to the Canaries (Spain) from 
April 11th to 24th 1993, Mr F. Bergasa Perdomo, 
♦ The first meeting of the Committee for the 
guidance and monitoring of intervention 
programmes jointly implemented by the 
CDI and Spanish institutions was held in 
Brussels on May 18th 1993. The CDI Directo-
rate and representatives of the five Spanish 
institutions that have signed cooperation agree-
ments with the Centre - ICEX at national level and 
COPCA (Catalonia), IFA (Andalusia), PROEXCA 
(Canary Islands) and SPRI (Basque Provinces) - re-
viewed the operations in course and the action pro-
gramme proposals for 1993/1994. Mr F. Aceña was 
appointed as the expert responsible for overseeing 
CDI cooperation agreements with Spain. He will be 
based at the ICEX. This full-time national expert fi-
nanced by the ICEX and the CDI will work 
extensively with companies, and will procure a 
standard approach to the preparation of dossiers, a 
clearer understanding of CDI procedures and na-
tional mechanisms for the co-financing of interven-
tions and, finally, better utilization of the interven-
tion capacity of Spanish institutions. 
♦ Another meeting within the context of the guid-
ance and monitoring of joint intervention pro-
grammes took place in Cologne (Germany) on May 
25th 1993, with the DEG, Africa Verein, the BMZ, 
GTZ/PROTRADE and UNIDO/IPS. As well as ex-
amining the different interventions and the opera-
tional programme, the meeting also appointed Mr 
H. Nuffer as the expert in charge of relations with 
the CDI in Germany. Mr Nuffer will be based in the 
DEG offices. Operational 
Summary 
No. 75 —July 1993 
(position as at 8 July 1993) 
EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EEC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EEC since 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (priorto financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.) ; 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to : : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
G 12 4-14 
200. rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
The Courier no. 140 — July-August 1993 DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE 
A1 Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2Ai Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3E Conservation and extension 
A3F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B Industrial development banks 
A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
A5D Export promotion 
A5E Trade, commerce and distribution 
A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous-
ing) 
A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog-
raphy 
A5H Other insurance and banking 
A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
A6 Education 
A6A Primary and secondary education 
A6B University and higher technical institutes 
A6BÍ Medical 
A6C Teacher training 
A6CÌ Agricultural training 
A6D Vocational and technical training 
A6E Educational administration 
A6F Pure or general research 
A6G Scientific documentation 
A6H Research in the field of education or training 
A6I Subsidiary services 
A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
A7 Health 
A7A Hospitals and clinics 
A7B Maternal and child care 
A7C Family planning and population-related 
research 
A7D Other medical and dental services 
A7E Public health administration 
A7F Medical insurance programmes 
A8 Social infrastructure and social wel-
fare 
A8A Housing, urban and rural 
A8B Community development and facilities 
A8C Environmental sanitation 
A8D Labour 
A8E Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
A8F Environmental protection 
A8G Flood control 
A8H Land settlement 
A8I Cultural activities 
A9 Multisector 
A9A River development 
A9B Regional development projects 
A10 Unspecified 
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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Rehabilitation national roads in the 
South-West region: Namibe-Serra da 
Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Construction. 18.5 imECU. Road rehabili-
tation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG A2d 
mECU. New tracks, construction of adminis-
trative office quarters and accommodation. 
Supply of equipment (earthmoving — trac-
tors — 4x4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
BAHAMAS 
Queens Highway, Long Island. Re-
habilitation of the road. Estimated cost 4.800 
mECU. EDF part 3.860 mECU. Worksbyacc. 
tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing September 93. 7thEDF. 
EDF BM 7001 A2d 
BARBADOS 
Hospitality Studies Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. 
2.75 mECU. Construction of Tourism Train-
Ik· ing Centre-cum-Hotel and T.A. Project in 
execution.6th EDF. 
EDF BAR 6006 A5c 
National Development Foundation. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. National Devpt. Foundation. 
0.250 mECU. Loans to SME, equipments, 
* training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BAR 7102 A6ci, d 
BELIZE 
Community Development Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social 
Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation 
study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF BEL 6002 A6b 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
Support programme to the health 
policy. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 
11.846 mECU. Rehabilitation of the health 
infrastructure, supply of equipment, medi-
cines and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7002 A7a 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
— General Import Programme — // 
1993-1994. Estimated cost 15.700 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing September 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7200 A1c 
BOTSWANA 
Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks. (DWNP). 6.800 
BURKINA FASO 
Water resources development pro-
gramme in the South-West. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau, Estimated total 
cost 15 mECU. Drillings, water supplies, 
water points, hand pumps, vehicles, various 
equipments, T.A. for works supervision and 
programme implementation. Training. Pro-
ject in execution. 5th and 7th EDF 
EDF BK 6020 A2b, A3c 
Douna Plain development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de 
l'Elevage. 2.050 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 
0.050 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6005/7002 A3a 
Electrification of 3 secondary urban 
centres. Resp. Auth.: SONABEL — Soc. 
Nat. d'Electr. 7.100 mECU. Power centre 
and distribution network in Diébougou, 
Kongussi, Nouna. Works, supplies and T.A. 
• for supervision and control. Date finan-
cing May 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7001 A2ai 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modem earthroad. Super-
vision : short-list to be done. Estimated cost 
18.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
Support programme to S.M.E's. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, du 
Commerce et des Mines. Estimated cost 
10.520 mECU. Investments, agencies, T.A. 
and training, line of credit. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF B K 7006 A4.A5 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 38 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-
up. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF B K 7200 A1c 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural— Livestock. Estimated cost 
10 mECU. Works for production, supply of 
equipments, T.A., training. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF B K 7008 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Cereals. Estimated cost 
12.500 mECU. Support for institutional 
reform, works, supply of equipments, T.A., 
lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7009 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Environment. Estimated 
cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, 
soil management and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7010 A3a 
Project to place solar equipments in 
the Provinces of Sourou, Yatenga and 
Passoré. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Eau. 2 
mECU. Water supplies, works, wells, T.A. 
Date financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6001 A3a 
Institutional Support to develop the 
Bagré region (610 ha). EDF part 2 mECU 
for T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7011 A3a 
BURUNDI 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Elimination 
of conf lictual sources between the game and 
population. Make the game accessible to the 
tourism. Works, supplies, T.A., training and 
awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-entrepr-
ises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare tech-
nical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
CAMEROON 
Rural development programme in 
the Logone and Chari. Resp. Auth.: 
Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolid-
ation and extension of existing actions. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6013 A3a 
Rural development poles: Saantui, 
Sang melima, Bafut. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tères de l'Agriculture et du Plan et de 
l'Aménagement du Territoire. Total es-
timated cost 14.625 mECU. EDF 10.300 
mECU, local 4.325 mECU. Strengthening of 
the monitoring structures, improvement and 
extension of basic socio-economic infra-
structures, training, education, populariz-
ation of rural development, health. Works: 
tracks, buildings; supplies for civil works, 
vehicles, crop inputs, rural equipment. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 601 2 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods. There is a 
negative list. 29.5 mECU. T.A. for starting 
and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CM 7200 A1c 
Support to the health services. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
8.5 mECU. Works, supplies of medicines by 
int. tender, T.A. by restr. tender after pre-
qualification. Project in execution. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6030 (7004) A7e 
Road maintenance programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
22.5 mECU. Maintenance in 3 regions : Tikar 
plain, Ayos-Bertona, Yaunde. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF.CM 6031(7005) A2d 
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Improvement of urban management. 
Resp. Auth.: Muncipalidad de Praia. Direc-
ção Geral Cartografia e Cadastro. EDF 0.800 
mECU, local 0.371 mECU, Sweden and 
Dienste in Übersee (German NGO). 
Strengthening of the land registration and 
cartographical services, creation of a Study 
and Planning Office in the Municipality. 
Supplies, training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CV 6001(7001) A8a, b 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
North Region development prog-
ramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Economie, du Plan, des Statistiques et 
de la Coopération Internationale — Minis-
tère des Eaux, Forêts, Chasse, Pêche et 
Tourisme (M.E.F.C.P.T.). 16 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Works by direct labour, 
supplies by int. tender, T.A. by restr. tender 
after prequalif ¡cation. Project on appraisal-
* .Date foreseen for financing July 93. 
7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6002/7002 A3a 
COMOROS 
Seed, support and market-garden 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. Total estimated cost 5.650 
mECU. EDF 5.5 mECU, local 0.150 mECU. 
Production of improved vegetable material. 
Rural development actions, infrastructures, 
training teams. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 5002(7001) A3a 
Line of credit for SMEs. Resp. Auth.: 
Banque de Développement des Comores, 1 
mECU. Small loans for farmers. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7002 A5b 
Micro-projects. Estimated total cost 3.4 
mECU, EDF 2.5 mECU, local 0.4 mECU, 
local communities 0.5 mECU. Warehouses, 
rural hydraulic and electrification, health, 
education, works, supplies, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7102 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 5.500 mECU. T.A. for starting and 
* follow-up. Project on appraisal. Dafe fore-
seen for financing July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7200 A1c 
Sea-access to the Moheli island. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement — 
Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 
3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for 
further investigations, tender dossier and 
works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d 
CHAD 
Support programme to revitalize 
primary education. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de l'Education Nationale. 10 mECU. 
Works by ace. tender or direct labour. 
Building materials, equipment, and edu-
cational equipment, by int. tender. Training 
programmes and support infrastructures. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7001 A6a 
Environmental conservation in the 
South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 3,5 mECU. 
Flora and fauna reconstitution in the 
Zakouma region. Integration, growing 
public awareness and participation of popu-
lation for conservation of natural resources. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7002 (4017) A8f 
Support programme to improve 
maintenance and road infrastructure. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des T.P. 15 mECU. 
Works, bridges, Moundou-Touboro road 
study, institutional support to the Ministère 
des T.P. Training. Road study: short-list 
done. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF CD 6001 (7003) A2d 
Cotton rural roads maintenance. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimated cost 7 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7004 A2d 
Rural hydraulics programme in the 
concentration zone. Resp. Auth. : Minis-
tère des Mines, Energie, Ressources en Eau. 
Estimated total cost 8.509 mECU. EDF part 
8.300 mECU. Drillings, wells, hand-pumps, 
solar pump, T.A. Works, supplies and Τ.Α., 
follow-up, works supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7003 A2b 
CONGO 
Support to the private sector and 
S.M.E.'s promotion. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authorizing officer, Ministère for 
SME, EEC delegation. Associations. 
10 mECU. Lines of credit, development, 
promotion, viability of micro — small and 
medium entreprises. T.A., supplies and line 
of credit. Project in execution. 6th and 7th 
EDF. 
EDF COB 6005/7001 A4, A5 
Support to the anticipated general 
elections. 0.200 mECU. Contribution for 
the printing of ballot papers. Imprimerie 
Nationale and Imprimerie des Armées. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7004 A1c 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Central Region food crops prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agric-
ulture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture 
modernization, young settlements. Food 
crops production marketing improvement. 
Works, soil improvement, supplies. T.A. 
studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009 A3a 
Health sector support programme. 
11.2 mECU. Strengthening basic care, cor-
recting balances between regions and sup-
port to decentralization. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6011 (7001) A7 
Support programme to coastal 
cities. 28.5 mECU. Social and economic 
infrastructure, planning and management of 
municipalities. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7001 A8a, b 
Research — development prog-
ramme for market gardening, agro-
forestry and fruit-trees sectors. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Supér-
ieur et de la Recherche Scientifique and 
IDESSA-IDEFOR/DFO and IDEFOR/DFA. 
Ministère de l'Agriculture. 8.760 mECU. 
Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7003 A6f, A6c, i 
Support to cooperatives. Resp. Auth. : 
G.V.C. Groupement villageois de com-
mercialisation. 1.275 mECU. T.A. for 3 years, 
evaluation and training, supply of equipment 
·*· and line of c re d it. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6101/7 A5f 
Forest settlement programme In the 
Urumbo-Boka sector. Estimated cost 9 
mECU. Rehabilitation and conservation of 7 
forests. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7006 A3c, A8f 
Wholesale market in Bouake. Es-
timated cost 10 mECU. Market construction 
and installation and starting. Works and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009(7) A5c 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Handcraft promotion. Resp. Auth.: 
Office National du Tourisme et de l'Artisanat. 
Estimated total cost 2.371 mECU. EDF 
1.960 mECU, local 0.071 mECU, France 
(Volontaires du Progrès) 0.340 mECU. 
Training, trade and technical advice, en-
couragement for forming professional 
groups, financial assistance. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. for training, monitoring and 
technical support. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF DI 7001 A4d 
Health training programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique et des 
Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., 
scholar-ships, seminars, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e 
DOMINICA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Development — Economie Develop-
ment Unit. 2 mECU. General Import Pro-
gramme. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DOM 7200 A1c 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Integrated rural development pro-
ject in the NOROESTE (PROLINO). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 
23.61 mECU. Building of earth-dams, infra-
structure, supply of equipment, T.A. and 
lines of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7006 A3a 
Integrated programme to develop 
primary education at local level. Resp. 
Auth.: Secretaría de Estado de Educación, 
Bellas Artes y Cultos (S EEBAC). Total cost 8 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 1 mECU. Build-
IV  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ings, equipment, T.A. Works by direct labour 
or ace. proc, the equipment will be pur-
* chased locally. T.A. ; short-list done. Pro-
jectin execution.7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7007 A6a 
Integrated health programme in the 
south-east. Resp. Auth.: Secretaría de 
Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social 
(SESPAS). Total cost 9.8 mECU. EDF 8.8 
mECU, local 1 mECU. Physical health 
infrastructure by direct labour or ace. proc, 
health materials and equipment by int. 
tender, training, health education, T.A. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7008 A7a,b,c,e 
Sectoral Import Programme for pet-
roleum products. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Refinería Dominicana de Petróleo S.A. 
Estimated cost 9.500 mECU. Purchase of 
petroleum products, T.A. for follow-up and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7200/001 A4ai 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
Rural development programme in 
the South-East. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ETHIOPIA 
Short-term support programme for 
the reconstruction and development 
of Eritrea. 19.800 mECU. Dams for irrig-
ation, rural hydraulics, road rehabilitation. 
Works by direct labour, supplies by int. 
tenders, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7001 A96 
Small Scale irrigation In the Western 
Lowlands of Eritrea. Resp. Auth. : Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Estimated cost 1.690 
mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of 
drinking water, agricultural inputs, T.A. Date 
financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7255 A3a 
AFAR Rural Development. To improve 
living conditions. Human health facilities, 
better animal disease control programmes, 
microprojects programmes. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7004 A3a 
FIJI 
Construction of 2 bridges (Sigatoka, 
Ba). Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 
Estimated total cost 11.060 mECU. EDF 9 
mECU, local 2.060 mECU. Bridge rec-
onstruction after cyclone Kina. Study to 
revise drawings: short-list to be done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF FU 7002 A2d 
Vunidawa and Korovou bridges con-
struction. Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 
0.950 mECU. Drawings and construction of 
Korovou bridge, deck construction for Vu-
nidawa bridge. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF FU 7002 A2d 
GABON 
Construction of 95 classrooms 
(primary schools) in Libreville. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. 6.5 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, work super-
vision and coordination. Project in exe-
cution. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF G A 5017 A6a 
GAMBIA 
Rural Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
water schemes, supply of road equipment 
and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF GM 6004 A3a 
Tourism promotion. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Information and Tourism. 0.960 
mECU. Tour operator promotion. Manage-
* ment Agency by restr. tender. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GM 6016-7008 A5c 
GHANA 
Accra Plains Livestock Development 
Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. 
Provision of veterinary and animal hus-
bandry extension services, including con-
struction of cattle treatment centres, water 
pointsand other inputs. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6006 A3a 
Twifo oil palm development. Main-
tenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(M.F E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU 
EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment and T.A Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6007 A3a 
Second microprojects programme. 
(Lomé III). Total cost 9 mECU, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning 2 mECU. 
District assemblies - communities 1 mECU. 
Construction of schools, clinics, wells, 
sanitation facilities, markets. Local T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6102 A6, A7, A8 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
General Import Programme. 1993. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EEC 
goods. There is a negative list of items not 
eligible (military-luxury and environmentally 
hazardous products). 29 mECU. Project on 
* appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7200 A1c 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to purchase EEC or ACP 
goods with negative list. 2 mECU. Provision 
of T.A. in the fields of legislative and/or fiscal 
*· expertise. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7200 A1c 
GUINEA 
Improvement of living conditions in 
backward areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministères 
de Santé de l'Enseignement et de l'Agricul-
ture. 20 mECU. Building, rehabilitation and 
equipping of health infrastructures (regional 
hospitals and health centres) education 
(teachers national schools, primary 
schools). Water points. Work, supervision. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6022 (7002) A6, A7, A8 
Road Infrastructure Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Transports. Min-
istère des T.P. Building, reconstruction of 
national and secondary roads 50 mECU. 
Works, supervision, several T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6021 (7003) A2d 
Rural Development Programme — 
Western Upper Guinea. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources 
Animales. 15 mECU. Cotton, crop, stock-
farming, rice-growing, bee-keeping, 
draught farming, market-garden, rural credit, 
processing, feederroads. Works, supplies, 
line of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6002 (7004) A3a 
Agricultural Programme in «Guinée 
Maritime» (PAGM). Resp. Auth.; Minis-
tère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources 
Animales. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Infra-
structural works, supply of agricultural 
inputs, equipments, T.A. and training. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 6001(7) A3a 
Development of the secondary 
towns. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Aména-
gement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 
mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, 
roads, T.A. and training, management, work 
supervision, supply of equipments. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b 
GRENADA 
Microprojects programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Rural development programme. 
23.8 mECU. Improvement of food and fish-
eries production, line of credit, micro-
projects, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF G UB 6001 A3a 
Project for the rehabilitation of 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 11 
mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health 
centres, urban roads, markets, water and 
sanitation. Construction of secondary brid-
ges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6013 (PRI) A7, A8 
GUYANA 
Sea defence programme. Resp. Auth. : 
Hydraulic Division. 12 mECU. Rehabili-
tation of 11 km of sea defences, procurement 
of materials and equipment. T.A. and train-
ing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 6003 (7001 ) A8g 
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Demerara Harbour Bridge. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 3 mECU. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF G UÀ 6011 (7002) A2d 
New Amsterdam water supply. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 4 mECU. Con-
struction of the ring main system, reservoir, 
supplies T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 601 2 (7003) A2b 
Credit development to S.M.E.'s. 
0.250 m ECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
♦ training. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUA 7001 A4, A5 
JAMAICA 
All-island beekeeping development. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agricul-
ture. EDF 1.700 mECU, local 0.230 mECU. 
Supply of equipment, vehicles, specialized 
T.A. research, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF J M 7003 A3a 
Target Europe Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: 'Jamaican Promotion Corporation' 
(JAMPRO). 3 m ECU. Trade and invest-
ments promotion. Marketing, T.A., training. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
E D F J M 5021 /7004 A5c,d,e, 
Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.; Planning In-
stitute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex 
Institution and Coordination and Monitor-
ing Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
■k seen for financing 2nd half 93. 5th, 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF J M 5020 A4,A5 
Water Supply, sewerage, insti-
tutional strenghtening programme. 
Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission 
(NWC). Estimated cost 18 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF J M 7005 A8a,b,c 
KENYA 
Conservation and Management of 
indigenous forests. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Environment and Natural Resources. 
Estimated total cost 67.5 mECU. EDF 4.4 
mECU, ODA (UK) 11 mECU, World Bank 1 6 
mECU, SDC (Switzerland), FINNIDA 17.7 
mECU, local 18.4 mECU. EDF part: T.A., 
supplies and materials to the Kenya Forests 
Dept. (KFD). Works, supplies, T.A., training 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF KE 6025 (7001) A3c 
Elephant and Community Wildlife 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS). EDF part 4 mECU. Erection 
of wildlife proof barriers to protect neigh-
bouring communities. Supplies, T.A. and 
•k training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 6024(7002) A3a. A5i, A8f 
Revival and Development of the 
Swahili Culture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Home Affairs and National Heritage. 
National Museums of Kenya (N.M.K.). 
1.990 mECU. Safeguarding, acquisition and 
* restoration, supply of equipment, T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7004 A5i 
St-Austin-Kabete Road. 1 970 mECU 
Strengthening of 7.5 Km of dual carriageway 
road. Works will be carried out under 
variation orders to the existing EDF financed 
contract for the Kabete-Limuru and West-
* lands-St-Austin roads. Date financing 
April 93 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 6303/001 A2d 
LESOTHO 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. 2.5 mECU. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF LSO 7200 A1 c 
MADAGASCAR 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
MALAWI 
Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: 
Office of the President and Cabinet. Con-
tingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU, Con-
struction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. 
Associated infrastructure and equipment. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF MAI 5020 A2a 
Programme for industrial products 
imports. 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial 
equipment, raw materials and spare parts. 
Project in execution 6th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6019 A1c 
Aid for refugees. Resp. Auth. : Food Aid 
Coordination Unit in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet (OPC). 5.224 mECU. 
The programme concerns basic needs for 
refugees from Mozambique. Roads, wells, 
drinking water, health, education. Manage-
ment by UNHCR, Red Cross, MSF, Concern 
Universal. First part for 1st half: 1.998 
mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7255 A6, 7, 8 
AIDS prevention programme Phase 
II. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health. 1.200 m 
ECU. Supply of information material, labo-
ratory equipment, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF MAI 7001 A7 
Support of Referendum Process. 
Training, stationery, publicity. National Re-
ferendum Commission, Construction of 
polling booths. 1.200 mECU. T.A. by UN 
Team. Date financing July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7002 A1c 
MALI 
Health programme and population. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
Estimated total cost 51.7 mECU. EDF 
12 mECU, F.R. Germany and France 6.4, 
World Bank 21.6 mECU, local 3.5 mECU, 
USAID 8.2 mECU. Rehabilitation of health 
centres. T.A. for pharmaceutical sector, 
supply of medicines (with anticonceptionals 
and condoms). Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 7022 A7 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-94. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 26.250 mECU. T.A. to improve efficacity 
* of the taxes and incomes department. Date 
financing June 93 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7200 Ale 
Fight against erosion around the 
road Bandiagara-Dourou. Dogon 
region. Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Resp. 
Auth.: Commandant de Cercle de Ban-
diagara. Works by direct labour, T.A. by 
Association Française des Volontaires du 
Progrès (AFVP). Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/003/7 A3i 
Support to develop rural credit. Resp. 
Auth. : Banque Nationale de Développement 
Agricole. BNDA. EDFpart 1.910mECU. T.A. 
and line of credit, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a 
MAURITANIA 
Support programme for the develop-
ment of the Gorgol region (PDRG). 35 
mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, 
support for traditional crops, regeneration of 
natural habitats, rural infrastructure, sani-
tation of Kaedi. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007 A3a 
Rehabilitation of Nouakchott and 
Aioun Hospitals. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Equipement et Transports. 7.350 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, staff training. 
* Supervision and audit. Project in exe-
cution. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6009 A7a 
Rehabilitation of the Nouakchott 
Wharf. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Equipe-
ment et des Transports. 3.6 mECU. Works, 
+ supervision, follow-up and evaluation. Date 
financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 5002(7003) A2d 
Support for the structural adjust-
ment programmes. General Import 
Programme. Hard currencies allowance to 
purchase EEC and ACP goods with negative 
list. 18 mECU. T.A. foreseen for implemen-
* tation of the G.I.P. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7200 A1c 
Istitutional support to the Ministry 
of Planning. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
* Plan. 1.562 mECU. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6015 A1b 
Second Road Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 
mECU. Supply of equipment and materials 
by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and 
* training. Date foreseen for financing 
July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d 
MAURITIUS 
Pamplemousse — Grand Baie Road. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Road construction. 11.8 km. Works and 
supervision. Works by int. tender (con-
ditional). Supervision : short-list done. Total 
cost 7.4 mECU. EDF 5.7 mECU, local 
1.7 mECU. Project in execution. 5th and 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAS 501 4 (7001 ) A2d 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY MOZAMBIQUE 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministères du Commerce et des 
Finances. 54.7 mECU. hard currency allow-
ance to import ACP and EEC goods. There is 
a negative list of items not eligible (military-
luxury and environmentally hazardous pro-
ducts). T.A. for management, follow up and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7200 A1c 
Training for railway staff. Phase II. 
T.A. for the regional School at Inhambane 
and the provincial centres of railway training. 
20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d 
Support for the rural health sector. 
15.390 m ECU. Assistance to populations, 
assistance for mutilated and disabled war 
victimes. Management by existing N.G.O.'s. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7255 A7 
Support for road rehabilitation and 
water supply. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la 
Construction et de l'Eau. Direction Nationale 
des Routes et des Ponts (DNEP) and 
Direction Nationale de l'Eau (DNA). 10 m 
ECU. Works and supplies. T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7005 A2d 
Reinstatement of displaced, refugee 
and demobilized people. 11m ECU. For 
about 108,000 families. Supply of T.A., 
workshops, tools, building materials and 
equipments, 'Kits' for S.M.E's, agricultural 
tools, seeds. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7006 A3a 
NAMIBIA 
Support programme for the mining 
sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. Day-to-day administration by the 
Industrial Development Corporation. 40 
mECU. Mine development, expansion, dril-
lings, tiling plant, recuperations, small scale 
mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 
1.3 mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and 
marketing and production economics. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7003 A1c 
Abacus Educational Supplement. 
Circulation of this educational supplement 
to the general population. 0.500 mECU. 
+ Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7006 A6a 
Namibia Integrated Health Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health and 
Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastruc-
tures, equipment, training and T.A. Project 
* on appraisal. Date foreseen for finan-
cing 2nd half 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7007 A7 
Upgrading and rehabilitation of 
primary school physical facilities in 
rural areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Culture. 1.800 mECU. Con-
struction, équipements, T.A. for supervision, 
* evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7008 A6a 
NIGER 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
medical supplies and inputs for the 
productive system. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de Finances et du Plan. 23 m ECU. Hard 
currency allowance to finance imports. T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7002 A1c 
Small-scale Irrigation in the Tarka 
Lower Valley (Phase II). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 
16 m ECU. Irrigation works, infrastructure, 
environment, supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF 6002/7001 A3a 
NIGERIA 
Export Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion 
Council. 37 mECU. To transfer export know 
how to ±250 Nigerian firms. Components: 
sectors, market, human resources and insti-
tutional development. Others: T.A. for man-
agement and supervision. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 6011 A5d 
General Import Programme. 
55 mECU, Hard currency facility to import 
goods and equipment not specifically ex-
cluded via a negative list. T.A. foreseen. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7200 A1c 
Oban Hills Programme. EDF 
16.5 mECU, Germany (KFW) 11 mECU. 
Park management and conservation, sup-
port zone development, park research and 
monitoring. To give the local people an 
incentive to protect - support the park. 
Buildings-peripheral facilities, supply of 
equipment and véhicules, T.A. and research 
studies. Villages Development Funds and 
recurrent costs. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UNI 7001 A3c, e-A8f 
Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria 
(RRIN). Resp. Auth.: R.R.I.N. 8 mECU. 
Works, infrastructures, rehabilitation of buil-
ding, repair of roads, water supply. Supply of 
vehicles, tractors, laboratory and comp, 
equipment. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF UNI 6012 (7002) A3a 
University Libraries Project. Resp. 
Auth.: National Universities Commission. 
11.500 mECU. Small repair work, supply of 
book, and scientific journals, equipment, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF UNI 7004 A6b 
Katsina Arid Zone Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Governor of Katsina State. 25 mECU. 
Soils and forests protection, livestock, in-
crease agricultural productivity, irrigation, 
rural and social infrastructure, management 
and coordination, training. T.A. : restr. tender 
after prequalification. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF UNI 7005 A3a 
Urgent assistance for the News 
Agency of Nigeria (N.A.N.) Resp. Auth. : 
N.A.N. 1.300 mECU. Repair-reconstruction 
of N.A.N, communication building, procure-
ment — installation of new telecommuni-
cation equipments. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7007 A5g 
NITEL Maintenance training pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Telecom-
munications. 10.5 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipment, T.A. and train-
* ing. Date financing May 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7008 (6004) A2c 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Third Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
8.5 m ECU. Same as 2nd programme. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7201 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of 
Education (NDOE) and Commission for 
Higher Education (CHE). 1 5 mECU. Works: 
building renovation, university construction, 
rehabilitation works, works supervision, 
scholarships, training. Works for the un-
it iversity by int. tender. Date foreseen for 
financing July 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b 
RWANDA 
Institutional Support. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Plan. 3.5 mECU. T.A. by 4 ex-
perts for 4 years to strengthen administration 
capacities to implement Lome IV. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 7001 A1f 
Drinking water supply in the Bu-
gesera East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
Travaux Publics. 9.920 mECU. Pumps, 
treatment, tanks, renovation existing net-
work. Works, supplies and supervision. 
Works: int. tender already launched. Project 
-k on appraisal. Date foreseen for finan-
cing 2nd half 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
Development of Social Infrastruc-
ture - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Works, Com-
munications and Public Utilities. 
0.872 mECU. Construction and supply of 
furnitures for primary schools, supply of 
equipments, T.A. for supervision of works. 
Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF SCN 6001 A6a 
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENA-
DINES 
Mount Wynne — Peter's Hope Land 
Resettlement Project. Resp. Auth.: 
A.R.D.P. — Agricultural Rehabilitation — 
Diversification Programme. Total estimated 
cost 3.329 mECU, EDF 3.2 mECU, local 
0.129 mECU. Road realignement, cadastral 
surveys, allocation of small holdings on 
leasehold bases, works, supplies and T.A. for 
supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SVG 7001 A36, A84 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
Structural Adjustment Support. Resp. 
auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Coopération — 
Délégation de la Commission à Libreville et 
Antenne de la Commission à Sao Tomé. 
1.5 mECU. Medical supplies, school equip-
ment, foods and T.A. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF STP 7200 A1 c 
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Support forthe Sectoral Adjustment 
Programme for Transport. Resp. auth.: 
Ministère de l'Equipement, des Transports et 
de la Mer. M.E.T.M. 70 mECU. Works by int. 
tender for 4 roads. Supervision: short-lists 
done. Training. General Import Programme 
(10 mECU). Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 5046 (7001) A2d 
St-Louis regional development pro-
gramme. 22.5 mECU. Jobs creation, lines 
of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, 
studies. Health centres, clinics, medical 
equipments and consumables, training, in-
formation. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in 
St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes 
Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, 
sanitation. Environmental protection with 
wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-en-
gineering scheme in Podor. Works by ace. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. 
•k tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd half 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a 
Support to the national programme 
to fight AIDS. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Comité National de Lutte contre le sida. 
CNLS. 1.700 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, 
supply of equipment, TA., management, 
training. Date financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7003 A7 
SEYCHELLES 
Assistance to small industry. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. 1 mECU. T.A. 
* et formation. Date financing June 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SEY 6003/7001 A4d 
Line of credit. Resp. Auth. : Department 
of Industry. 0.250 mECU. For handicraft and 
* small industry projects. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SEY 6003/7002 A4d 
SIERRA LEONE 
Tourism development programme. 
Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the 
Ministry of Tourism and supply of equip-
ment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF SL 5026 A5c 
Agricultural Sector Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 14.3mECu. Construction of stores, 
rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, 
agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project 
management, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7001 A3a 
Electricity Sector rehabilitation pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: National Power Au-
thority. Estimated total cost 52 mECU. EDF 
10 mECU. E.I.B. 15.5 mECU, World Bank 
17.5 mECU, local 3 mECU, Japan 6 mECU. 
EDF part: rehabilitation of the distribution 
network. Works, supply of equipments and 
T.A. for supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF SL 6005 A2ai 
Support to the Accountant General's 
Department. Ministry of Finance. 
1.900 mECU. Supply of computing and 
office equipment. Training. T.A. : contract 
* awarded. Date financing May 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SC 6011/7002 A1c 
SURINAME 
Rehabilitation Road Section Jenny -
Ingikondre. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Public 
Works. 4.5 mECU. New asphalt surfacing on 
37 km and ancillary works. T.A. for super-
vision and tender dossier preparation. 
Works: ace. tender (conditional) launched. 
Opening 27.1.93. Date foreseen for finan-
cing 2nd half 93. 5th EDF. 
EDF SUR 5011 A2d 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
(N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU.T.A. 12 person-years 
to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SW 7001 A1f 
Institutional Strengthening of 
Government's Central Agencies. 5 
mECU. To achieve an appropriate level of 
institutional planning and management ca-
pacity in the central ministeries. Three T.A. 
for 4 years under 'link' arrangement with a 
European Public Administration training 
* institution. Fellowships. Date financing 
June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF SW 501 9/7003 A6c 
TANZANIA 
Port development, Zanzibar and 
Pemba ports, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Zanzibar. Estimated total 
cost 13.4 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, Italy 
3.4 mECU. Procurement and rehabilitation 
of cargo handling equipment. Rehabilitation 
of transit sheds, construction of passenger 
terminal with RO-RO facilities. Study: 
design of passenger terminal with RO-RO 
facilities for Zanzibar port. Short-list done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6009 A2d 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme-General Import Programme. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of 
Tanzania. 55 mECU. Import of goods in the 
context of Tanzania's open general licence 
■k system, subject to a negative list. T.A. Date 
financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200 A1c 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
3 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Serengeti Conservation and Devel-
opment project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism, Nat. Resources and Envir. 9 mECU. 
Road and water supply rehabilitation, supply 
of equipments, studies and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7002 A3a 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabili-
tation. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Transports 
and Communications. Estimated cost 35 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 Km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza se-
werage system (main works). Design study 
ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6021 A2d 
Training and Training Institutions 
support project. Training materials, 
equipments, training. University Twinning. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. Estimated cost 5 
mECU. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001 A6b 
Support to Ministry of Finance, Zan-
zibar. Estimated cost 1.300 mECU. Equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TA 7007 A1c 
Support Unit to N.A.O. Estimated cost 
2 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7008 A1c 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase It. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and 
minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipments, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b 
Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of watet, energy and minerals. 
Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, 
Treatment, storage and distribution. Works, 
equipments, design and supervision. Short-
list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7009 A2 
TOGO 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and E.C. 
goods. T.A. for management and implemen-
tation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TO 7200 A1c 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Sectoral import programme: indus-
try. 12 mECU Allocation of currencies to 
import raw materials and intermediate pro-
ducts. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TR 6002 A4b 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to pur-
chase EEC and ACP goods with negative list. 
T.A. for six months for GIP implementation 
and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. 
* Project on appraisal. Dare foreseen for 
financing 2nd half 93. 6th and 7th EDF 
EDF TR 7200 A1c 
UGANDA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme General Import Programme. 
Phase II. 30,250 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import ACP and EC goods. 
There is negative list of items not eligible 
(military-luxury items). Project on appraisal. 
Identification study: short list done. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7200 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Department. 12.8 mECU. 
Infrastructural rehabilitation, equipments, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7001 A6b, c, d 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Smallholder Tea Development Pro-
gramme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda 
Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 
mECU. Increase in the production and 
quality, management improvements, infra-
structure development, institutional and 
financial sustainability, environment conser-
vation and regional development. Works, 
supply of equipments, T.A. and training. 
* Date foreseen financing July 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a 
Uganda health project. Phase III of the 
Rural health Programme, West Nile Health 
Programme and the Uganda Blood Transfu-
sion Service Project Phase II. Infrastructure 
rehabilitation equipment (vehicles, furnish-
ings, offices), medical supplies and tests, in 
service training and T.A. and management. 
* 20 mECU. Date financing June 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 6012/7003 A7 
Institutional Support. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authorizing Officer. 2 mECU. Re-
inforce the capacity of the NAO office. T.A., 
training and supply of equipments. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6023/7004 A1c 
ZAMBIA 
General Import Programme. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 41 mECU. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC good. T.A. already financed on previous 
funds still on the spot. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ZA A1c 
SYSMIN III - General import. Resp. 
Auth. : Bank of Zambia. 60 mECU. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 999-SYS A1c 
Zambian Centre for accountancy 
studies. Phase II. Estimated total cost 
5.200 m ECU. EDF 4.400 m ECU, local 
0.500 m ECU, Centre itself 0.300 m ECU. 
T.A., supplies and Works Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6001/7001 A6a 
Social Sector Support Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Education, 
Water Affairs and Local Governments. 12 
mECU. Rehabilitation works and health 
infrastructures, water supply, education. 
Supply of drugs and equipments, and T.A. 
* Date foreseen for financing July 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZA 7003 A7,A8 
Support Services Programme to 
Zambian administration. Estimated cost 
1.850 mECU. Institutional support to the 
office of the N.A.O., budget office and 
Central Statistics office. T.A., consultancy 
and operational support costs. Short-list, 
done. Date financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7200 Alb 
ZIMBABWE 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp Auth.: Ministry of National 
Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholar-
ships, awards, seminars. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDFZIM 6020 A6 
OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
land use and health programme. Resp. 
Auth. : A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the stan-
dard of living of rural populations. Conserva-
tion and improved utilisation of the Wild Life 
resource, support to agriculture and im-
provement of social infrastructure. Road 
network, water, sanitation, building of a 
district hospital, equipment and supplies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDFZIM 6004/7002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development. 28 mECU. 
General Import Programme and T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZI M 7200 A1c 
Support to the Faculty of Veterinary 
Science of the University of Zim-
babwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary. 
Estimated cost 5 mECU. Supply of vehicles 
and equipments. T.A., University link, 
fellow-scholarships. For Zimbabwe and 
SADC region. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDFZIM 5004/7001 A6b 
Mashonoland East Fruit and Veget-
able Project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Agricultural Development Authority. 3.300 
mECU. Provision of transport, construction 
of houses and assembly markets. Supply of 
equipments and T.A. Date financing June 
93. 7th EDF. 
EDFZIM 5012/7003 A3a 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
ARUBA 
Airport extension. Extension of airport 
facilities. Apron, taxiway, new arrival build-
ing, car park, access roads, platform buses, 
fencing, security, peripheral road, technical 
studies. Estimated cost 12.5 mECU. EDF 
6.25 mECU, The Netherlands ± 6,25 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. (final design, 
tender dossier, supervision). Int. tender 
(conditional) already launched. Date finan-
cing June 93. 6th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6003 A2d 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Improvement of Magenta airport. 
Construction of Crash, Fire and 
Rescue Services (SSIS) building. Resp. 
Auth.: Civil Aviation Department. 0.700 
mECU. Special loan. Building, parking area 
and slip roads, furnishing and technical 
* equipment. Works by ace proc Project in 
execution. 5th EDF. 
EDF NC 6006 A2d 
Educational buildings in the Loyauté 
Islands. 2.375 mECU. Works by ace. proc 
* (conditional). Date financing June 93. 
7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7001 A6d 
Construction of a vocational train-
ing centre for apprentices. Estimated 
total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 
mECU. Works by ace. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7002 A6d 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
Development of fishing-boats fleet. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth. : Etablissement pour la 
Valorisation des Activités Aquacoles et 
Maritimes (EVAAM). Estimated cost 7.125 
mECU. EDF part 3.160 mECU, local 3.965 
mECU. Construction of 5 tuna-vessels (24-
25 m). Int. tender (conditional) no. 3665 
launched. Date submission and opening in 
Papeete 30.9.93. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing September 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF FP 0000 A3d 
Regional Projects 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three 
management units and 10 bridges and 20 
observation posts with their equipment. 
Building and rehabilitation of administrative, 
technical and social buildings, tracks and 
bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on 
appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
TANZANIA 
RWANDA -
— BURUNDI — 
UGANDA —ZAIRE 
Tanzania Railways Corporation. 
Railway Restructuring Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Communication and 
Transport. T.R.C. 33 mECU. Flood preven-
tion works, quarry development, procure-
ment of track maintenance and accident 
relief equipment, fuel tank wagons and 
trolleys. T.A. for supervision of works, tender 
dossier and training. T.A. short-list done. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7003 A2d 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth. : 
Secretariat of the centre. 2.0. mECU, Widen-
ing of capacity. Construction of class-
rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: 
identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 A6b 
Institutional support to Eastern and 
Southern Africa Management In-
stitute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, 
Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Exten-
sion of ESAMI installations plus provision of 
library, audio visual and printing equipment 
and improvement of kitchen and laundry 
facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6311 A6b 
Strenghtening Economic and Policy 
Research in NARS in Eastern Africa 
(NARS: National Agricultural Sys-
tems). Technical and logistic support for 
building-up strong socio-economic pro-
grammes in NARS in Eastern Africa. Es-
timated cost 1.200 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7306 A3c 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Support to improve educational sys-
tems. 4.450 mECU. Trainers training, pro-
duction of pedagogical equipment, T.A. 
* Date financing June 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-001 A6b 
Regional training for Middle Staff 
Statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 
middle staff statisticians in the five countries. 
Building-up a modular training system, 
training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. 
* T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd half 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j 
The Courier no. 140 — July-August 1993  IX Regional Centre for Health Develop-
ment. Strenghtening of public health sys-
tems in the 5 countries and better manage-
ment of 385 sanitary districts. Training 
programmes, trainers training, T.A. for start-
ing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-003 A6bi 
COTE D'IVOIRE-ETHOPIA-MALI 
PAN African Rinder - Pest Cam-
paign. Phase III. To improve financial 
autonomy of the livestock services, improv-
ing the vaccination programmes, supporting 
farmers associations and privatisation of 
certain profession in the livestock sectors, 
estimated cost 15.600 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5007/003 A3a 
MEMBER 
ECOWAS 
Pacific Tourism Development pro-
gramme. Phase III. To assist Pacific ACP 
countries and OCT to develop their tourism 
sector. Estimated cost 11.500 mECU. Tour-
ism marketing and promotion of the Pacific 
destination. Planning and policy capacities, 
research and statistics, manpower. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
September 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7701 A5c 
ANGOLA— MOZAMBIQUE 
Training in the port and maritime 
fields. Training by experts and consultants. 
T.A., training and equipment. 0.950 m ECU. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7403 A6b 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
• training. Project on appraisal. Dare fore-
seen for financing 2nd half 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF C.O.I. -
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
Supportforenvironmental program-
mes in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth.: 
Mauritius Regional Authorising Officer. 11 
mECU. T.A. for the regional coordinating 
unit - for national coordinating units - for 
surveys on the coastal area and on the 
protection of plant biodiversity. Supply of 
equipment by int. tender, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6511/7 A8f 
Regional programme to develop 
tourism in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth. : 
C.O.I. - Comité Permanent du Tourisme -
C.P.T. 6.239 mECU. T.A. for setting-up the 
training programmes, sale, promotion and 
marketing, back-up operations to assist 
management, transfer of know-how and 
intra-regional solidarity, specific studies. 
Supplies and training. Project in execution. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6944/7 A5c 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
COUNTRIES OF 
Improvement of postharvest utilis-
ation of artisanal fish catches. Resp. 
Auth.: Sierra Leone National Authorizing 
Officer as Regional Auth. Off. Technical 
Secretariat in Abidjan. 8 mECU. Interven-
tions in 16 countries. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6126 (001) A3a 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Human resources development in 
energy sector. 4.400 mECU. T.A. to 
improve management, technical perform-
ance and regulation of conventional power 
supplies and petroleum import. Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5705/001 A2a,i 
SADCC 
International Baccalaureate Studies. 
Resp. Auth.: SADCC Regional Training 
Council. 1.695 mECU. Supply of scholar-
ship programme for selected secondary 
school graduates from Angola and Mozam-
bique to study for the International Bac-
calaureate Diploma in Swaziland. T.A. and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6440 (7016) A6a 
Senior Managers' Training in Road 
Traffic and Transport. Resp. Auth.; 
SATCC. 1.900 mECU. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. evaluation. Fellowships. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6426 A6d 
Collaborative effort for a maize and 
wheat improvement network. Resp. 
Auth. : SACCAR — CIMMYT. 3.970 m ECU. 
*T.A., training, supply of equipment. Dare 
financing June 93. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7402 A3a 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5412/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6 
Regional training programme for 
food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security 
Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) 
in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply 
of equipment by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci 
S.I.M.S.E.C. - Sade Initiative for 
Mathematics and~Science Education 
'Cooperation. To establish a professional 
unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information 
exchange, teacher training curriculum de-
velopment, staff development, research 
cooperation and support for teachers' or-
ganisations. Project on appraisal. Estimated 
cost 5 mECU. Date foreseen for financing 
September 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6428 A6b 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU —TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
OECS —TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
BARBADOS — GUYANA 
Regional fruit and vegetable market-
ing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean 
Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and 
supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6620 A5de 
ACP COUNTRIES 
Programme for fighting AIDS. Fund-
ing of regional actions. 20 mECU. Support 
for regional structures, improvement of 
information, funding of research and training 
actions. Supplies, T.A. and training. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 8000 A7 
SADCC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materialsto finish 100,000 
social houses. 70 mECU. hard currency 
allowance to cover CIF imports. Manage-
ment by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.Α.). 
Special accounts in the Central Bank. 
Banque d'Algérie (Β.Α.). Purchase by a 
positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
+ parts). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd half 93. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
EGYPT 
Oil pollution combating emergency 
centre at the entrance of the Gulf of 
Aqaba. 4.300 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 771/91 A8f 
Channel Maintenance Project 
(CMP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works and Water Resources (MPWR). 40 
mECU. Integrated weed control, irrigation, 
biological control, institutional support, 
training, T.A. for general management, pro-
curement and contracting, planning, moni-
toring and supervision, works, supplies and 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 881/92 A3c 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Public Enterprise Reform and Priv-
atisation Programme. Privatisations, re-
structuring operations, addressing policy 
and managerial issues (employment and 
labour issues, public sector indebtedness, 
financing of the restructuring operations, 
use of privatisation proceeds). Training 
action programme. Project Management. 
Estimated EEC contribution 43 mECU. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 
SEM EGT 506/93 A1b 
JORDAN 
Ground water investigation in the 
Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 
Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, 
drilling exploration, surveys and analysis. 
Project on appraisal. 
SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a 
Structural adjustment. Support pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 50 mECU. T.A. for follow-up 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 
SEM JO 440/92 A1e 
LEBANON 
T.A. to prepare reconstruction 
works. 2nd phase. Resp. Auth.: Conseil 
pour le Développement et la Reconstruction 
(CDR). EEC contribution 3.4 mECU. War 
damages evaluation, preparation tender 
documents, T.A. to establish execution 
programme. Project in execution. 
SEM LEB 702.92 A8a 
T.A. to the Administration. Resp. 
Auth.: Conseil pour le Développement et la 
Reconstruction. C.D.R. EEC contribution 
30 m ECU. Establishment of consultant 
teams for CDR and various Ministries and 
Public Offices. Management Units and 
Implementation Units. Sectors: Water, elec-
tricity, sanitation, public works, finance, 
economic affairs. Studies. Project in exe-
cution. 
SEM LEB 1044/92 A1,A2 
T.A. to prepare reconstruction 
works. 3rd phase. Resp. Auth.: C.D.R. 
EEC Contribution 1.500 m ECU. Sectors: oil 
and gas, agriculture, industry and non 
financial services. Project in execution. 
DEM LEB A8a 
MALTA 
Protection of Malta's coastline 
against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil 
Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, training and T.A. 
* Project in execution. Int. tender launc-
hed. Opening 14.9.93 
SEM MAT A8f 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre, integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d 
MOROCCO 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
Support. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency allowance tothe Central Bank 
- Bank AL-Maghrib, to import EC goods. 
• With negative list. 80 mECU. Date finan-
cing June 93. 
SEM MOR 334/93 A1c 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
Water Supply Bseira and Hama Rural 
Regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local 
Administration. Governments of Deir Ez Zor 
and Hama. EEC contribution. 7.5 mECU. 
Drinking water supply. Supply of pipes and 
fittings and electrical-medical equipment. 
T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM SYR 662/91 A2b 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm trees in the Rejim-
Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de 
Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC 
contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. 
Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equip-
ment— Italy. Electrical equipment: Italy. 
Irrigation equipment: int. tender. T.A. Italy 
Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A3a 
Exploitation of water resources in 
the Kasserine Governorate. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministère du Plan et du Dév. Régional. 
Commissariat Régional de Développement 
Agricole de Kasserine. EEC Contribution 7 
mECU. Water schemes, dams, drilling. 
Works by ace. tender. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 254/91 A3c, A9b 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance. T.A. for 
follow-up and evaluation. EEC contribution 
40 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A1v 
Water and soil conservation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture — Direc-
tion de la Conservation des Eaux et des Sols, 
EEC contribution 45 mECU. Works by ace. 
tenders or direct labour. Supplies by int. 
tender. T.A.: ORSTOM (F) funded by 
France. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A3c 
15 mECU. Health, education, production, 
+ environment, water, research and T.A. Date 
financing June 93. 
SEM OT 93 A3,A6,A7,A8 
TURKEY 
Vocational training programmes for 
tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programme to broaden relations be-
tween EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNI-
CATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS 
Euro-Maghreb training programme 
in communications. EEC contribution 
1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for 
young professionals from Maghreb coun-
tries. Project on appraisal. 
SEM REG 687.92 A5g 
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ME-
DITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
Support to I.P.P.F. (International 
Planned Parenthood Federation) to 
provide family planning services to 
reduce birth rates. Resp. Auth.: I.P.P.F. 
(UK). EEC contribution 10.500 mECU. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM REG 680-92 A7c 
MED-CAMPUS 
Support programme for develop-
ment cooperation actions among Un-
iversities and High Schools from 
Europe and Mediterranean third coun-
tries. EEC contribution 6.500 mECU. Teac-
her training and continuing training. 62 
networks already selected. Project in exe-
cution. 
SEM REG 729-92 A6b, f 
MED —INVEST 
Programme to support cooperation 
in SM E development. EEC contribution 
10 m ECU. Project in execution. 
SEM REG A5e 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Exceptional Aid forthe benefit of the 
Palestinian population of the Oc-
cupied Territories. 60 mECU. To counter-
act the negative consequences of the Gulf 
war. Grants to extend credit and to create 
revolving funds, supplies of equipment and 
other materials and contributions to operat-
ing costs, technical assistance and training. 
Project in execution. 
SEM OT 91 E A5e, A8a, b. c 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the West Bank of the Jordan 
and of the Gaza strip. EEC contribution 
MED —MEDIA 
Programme to support co-operation 
between media institution, organis-
ations and companies in the Com-
munity and in the Mediterranean 
countries. EEC contribution 5 mECU. 
Project already selected for this 1st phase. 
* Date financing May 93. 
SEM REG 149/93 A5g 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
BANGLADESH 
Population and Health IV: Contrac-
eptive Supply Project (C.S.P.). Procure-
ment of approximately 840 million condoms 
during the period from January 1993 to 
December 1996. Phase I approximately 30 
million pieces at the rate of about 10 million 
pieces a month, followed by eighteen sub-
sequent shipments up to 1994. The total 
quantity for phase 1 is 210 million pieces. 
Second phase (21 0 million pieces) in 1 995-
96. The project would continue to supply the 
Social Marketing Company 'S.M.C.' with 
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doms. Given the magnitude, complexity and 
specialised nature of the procurement and 
supply operation and in order to minimise 
risks of delays or other supply problems, the 
project will be implemented with the assist-
ance of a specialised European Procurement 
Agency (P.A.). Condoms will be procured 
by the P.A. through int. tenders from EEC, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam. EEC contribution 20 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9113 A7c 
Import and Internal Resources Sup-
port Project. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh 
Bank. EEC contribution 16 mECU. The 
foreign exchange will be made available in 
ECU to and through the Central Bank for the 
import by private importers vegetable oils, 
seeds and cement. T.A. for monitoring 
evaluation and audit. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9117 A1c 
Cyclone Protection. Project II. Resp. 
Auth.: Bangladesh Water Development 
Board. Estimated total cost 78 mECU. EEC 
contribution 3.2 mECU. The EC will finance 
the existing T.A. provided by Kampsax 
International - BCEOM and the Danish 
Hydraulic Institute. The investment costs of 
the project will be financed by: Bangladesh 
(2.4 mECU), I.D.A. (19.6 mECU), Japan 
(17 mECU), Saudi Fund for Development 
(11.3 mECU). Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9118 A8g 
Jamuna-Dhaleswari Left Bank 
Studies (J.D.L.B.S.). Cofinancing with 
France. EEC contribution 4 mECU, France 4 
mECU. Short-lists done. Date foreseen for 
financing June-July 93. 
ALA BD 9305 A8g 
Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation 
Project (CERP). EEC contribution 15 
mECU. Flood protection, forestry, agricul-
tural development. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 93. 
ALA BD 9320 A3a 
(SEARP1: personnel, logistics, ancillary 
services, maintenance of works - COR-
DECRUZ: works - direct labour, logistics, 
operating costs). Studies, monitoring, train-
ing programmes, defence works. Works by 
ace proc supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 
BO 9235 A8g 
Consolidation — Rural auto-devel-
opment. Rural programme in Oruro 
and Potosí. EEC contribution 12 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Line of credit. Int. 
tenders for works and supplies to be launc-
hed. T.A. : contract awarded. Project in 
execution. 
ALA BO 9248 A3a 
CHILE 
Integrated development programme 
for the northern regions. EEC contri-
bution 10 m ECU. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 
ALA CHI 92/33 A3a 
CHINA (P.R.) 
Jiangxi Sandy Wasteland Develop-
ment Project. Resp. Auth.: Nanchang 
Municipal Science and Technology Com-
mission (NMSTC). Institute of Desert Re-
search (IDR). EEC contribution 4 mECU. 
Supply of equipment, irrigation system, 
overseas training and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA CHN 9214 A3a 
Gansu provincial irrigation experi-
ment and training centre. Resp. Auth.: 
Water and Electricity Bureau of Lanzhou 
Municipality. EEC contribution 1.700 
mECU. Supply of sprinkler irrigation systems 
by int. tender. Specialized T.A.: agronomist 
* and engineers, training specialists. Date 
financing May 93. 
ALA CHN 9313 A3a 
BHUTAN 
Integrated Pest Management De-
velopment. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agric-
ulture-Dept. of Agriculture (D.O.A.) EEC 
contribution 2.6 mECU. Works by ace 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. short and 
long term. Project in execution. 
ALA BHU 9212 A3a 
Cultivation of Medicinal Plants for 
Traditional Médecine. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Agriculture (MOA) - Dept. of 
Agriculture (DOA) - EEC Contribution 3.5 
mECU. Short-term and long-term T.A. : 
coordination, agronomist, economist, phar-
macology, processing. Supply of equipment 
by int. tender. Project in execution. 
ALA BHU 9222 A3a 
BOLIVIA 
Integrated development programme 
for the Andean zone and the upper 
Tarija valley (PRODIZAVAT). EEC con-
tribution 14.155m ECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA BO 92/34 A3a 
Flood protection for the town of 
Montero. Resp. Auth.: CORDECRUZ and 
SEARPI. Total estimated cost 15.670 mECU. 
EEC contribution 12.500 mECU, SEARPI 
0.674 mECU, CORDECRUZ 2.5 mECU. 
COLOMBIA 
Silk production development. Resp. 
Auth. : Secretaria de Integración Popular and 
Unidad de Gestión consisting of a European 
co-director and a Colombian co-director. 
EEC contribution 8 mECU. Specialised T.A., 
supply of equipment for silk plants, revolving 
funds. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 9131 A3a 
Fondo Amazónico. Cofinancing of pro-
ject with private or public institutions in 
different sectors: mining, forestry, agricul-
tural, environmental, institutional develop-
ment, information, educational, health, tour-
ism. T.A. line of credit: EEC contribution 5 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 9213 A3a 
Drinking water- Sanitation - Pacific 
Coast. 7.5 mECU. Water conduits and 
sewers in 57 villages. Supplies: int. tender to 
be launched. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 9239 A7c 
COSTA RICA 
Rural Integrated Development Pro-
gramme in OSA-GOLFITO (Consolid-
ation). EEC contribution 5.500 mECU. 
Supply of equipments, infrastructures, line 
* of credit and T.A. Date financing June 93. 
ALA COS 93/19 A3a 
ECUADOR 
Rural development in the Bolivar 
region. FOEDERUMA 2nd phase. Resp. 
Auth.: FODERUMA - Fondo de Desarrollo 
Rural Marginal. Central Bank and co-
directors (Ecuadorian and European). EEC 
contribution 8.7 mECU. Supply of T.A. 
(director-expert in integrated rural develop-
ment programmes, civil works engineer and 
administrative expert), equipment for road 
maintenance, medical supplies, transport, 
infrastructure, line of credit. Supplies by int. 
tender, works by ace. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA EQ 9126 A3a 
EL SALVADOR 
Basic health and hygiene programme 
in the paracentral region. EEC contri-
bution 10 mECU. Improvement of hygienic 
and sanitary conditions. Supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Works by direct labour. 
Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 9217 A7e 
Urgent programme for productive 
reinstatement of demobilized people 
in agricultural activities. EEC contri-
bution 15 mECU. For about 3,000 families of 
demobilized people from army and from 
FMLN, in the Usulutan department. Rural 
credits via Banco de Tierras, supply of 
equipment and expatriate T.A. Project in 
execution. 
ALA SAL 921 8 A8h 
Rural development programme in 
the Chalatenango Department. EEC 
contribution 7 mECU. Cofinancing with 
I FAD. T.A. for monitoring, coordination, 
commercialisation, soil protection, reaffor-
estation, dynamisation of associations, spe-
cific action for women. Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 9245 A3a 
GUATEMALA 
Support for agricultural reform in 
the Pacific Region (Coatepeque). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministero de Desarrollo (MINDES). 
EEC contribution 9 mECU. supply of equip-
ments, line of credit, T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA GUA 9228 A3a 
Rural development programme in 
the Quiche Department. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministero de Desarollo (MINDES). Support 
to the agricultural production and environ-
ment production. Support to the micro-
industry. Works, supply of equipment, line of 
credit, T.A. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing July 93. 
ALA GUA 9322 A3a 
INDIA 
Sector Support for Primary Edu-
cation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Human 
Resources Development. EEC contribution 
150 mECU. Support to the sectoral pro-
gramme and T.A. for follow-up and edu-
* cation. Date financing June 93. 
ALA IN 9314 A6a 
INDONESIA 
Irrigation and water supply pro-
gramme in Bali North. Resp. Auth.: 
Directorate General of Water Resources 
Development (DGWRD), of the Ministry of 
Public Works. EEC contribution 10.300 
mECU. Drilling works and supply of equip-
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ment. Specialized T.A. and training. Works 
by ace tender. Supplies by int. tender. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA IND 9119 A3e 
MERCO SUR 
EC-Merco Sur (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay). Cooperation 
programme and T.A. for technical 
standards. EEC contribution 3.950 mECU. 
Specialized T.A. and supply of equipments. 
* Date financing June 93. 
ALA REG 9315 A1c 
MONGOLIA 
Strengthening of the Veterinary Ser-
vices. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Dept. of veterinary medicine. EEC contri-
bution 2.3 mECU. Purchase of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA MNG 9209 A3a 
PAKISTAN 
Rural roads in the Buner Area. Resp. 
Auth.: Provisional Government's Construc-
tion and Work Dept. (C & W) and District 
Council. 5 mECU. Construction of new 
sections of rural roads, upgrading of existing 
roads. Works by ace tender. Supervision by 
European Consultant. Project on appraisal. 
AIA PK 9106 A2d 
Rural Electrification in Punjab. Resp. 
Auth.: WAPDA Project Management Unit. 
EEC contribution 21 mECU. Electrification 
of 540 villages. Equipment by int. tenders, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
ALA PK 9211 A2ai 
Institute for Educational Develop-
ment (IED). EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. 
Training and university cooperation. Man-
agement by Aga Khan Foundation-Karachi 
and Aga Khan University. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA PK 9208 A6a, b 
PANAMA 
Cooperation with the Social Emer-
gency Fund (FES). Resp. Auth.: Co-
directors (national and European). EEC 
contribution 4.600 mECU. social infrastruc-
ture, micro-enterprises, line of credit, T.A. 
and technical support to NGO's. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PAN 9229 A5, A8 
PANAMA — COSTA RICA — 
NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — 
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA 
Regional programme for the collec-
tion and treatment of the hospital 
waste. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Health in each country. EEC contribution 
4.900 mECU. This programme covers the 
hospitals in the various capitals. Supply of 
equipment, incinerators, vehicles and tools. 
Training and European T.A. Supplies by int. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG 9133 A7a 
Regional support programme for 
plant health. Resp. Auth.: O.I.R.S.A.-
Organismo Internacional Regional de Sa-
nidad Agropecuarias in San Salvador. EEC 
contribution 6.4 mECU. Supply of equip-
ment, vehicles, tools by int. tender. Works by 
direct labour or ace tender. T.A. long and 
short term. Training. T.A. : contract awarded. 
Project in execution. 
ALA REG 9137 A3a 
Regional programme for T.A. and 
development of the telecommuni-
cations sector in Central America. EEC 
contribution 13.800 mECU. T.A. to COM-
TELCA and centro-americans operators. 
Rural telephone networks and improvement 
of transmissions capacities. T.A.: contract 
awarded. Supplies by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9123 A2c 
PERU 
Support for disadvantaged rural 
populations in the RENOM and INKA 
regions. EEC contribution 10 mECU. 
Microprojects, reafforestation, road infra-
structure rehabilitation, improvement of 
production and marketing, educational and 
health programmes. T.A. and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA PE 9244 A3a 
Majes II Programme. Resp. Auth.: The 
Regional Government of the Arequipa De-
partment. EEC contribution 11 mECU. Sup-
port for production (milk, fruit, vegetables), 
livestock, infrastructural works. T.A., line of 
credit. Supply of equipment by int. tender. 
Project in execution. 
ALA PE 9302 A3a 
PHILIPPINES 
Western Samar - Agricultural Re-
sources Development Programme 
(WS-ARDI). Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Agriculture (DA). Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR). De-
partment of Public Works and Highways 
(DPWH). EEC contribution 15 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, agricultural 
inputs, vehicles, long term T.A., training, 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9215 A3a 
Agricultural Support Services for 
Small Islands (ASSSI). EEC contribution 
20 mECU. To support local community 
oriented micro-projects, in agriculture, fis-
heries, livestock, marketing, training, T.A. 
and line of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9232 A3a 
SINGAPORE 
EC — Singapore Regional Institute of 
Environmental Technology. EEC contri-
bution 2.7 mECU. T.A. and Staff: Director, 1 
Head of Division, part-time expatriate ser-
vices. Project in execution. 
ALA SIN 9202 A8f 
4 mECU. T.A., coordination, management, 
follow-up. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9246 A8e 
VENEZUELA— EQUATOR — COL-
OMBIA—PERU 
Fishing programme VECEP. EEC con-
tribution 20 mECU. Artisanal fishing, re-
sources evaluation and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9243 A3a 
SRI LANKA 
Moneragala Irrigation and Com-
munity Development. Resp. Auth.: Pro-
ject Management Unit (PMU) — Project 
Steering Committee (PSC) — Ministry of 
Agriculture. Total cost 7.03 mECU — EEC 
contribution 5.76 mECU, Government and 
local 1.27 mECU. Rehabilitation and im-
provement of 8 irrigation schemes, water 
management development, forestry, feeder 
roads, health services, small business, train-
ing, institutional support. T.A. transport and 
equipment. Supplies by int. tender. Date 
financing May 93. 
ALA SRL 9210 A3a 
YEMEN 
Fourth Fisheries Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Fisheries. EEC 
contribution 13.900 mECU. Construction of 
access roads, facilities for fish handling, 
supply of equipment, engines and fishing 
gear. T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA ROY 91 22 A3a 
VIETNAM 
Reintegration programme for Viet-
namese refugees. EEC contribution 
• 1 2.500 mECU. Date financing May 93. 
ALA VIE 9303 A1c 
ASEAN 
EC-ASEAN Radar Remote Sensing, 
ER S-1 Project. Resp. Auth.: European 
Space Agency (ESA). EEC contribution 3.9 
mECU. To improve radar data acquisition for 
receiving stations. Supply of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. for training and manage-
ment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9128 A1 g, A8f 
EG-ASEAN patents and trademarks 
programme. Resp. Auth.: EPO — Euro-
pean Patent Office. EEC contribution 
6.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9223 A4g 
COSTA RICA 
NICARAGUA 
HONDURAS 
Action programme for adolescent 
women and young unmarried mothers. 
AL-INVEST 
Framework programme for indus-
trial cooperation and investment pro-
motion. To facilitate trade and the transfer 
of technology, know-how and european 
financing for the benefit of both sides. EEC 
•k contribution 9.100 mECU. Date financing 
May 93. 
ALA REG 9309 A1e,f,A5 
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Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6 
Luanda CP. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
Β.P. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 31 5 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 D EC EC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
Β.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
Β.P. 103, Bujumbura 
Tel. 3426/3892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
Β. P. 847, Yaoundé 
Tel. (237) 20 13 87-20 33 67 
Telex DELEFED 8298 KN 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
CP. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238) 61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
BP. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Fax (236) 616535 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
Β.P. 552, N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
Β.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
Β.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEGFED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'A2UR' Bd, Crozet, 18 
BP. 1821. Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent. Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 26 15 
LIBREVILLE 
BANJUL 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel 251-1-61 25 11 
Telex 21 7 38 DELEGEUR — ET 
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO ■ 
Fax (241) 736554 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 27777 — 28769 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV-
Fax (220) 26219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K. I.A. -Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, CP. 359. 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245) 251071/251027 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 25 10 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200. 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rap. of Germany 22479 
Fax (224) 441874 
Guyana 
72 High Street. Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse breve n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509)57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Telex (203) 20018 DELCCEN HN 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEGEC JA 
Fax (1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21-712860-712905/06 
Telex 22407 DELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 716481-710998 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100, Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266 — 310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor 
P.O. Box 10 3049. Monrovia 
NOUAKCHOTT 
MAPUTO 
- 1-49 02 71 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax (231) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B.P. 746, Antananarivo 
Tel. 242 16 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102. Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Mot V, Lot 24 
B P. 213. Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN 
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61/63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61/686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
CP. 1306 — MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — 
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-491716 
1-49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (268-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Indépendance Avenue 
Windhoek 
Tel.:264-61-220099 
Fax 35135 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388. Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 6267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4. Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House. 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag. G PO Suva, Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 0421 37 18 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515, Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12. Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 23 13 34 - 23 47 77 -
23 79 75 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL - FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
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2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 — DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
Via Makka Al Mukarram, n° Z-A6/17 
P.O. Box 943. Mogadishu 
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO 
Fax (2521) — 21118 — 21049 — 81118 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road. Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61 /62 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51) 46724 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA 
Fax (256-41) 233708 
Zaire 
71. Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000, Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Brentwood Drive 
Lusaka 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 -25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
NCR House (10th Floor) 
65 Samora Machel Ave. 
Harare 
Tel. 470.71.20/39/40/43 
Telex 24811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE 
Fax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG. Smith Blvd. 50. (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel. 297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue,PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tel, (357-2)36 92 02 
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2)36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St., 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
AI Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11-4008, Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31 /32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa 'The Vines', 51 
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front, Ta'Xbiex-Malta 
Tel. : (356) 34 48 91 -93-95, 345111 
Telex: (356)910 EC MLA 
Fax (356)34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 761 2 17/7612 46/7612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
73 rue Rachid 
P.O. Box 11 269, Damascus 
Tel. 24 76 40-24 76 41 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Telex (963 11) 420683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
In A.L.A. countries 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7, Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel. 88 47 30-31-32 
Telex 642501, CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A— Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel. : (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1)532 43 42 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centra Calon — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road 
New Delhi 110001 
Tel. 344 222 — 350 430 
Telex 31/61315 EUR-IN 
Fax (91) 352706 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21) 570 6075 
Korea 
ICON Building 
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1 -ga 
Choong-Ku 
Seoul 100-691 - Korea 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. 82 18 28-82 24 15-82 30 26 
Telex 54044 COMEU PK 
Fax (92) 822604 
Philippines 
Salustiana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 104, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 812 66 86 - 81 2 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Fax (66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Edificio Artigas (1° Piso) — Calle Rincón 487 — Monte-
video 
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-95.36.53 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
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Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1 -809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frodorick Houso, 2nd floor, Frodcrick St. 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGEC NS 310 
Säo Tome & Principe 
B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé 
Tei. (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 Delegfed ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé 
Tel. 23 940 
Telex 2213 DELCAM SZ 
Fax (248) 23890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n°5-CPO 
Nuku Alóla 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Fax 23869 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15. Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca. Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 AT Β E TR 
Fax 1377940 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501-2) 72785 and fax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Grenada 
Archibald Avenue 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indie 
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Grouna Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
PO. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023, 
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Telex 204 CECOF SX 
Fax (685)24622 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Programme Coordination 
Office. 
South African Republic 
207. Infotech Building 
1090 Arcadia Street 
Hatfield-Pretoria 0083 
Tel.: (012) 436 590 
Fax (012) 436 594 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY BOOKS 
Africa : From Stagnation to Recovery, 
Edward V.K. Jaycox, Vice-President, 
Africa Region, World Bank; 21 pages, 
FebrLiary 1993. Obtainable free from the 
Africa Region Department, World Bank. 
Washington DC. USA or the Bank's 
resident missions in Africa. 
This report from the World Bank gives 
brief details of its programmes to help 
African countries through their economic 
difficulties and states the arguments tor 
various familiar structural adjustment 
policies in Africa. 
In a continent where, the report says, 
economic and political mismanagement 
in most countries has led to inefficiency, 
low productivity and limited investment 
in human capital and institutions, and 
where economic growth has barely kept 
ahead of rising population figures, the 
Bank's overriding mission must be to 
help alleviate the abject poverty in which 
most Africans live. In Africa today, the 
author maintains, 'the debate on adjust­
ment has shifted to questions of how, not 
whether, to adjust. And on this question 
there is general agreement that reforms 
should focus on promoting sound mac-
roeconomic policies, price liberalisation, 
a reduced role for the state, and measures 
to enhance the market and increase 
agricultural productivity'. 
Now, the Bank says, the time has come 
to build on existing achievements. Africa 
must diversify into new markets and 
industrial countries must liberalise their 
import policies. The Bank is supporting 
thorough reform of the machinery of 
government and public administration in 
African countries, and backing new 
strategies of social service delivery and 
cost recovery. The balance in African 
economies needs to shift from public to 
private enterprise, backed by well-fun­
ctioning credit and capital markets. 
Above all, donors and African govern­
ments must maintain the commitment 
and the stamina for reform, even where 
progress is only modest. 
Much emphasis is placed on the need to 
encourage the private sector : only it, says 
the report, can create the jobs needed to 
occupy a labour force which is likely to 
double in size in the next 30 years. 
African countries must create a support­
ive environment for domestic and foreign 
investment in private business, and 50 to 
60% of World Bank lending to sub­
sanaran Africa goes towards private 
sector development in one way or anoth­
er. 
But should countries go for structural 
adjustment at all? Some have found it a 
painful process, especially in terms of 
trying to find new livelihoods for the 
thousands laid off when inflated public 
sectors are divested, or of trying to help 
the poor and vulnerable when controlled 
prices are deregulated. But Mr Jaycox 
has no doubts: 'The continuing deterior­
ation in the condition of the poor in some 
countries is the result of the crises that 
demonstrated the need for policy change 
rather than of the structural adjustment 
policies adopted to deal with the underly­
ing problems.' And there is a stern lesson 
to be learned by any government looking 
for World Bank help but apprehensive 
about adjusting: the Bank's lending 
strategy is 'highly differentiated and 
selective' depending on whether or not 
countries conform to its prescriptions or 
not. 
As the purveyors of aerobic exercise 
courses say, 'No pain, no gain". To help 
with the pain, the Bank runs programmes 
to cater for the social dimension of 
adjustment, in such fields as human 
resource development and promotion of 
the role of women, poverty assessment 
and alleviation, education, fertility reduc­
tion, environmental protection and com­
bating Aids. 
Regional economic integration is 
another priority. The focus, in fact, is 
largely the same as that of the EC 
Commission, and Mr Jaycox welcomes 
the recent improvement in the dialogue 
among international organisations as 
well as governments and beneficiaries. 
The task facing everyone now. he says, is 
to ensure that future investments in 
Africa work with maximum efficiency. O 
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